Some considerations about the body in the current psychoanalytic scenario

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Abstract: This article seeks to raise some central questions about the presence of the body in psychoanalytic clinical practice and contemporary culture. For such, it examines how this problem appears in the social transformations witnessed in the last decades. The biology body and the psychoanalysis body are then compared to emphasize the specificity of the latter. This problem refers to the psychoanalytic notion of the drive body, to the limits of psychic representation in psychoanalysis, and to the assertion that there is, in this field, a basic indiscernibility between the context of the drive and that of representation. In addition to these two aspects, the article highlights the importance of including the biological body as one of the dimensions of the metapsychological body in Freud.

Keywords: body, psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic clinic, contemporaneity.

The objective of this article is to map some crucial issues about the body in psychoanalysis and in contemporary culture that appear as challenges for the current psychoanalytic clinical practice. First of all, we must stress that the changes in social regulations that have occurred in recent decades caused direct resonances and impacts in the subjectivities and psychoanalytic practice. Among these transformations, the problematic of the body has been highlighted, mostly because many contemporary clinical symptoms derive from it.

First, we will discuss the effects of these changes in the social field, then, we will raise some points that we consider critical regarding the psychoanalytic clinical practice. The body has been instrumental in the creation of the contemporary subjectivity due to its predominant role in culture and social ties, to the point of being called “somatic personality” (Costa, 2005). In other words, the modern individual has the construction of his/her identity based on the double reference to the body and to self-care. On one hand, being attractive, slim and young became the morality standard. On the other hand, living for a long time and being healthy became imperative, thus, the appreciation of the quality of life was inserted in the prototypical model of the current identity – the bioidentity – transforming self-care into a cult of the body, seen as a supreme good. If previous to these changes self-care was directed towards the cultivation of the soul and of interiority, to the development of moral virtues and feelings, nowadays self-care is focused on health, beauty, fitness, i.e., to the signs of the subjectivity registered more within the exteriority than interiority (Birman, 1999; Costa, 2005; Fernandes, 2003; Fortes, 2010).

This is problem for a constituted psychoanalysis, since its birth, as a form of therapy inserted in the field of language and supported, primarily, by registering speech. Many authors (Assoun, 2009; Birman, 1999; Costa, 2005; Fernandes, 2003; Queiroz, 2008; Winograd, 2003) have not only shown how much the body dimension was historically neglected by psychoanalysis – whose modus operandi has contributed to its exclusion – but also, in recent times, have sought to manipulate that notion more consistently and systematically. The old tradition is one of the reasons for this neglect – still followed by some parts of the psychoanalytic field –, that defines the body as opposed to a psyche described commonly as representational. In other words, although the Freudian theory consolidated the concepts of unconscious and drive and, with it, built enough theoretical instruments to discuss and even overcome this opposition, psychoanalysis was seen, over time, limited to an understanding of the psychic processes from the representation and from the signifier. In addition, the reduction of the body to its physical reference, a characteristic of the hegemonic scientific discourse, caused psychoanalysis to reinforce the psychophysical dualism of introspective psychology from the 19th century. This relationship of distance that psychoanalysis maintained with the body led to a double movement, according to Fernandes (2003): forgotten, the body was absorbed by psychosomatic which, however, always emphasized an ill body.

Therefore, discussing the presence of the bodily dimension in psychoanalysis is necessary, since the traditional psychoanalytic framework usually operates from the field of language and betting on a treatment...
that happens through the word, to the cost of removing the body and, as a result, the affection. In the base of this problem, multiple reflections arise as propellants of important questions for the contemporary psychoanalytic clinical practice. The question made in this article is how to perform clinical practice with patients that make their body – and strictly the body – not only their symptom, but their own way of being. In other words, from the observation of increasingly severe symptomatic formations, configured from the and, above all, in the body, we must question the clinical impact of the current cultural imperative of the cult to the body, which, quite possibly, intensifies the difficulties of symbolic expression of subjects marked by fragile narcissistic arrangements.

In this sense, we will now discuss a few points that we consider as central to the debate about the place of the body in the current psychoanalytic setting. Our proposal is not to deepen the issues raised, but to draft a mapping that outlines critical and compelling reflections nowadays to discuss how the body is considered in psychoanalysis.

