The game of senses in psychoanalysis: otherness, truth and construction

Mauricio Rodrigues Souza*

Universidade Federal do Pará, Instituto de Psicologia. Belém, PA, Brasil

Abstract: This article is a contribution to the debate concerning the problem of otherness in psychoanalysis. For this purpose, it focuses on the notion of construction, discussing the dilemma of imposition/negotiation of meaning in the clinical setting through a theoretical research that enhances two specific perspectives: the Freudian original one, closest to the realism of an equivalence between metapsychologies and the expressions of the unconscious, and that other later suggested by Serge Viderman, constructivist and skeptical about the possibilities of well-defined correspondences between clinical phenomena and predetermined theoretical representations. In conclusive terms, after approaching some dialogues proposed by Luís Claudio Figueiredo between psychoanalysis, temporality, narrativity and elements of Heidegger’s philosophy, it defends an interpretative ideal that metabolizes and embodies the speech that is directed to it, but that also supports and holds its inner differences, revealing an availability to the movement of thought itself.

Keywords: psychoanalysis, otherness, truth, construction.

This article can be understood as a contribution to the debate concerning the problem of otherness based on the specificity of psychoanalytic framework. To this end, a particular notion is referenced: that concerning the construction. In these terms, its main intention is to demonstrate the undulations of the concept in question and, along with them, discuss the problem of the imposition/negotiation of meaning also in the type of knowledge conceived by Freud. Thus, after some initial comments of a more conceptual nature, it will explain in details two important contributions directly related to the abovementioned subject: the original Freudian one (Freud, 1937/1976) and the one later suggested by Serge Viderman (1990).

In this path, it will move between the poles defined by two distinct approaches. The first, of a more realistic nature, is marked both by an ideal of equivalence between the metapsychologies and the expressions of the unconscious and by the belief in the existence of “buried” truths to be reached by the analytical pair. The second, eminently constructivist, while suspecting the possibility of well-defined correspondences between clinical phenomena and predetermined theoretical representations, emphasizes that the effectiveness of psychoanalysis would depend not exactly on the discovery of the past traumas, but on the generation of more or less coherent narratives in the here and now of the analytic encounter, narratives that would take into account the interaction between the theoretical arsenal of the analyst and the stories brought by each subject who submits to treatment (Ahumada, 1999; Figueiredo, 1998).

Considering this, it is worth asking: which of these paths to choose? Maybe neither of them, since, as pointed by Figueiredo (1996, 1998), the difference imposed by the other in the context of clinical practice is inseparable from the difference represented by the unconscious itself, owner of a particular temporality and narrative that refuse any submission to representational thought. The implications of this affirmation are enormous and are established on the observation that, despite the undeniable quality of realizing devices, in the virtual space and potential of the analytical encounter the metapsychologies can and should function as de-realizing devices. Only in this way they will provide to the unconscious a space of openness and figurability where it can express itself precisely in its untimeliness, in a radical otherness that founds the very psychoanalysis.

Therefore, here are the topics that will guide the following pages. For us to get to them, however, it becomes important that first we observe a little more closely some intriguing conceptual outlines that the verb construct acquired over the years in psychoanalytic thought.

But what does “construction” mean in analysis?

According to Laplanche and Pontalis (1992), it is a “Term proposed by Freud to designate an elaboration of the analyst more extensive and more distant from the material that the interpretation, and essentially intended to reconstitute in its simultaneously real and fantastic aspects a part of the subject’s childhood history” (p. 97). As can be observed, there is here a seemingly more comprehensive and less immediate character of construction, which, aiming at the recovery of forgotten elements (read: repressed) of the primeval history of the subject, would take into account elements from two
realities that are distinct, yet complementary: the material and the psychic.

Then, Laplanche and Pontalis (1992) add to their description some interesting comments. For example, that it would be complicated – and even “little desirable” – to seek to keep the definition of construction originally proposed by Freud (1937/1976), according to them somewhat restricted in its excessive approach to technique. Thus, beyond the work of the analyst in its clinical setting, the French authors include in the concept of construction the fantasies and/or elaborations of the very subject under analysis, suggesting the idea that, more than the structuring by the treatment, here it would be the wider problem of unconscious structures in themselves.

A few years later, it is also in a direct relationship with interpretation that Kaufmann (1996) refers to the concept of construction in analysis. Thus, he considers the latter as a tool used by Freud (1937/1976) aimed at, among other things, a restraint or moderation of the interpretative omnipotence that some damage had caused in the history of the psychoanalytic movement (Freud, 1910/2013).

