The aporia of ἢ ἐκ παντὸς in Posterior Analytics II.19

This article sketches, and works to motivate, a controversial approach to Posterior Analytics II.19. But its primary goal is to recommend a novel solution to one Parts of this article has been presented to audiences at the Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP), HumboldtUniverität zu Berlin, and the UCLA “Aristotle Bash”. The text that follows has benefitted greatly these discussions, as well as written comments from Lucas Angioni, Fernanda Izidorio, Whitney Schwab, and Breno Zuppolini. Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 42, n. 4, pp. 387-438, Oct-Dec. 2019.


Introduction
For better or worse, Post. An. II.19 is today the most widely studied chapter in the whole of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. The present article sketches, and works to motivate, a controversial approach to Post. An. II.19. Our primary goal, however, is to recommend a novel solution to one particular interpretive aporia that's especially vexed recent scholars working on Post. An. II.19.
The aporia in question concerns how to understand the enigmaticē ek pantos... (≈ "or from all...") that we read at 100a6 when we study the genealogical account of foundational knowledge at II.19 100a3-9. The philosophical interpretation of 100a3-9 is, of course, highly controversial. And many competing readings of 100a3-9 in particular-and Post. An. II.19 in general-turn on how one responds to this aporia about how to interpret 100a6'sē ek pantos. The solution proposed below doesn't seem to have been elsewhere discussed. But it strikes me as significantly more attractive than any alternative solution to the aporia I'm aware of.
We'll be turning to 100a3-9 and the aporia ofē ek pantos soon, in Sections 3-5 below. But I begin with some preliminary remarks about Post. An. II.19 as a unit and how 100a3-9 is embedded within it. cal sense at issue in the Analytics-is to have a rationally unshakeable, perfected knowledge of why some inexorable aspect of reality is in fact as it is and cannot be otherwise (Post. An. I.2 71b9-12, cf. 72b2-3). To possess demonstrative [apodeiktikē] episteme of (some particular epistēton) X is to have episteme of this X exactly in virtue of one's understanding-and assenting to the premises of-a demonstration that, through proving its conclusion, fully accounts for X in terms of prior causes. A demonstration [apodeixis], in this context, is much more than a valid argument (cf. Post. An. I.2 71b16-72a8): it's a syllogistic-proof [sullogismos] of a truth T which fully explains why T is the case by deriving it from starting-points that are, by nature, (i) explanatorily primitive in themselves and (ii) explanatorily prior to T . These demonstrative starting-points, for Aristotle, are real explanatory primitives that prior causes fail to account for; in effect, they are the ultimate whys from which demonstrations demonstrate. Aristotle himself calls them the foundations [archai] of demonstrations (cf. I.2 72a7-8). Since such archai aren't themselves fully accounted for by prior causes, Aristotle contends that demonstrative episteme of a demonstrative foundation is impossible in principle. But since demonstrative episteme of X is always based on one's assent to a corresponding demonstration's premises, Aristotle also insists that knowing demontrative foundations is foundational for demonstrative episteme.
Aristotle's psychological works discuss episteme from the perspective of a theory of soul; his ethical works discuss episteme from the perspective of a theory of virtue and the human good. The distinctive strategy of Aristotle's Analytics is to account for episteme from the perspective of a theory of logoi. I myself (see late eidenai as well as instances of gnōrizein where it functions as a synonym for gignōskein. below) take this investigative approach to stand behind the 99b17 words t'auton gar esti ("for they're the same") in the opening sentence of Post. An Ross' 1949 edition. Ross' text for Post. An. II.19 is primarily based on the testimony of four 9-11th cent. Byzantine Post. An. manuscripts-sigla: A, B, d, n. Subsequent research has shown there to be significant extant text-witnesses for the Post. An. that Ross failed to exploit. Here I'll be making additional use of the following "direct" Post. An. text-witnesses: D = Par. gr. 1843 (12-13th cent.
Post. An. II.19 opens with the announcement that this investigative programme has reached a philosophically successful conclusion and proceeds to articulate a pair of questions about foundations: (Q1) and (Q2).
The 'foundations' [archai] whose knowledge is at issue in questions (Q1) and (Q2) are foundations of a demonstration: i.e. demonstrative starting-points in the sense rehearsed above (archai apodeixeōs). In asking how the foundations of a demonstration become 'known' [gnōrimoi], (Q1) is specifically asking how animals like us come to know such objects if/when we do come to know them and achieve the "state of knowing" [hē gnōrizousa hexis] mentioned in (Q2). 7 To be in the "state of knowing" mentioned in (Q2) is 6 Reading the lectio difficilior esti ('is'/'are') with A, B, d, D, V, G, Themistius, Bekker, Waitz where Ross prints estai ('will be') which is attested by n alone. Translating-and perhaps over-translating-Ross' text, Barnes renders 99b18-19 (1993 ed. p. 72, my emphasis): '[the truth regarding (Q1) and (Q2)] this will be plain from what follows [enteuthen estai dēlon], when we have first set out the puzzles [proaporēsasi prōton]'. I take 99b18-19 to be making a weaker claim than that which Barnes' translation seems to suggests. Prima facie, Barnes' construal of enteuthen might seem more linguistically likely than mine; but I think my alternative philosophically superior given the actual discussion the remainder of Post. An. II.19 contains. 7 Post. An. displays an especially strong preference for gnōrimos over gnōstos, using gnōstos at 82b38 but nowhere else. I take it that articulating (Q2), Aristotle is using the verb gnōrizein as a synonym for gignōskein/eidenai; I take it that he prefers gnōrizein over gignōskein/eidenai in articulating (Q2) because the verbal correlative of gnōrimos is gnōrizein and he's just used gnōrimos in articulating (Q1). (Q2) are highly abstract is that Aristotle is abstracting away from (what he himself takes to be) significant differences between the epistemology of foundational knowledge in mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. festly imply that the Analytics' preceding chapters do not suffice for philosophical clarity about (Q1) and (Q2). Emphasizing this latter point, Brunschwig has argued that students of the Post. An. shouldn't suppose "que le problème de la connaissance des principes a été traité avant son ouverture officielle au début du chapitre II.19" (1981, p. 96). However, the Analytics' preceding chapters have in fact given extensive attention to many substantive issues concerning demonstrative foundations and their epistemology. Moreover, before "officially introducing" (Q1) and (Q2), II.19's opening sentence asserts that philosophical clarity regarding the nature and coming to be of demonstrative episteme has already been achieved (99b15-17). In connection with this assertion, I think the indicative mood of (Q1) and (Q2) is important to appreciate. As raised in Post. An. II.19, questions (Q1) and (Q2) presuppose demonstrative foundations exist and presuppose that demonstrative foundations-though impossible to demonstrate-are nonetheless capable of being known with a kind of knowledge that suffices to ground genuine episteme. I submit that Aristotle took himself to be entitled to these presuppositions in Post. An. II.19 because earlier chapters of the work argue for these claims at length. 9 Post. An. II.19 is not-as it's sometimes assumed to be-an obscure and philolosophically underwhelmimg attempt to defend the claim that the indemonstrable foundations of demonstrations are knowable by a knowledge which I'm rejecting here see, e.g., Smith (1986, p. 55) and Tuominen (2010, p. 115).