The place of the body today

By proposing a clinical question about some effects and logical implications of subjectification in the culture, we start from the premise that there is a social topicality of metapsychology (Douville, 2004). The psychoanalytic unconscious is not formed solipsistically, as mentioned by Freud when arguing that there is no separation between individual psychology and social psychology, and also by Lacan, when stressing the transindividual character of the unconscious. Therefore, formulating key questions is necessary to map the concept of body both in contemporary culture and clinic, and to describe the scenario that elevated the body as a supreme good.

In the last few decades, a new social cartography tied to an unprecedented form of subjectification was formed in the Western world, in which the self is located in a privileged position (Birman, 1999; Lasch, 1979; Sibilia, 2008). In fact, the privilege given to the self is one of the main characteristics of the so-called society of the spectacle (Debord, 1968/1997), which is crossed by narcissism (Lasch, 1979). We are facing a subjective mode of production that, simultaneously and paradoxically, moved from the value given to exteriority to being centered in the self (Birman, 1999). In this world, marked by the caliber of what appears in and what matters to the exterior – and no longer by the refinement and enrichment of interiority –, the body dimension received prominence as the quintessential materialization of the order of exteriority of subjectivity parameters.

The reference to this context of the spectacle and exteriority marked several interpretations about the increase in the number of practices and techniques to modify the body, including elective interventions and the irreversible manipulation to change the size and the format of various body parts, as well as the inscriptions with paint or scars to create signs in its surface. For example, Birman (2011) understands the culture of tattooing as one of the ways young people found to express uniqueness, given the invisibility of identity in which they find themselves. Similarly, Mielli (2002) interpreted body modifications in general as a search for landmarks, through which the subject would seek to constitute a symbolic territory, an identification trait that serves to outline a fluid form. However, if the current instability of the body is a condition for the development of practices that intend on giving it some sort of identifiable mark, we observe that, at the same time, the infinite possibilities contained in those same practices reinforce the contemporary experience of a mutant and unstable body (Mielli, 2002; Orbach, 2009).

Concurrently, although mutant and unstable, the body also became the locus of concerns of a subject constituted from the imperative of an ideal body image, either in its form, according to beauty standards, or according to its physiology, following the health paradigms. In a world saturated with images (Debord, 1968/1997), the body also became a pattern, in a way that the desperate search for the ideal image led to the impoverishment of the forms of body language and of the own concepts of what would be beautiful, healthy and normal. In other words, although we have witnessed an exacerbation of images, only a few became imperative, leading, paradoxically, to the depreciation of body shapes that are different from the established models (Orbach, 2009). Although we are witnessing some attempts to value bodies that are fat, flaccid, defective, old, etc., since very recently, through, for example, the proliferation of discourses favoring the diversity of patterns in general (aesthetic, gender, etc.) and advertising campaigns that capture these groups with self-objectives, the respect and appreciation of this multiplicity are, to us, still shy. The digital treatment of images broadcast in the media so bodies can look perfect and so wrinkles are non-existent is still the rule, despite the multiplication of reports of the artificiality of models constructed like this.

However, these questions on bodily changes and on ideal bodies are not the only way to discuss the place of the body today. There is also the discussion of the so-called cerebral subject (Ehrenberg, 2004/2009), created by the neurosciences. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, this concept became widely used in the field of culture: individuals increasingly believe to be, mainly, a product from neurochemical processes. The idea of a subject defined and determined by his/her neurophysiology is the result from the dominant role that biology is occupying in science and in the ideas of the 21st century, due to, among other things, advances in many fields, such as molecular biology, human genome...
mapping, cloning and assisted reproduction technologies, the production of new medicines, etc. Specifically, the evolution of cerebral imaging techniques paired with the physicalist interpretation of the images produced, helped to construct the belief that comprehending how the brain works would be equivalent to understanding the subject in its entirety (Ortega, 2008). Concurrently, the data produced by the technology to visualize the brain while functioning and its correlation with psychic processes led to the rearousal of classic discussions and produced an important debate – a lot less intense nowadays – between neuroscience and psychoanalysis.

Three general axes can be observed in this debate. The first comprised the need to compose a hybrid field, since neurosciences can offer solid fundamentals and methodological instruments (scientific) to psychoanalysis to research the psychic functioning. That axis was consolidated with the creation of neuropsychoanalysis. The second axis was completely refractory to any kind of dialogue, by understanding that a dialogue was epistemically impossible and would inevitably result in the submission of psychoanalysis to contemporary science. Finally, between these two, the third axis, assuming a strong non-reductionist position, defending the theoretical and methodological pluralism in the production of knowledge about the human psyche and recognized the importance of exploring the topic of the body in the psychic life, not only the discussions on the conscious and unconscious representations of the body, but above all, the determinative function in its constitution, in the economy and psychic functioning.

