The truth between the self and the other: Modernity and psychoanalysis in Foucault

Luiz Paulo Leitão Martins*

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Post-Graduation Program in Psychoanalytic Theory. Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil

Abstract: The purpose of this article is to articulate the category of truth and the records of identity and difference in the analysis of Michel Foucault on modernity and the discourse of Freud. By identity, we understand the order of distribution of words and things in a given period of history, and by difference, it is what is out from the thought, is foreign and appears as an event. However, this arrangement between the self and the other is the condition of possibility of this analysis, one that investigates the historical truth of who we are, as well as a criticism of yourself, which includes the possibility of the thought reinventing itself, overcoming its limits. In that scenario, psychoanalysis emerges as a discourse of the unconscious, which points to the finitude of man and to the tragic experience of madness. Therefore, it is a modality of thinking where the events introduce new forms of truthfulness.

Keywords: truth, identity, difference, psychoanalysis, modernity.

This article investigates the status of category of truth in the analysis developed by Michel Foucault regarding modernity, and proposes an interpretation of the constitution of psychoanalysis in this panorama from its relationship with the identity and the difference of a thought. Psychoanalysis is evaluated through its creation ground, the order in which it participates, and modernity is thought from the events in the present, events which are historical at first, defining the discontinuity of a period in relation to the previous periods, and at the same time, the continuity of the thought in the files of the present, being expressed as it is by the regularity of the phrases in the discourse plan. The possibility of a psychoanalysis outbreak as a discursive unit, or even arising Freud, as an author, is very closely bound, therefore, to power lines laid out by these events, which, when designed by Foucault, are included in a history of the present. As a first research axis, our paper will seek to retrieve that genealogy from two narrative perspectives: one from the self and one from the other. The goal of this resumption is to identify which relations thought has with identity, the latter being what constitutes the order of distribution of words and things, and with the difference, as being what is excluded from the thought but does not cease to define in relation to this certain position of a possible disruption. In addition to that, we will examine the way Foucault included within these stories the discursive unity of psychoanalysis: how he thinks the presence of psychoanalysis in the configuration of modernity, and that from his relationship with the self and with the other, the second axis of our research. Our aim is to think in what sense and under which aspect psychoanalysis, as an unconscious thought, might express a thought unconsciousness. We will identify within Foucault’s discourse itself a privileged place given to psychoanalysis, and that occurs especially in *The Order of Things*, regarding the possibility of relationship between a discourse unit and its creation space. This place will be defined not only from the articulation that can be established between the object of a given discourse and the blatant game of opinions, the surface area where the thoughtless and finitude can eventually become positive in the case of modernity, but rather from the fact that a discourse points to that record even if unconsciously, in which the events define continuity fields over a period and discontinuity in thought: opening and surpassing spaces that introduce the possibility of the new.

To perform a history of the present and investigate the relationship between identity and difference of a thought, namely, that of modernity, is thinking the history of thought in close articulation with the category of truth. Now, in those terms, truth is understood not as a category that defines the conditions of a true discourse, or if you will, a discourse that tells the truth about the true, but rather as a category included in an analysis of the present, or an ontology of ourselves. Thinking psychoanalysis through this tradition is to include its formation in a history of events. Between identity and difference, Freud’s discourse can point to an area of continuity and discontinuity from which thoughts are possible. Thus, at the end of the text, we will seek to bring the tradition in which Foucault inserts his research, the analysis of that tradition, and the possibility of a thought in psychoanalysis comprised by events. The analysis would unfold into a criticism of the present, or in a criticism of the possibility of transgression, if you will.