In the philosophical practice of Aristotle, the work of discovering, developing, and solving the relevant aporiai plays a central role. An aporia, is this context, is any outstanding problem or unresolved philosophical disagreement that stands in the way of philosophical progress in the investigation at hand. 15 The language (99b19, 99b23) with which Post. An. II.19 introduces (a1) and (a2) invites us to view (a1) and (a2) as aporiai in this sense-as aporiai the Analytics' preceding chapters do not solve, as aporiai that (qua unsolved) impede us from giving philosophically adequate answers to questions (Q1) and (Q2). As I myself read II.19, the unit 99b30-100b5 works towards progress on (Q1) by sketching (what Aristotle takes to be) the truth concerning (a1); the unit 100b5-17 works towards progress on (Q2) by sketching (what Aristotle takes to be) the truth concerning (a2). I submit, in other words, (i) that in the first instance 99b30-100b5 and 100b5-17 set out views which respond to (a1) and (a2) respectively, and (ii) that Aristotle's goal in so doing is to draw out what the truth concerning (a1) and (a2) teaches us about (Q1) and (Q2) respectively. 16 There are aspects of questions (Q1) Our main focus below will be 99b30-100b5's discussion of (a1)/(Q1). But before turning to 99b30-100b5, it will prove useful to rehearse a few basic points concerning 100b5-17's discussion of (a2)/(Q2). Regarding the kind of non-demonstrative knowledge K on the basis of which a person with demonstrative episteme assents to an episteme-yielding demonstration's premises, (a2) asks whether K is episteme or some different kind [genos] of knowledge. 100b5-17 famously opts for the latter option, contending that K is not episteme but another type of knowledge which Aristotle calls nous. On the final analysis, the English translation that best captures the basic sense and semantic range of the term nous in Aristotle's Greek difficult to see: all that 100b5-17 really says about (Q2) is that the knowing state at issue is something called nous which isn't episteme. To appreciate that 99b30-100b5 likewise addresses (Q1) by addressing (a1) compare 99b25-34 with 100a10-11. The latter looks to be the central conclusion that 99b30-100a9 works toward. And 100ba12-100b5 presents itself as an elaboration of 100a10-11.
17 Insofar as Aristotle wrote an On the Soul, 100a13-14's unexplained assertion "the soul exists as the sort of being capable of undergoing this [progression]" looks like a pretty obvious invitation to consult it.
quite generally is probably 'understanding'. Aristotle sometimes uses nous to indicate (what we might call) the understanding: i.e. the faculty of understanding/rational intelligence. But he also uses nous to mean a (perfected) understanding (of something): i.e. an acquirable intellectual virtue that a rational intelligence might, or might not, achieve. The Analytics univocally employs nous in the latter sense as a label for a quite specific perfection of intellect which (according to Aristotle) is epistemically superior to the intellectual virtue of episteme. 18 A form of knowledge, paradigmatic instances of this intellectual virtue of nous consist (at least on my own reading of Aristotle) in perfected conceptualizations of essences through their real definientia. In a word, then, nous is Aristotle's 100b5-17 answer to question (Q2). According to 100b5-17: nous is the type of knowledge on the basis of which a person with demonstrative episteme assents to an epistemeyielding demonstration's premises. The intellectual virtue of nous is the "foundation of episteme [archē epistēmēs]" (100b13). Now, getting clear on the exact account of nous that the Analytics' theory of episteme presupposes would require an extended discussion, and is quite unnecessary for present purposes. It will, however, prove useful to have an unambiguous name for the kind of knowledge question (Q2) asks us to identify. So for ease of expression in what follows, let the (English neologism) 'nous' be just such a noun-a la-18 As far as Post. An. II.19 goes, occurrences of the noun nous are limited to 100b5-17. That it's an intellectual virtue called nous which is at issue in 100b5-17 is readily verified by studying 100b5-17 in the light of NE VI.1-3, 6 (NB 100b5-9's employment of the tag "always true" [aei alēthē]). Outside of 100b5-17, we find the term nous in only three further passages in the whole of Aristotle's Analytics: 85a1, 88b35-89a1, 89b8. What Aristotle means by nous in the latter three passages is exactly what he means by nous in 100b5-17.
bel for the kind of knowledge (Q2) asks us to identify and nothing more. Setting other senses of (the Greek word) nous aside, the basic thrust of (Q1) can then be restated as: How do we develop nous of demonstrative foundations?
3 From (a1)/(Q1) to the aporia of ἢ ἐκ παντὸς It is not, of course, uncommon for humans to have knowledge that they presently can neither consciously access nor in any way exercise. (Consider, e.g., an expert cobbler or geometer who is severely drunk or in the midst of a panic attack). What's at issue in aporia (a1) is whether embodied human beings (i) are born lacking and need to acquire [lambanein 99b28] nous of foundations, or (ii) always already have [echein 99b26] this knowledge but initially lack-and must work to later develop-the ability to access and fully exercise it.