**The biology body and the psychoanalysis body**

Given the dominance of the biological order in the contemporary discursive scientific constructions, as previously mentioned, we consider relevant to analyze which body is discussed in psychoanalysis. For such, emphasizing the drive dimension of the body through a brief discussion of the role of biology in psychoanalysis is necessary. As conceptualized by Freud, we can argue that if the body is not to be mixed with the organism (biological), the body is also not only defined by its symbolic and imaginary inscriptions. For psychoanalysis (not only the Freudian), the body is at the intersection between the psychic and somatic due to its drive, i.e., within the complex and multidimensional game between the material (the organic), the immaterial (the representational) and a sort of indiscernible blend between both (the drive). To circumscribe this problematic and create reflections about it, these three records must be considered.

When Freud showed that the body revealed by hysteria was not the same as the one from anatomy, it was because he understood that the hysterical body is traversed by the popular language and not by science. This difference between the scientific body and the popular body, exemplarily evidenced by the hysterical conversion symptom, inaugurated the distinction between the body from biology and the body from psychoanalysis – which was clearly formulated when the inventor of psychoanalysis concluded that the hysteria behaved as if the anatomy did not exist or as if it did not have knowledge of the anatomy. The symbolic representation was at stake in hysterical symptoms, which were very common at that time, more precisely that of the popular language of the organs and the body in general. For this reason the paralysis or hysterical blindness were not caused by injuries or dysfunction of the organs involved, in fact, they were caused by representational processes. When considering any injury, as Freud claimed in 1893, it would be located in the idea of the arm and not on the arm itself (Freud, 1893/1976). Thus, the hysterical body would be ill by its symbolic representation, not by an anatomical or clinical injury. This aspect would only serve to affirm that the concept of body in psychoanalysis is broader and more complex than the idea of a body-organism, since it is also a body-subject that condenses the symbolic and imaginary dimensions.

However, if there is no doubt that the invention of the unconscious was only possible from the rupture with the body anatomical and physiological body from medicine, that does not mean that the body in Freud is a mere representational figure. In other words, in its biological materiality, the body cannot be dismissed as one of the determinations of psychic processes. However, if this is the case, we must ask: where is the place of what is biological in Freudian theory? In addition to the logic of representation, would we find exclusively the drive dimension, or also the organic to which the drive would articulate? To answer these questions, we must resume the Freudian notions of support and demand for life.

To analyze these two concepts, first, we have to differentiate the classical Freudian theory of support and the circumscription that the reference to what is organic had in Lacanian theory (Lacan, 1955/1985, 1964/1985). According to the classical reading of the theory of support formulated by Freud (1905/1976) in “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality”, at first, satisfying the vital needs for the maintenance of life and self-preservation would occur simultaneously to sexual satisfaction, due to the erotic character given to the areas or organs involved in the vital needs and to the contact with the object that provided the satisfaction. From there, sexual drives would become gradually independent of vital needs, constantly imposing a search for the repetition of the first sexual satisfaction. Thus, if on one hand the support represents the resulting relationship from the drive and vital functions, which would be their somatic source and provide them, initially, a specific direction. On the other
hand, it also would stress the gap between the drive and the vital functions. In other words, the support would represent the primitive and intimate relationship and, at the same time, the profound distance between the orders of sexuality and of the preservation of life, pointing to the relationship of both coincidence and difference between self-preservation and sexuality. This is the reason as to why this notion is key to understand the drive (sexual) conceived as the marginal effect of this support-deviation, and as the rupture with the natural order. We also must cite the deepening, revision and singular reading of the concept of support performed by Laplanche and Pontalis. According to Garcia-Roza (1995), the credit for giving prominence to this notion must be given to Laplanche, who studied it even more deeply than Freud (Garcia-Roza, 1995, p. 108).