---

1 Financing information: Coordination for the Personal Improvement of Higher Education (CAPES).

* Corresponding address: lplmartins@gmail.com
Two narratives of modernity

In the very beginning of The Order of Things, a book written in 1966, Foucault mentions his other great archaeological description project, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, written in 1961, to think of a belonging articulation between them, an articulation that indicates perhaps the same program within, but present and the expression of a continuity between the two works (Foucault, 1966, pp. 15-16). In Madness and Civilization, he would have proposed a history of the other, a history of that which on a certain thought, from a certain culture, anyway, on a certain historical, political and social scenario, is perceived as strange, being placed in this place of otherness, of exteriority, constituting a kind of out of thought. Now, rescuing this story would not neglect talking about what is within, what determines and what keeps the movement even from deleting the identity of a thought (Foucault, 1962, pp. 71-75, 90-91); that is because the reason for something being out is the same reason that defines the thought about that it means or says nothing, it rather defines the thought that in relation to that it should be really well known, so much so that it develops power devices and mechanisms aiming at minimizing, neutralizing, or even imprisoning the lines of difference. Thus, if Foucault retrieves the other by an archaeological history, it is to talk about a whole set of discourse practices, which has become the history of the West, as one of exclusion, which intends to think the other as a madness experience, as negativity, or to say it as the author phrases it, as an absence of work (Foucault, 1961/1994a, pp. 161-164, Foucault, 1969, pp. 26-27, 64). This reception of the experience of the other in the thought is the object of Madness and Civilization by Foucault, for it concerns the investigation of how madness was understood, under which ways of consciousness it was thought, which discourses we formed in relation to it both in the classic era and in modern times. On the one hand, the diagnosis of the exclusion practices, practices that have attributed the madness or unreason character to the other, which made a voice heard that once spoke only silence. On the other hand, however, it is also necessary to point out another retrieving of the madness in Foucault, a resumption that intends to be the history of that silence, a resumption that intends to place the moment in which the division lines between reason and unreason are not yet formed between the threshold of the Renaissance and the beginning of the classic age. This other one that is excluded from the thought by a critical tradition can also be thought of in the history of the West by a marginal language, buried maybe by a tragic language that perpetuates the presence of madness. Madness excluded from the Western identity can be resumed as an experience of work, as an expression of our own limits, an experience saying from the being of difference, that is, makes difference speak for itself. In that sense madness can be the presence and the production of a work (Foucault, 1972a, pp. 338, 531-557). Thus, the history of the other at the same time indicating the lines of force under which the other was historically reduced to the status of absence also indicates some output or escape lines, lines of a thought which even being out in relation to the episteme participates in its formation. The truth that points this history between a critical thought and a tragic thought is what allows the problematization of the place in the historical constitution of madness in the West. If an experience is muted and dominated by the hierarchy of knowledges and the powers of a period, it can be offset to an experience that is voice, presence and production of work because it is a criticism of the present. Some authors listed by Foucault make reference to this possibility of an event, namely: Hölderlin, Nerval, and Roussel in literature, Artaud and Strindberg in drama, Goya and Van Gogh in painting, and Nietzsche in philosophy.

In The Order of Things, Foucault would have an offset from its initial project. From that point on it would think not the history of the other, but the history of the self, not the otherness of a marked difference in archaeology by an exclusion, but the identity of an order that present in the narrative of the formation of modern thought would be the expression of the exact distribution of words and things (Foucault, 1966, pp. 7-16). What was at stake, in this case, would no more be the diagnosis of an exclusion, rather the diagnosis of a presence, an obvious presence in the discourses of a period manifested as the self of the thought. The proposal of creating an archaeology from the continuity between the events of an episteme and the regularity with which the phrases appear and are presented in the discourse for practical purposes defines its second intervention. The order and the regularity of this continuity would indicate the disposition of reasoning in the space of knowledge and the visibility of the objects in the empiricism of the world, so that archaeology would be this general field of thought formation. Therefore, to Foucault what matters is to think about in which ground are discourses formed, according to what rules discourses create concepts, form objects, produce statements and operate strategic choices, and from what are statements circulating, revealing equivalence points, of concurrency in a general space which is none other than that of dispersion (Foucault, 1969, pp. 31-93). Foucault’s thesis is that such ground is the self for all the discourses; there is more continuity between different discourses from the same archaeological period than between discourses belonging to diverse archaeological periods. Well, the identity of the archaeological ground that should indicate the truth of the discourses is the one that they belong and they are the result. Foucault aims at this self in archaeology in his analysis in The Order of Things, which is developed as a history of the present, a history that shows the possibilities in which the modern thought has appeared.