19
Post. An. II.19 famously opts for alternative (i). Scholars have tended to identify alternative (ii) with Plato's theory that humans learn (mathematical and other kinds of philosophical) knowledge by a kind of recollecting [anamnēsis]. Yet it must be admitted that the letter of II.19 hardly requires this identification. Aristotle was, moreover, a careful student of Plato's Phaedo. But in an attempt to clarify the Meno's far swifter 85b8-86b5 presentation of the Platonic theory of recollection, the Phaedo (73b3-76e7, esp. 75c7-76d6) manifestly takes great pains to distinguish the theory of recollection from the kind of strong innatism embodied in (ii). For recall that on the theory of recollection, our pre-embodied souls come into some sort of direct contact 20 with imperceptible unchanging Socrates' authoritative and careful presentation of the theory of recollection at Phaedo 73b3-76e7 is supposed to correct-and should be contrasted with-Cebes' overly swift 73a7-b2 sketch of the theory. For the latter, which unsubtly refers us to the Meno, is instructively inaccurate on several important points. Contra Cebes (Phd. 73a7-8), when Meno's slave is questioned by Socrates he makes mistakes and importantly does not αὐτὸς λέγει πάντα ᾗ ἔχει (cf. Men. 82b9-85b). Contra Cebes (Phd. 73a8-10), the argument of Meno 81e3-86b5 does not in fact show that epistēmē and the correct logos are already present within [enousa] Meno's slave before Socrates questions him (cf. Men. 85b8-d4, 86a7-8: ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ [= the slave] ἀληθεῖς δόξαι αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι γίγνονται). Most basically: in giving his swift Phaedo 73a7-b2 account of recollection, Cebes has forgotten about the crucial role of "forgetting" (= the destruction of pre-natal knowledge) in the theory. Socrates' corrective discussion (esp. Phd. 75c7-76d6) works to clarify-and strongly emphasizes-this latter component of the Platonic theory of recollection. Insofar as τὸ εἰδέναι and τὸ ἐπίστασθαι is λαβόντα του ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι (75d8-10), it is strictly speaking both false and at odds with the theory of recollection to say that epistēmē of Forms is present within [enousa] So on Plato's own interpretation of the theory of recollection, its proponents should actually agree with Post. An. II.19's claim that we don't always already have [echein 99b26] nous of foundations and do need to acquire [lambanein 99b28] this knowing state [hexis]. To this extent, Plato and Aristotle effectively respond to aporia (a1) in the same way: by rejecting alternative (ii) and developing alternative (i). The Platonic theory of recollection, however, would maintain that for humans to successfully acquire nous of a given foundation X we crucially need to access innately present X-specific information. And this is something that Aristotle will adamantly deny. Human beings, according to Aristotle, are naturally endowed with innate faculties of knowledge reception (like perception and a "blank" faculty of understanding); we are born with innate learning-conducive behavioral dispositions (like a compulsion to memetic imitation), and even an innate attraction to knowledge.
22 But nature does not, he insists, supply us with any kind of innate contentful grasps.
On these grounds, among others, Aristotle will contend that the Platonic theory of recollection has to be false. And yet, while the details of II.19's response to (a1)/(Q1) are, to be sure, at odds with the theory of recollection, scholars are quite wrong to characterize Post. An. II.19 as attempting to argue against the Platonic theory of recollection and in favor of some alternative theory of Aristotle's. The chapter does not characterize itself as giving such an argument. Moreover, any philosophically serious Aristotelian attempt to do so would centrally involve explaining why the theory of recollection isn't needed for solving the philosophical problems that motivated Plato to introduce it.
Meno's slave from birth. But these are hard problems tied up with complex issues of metaphysics and mind. 23 And neither Post.
An. II.19 in particular-nor the Analytics in general-really works to explain how Aristotle proposes to handle these problems without giving up on the various rationalist and realist commitments he shares with Plato.
Post. An. II.19, as we shall see, claims that humans can acquire nous of foundations by a process that begins in sense-perception; but an intelligent Platonist who fails to see how this could occur unless something like the theory of recollection is true will hardly find much help in II.19.
Post. An. II.19's responses to (a1)/(Q1) are most definitely not Plato's; but in truth, the chapter does vanishingly little to show why its responses are better than Plato's, or why we should believe the theory of recollection is false. That Post. An. II.19 aspires to be some kind of profound critical engagement with the Platonic theory of recollection is, I submit, a myth.
24 23 E.g. "poverty of stimulus" problems connected to questions like Why does the human intellect produce reliably true intuitions about mathematical objects (e.g. perfect squares) and unchanging essences (e.g. the nature of justice)? (NB that I'm using the term 'intuition' here in the loose and non-loaded sense favored by contemporary Anglophone philosophers). 24 I contend, in sum, that the rejected alternative (ii) of aporia (a1) is not the theory of recollection. And I contend that if II.19 were to be read an to attempt to refute the theory of recollection and show the superiority of an Aristotelian alternative, we should have to judge its discussion as thoroughly inadequate and highly question-begging. Scholars are wrong to suppose that 99b25-34 refers to the Platonic theory of recollection. And scholars are wrong to interpret 99b26-27 as an argument against the theory of recollection. To further appreciate the implausibly of the latter interpretative thesis, recall that Plato agrees with Aristotle that it would be "strange" [atopon] and "wondrous" [thaumaston] (Post. An. 99b26, Met. 993a1) if the theory of recollection were true. Plato's basic idea in texts like the Meno and Phaedo is that the theory of recollection is a hypothesis worth adopting because (i) it solves certain hard philosophical problems, and (ii) upon investigation, it's not as implausible But let us return to the aporia ofē ek pantos (ἢ ἐκ παντὸς). This aporia (to repeat) arises in connection with 100a3-9 which, in turn, lies at the heart of 99b30-100b5. ] nor to what we call "Meno's paradox". The latter is a puzzle argument-an apparently valid argument from apparently true premises to an apparently absurd conclusion; the puzzle which 71a17-31 claims to solve is a different puzzle entirely; and the referent of to en tōi Menōni aporēma at 71a29 isn't an argument at all but a paralyzing objection-an absurd consequence that allegedly results [sumbainei 71a30] if one rejects Aristotle's proposed solution to the puzzle which Post. An. I.1 71a17-31 claims to solve. This absurd consequence is analogous to, but not identical with, the absurd conclusion of the "eristic logos" (Meno 80d-e) that we call Meno's paradox. The sense of to en tōi Menōni aporēma needs to be understood accordingly. Neither Post. An. I.1, nor any other Analytics text, presents Aristotle's response to the puzzle argument (we call) Meno's paradox. 11). The first is that in cases where we do acquire new knowledge by exercising knowledge we already have, the old knowledge needn't be more epistemically valuable than nor prior by nature to the new knowledge. The second is that, like other animals, humans in fact possess primitive faculties of knowledge acquisition whereby we can gain new knowledge without exercising any pre-existing knowledge at all. All animals, Aristotle explains (99b34-35), have at least one such primitive faculty of knowledge acquisition: "the innate [sumphutos] faculty of discrimination [dunamis kritikē] that people call perception [aisthēsis]". Some animals, he adds, have no knowledge [gnōsis] of perceptible objects when they're not perceiving them; but other animals are so structured that exercises of perception suffice for bringing about lasting dispositional knowledge and developing further epistemic powers (99b36-100a3). Thus some animals are of such a nature that by simply perceiving they acquire memories. And other animals are so constituted that after much perceiving and forming many memories, rationality [logos] is engendered within them.