More than 50 years after the formulation of the theory of support, Jacques Lacan conceived a different perspective from the one proposed by Freud. While Freud associated the emergence of sexual drive to an organic source corresponding to vital needs, Lacan (1964/1985) related the organic reference to demand for life that, unlike Freud, would impose the partiality and the independence of the drives. For the French psychoanalyst, the drive field would not only blend itself with the somatic sources in a mythical beginning, it would point for a radical non-adaptation of human beings. If on the Freudian theory the initial satisfaction of the sexual drive derives from the stimulation of the oral zone during feeding, we can observe that in Lacan, the biological dimension would not involve the provision of a specific initial direction.

More than joining the notion of support, the circumscription of the biological field in Lacan seeks to enhance the understanding of the precariousness of the human body. The idea that there is a biological prematurity in humans is bound to the fact the imaginary needs to be anticipated for the formation of the self as a unit (Lacan, 1949/1966). For Lacan, there is a radical distance between the organs and their functions, and this non-association between both is the condition for the emergence of the erogenous body, understood as a partial body. The organ can acquire an erogenous function if it does not have a determined function (Leclaire, 1979/1992; Miller, 1999). This is where the Lacanian critique to the idea of support comes from. Sexuality would always be taken off the biological, i.e., marked by the inability to reach full satisfaction. The Not des Lebens would be the demand for general satisfaction, and not the coincidence between the drive, its somatic source and, therefore, the drive for satisfaction. As Lacan stressed (1964/1985), oral satisfaction does not come from the ingestion of food, but from the pleasure of what the own mouth is capable of. Therefore, the demand for life would not represent a reference to specific vital needs, such as nutrition, but would express the general need for satisfaction through infinitely variable various ways and objects.

As Assoun (2009) stresses, the Lacanian understanding of the biological registration seeks to emphasize the importance of partiality for the status of the body in psychoanalysis. Considering this understanding, the framing would not be given by the notion of support, but by the notion of organ pleasure, which links the living body and the unconscious life of the organs. The organ pleasure was one of the terms used by Freud to oppose the idea of a pleasure that would be connected to a vital function. As a result from the satisfaction of vital needs, the organ pleasure would precisely express the size of the bias that comprises what Assoun (2009) called “Freudian organology”. From this analysis we can understand how important the reference to biology is, given that it emphasizes that the excitement permeates the organs, characterizing the autoerotic satisfaction of partial drives.

However, according to Miller (2000), the sense of this importance was updated from the advent of molecular biology, which, in his words, supported “Lacan's thesis that the Self will be captured from the signifier and not from nature” (p. 10). To Miller, molecular biology serves mainly as a reference for the idea of a fragmented body, since it reinforces the idea that the living is originally presented in its molecularity, i.e., in its fragmentation. This would renew the understanding that the body, as a unified instance, is the product from the imaginary order. Furthermore, still considering Miller’s understanding, articulating the Lacanian notion of living body to the concept of jouissance may sustain the presence of biology in theory, as it points to a dimension “that is not imaginary or symbolic, but living, a body that is affected by jouissance” (p. 17).

Regardless, what is common to these possible readings about the place of biology in the psychoanalytic conception of the body is the idea that the body, through its processes, pushes the subject to search for a satisfaction that is always partial, that transcends the maintenance of life and can only be a unity in the imaginary. From the conception of psychoanalysis and although it always reinforced the importance of the symbolic covering of the body, Freud understood that it cannot be reduced to its representational dimension because it is source of drives that insistently and constantly pushes the subject, undoing and redoing symbolic connections. For this reason, Leclaire (1979/1992) was able to state that, concurrently and articulately to the symbolic theory, in the Freudian theory of sexuality there is also something that can be understood as “the capacity of the living body”. Abandoning anatomical and physiological conceptions of the body did not lead to its elimination: the drive body is still the living body, although distinct from the anatomical body because it is broader in its capacity to respond to drive tensions. In other words, it is a body conditioned by a drive pressure that, not only needs to be unloaded, it cannot be fully covered by language. There is always something left.
The drive body: the limits of psychic representation

Therefore, the Freudian approach of the body involves both the representation and the drive and these concepts cannot be separated, since the drive is expressed through their representatives, from which, at least one is necessarily inserted in the language dimension. From this, we can claim the existence of a basic indiscernibility between both concepts and a permeability that moves towards any dichotomy between representation and drive: by definition, the representation is one of the forms of expression of the drive. In other words, we must always emphasize the intense and driven dimension of language, without this, language is dead.