Besides that, the book’s subtitle: an archaeology of human sciences, indicates an underlying or main theme in the text, whatever, which has a core role in Foucault’s path when he thinks about the relationship that may exist between the events of a period and the archaeology of a thought. Through this theme Foucault retrieves a reflection that is present since the Madness and Civilization and the Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, regarding the creation of a type of silent anthropology in modern thought. In The
Order of Things, this reflection appears under the investigations concerning the emergence of man as an object in the knowledge, and the constitution of the human sciences to think of that man. But if in this last work Foucault retrieves the idea of anthropology to dedicate long pages to the articulation on humanities, the empiricism, the trihedron of the knowledges and the history event (Foucault, 1966, pp. 355-398), not less important, and maybe of inversely proportional importance to its assessment on the wording of Foucault’s text, is the issue of forming a thought image, that reproduces the relationship between the discourses and the provision expressed of the empiricism and the knowledges in modern experience through an anthropological illusion. If the man comes at the end of a track, as something resulting from the incursion of the historicity and finitude in the history of thought, on the other hand, it is from that foundation that an anthropology derived from the Kantian question regarding the purpose of man starts to think the self from empiricisms and the truth of knowledges. It is as if beyond that which arises before the eyes, as visibility, and what protrudes in the discourse, as enunciation, were the man, as a foundation that would be thought in terms of a transcendental figure (Foucault, 2007, pp. 122-124, 1966, pp. 351-354). The man would appear as the starting point, as the principle from which empiricisms and knowledges should be thought, no longer as end, by inserting these in terms from a genesis, from a sense and from a structure. n placing the man in this position as some sort of a priori of thought, the thought is no longer thought from historical a priori, from events defined by the analysis of the present, to be determined by a transcendental a priori. Foucault criticism is established against this transcendental foundation, built from and through the formation of the figure of man, as a kind of anthropological subject. On the opposite, man who was previously a priori from the thought, is a fleeting figure, a face of sand, designed on the beach, next to the sea shore, on which, due to such few waves, should disappear as quickly as it was formed (Foucault, 1966, p. 398).

For Foucault, thought is certainly not an image, it is not defined by a shape to which one can hold on to and obtain consolation. Thought also is not universal, it is not a foundation from which it can assert a so-called true existence. It is not ontology, nor metaphysics. That is nothing, because it is formed by events, it is always thought from historical a priori, which determine the continuities and discontinuities possible to the forms of discourses in history through its configuration. These events constitute the category of truth in the history of the self. As in a kind of play, as a sort of stage on which the words and things are, forming multiple scenes, scenes built by gestures of affirmation, and production of concurrences, the thought becomes a space of expression of truth as an event (Foucault, 1970/1994b, pp. 83, 89-90, 97-98). It is done without scripts, without planning, without subjects. So what is this place where the events happen, which are involuntary and impersonal, introduce themselves in time and space, stating the difference and repeating by his own statement the other in the thought. The project of thinking an archaeology of modernity in Foucault matches thinking of an analysis of the present which is deeply marked by events. Either by a history of the self or of the other, the truth of this analysis proposes a close articulation between events and thoughts, being the first ones understood as this historical inscription that deeply modifies the archaeological deployment of the episteme, and the latter ones as this distribution of the order that guides the statements of a given period according to a specific formation grammar. Said anthropological illusion comes as a problem for the truth in Foucault precisely because it affirms a transcendental reference in thought. From the event of the man it intends to build a foundation for all the possibilities of events beyond him. Thus, thought becomes an image, crystallized by a single frame and reduced to this petrified corpse of a man's being, event, history, continuity and discontinuity. If this relationship between thought and event is defined by a transcendental a priori, there is no possibility of an effective meeting with difference – hence the dogmatism in thought (Deleuze, 1962, pp. 118-126, Deleuze, 1968, p. 169-217). If the difference speaks of what is beyond an identity, of what circulates as free, dispersed intensity and that focuses as singular event, a small thought and forged from a single event, turned transcendental itself, is a mirage of difference, a mirage that is not anything other than the image of itself. Now, a history of the present has to be a history of events, a history that, vested by the self and the other, gives way to what is chance, corresponding necessarily to the involuntary of the thought. A history made up of events is what makes up the present; a thought without images. As Foucault says: “a thought has to think about what shapes it and to be formed by what it thinks” (Foucault, 1970/1994b, p. 85). The truth of this thought is its articulation with the difference, it is the articulation between its constitution and its possibility of becoming one with the events of the present. Now, in what way can psychoanalysis be included in this history? In what way its discourse relates to the identity and the difference of thought? And how does its application produce a distinct statement in archaeology from that of the transcendental anthropology?