25 I take 100a1-3 to be saying that humans are not born with rationality, but rather acquire rationality from the world by perceiving and remembering what we perceive. As for how this occurs-and why one would be wrong to think that the theory of recollection is needed for explaining this kind of occurrence-such matters are passed over without comment. Thus, in sum, 99b30-100a3. The remainder of Post. An. II.19's response to (a1)/(Q1) comprises 100a3-25 Like Bronstein (2016) and others, I think the Met. A.1 parallel (980a27 ff.) tells strongly in favor of taking logos at 100a2 to mean reason in the sense of rationality (NB logismois at 980b28). Barnes' case against this construal of logos at 100a2 is not convincing. For further discussion I esp. recommend Gregorić and Grgić (2006, pp. 21-4), Gasser-Wingate (2016, pp. 7-8).
100b5. Turning away from knowers in general, and towards human knowers in particular, 100a3-100b5 sketches a highly abstract account of the multi-stage epistemic progression whereby we humans would proceed from ignorance to nous. It bears emphasis that what 100a3-100b5 describes isn't a justificational procedure or heuristic method that one might either adopt or fail to adopt. 100a3-100b5 concerns the type of intellectual progression that (according to Aristotle) is always successfully traversed when humans acquire nous of demonstrative foundation(s). At issue in 100a3-100b5 is something which "the [human] soul is capable of undergoing [paschein]" (100a14).
While the vast majority of 20-21st cent. scholars construe 100a6's pantos with tou katholou in the very manner that Barnes does, Pseudo-Philoponus construes 100a6-9 in a strikingly different way (cf. the translation of 100a3-9 in Bolton and Code (2012) p. 67). Pseudo-Philoponus' gloss on 100a6 explains (CAG 13.3 436,2-5): τὸ ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ καὶ ληπτέον. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦ-τον· ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐμπειρίας καὶ ἐκ παντὸς αἰσθήματος τοῦ ἠρεμήσαντος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἑδραιωθέντος γίνεται ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ καθόλου τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος παρὰ τὰ πολλά. Taking pantos to modify an implied aisthēmatos, and pantos aisthēmatos as the subject of eremēsantos en tēi psuchēi psuchēi, Pseudo-Philoponus seems to effectively read tou katholou as an objective genitive (governed by an implied gnōsis if not technēs archē kai epistēmēs at 100a8)! is being so obscure in speaking of 'all the universal' rather than just 'the universal'. Should all the universal be opposed to some or most of it? Aristotle simply does not use such locutions elsewhere, and the passage at issue does not seem to furnish any disambiguating hints. So why does he write 'all the universal' here? Why not simply write 'the universal' ? Various conjectures can be, and have been, given. But no-one seems to have convinced anyone else to adopt their own proposed conjecture; and most of us don't find any of the proposals terribly promising. So, part of the obscurity of 100a6'sē ek pantos is due to the pantos ('all'). But there's also, of course, the ambiguity of the Greek the particleē ('or'). In fact, the debate about how to interpret ek d' empeiriasē ek pantosēremēsantos tou katholou en tēi psuchēi ("from experience or from all the universal which has come to rest in the soul") is best viewed as centered around the question of how one should read thisē ('or'). In an influential passage of his 1992 book, McKirahan explains the issue as follows: After saying that memory arises from perception and experience arises from memory, [Aristotle] says II.19 100a6-9 'From experience, or from the whole universal at rest in the soul, the one beside the many, which is one identical thing in all of them (the many), [arises] the principle of art and science.' The issue in interpreting this passage is how to take the conjunction 'or' (ē). Is it (a) disjunctive (the principle of science comes either from experience or from the universal in the soul), (b) explicative (it comes from experience, that is to say, from the universal in the soul), or (c) progressive (it comes from experience, or rather from the universal in the soul, which is the next stage after experience)? The first can be eliminated straight off. [...] The second is adopted by most translators and commentators, but it contradicts the Metaphysics view that experience remains on the level of particulars. The parallels between Metaphysics A.1 and APo. II.19 are so close that we should be loath to find any significant disparity in the conceptions of experience present in the two chapters. Accordingly I prefer the third interpretation of 'or', on which 'the universal at rest in the soul' is a stage intermediate between experience and scientific knowledge. (McKirahan 1992, p. 243) McKirahan's terminology of "disjunctive", "explicative", and "progressive" has been taken up in many subsequent discussions of our passage. 28 McKirahan's contention that the "explicative" reading is the one "adopted by most scholars and translators" is less obviously true today than it was in 1992 when McKirahan wrote it.
ize the "explicative" construal as (still) the reading favored by "most scholars" (p. 122-123, n.7). But my own impression of the present scholarly landscape is that researchers who've worked on Post. An. II.19 are more-or-less evenly split on the "explicative" vs. "progressive" question. (For excellent reasons, the highly unlikely reading McKirahan calls "disjunctive" has never been seriously endorsed). So scholars are divided as whether 100a6'sē ek pantos...psuchēi ("or from all the universal having come to rest in the soul") should be given a "explicative" or "progressive" reading. On the "explicative" reading, e ek pantos...psuchēi is saying that experience somehow constitutes a grasp of "the entire universal"; and 100a3-9 would then be describing a four stage cognitive progression whereby nous is acquired: On the "progressive" reading,ē ek pantos...psuchēi is saying that a grasp of "the entire universal" is some kind of intermediate cognitive achievement superior to experience but inferior to nous; and 100a3-9 would then be describing a five stage cognitive progression whereby nous is acquired: Neither construal is obviously incorrect. And nothing in the remainder of Post. An. II.19, or elsewhere in the Corpus Aristotelicum, is thought to decisively rule out either interpretive possibility. Now, I don't myself think that 100a3-9 is supposed to present some boldly inventive piece of anti-Platonic epistemology; I don't myself think that 100a3-9 articulates a centrally important component of the theory of episteme that the Analytics works to develop; and I don't myself believe of Post. An. II.19 that 100a6-8 "makes the central claim of the chapter as a whole" (Adamson 2010, p. 9). But on all of these counts, many recent scholars have thought otherwise. One result of this is that Post. An. scholarship has come to contain a great multiplicity of philosophicallyinteresting, albeit highly speculative, interpretive proposals developed out of the "progressive" and "explicative" readings of 100a6'sē ek pantos respectively. The "progressive" vs. "explicative" question has become highly contentious. And many competing interpretations of 100a3-9 in particular-and Post. An. II.19 in general-now crucially require adopting one of these two construals of 100a6'sē ek pantos and rejecting the other.