Thus, claiming that drive and representation are indistinguishable does not mean that their reasoning are absolutely the same. As pointed by David-Ménard (2000), if there is a direct relationship between sexual jouissance and thought in Freud, the difference between them would be in energy levels that each involves. In “Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning, Freud (1911/1976) showed that there is no opposition between the pursuit of pleasure and the act of thinking. While the first would relate to the immediate discharge – pleasure principle –, the second would result from and operate a delay of this discharge in favor of a more effective satisfaction – reality principle. Ultimately, both principles seek the discharge and satisfaction: enjoyment (jouissance) and thinking would be expressions of the forms of energy distribution in the psychic apparatus. Allowing the activity of thought would be the postponement of the discharge and pleasure, which would not oppose the sexual jouissance or the order of the drive body.

Because the living body is jouissance and thought, passion and spirit, we can understand how the Freudian thought dissolved the Cartesian dualism in which the body and the mind would be radically different and would not need anything but themselves to exist. Freudian theory, contrary to and despite the drive dualities from 1905 and 1920, is anchored on a drive monism: sexual or of self-preservation, of life and death, it is always about the same drive body. Moreover, the mere alternation between different modes of psychic inscription and materialized discharge, be it immediately in and through the body, or in its inhibition and postponement, condition that allows thought. Thus, what is at stake is how the intensities are (or are not) regulated. For this reason, David-Ménard (2000) proposes the psyche to be defined as an instrument of pleasure-displeasure and anguish and, at the same time, as an instrument of thinking that puts into action movements that seek to meet the purpose of satisfaction and jouissance. In other words, for David-Ménard, if “the hysterical body thinks” (p. 17), this occurs due to an existing and necessary permeability between the body, jouissance and representation, which opposes the existence of a dualistic thought in Freud’s works.

This question is important for shedding light on the psychoanalytic definition of psyche, which, for various reasons throughout its history, referred mainly to the role of representations, consequently, reinforcing the dominance of the representation and of the signifier. However, as we have seen, in addition to and as fundamental as the representational dimension, the concept of drive appears as the theoretical terrain that reveals the substantial indistinction between body and psyche in metapsychology. Freud (1915/1976) started the essay “Instincts and their vicissitudes” associating and, at the same time, differentiating the drive from a physiological stimulus, from the reflex arc model. If there is no way to escape the incessant pressure exerted by the drive – this is the main argument from Freud’s 1915 essay – it is necessary to seek possible destinations for drive excitation. The source of the drive is the somatic process, but its destinations involve psychic processes that, in turn, necessarily return to the body. Derived from the body, the drive returns to it, making it, at the same time, the source and the destination. Simultaneously, the body is both the drive source and the vehicle that allows the discharge that leads to experiencing satisfaction (Andrade, 2003; Birman, 2009; Winograd & Mendes, 2009).

From 1920, after the formulation of the Freudian concept of death drive, the drive dynamics were inscribed beyond the pleasure principle, in which the nirvana principle would cause the psychic apparatus to try zero out all stimulation received. The death drive was defined as the cause of psyche impairments and at its limit, of the decomposition of the psychic apparatus, thus, in opposition, the life drive was responsible to promote the link between the internally circulating excitations. Going further, when detached from life drive, the death drive would trigger movements aspiring total discharge. This would occur because the detachment of the drives would lead their sudden increase, in an abrupt and traumatic movement with an overflow effect of what was not captured by the psychic connections (Fortes, 2008).

Simply put, if we believe that the drive is an expression of a body never fully covered by representation, by reversing the reasoning we can affirm that the drive body is the source and the limits of representation, in the region before and after the pleasure principle, it is the excess drive because it is not linked to and covered by representation. The abrupt discharges and violent movements of intensification and drainage operate from and towards the body. The body that exists now is no longer hysterical, symbolic and paradigmatic as it was at the beginning of psychoanalysis, it is now an intensive and excessive body.

Therefore, there are two dimensions of the Freudian approach of the body to Fernandes (2003, 2011): the symbolic and the excessive. Between them, there is always a tension between what Fernandes (2003, 2011) called representation body and drive overflowing body. The author proposes that there is a dual existence of the
role of the body in Freudian theory, a double rationality that indicates that both forms – representational and overflowing bodies – reflect the central traits of the metapsychological function of the body and offer a fruitful way of comprehension of its presence, both in theory and in practice.