Freud’s thought and thought unconsciousness

The reference of psychoanalysis in Foucault is quite dispersed. Such author effectively never wrote a book or an article exclusively about the psychoanalytic discourse, although he has given some interviews and has cited Freud and Lacan himself in texts and articles, and that at various times during his work. In fact, this presence which is spread and deployed that leads us to the hypothesis of a type of meeting, either implicit or explicit, between the thought from Foucault and the one from Freud. Freud and psychoanalysis certainly marked the French philosopher’s reflections: several times we see the inroads of Foucault in the sandy terrain of psychoanalysis to think about
a specific concept, either with the function of this same concept inside a discourse, or even with relations between discursive determinations of psychoanalysis and the lines of knowledge and power in archaeology or genealogy. So, in those terms, the psychoanalysis of Freud or even that of Lacan seems to be a kind of speaker kept on the horizon of reflection of Foucault, with whom this establishes new articulations and productions whose consequences we can still identify. On the part of psychoanalysis, it is evident the importance of Foucault’s statements on a kind of internal criticism, that develops to think a relationship between psychoanalysis and other discourses in the present, and, in addition, a reflection on the network of power relations that crosses the psychoanalytic experience, whether within clinical or institutional scope. So, within the psychoanalytic community the repercussions of Foucault’s theses and the shocks that are created from these same repercussions are observed. One way or another, the production resulting from the historical constitution of this meeting of a work of the thought is undeniable, a work of questioning and transforming the self, and that both within the psychoanalysis and in the field of philosophy (Foucault, 1984, pp. 14-15).

Our intention here is to resume the reading that Foucault develops regarding psychoanalysis in the two stories we listed, whereas the presence of psychoanalysis between the self and the other in modernity can indicate the status of its relationship with the truth of our present.

Psychoanalysis is registered in Madness and Civilization in an ambiguous and hesitating way. It is a presence, an appearance, for which it is not possible to define its place of belonging, not even its ultimate position when facing the articulations between the thought and the other. In fact, it’s not that psychoanalysis is not defined between one and another position in that debate, but rather it states two different and incompatible positions. According to Foucault, Freud participates both in a critical tradition and in a tragic tradition of the thought in relation to madness. As a kind of discourse built between two items, Freud’s psychoanalysis would be marked by a perspective that at times includes the experience of the other when registering unreason, defining it as absence of work, and at times thinks madness through a tragic path in which what you see in the crazy being is not the absence or the silence, but a production of a work. Freud, the heir of criticism tradition is that of metapsychology, one that inserts madness into an interpretation system, which formulates the development of the individual in terms of an evolution of the culture, or that intends to turn a normal production of subjectivities into a positive issue, in addition to the dead end of a perverse-polymorph sexuality (Foucault, 1962, pp. 23-26, Freud, 1905/1996a, 1906/1996b, pp. 260-265); besides that, it is also the one that takes the hierarchical distribution of power at the asylum in clinical experience, through condensing the figures of Janitors and guards in the figure of the physician, transposed to the figure of the analyst under a transfer (Foucault, 1972a, pp. 529-530). Thus understood, psychoanalysis reproduces a critical conscience of madness, since it observes it according to the Western rationality criterion, constituted at the beginning of the classical age. There is, however, another possibility of reading of the experience of madness in Freud, a possibility that is evoked by Foucault when he speaks of the need to do justice to Freud (Foucault, 1972a, p. 360). However, in the case of critical experience, the other is considered as the absence of work, on the other hand, in the case of tragic experience, it is taken back as a being, by a marginal language, a language that does not sign up in the canons of truth and of work, but which becomes effective due to a particular meaning. In addition to the critical language, a positive language comes from the fields of literature, drama, arts and philosophy, all those fields that, despite orthodox regimes of knowledge, make up the heterodoxy of the thought (Birman, 2010, Foucault, 1972a, pp. 338, 531-557). In the case of Freud, that tradition is expressed not by a systematic metapsychology, but through clinical narratives. It is on account of the clinical cases, when Freud gives way to language and to the delight of the madman, that madness can be rescued, as a primitive and positive experience before the split between reason and unreason, and that through a core conceptual operator that is the notion of phantom (Deleuze, 1969, pp. 245-252). When the real from words and images (Foucault, 1954/1994c, pp. 69-73, Freud, 1915/2010a, p. 146) can be entered in the fictional universe of language and thought, the unconscious can finally eventually turn positive, always through new and unique ways of creation (Foucault, 1964/1994d, pp. 570-574, Freud, 1915/2010b, p. 64, Freud, 1920/2010c, pp. 170-176). The truth of the relationship between the unconscious registry and the truth of the thought in psychoanalysis points out to a tragic language of madness, in those terms. So that otherness which is this presence of madness, when finally offset to the registry of the work, produces a new thought, a thought in which the invention and interpretation possibilities are endless.