29
29 For a taste of this, one can compare (e.g.) Bronstein's version of the "progressive" reading with Sorabji's version of the "explicative". In a 2010 article Sorabji writes: [In Post. An. II.19] Aristotle is providing an alternative to Plato by showing how concepts can be formed on the basis of sense perception. There is in that case, he thinks, no need for Plato's alternative, argued in Phaedo 72e-77a, of concepts stored in the mind from the soul's existence before birth. In 100a3-8, Aristotle says that many memories of the same type of perceived thing, let us say of oxen, constitute experience (empeiria) of oxen. And then, on my interpretation, he uses the word 'or' (ē), to equate experience, or many memories, with a rudimentary universal concept of oxen. At any rate, he speaks of experience, or (ē) the whole universal (katholou) in the soul. Admittedly, the word 'or' can mean 'or rather'. But if he were here talking of experience or rather the whole universal [as Aristotle would be on the "progressive" reading], he would have left unexplained the very thing he is trying to explain, how, contrary to Plato's view, remembered sense perceptions are enough to give us at least a rudimentary universal concept. The explanation is that to have a rudimentary universal concept of oxen just is to have enough memories of oxen to react with experience to them. It is not a further step beyond many memories. (Sorabji 2010, p.3) Pace Sorajbi, his "explicative" construal of 100a6 does not in fact yield a text that (my emphasis) "explains how, contrary to Plato's view, remembered sense perceptions are enough to give us at least a rudimentary universal concept". If Post. An. II.19 was (which I dispute) written to accomplish the philosophical task Sorabji describes, the effect of adopting his "explicative" reading ofē ek pantos would be a flagrant begging of the question. Sorabji's case in the passage above that the "explicative" reading ought to be preferred because it's philosophically superior to the "progressive" is hardly compelling. While Sorabji's reading of Post. An. II.19 requires adopting the "explicative" reading of 100a6'sē ek pantos and rejecting the "progressive" alternative, Bronstein's depends on adopting the "progressive" reading and rejecting the "explicative" alternative: [In 100a3-9] Aristotle identifies four stages prior to nous which he here calls the "principle of craft and scientific knowledge": perception, memory, experience, and the grasp of "the entire universal". By 'universal' Aristotle means, I take it, a proposition of the form 'all As are B'. We reach this universal by induction which he discusses [at 100a14-b5]. However, knowing this universal is not equivalent to knowing a first principle. Aristotle is clear that nous, the state we are in when we know first principles, comes after knowing this universal.
[...] Nor is it the case that we reach knowledge of first principles directly after grasping this universal. Rather, I suggest that the universal we reach by induction is a preliminary account required for scientific inquiry. Aristotle omits the important stages between grasping the universal and nous, and so there is a gap in his account. However, this gap is not filled by further inductive activity alone or by the allegedly intuitive activity of [some faculty of] nous; rather, it is filled by the methods of inquiry he sets out earlier in Book 2. (Bronstein 2016, pp. 236-237) Proponents of the "progressive" reading have set out various competing proposals regarding (i) what kind of cognition "the universal having come to rest in the soul" amounts to, (ii) how nous is supposed to emerge from this kind of cognition, and (iii) how this kind of cognition differs from experience. Bronstein's own account of (i)-(iii) is highly speculative. Alternative accounts of (i)-(iii) given by other proponents of the "progressive" In the next section I'll be proposing a novel response the aporia ofē ek pantos. But before bringing this section to a close, it's worth rehearsing the main and most powerful arguments that have been adduced for the "explicative" and "progressive" construals of 100a6'sē ek pantos respectively.
The chief argument in favor of the "explicative" reading and against the "progressive" alternative is that the "explicative" construal ofē ek pantos looks quite a bit linguistically easier than the "progressive".
30 Now, proponents of the "explicative" reading are (I think) correct on this point of language. But proponents of the "progressive" reading ofē ek pantos are reasonably unmoved by the argument. For as a matter of Greek, the "progressive" construal really does seem to be linguistically possible. And in the interpretation of Aristotle, considerations of linguistic naturalness need to be weighed against many other considerations, hermeneutical and philosophical. The chief argument in favor of the "progressive" reading and against the "explicative" alternative is that the "progressive" coheres better with a closely parallel text in Metaphysics A.1. In language impressively reading differ and tend to be no less speculative than Bronstein's. 30 Hasper and Yurdin, for instance, develop this line as follows: A sentence of the form 'from x or from y, z comes about' is more plausibly interpreted as meaning either that x and y are two separate sources for z or that 'y' is an alternative way of specifying or picking out the same thing as is picked out by 'x', one that makes it clear what aspect of x is relevant to its being a source for z. in particular-require adopting one and not another construal of thisē ek pantos. Some scholars read the relevantē ('or') as "progressive" while others read it as "explicative". Arguments have been adduced in favor of both possibilities. But neither of the two cases is terribly strong; and it's far from clear that either case is significantly stronger than the other. Why 100a6 speaks of "all [pantos] the universal coming to rest in the soul"-rather than simply "the universal coming to rest in the soul"-is anyone's guess. My proposed solution to this aporia is more a dissolution than a resolution of the puzzle. It sets out from a simple observation I haven't found elsewhere discussed: the wordsē ek pantos that we read in modern printings of 100a6 are unattested in some quite important witnesses to the text of Post. An. II.19.

Evidence of "direct" witnesses to the text of 100a6
Given the present state of scholarship on the Greek Post. An. manuscript tradition, the most evidentially important "direct" witnesses to the text of Post. An. II.19 look to be (i) manuscripts A, B, d, and n consulted by Ross (1949), and (ii) manuscripts D, V, and G of which Ross was ignorant.