Similarly, Winograd and Mendes stress that to understand which body is being cared for in psychoanalysis, we must consider that Freud did not address the body only in its symbolic and imaginary aspect, but also its biological and drive traits. Additionally, for these authors, Freudian theory is not limited to only two possible body dimensions, they invite us to consider the possibility of the biological body in Freud’s works. As already mentioned, we can claim existence of three body records for a metapsychology of the body in Freud – biological, representational and drive –, considering that these records are not isolated, but have impacts and reverberations among them.

In this perspective, studying the various aspects of the metapsychological body is particularly important for us when we propose a general mapping of central issues on the subject of body in Freudian theory. The idea that there is a double rationality of the place of the body in Freudian theory and the emphasis on the importance of biology as being equally determinant of what occurs within the subject are, to us, essential for the purpose of this article, which is, raising some points to reflect on the current debate on the topic of the body in psychoanalysis.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this article sought to draw a panorama on the place of the body in the current psychoanalytic setting, highlighting some areas of research and analysis that we consider central for the understanding of the current conceptual and clinical frame and this problem. In this perspective, we believe that discussions on the emphasis that contemporary culture gives to the body and the effects of this emphasis on psychoanalytic clinical practice must be discussed in conjunction with the metapsychological body, which was presented here considering its different aspects, namely, the records of the drive body, biological body and representational body in psychoanalysis. These are key conceptual pieces that deserve more study so the psychoanalytic understanding about this subject is expanded, helping the psychoanalyst in the conflicts and challenges posed by the current clinical practice.

Algumas reflexões sobre o corpo no cenário psicanalítico atual

Resumo: Busca-se levantar indagações centrais acerca da presença do corpo na clínica psicanalítica e na cultura contemporânea. Para tal finalidade, examina-se o quanto essa problemática participa das transformações sociais testemunhadas nas últimas décadas. Em seguida, compara-se o corpo da biologia e o corpo da psicanálise, a fim de enfatizar a especificidade deste último. Esse problema remete à noção psicanalítica de corpo pulsional, aos limites da representação psíquica em psicanálise e à afirmação de que há nesse campo uma permeabilidade entre o registro da pulsão e o da representação. Além desses dois registros, o artigo propõe também incluir o corpo biológico como uma das dimensões do corpo metapsicológico em Freud.

Palavras-chave: corpo, psicanálise, clínica psicanalítica, contemporaneidade.

Quelques réflexions sur le corps dans le scénario psychanalytique actuel

Résumé: On cherche à soulever des questions centrales au sujet de la présence du corps dans la clinique psychanalytique et la culture contemporaine. À cet effet, on examine comment cette problématique participe des transformations sociales témoignées au cours des dernières décennies. Ensuite on compare le corps de la biologie au corps de la psychanalyse pour souligner la spécificité de celui-ci. Ce problème renvoie à la notion psychanalytique du corps pulsionnel, aux limites de la représentation psychique en psychanalyse et à l’affirmation selon laquelle il y a dans ce domaine une indiscernabilité basique entre le registre de la pulsion et celui de la représentation. En plus de ces deux dimensions, l’article souligne l’importance d’inclure le corps biologique comme l’une des dimensions du corps métapsychologique en Freud.

Mots-clés: corps, la psychanalyse, la clinique psychanalytique, contemporanéité.

Algunas reflexiones sobre el cuerpo en la escena psicoanalítica actual

Resumen: Se busca levantar indagaciones centrales sobre la presencia del cuerpo en la clínica psicoanalítica y en la cultura contemporánea. Con este propósito, se examina cuánto esta problemática participa en las transformaciones sociales
atestiguadas en las últimas décadas. Enseguida se compara el cuerpo de la biología con el cuerpo del psicoanálisis, a fin de enfatizar la especificidad de este último. Este problema se remite a la noción psicoanalítica de cuerpo pulsional, a los límites de la representación psíquica en el psicoanálisis y a la afirmación de que hay en este campo una indiscernibilidad básica entre el registro de la pulsión y el de la representación. Además de estos dos registros, el artículo destaca la importancia de incluir también el cuerpo biológico como una de las dimensiones del cuerpo metapsicológico en Freud. Palabras clave: cuerpo, psicoanálisis, línica psicoanalítica, contemporaneidad.

Palabras clave: cuerpo, psicoanálisis, línica psicoanalítica, contemporaneidad.

Referencias