We must also mention another presence of psychoanalysis in Foucault’s modernity. In The Order of Things, its interpretation of psychoanalysis is much more optimistic than in Madness and Civilization. Because psychoanalysis, together with the ethnology and linguistics would point to the opening a priori for the modern thought, a historical a priori that determines its creation and outbreak (Foucault, 1966, pp. 385-387). Stating a field that, in addition to the object, is the concept, the field of unconscious, would create an entire positivization of history and finitude to the experience of modern thought, crucial to the formation of the empiricism fields of labor, of life and of language, as well as the knowledge fields of political economy, of biology and of philology. As the discourse vanishes, the bankruptcy of language as a representation, man becomes traversed from end to end by the experience of death, the experience that emerges not only as a life term, but runs as a central element of the entire trajectory of the being (Foucault, 1972b, pp. 201-202). When this finitude is affirmed by a thought as psychoanalysis, it promotes a
radical inner twist within the sciences of man: a twist that points to its limits. Because positive psychoanalysis, in addition to the standards and the functions of a psychology, an unavoidable repetition of death, in addition to the rules and conflicts of a sociology, the opening of a desire, and beyond the language and meaning systems of an analysis of the myths and literature, a word that is the law (Foucault, 1966, p. 386). By taking the thought to this limit of itself, by taking the thought to that point of unconsciousness, psychoanalysis incorporates, in turn, the events of the present. The modern thought visits this point of unconsciousness of thought (Foucault, 1972/1994e, p. 284), in which the events produce difference and discontinuity. From now on a new thought is possible: a thought formed by events, a thought that is not an image of man, nor uses transcendences. Thus, either by psychoanalysis, ethnology, or by linguistics or literature, the so-called counter-sciences which Foucault promotes in the history of the self in The Order of Things is the possibility of an effective meeting of the thought with its forming element, with the point of its opening and with the obstacles that prevent its transformation, with what is out, and as such is an event (Foucault, 1966, pp. 64, 353).

While an unconscious thought psychoanalysis visits the self and the other through different ways in Foucault’s archaeology. In the history of the other, it belongs to two distinct traditions: on the one hand, it is critical, when it understands madness through a metapsychology, and when it reproduces the disposition of a moral treatment discourse in the clinical tradition, and, on the other hand, it is tragic, when it collects the word from the crazy to enter it in Romanesque narratives, whose central character is not a subject from reason, but a phantom, not a reality, but a truth from what is real. In the history of the self, psychoanalysis states an unconscious thought, and that when it promotes the finitude within the modern experience of language: it deconstructs an image of the thought that the central categories of man and the representation to speak of an imageless thought, of a thought that meets events without subjects nor representatives of the representation. So that, either by the self or the other, what is observed in the case of psychoanalysis is the possibility of meeting a thought with its unconsciousness (Foucault, 1972/1994e, p. 284), where this category serves to indicate the strata, the force lines of an archaeology and a genealogy that constitute the present of a thought, as well as the possibility of new events, a positive possibility of the thought becoming the other.

The truth when analyzing the present and a thought to come

Until here we made some considerations on the relationship between the event and the thought in modernity and in psychoanalysis: we saw how the narrative of the self and the narrative of the other are a particular way of thinking in the history of the West in the two narratives proposed by Foucault, a form that establishes the ground of our present and that determines what we can say and what we can see; and, besides, we also saw how psychoanalysis affirms itself over this same ground, as Freud thought delimits a certain formation of concepts, objects and statements in the field of discourse. We still have to talk about the correlation between this analysis of the present and the category of truth in detail; we still need to define as a reflection, which intends, by means of an archaeology and a genealogy of the modern thought, to bring to the surface the ground of the events of the thought, as this reflection can point to what we might call the truth, or, phrasing it as Foucault would, an ontology of ourselves (Foucault, 1984/1994f, p. 687).