33,34
33 For sigla see note 3 above. The especially significant evidentiary value of D (= Par. gr. 1843) for the Post. An. has been stressed by Brockmann (2004) and is confirmed in my "Towards a Text History of Aristotle's Analytics" (draft available on request). Among the most important results of Brockmann 2004 is that folios 127-207v of manuscript D give us a careful copy of the (now highly fragmentary) 9th-10th cent. manuscript Sin. gr. M138 newly discovered in 1975 (on which see Reinsch 2001). Folios 127-207v of D cover Pr. An. 30b37 -Post. An. end; unfortunately, Post. An. II.19 is not extant in surviving fragments of Sin. gr. M138. 34 The sense in which Ross was "ignorant" of manuscript D is qualified and merits comment. The Organon siglum 'D' actually goes back to the 1831 Organon edition of Bekker whose (very sparse) apparatus uses 'D' to index selected variants Bekker found in the BnF manuscript Par. gr. 1843. Unfortunately, instead of (correctly) stating that D = Par. gr. 1843, the front matter to Bekker's edition incorrectly reports that D = Cois. 170. But as Waitz pointed out in the introduction to his own 1844-46 enlarged critical edition, the latter BnF manuscript (i.e. Cois. 170) doesn't in fact contain any of the Organon. The true codicological identity of Bekker's D was to remain a scholarly As for the relative genealogy of the group of manuscripts {A, B, d, n, V, G, D} it is readily shown that: 1. our Post. An. manuscripts A, B, d, V, and G all descend from a (no-longer-extant) common ancestor α from which neither D nor n descend 2. our Post. An. manuscripts D and n descend from a (no-longer-extant) common ancestor β from which none of A, B, d, V, or G descend It's with reference to the above that we speak of 'αfamily' and 'β-family' Post. An. manuscripts. At the 100a6 text-location empeirias...ēremēsantos in our α-family manuscripts, we find that A, B, d, V, and G furnish a number of variant readings: ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος BG ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμίσαντος A ἐμπειρίας ἡ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος V ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκτὸς ἀριθμήσαντος d But at the same text-location in both our β-family witnesses, n 1 and D 1 , the wordsē ek pantos (ἢ ἐκ παντὸς) are omitted. For 100a6's empeirias...ēremēsantos: ἐμπειρίας ἠρεμήσαντος nD This latter variant, as we shall see, is also found in significant "indirect" witnesses to the text of 100a6.

Evidence of "indirect" witnesses to the text of 100a6
The oldest Post. An. commentary of whose contents we have any substantial knowledge is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl.  Moraux (1979), we now know the primary-and perhaps exclusive-source of these excerpts to be the largely lost Post. An. com-mentary of Alexander.

35
Now, among the excerpts one finds in the "Anonymous Commentary" on Post. An. II, there turn out to be two discussions (602,2 ff. and 600,26 ff.) that actually quote 100a6. And on both of these occasions, the "Anonymous Commentary" quotes 100a6 in a version that omits the 3 wordsē ek pantos (ἢ ἐκ παντὸς). The text for 100a6's ek d' empeirias...katholou that whoever wrote these discussions read in their copy/copies of the Post. An. was: ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου and not, as one reads in modern editions: ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου So the "Anonymous Commentary" testifies to the same 100a6 variant as our β-family manuscripts n and D.
Boethius' 6th cent. translation of the Post. An. into Latin seems to have been lost not long after it was produced. And we have no evidence that the Post. An. was re-translated into Latin before the 12th cent. The Syriac Post. An. translations of Athanasius of Balad (d. 687) and especially Ish .ā q Ibn H . unayn (d. 910/911) seem to have faired much better than Boethius'. But neither of them, nor any other Syriac Post. An. translation, presently survives. The oldest extant Post. An. translation in any language is the Arabic Post. An. due to Abū Bishr Mattā (d. 940). While the oldest Greek Post. An. manuscripts that survive today date to the 9-10th cent., the no-longer-extant Greek Post. An. manuscript(s) on which Abū Bishr's Arabic most immediately depends are early 9th cent. at the latest 35 For an insightful and pleasantly concise discussion of the II.19 are presently extant in Arabic. As Walzer 1953's comparative study of Abū Bishr's translation and manuscripts A, B, d, n already suggests, the Greek manuscript(s) on which Abū Bishr's Arabic Post. An. is ultimately based look to be βfamily. For a concise introduction to 20th cent. scholarship on Arabic/Syriac Post. An. translations and related issues, see the entry "Aristote de Stagire, Organon-Tradition syriaque et arabe" in Goulet (1989).
37 Abū Bishr translates 100a3-9 as follows:  Ross (1949) and Waitz (1844-46) had no access to Abū Bishr's Arabic and were unable to consult manuscript D, both correctly note the omission ofē ek pantos at 100a6 in the first hand of manuscript n. But Ross (1949) and Waitz (1844-46) both print the vulgate text of Bekker/Pacius for 100a6. Due largely (I suspect) to their incomplete knowledge of the available evidence, neither editor bothers to justify doing so.

The proposal
It turn outs to be clear that in the early medieval (and probably late ancient) world, two quite different versions of 100a6 were in circulation: a version that contained the wordsē ek pantos and a version which didn't. We've noted that Version 1 is supported by (i) the "direct" testimony of certain α-family manuscripts, as well as (ii) the "indirect" testimony of certain 12-13th cent. Byzantine Post. An. commentaries and certain 12-13th cent. Latin Post. An. translations. We've noted that Version 2 is supported by (i) the "direct" testimony of our β-family manuscripts, as well as (ii) the "indirect" testimony of Abū Bishr's 10th cent. Arabic Post. An. translation and the so-called "Anonymous commentary" on Post. An. II (whose discussions Moraux has shown to be excerpted largely, and perhaps exclusively, from Alexander). Version 1 is printed by Pacius, Bekker, Waitz, and Ross and presupposed by all modern discussions of 100a3-9 I'm aware of. But significant evidence-some quite unknown Pacius, Bekker, Waitz, and Ross-supports Version 2.
Ultimately, I find it difficult to resist the following conclusion. Careful scrutiny of the relevant textgenealogical, linguistic, hermeneutical, and philosophical considerations tells strongly in favor of taking Version 2 to preserve what Aristotle in fact wrote, and rejecting Version 1 as spurious. I contend that the wordsē ek pantos one reads at 100a6 in all modern editions of the Post. An. were not put there by Aristotle; I contend that in the transmission history of the text these 3 words were erroneously interpolated into the α-family exemplar. This, in a nutshell, is my proposed response to the aporia ofē ek pantos.
To establish the basic viability of this, let's start with the most pressing text-genealogical issue it raises. If one adopts the hypothesis that Version 2 of 100a6 is correct, the erroneous appearance ofē ek pantos in α-family manuscripts needs accounted for. Now, this can in fact be done in several plausible ways. But for present purposes, it suffices to rehearse two such plausible explanations-both appealing to one of the most common and widely recognized mechanisms of accidental interpolation.

40
If Version 2 of 100a6 is correct, the erroneous emergence of Version 1 could easily have resulted from a process like one of the following. (Option 1) The closeness of these uncial letter patterns is striking: This suggests the following hypothesis. In the early transmission history of the Post. An., a scribe erred in transcribing 100a6 by erroneously writing ἢ ἐκ παντὸς where s/he ought to have written ἠρεμήσαντος (perhaps the text of the source-manuscript was semi-legible at 100a6). As a result, ἢ ἐκ παντὸς enters the manuscript tradition as a variant for ἠρεμήσαντος. (NB that ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ isn't non-sense). Later, a diligent scholar records ἢ ἐκ παντὸς as a variant for ἠρεμήσαντος in some α-ancestor (perhaps in supralinear position, perhaps in the left margin beside a line initial ἠρεμήσαντος). Finally, the scribe of some subsequent α-ancestor conflates this reported variant for a proposed insertion and erroneously writes ἢ ἐκ παντὸς in front of ἠρεμήσαντος. (Option 2) Scholars in the Greek world have long used 40 The following paragraph has greatly benefitted from conversations with David Blank. the particle ἢ to introduce explanatory glosses and the like. This suggests the following hypothesis. At some point in the transmission history of the Post. An., a scholar transcribes ἢ ἐκ παντὸς into her copy of the Post. An. as a meta-textual comment on 100a6 (perhaps as a kind of gloss on καθόλου, perhaps to indicate the manner of ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ that's requisite for the emergence of τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης). Later, the scribe of some α-ancestor conflates this meta-textual comment for a proposed insertion and erroneously writes ἢ ἐκ παντὸς in front of ἠρεμήσαντος.
For present purposes, we needn't dwell further on Options 1 and 2. Both can be tweaked in various ways; it can be argued that one of them is more likely than the other; and the same explanatory work can undoubtably be done otherwise. All that matters here is that it needs to be admitted as a not-at-all-unlikely historical possibility that Version 1 entered the Post. An. manuscript tradition through some suchē ek pantos interpolating event. And this much should now be clear.
At a minimum, the last few pages have shown that the collective testimony of our most important surviving text-witnesses to 100a6 no more disfavors the hypothesis that Version 2 is correct than it disfavors the competing hypothesis that Version 1 is correct. I submit, moreover, that there are strong linguistic, hermeneutical, and philosophical considerations that support adopting Version 2 and rejecting Version 1. To start with the obvious, Version 1 gives us a text with an unfortunate ambiguity (ē) and unnecessary obscurity (pantos). Version 2, in contrast, reads much more smoothly. In fact, withē ek pantos out of the picture, the 100a3-9 we are left with is a wellbalanced, and kind of beautiful, piece of Aristotelian prose.
To dig deeper, let's take a closer look at 100a3-9. We need to ask how 100a3-9 will need to be interpreted if Version 2 of 100a6 is adopted. And we'll do well by starting with some points of grammar. The first thing to note is the prominence of the ek men oun aisthēseōs...ek de mnēmēs...ek d' empeirias structuring of 100a3-6. The finite verb ginetiai that's explicit in the ek men unit will need to be supplied twice: both with empeiria (100a5) to get the main clause of the first ek de unit, and also with archē (100a8) to get the main clause in the second ek de unit. (NB that 100a7-8's tou henos...to auto is in apposition to 100a6's tou katholou). Note finally, that in view of the text's pronounced men...de...de structure we'll want to take the participial clauses pollakis tou autou ginomenēs (100a4) andēremēsantos tou katholou en tēi psuchēi (100a6) as grammatical parallels. Given the genders of the relevant participles, it seems that mnēmēs will have to be the (implied) subject of 100a4's ginomenēs, and that tou katholou will have to be the subject of 100a6'sēremēsantos.
If the authentic 100a3-9 is the one I've printed above, Aristotle's basic train of thought would look to be the following.
100a3-9 is sketching a highly abstract account of the intellectual progression whereby humans would acquire nous-a knowledge of demonstrative foundations that's suitable for grounding demonstrative episteme. The account is highly abstract because it's supposed to be general enough to cover all possible cases of demonstrative episteme. The account aims, that is, to capture not only how humans would develop states of nous needed to ground demonstrative episteme regarding (say) the natural world, but also how humans would develop states of nous needed to ground demonstrative episteme concerning truths studied in mathematics and metaphysics. (This bears emphasis because as NE 1142a16-20 makes clear there's a sense of "from experience" [ek empeirias] on which Aristotle will deny that nous of mathematical foundations is "from experience"). In fact, 100a3-9 presents its account as so abstract that it even captures how humans would acquire the kind of foundational knowledge on which craftknowledge [technē] is based. But putting technē aside, we can say that 100a3-9 introduces four knowledgefurnishing states [ If the authentic 100a6 is Version 2, 100a3-9 will be presenting a highly abstract sketch of an intellectual progression in four stages: 100a4's pollakis tou autou ginomenēs ("when [memory] comes to be of the same [thing] many times") evidently describes a necessary condition for the occurrence of transition-2. And 100a6'sēremēsantos tou katholou en tēi psuchēi ("when the universal has come to rest in the soul") will likewise describe necessary a condition for the occurrence of transition-3. 100a5's parenthetical hai gar pollai mnēmai tōi arithmōi empeiria mia estin ("for, the memories, numerically many, are an experience that's one") strongly suggests that 100a4's pollakis tou autou ginomenēs is intended as a rough-and-ready characterization of a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of transition-2. And if this is correct, our text's pronounced men...de...de structure will suggest thatēremēsantos tou katholou en tēi psuchēi correspondingly names a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of transition-3. In fact, given a parallel passage in the Phaedo (96a6-b8) as well as Aristotle's well-known epistemic uses of the verb hērmein elsewhere, 42 I think that our default assumption needs to be that on Version 2 of 100a6, eremēsantos tou katholou en tēi psuchēi does name a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of transition-3. The noun phrase tou katholou ("the universal") would then refer to the object of nous. Now, there are scholars who take "the universal" mentioned at 100a6 to be a universal proposition. But this proposal is severely undermined by Aristotle's own 100a7-8 gloss of the relevant phrase. 