In fact, when Foucault reintroduces the category of truth in his intellectual itinerary in the late 1970 and early 1980, he makes the same movement to think the analysis of the present for a fairly accurate meaning, namely, the development, beyond the diagnosis, of a criticism of the present, or even a criticism of the possibility of transgression. However, if the field of events, as this possibility opens of positivization of discontinuities and ruptures in space of thought, if this field is a history of practices of transgression, processing practices that touch the possibilities of reinvention and the composition of the self, it becomes possible to reinsert the history of archaeology or genealogy in the history of the forms of truthfulness, or reinsert these stories in an archaeological or genealogical history of the relationships of the subject with the truth (Foucault, 2008, p. 6; Foucault, 2009, p. 161). So when Foucault evaluates the contribution of psychoanalysis in this crossing, he identifies in a very punctual way the resumption of an old problem in the tradition of spirituality in the discursive intervention of Jacques Lacan. Because when Lacan discusses “the issue of price the subject has to pay for telling the truth, and the issue of the effect from the fact that he/she said, that he/she can say and of what he/she said, the true over the subject about him/herself” (Foucault, 2001, pp. 31-32), he takes over an issue that is spirituality and that talks about the possibility of a knowledge being crossed by the records of the subject and the truth (Lacan, 1965/1966a, pp. 855-877, Lacan, 1966/1966b, pp. 229-236). This way, the discourse of the psychoanalysis effectively moves to the record of an ethics; it is from now on the formation of a subjectivity from the relationship of the thought with the truth, and that is a work of self problematization (Foucault, 1981/1994g, pp. 204-205). Well, what does that mean? Under which aspect this perspective of psychoanalysis can be articulated with Foucault’s thought, especially with what he proposes regarding the present analysis and the practical possibilities of the forms of truthfulness in history today?

The truth that Foucault talks about belongs to a very specific tradition of thought that he attributes back to Kant himself. Well, it was Kant who undertook the criticism of the idea of a universal, historical, and unconditional subject, that subject from Descartes – and he did it when he asked himself: what is the man?, and even more, when he asked himself: what is enlightenment?, as this historic moment which is called the Age of Enlightenment. By twisting the thought, he raised the problem of historical definition of the man (Foucault,
The truth between the self and the other: Modernity and psychoanalysis in Foucault

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é articular a categoria da verdade e os registros de identidade e diferença na análise de Michel Foucault sobre a modernidade e o discurso de Freud. Por identidade, entendemos a ordem de distribuição das palavras e das coisas num dado período da história, e por diferença, aquilo que no pensamento está fora, é outro e surge como acontecimento. Ora, essa disposição entre o mesmo e o outro é a condição de possibilidade de uma análise do presente, análise que investiga a verdade histórica daquilo que somos, bem como de uma crítica de si, o que inclui a possibilidade de o pensamento se reinventar e, ultrapassar seus limites. A psicanálise, nesse panorama, surge como um discurso do inconsciente, que aponta para a finitude do homem e para a experiência trágica da loucura. Trata-se, portanto, de uma modalidade de pensamento em que os acontecimentos introduzem novas formas de verificação.

Palavras-chave: verdade, identidade, diferença, psicanálise, modernidade.

La vérité entre le même et l’autre: la modernité et la psychanalyse chez Foucault

Résumé: L’objectif de cet article est d’articuler la catégorie de la vérité et les registres d’identité et de la différence dans l’analyse de Michel Foucault sur la modernité et le discours de Freud. Par identité, nous comprenons l’ordre de distribution des mots et des choses dans une période de l’histoire donnée, et par différence, ce qui est en dehors dans la pensée, est autre et arrive comme un événement. Or, cette disposition entre le même et l’autre est la condition de possibilité d’une analyse du présent,
La verdad entre el mismo y el otro: la modernidad y el psicoanálisis en Foucault

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es articular la categoría de verdad y los registros de identidad y diferencia en el análisis de Michel Foucault acerca de la modernidad y el discurso de Freud. Por identidad comprendemos la orden de distribución de las palabras y de las cosas en determinado período de la historia, y por diferencia lo que en el pensamiento está fuera, es otro y surge como acontecimiento. Esta disposición entre el mismo y el otro es la condición de posibilidad para un análisis del pensamiento donde los acontecimientos introducen nuevas formas de véridiction.

Palabras clave: verdad, identidad, diferencia, psicoanálisis, modernidad.

Mots-clés: vérité, identité, différence, psychanalyse, modernité.

References


Received: March 28, 2014
Reviewed: February 12, 2015
Accepted: March 23, 2015