43 For 100a7-8 describes the universal in question as a "one over many" [hen para ta polla]: as something that can be uniformly "present within" [enēi] a plurality of things; and this is simply very hard to square with Aristotle's usual ways of thinking/speaking about universal propositions [protaseis]. Far more likely, I submit, is that "the universal" that "comes to rest in the soul" is an eternal and unchanging universal nature-roughly, an Aristotelian analogue of a Platonic Form. This very conceptual analogy, I suggest, is the basic philosophical point behind 100a7's self-consciously Platonic turn of phrase "one over the many" (cf. Post. An. I.11 77a5 ff., I.22 82a32-35). Before drawing this section to a close, permit me a few final remarks on the relationship between Post. An. 100a3-9 and the Phaedo passage mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Phd. 96a6-b8). The opening of the so-called "philosophical autobiography", the text of Phd. 96a6-b8 might be translated as follows (for Plato's Greek see footnote 41): "O Cebes," said [Socrates], "when I was young, I became incredibly passionate for 42 See, e.g. DA I.3 407a32 ff., Phys. VII.3 247b9 ff. 43 Further evidence against this proposal is that the items 100a15-100b5 calls "universal" are things like animal and human being. the kind of wisdom which people call natural history [historia peri phuseōs]. For I thought it sublime-to know the explanations [tas aitias] of each thing: [to know] why each thing comes to be, why it perishes, and why it is. And many times I would turn myself back and forth, examining first of all the following sorts things: Is it the case, as some were claiming, that living things are assembled precisely when the hot and the cold start to decay? And it is blood by which we are wise [phronoumen]? Or is it air ? Or fire? Or is it none of these, but it is rather the brain that furnishes the senses [aisthēseis] of hearing, seeing, and smelling? And is it the case [as some were claiming] 44 that from the senses, memory [mnēme] and opinion [doxa] come to be, and from memory and opinion-when it has acquired fixedness [to hērmein]-along these lines epistēmē comes to be?' (Phd. 96a6-b8) The linguistic parallels between Phd. 96b6-8 (bolded) and Post. An. 100a3-9 are hard to exaggerate. Given the context and grammar (NB footnote 44) of the Phaedo text, it's quite likely that Phd. 96b6-8 and Post. An. 100a3-9 are both making conscious reference to some earlier Presocratic source. On the final analysis, I suspect Aristotle himself would have viewed Post. An. 100a3-9 as distilling a small handful of more-or-less widely accepted endoxa [≈ "reputable opinions"] about how humans develop intellec-44 I'm supplying ὥς τινες ἔλεγον ("as some were claiming") from 96b3 as is grammatically necessary. Note the accusativecum-infinitive of indirect speech γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην at 96b8, and that γίγνοιτο at 96b7 is an optative of indirect discourse from the past.
tual virtue-endoxa drawn (I suspect) not only from Presocratic natural philosophy, but also from ancient debates about the epistemology of technē.

45
Our Phaedo passage (96b6-8) speaks of epistēmē emerging when an opinion/view [doxa] "has acquired fixedness" [labousēs to hērmein]. This latter idea is famously developed in the Meno (97e-98a) which explains that states of epistēmē come about when correct opinions/views [orthai doxai] are tied down. Above we translated the Post. An. 100a6 phrase hērmēsantos tou katholou en tēi psuchēi as "when the universal comes to a rest [hērmēsantos] in the soul". But the verb hērmein from which hērmēsantos derives can indicate unmovable presence ("standing firm") as well as unmoving presence ("standing still"). It's arguable that an alternative translation like "when the universal has become fixed in the soul" better captures the thought behind 100a6's hērmēsantos tou katholou en tēi psuchēi. At any rate, Aristotle's considered view in the Analytics is that because a person's episteme through a demonstration D must be rationally unshakeable [ametapeiston], the nous from which this person assents to D's premises must itself be no less unshakeable (cf. Post. An. I.2 72a25-b3 to which the II.19 text 99b20-22 apparently refers).

Conclusion
The preceding sections have sketched, and worked to motivate, a controversial approach to Post. An. II.19-one 45 NB Metaphysics A.1's 981a3-5 reference to the historical rhetorician Polus and/or the character Polus at Gorgias 448c; with Metaphysics A.1's 981a7 ff. remarks on the epistemology of medicine cf. esp. Laws IV 720a ff., IX 857c ff. In speaking of Post. An. 100a3-9 as distilling endoxa concerning how humans develop intellectual virtue, I don't mean to suggest-for, I see no reason to think-that Aristotle's endorsement of 100a3-9 is "merely dialectical" or qualified in any such way.
considerably more deflationary than most. But we have not rehearsed a complete reading of the chapter.

46
For our main goal has been to recommend a novel solution to the aporia ofē ek pantos. The proposed solution, as I've said, is more a dissolution than a resolution of the underlying puzzle. But this dissolution I propose seems to me considerably more philosophically, hermeneutically, and textually satisfying than any alternative solution I'm aware of. For let us return to the chief arguments marshaled in favor of the "explicative" and "progressive" construals of 100a6'sē ek pantos respectively.
The chief argument in favor of the "explicative" reading and against the "progressive" alternative was that the "explicative" is more linguistically natural than the "progressive". Be this as it may, I submit that the variant ek d' empeiriasēremēsantos tou katholou is more linguistically plausible Aristotelian Greek than ek d' empeiriasē ek pantosēremēsantos tou katholou. So with respect to considerations of linguistic naturalness, our proposed solution to the aporia ofē ek pantos in an important way looks to fare better than the "explicative" reading ofē ek pantos.
The chief argument in favor of the "progressive" reading of 100a3-9 and against the "explicative" alternative was that the "progressive" reading more closely coheres with a parallel text in Metaphysics A.1: i.e. 980a27-981a16. But this paper's proposal gives us a reading of 100a3-9 that coheres even better with 980a27-981a16 than the "progressive" reading does. For, recall that 980a27-981a16 describes a four stage in- 46 We have not, e.g., discussed the important question of what's meant by epagōgē at 100b4. For what it's worth, I think epagōgē at 100b4 does not mean what it does in the Topics; and I think that while translating epagōgē at 100b4 as "induction" can help illuminate later episodes in the history of philosophy, this translation significantly obscures what Aristotle himself is trying to say.