Corroborating this perspective, a work such as Roudinesco and Plon (1998) adds, also, another important information: that the potentiality of construction as analytical tool was not restricted to the context of clinical practice, also being used by Freud in his metapsychological discussions and works on art and culture. According to the authors:

in this respect, it could be said that construction is, at the same time, the quintessence of interpretation and a critique of interpretation, insofar as it enables to restore coherently the global significance of a subject’s history rather than sticking to the apprehension of some symptomatic details. Freud used permanently this process of construction, both in his analyses ... and in his assumptions about metapsychology or the death drive, or also in his literary works about Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) or Moses. (Roudinesco & Plon, 1998, p. 389)

Despite such comments functioning as brief introduction to the topic, they certainly are no substitute for reading the original text in which Freud (1937/1976), dealing with accusations that the clinical treatment he conceived would be directly associated with suggestion, approaches directly the topic of the analyst’s constructions. And, in so doing, he seeks, among other things, to relativize the notion and the criteria of truth with which psychoanalysis works. Thus, let’s let him speak.

Realism vs. constructivism in psychoanalysis

First part: the sense of a return to Freud

Freud’s article (1937/1976) starts with a response to the assertion that, in the case of the analyst’s work, reason would always be on his side. After all, suggested at the time the critics of psychoanalysis, any readily accepted interpretation would show to be appropriate in itself, while attempts at opposition by the patient would mean only neurotic resistances.

Given these arguments, combined with the acceptance of the fact that a negative response by the patient in general does not dissuade the analyst from his interpretative choices, Freud (1937/1976) considers worth examining how are evaluated the yes and no as possible responses of the subject under analysis. Accordingly, recalling some of the main postulates of psychoanalysis, it is highlighted as fundamental task of the analyst conducting the patient towards the abandonment of childhood repressions that would result in current suffering, which should be replaced with other reactions more mature in psychic terms.

To this end, points out Freud (1937/1976), it would be necessary to promote the remembrance both of certain momentarily forgotten experiences and of the motions of affection resulting therefrom, resorting, for such a task, to the precious aid of a series of materials provided by the patient. Examples would be ideas and fragments of dream, as well as the repetition of affections obtained through transfer.

Also according to Freud (1937/1976), the fundamental interest of such reminiscing work would lie in establishing a framework as sound and reliable as possible in terms of a reconstitution of past – and now apparently forgotten – events of the life of the patient. In other words, the analyst would be responsible for: “deducting the forgotten from the clues left by the patient; or rather: for constructing it” (Freud, 1937/1976, p. 260). With that, Freud (1937/1976) proposes an interesting relationship between the analyst’s activity and that other, of the archaeologist – both founded on a process of reconstruction.

A little ahead, however, Freud (1937/1976) establishes a difference between archaeology and psychoanalysis which will prove to be important, considering our purposes. This is when he shows us his belief both in ultimately preserving repressed psychic content – and, thus, away from consciousness – and in the capacity of the analytical work for a recover of such material. Above all, possibly, in its complete form. In his own terms:

it should be taken into account, however, the fact that he who exhumes deals with destroyed objects, of which large and important fragments were hopelessly lost. ... Then, only and exclusively the
reconstruction remains, which, as a result, very often cannot achieve more than a certain similarity. Something else occurs with the psychic object, whose prehistory the analyst seeks to establish. Here is achieved regularly that which in relation to the archaeological object only occurs in exceptional, fortunate cases ... All the essential remains conserved, even what seems completely forgotten is, however, present somehow and somewhere, just buried, inaccessible to the individual. ... It depends only on the analytical technique that that which is hidden can or cannot be brought to light completely. (Freud, 1937/1976, p. 261-262)

The text goes on with other very relevant considerations. For example, a timely comparison between the notions of interpretation and construction”. Here, ponders Freud (1937/1976) – in spite of the greater fame of first and also of some confusion between the two – it is the second that effectively should be more taken into account if we wanted to describe the qualities of psychoanalytic technique. After all, instead of pointing to elements isolated from the material provided by the patient (role of interpretation), construction would put the subject before a truly greater portion, albeit fragmented, of his life history.

However, questions Freud (1937/1976), what guarantees can be used to assure the veracity and even the therapeutic utility of such constructs? Before seeking answers to this question, the author finds comfort in his own clinical practice. According to him, it would allow him to support that, disregarded a certain waste of time or even a possible bad impression about the person of the analyst, no other more serious consequence would be caused to the analytical process by the isolated mistake represented by a bad construction (Freud, 1937/1976). What could occur, in this case, would be a non-response from the patient, untouched by what was just heard. Here is the cue for the assumption of error by the analyst, who, without losing his authority, could, on another occasion, report the error to the patient, adding to his report a more appropriate construction.

Without losing sight of the guiding principle of his reasoning – that is, the defense of psychoanalysis in relation to the accusation of, ultimately, acting through suggestion, neglecting the patients’ responses to the constructions that are proposed to them – Freud (1937/1976) then makes a few comments about the ambiguity of both the yes and the no that can follow a construction of the analyst. This is because, although both can contain in themselves an indisputable degree of legitimacy, it would not be possible to rule out the hypothesis that they were operating under the baton of the resistance. Moreover,

as all construction of this type is incomplete, since it covers only a small fragment of the forgotten event, we always have the freedom to assume that the subject under analysis is not properly unaware of what was reported to him, and rather that his contradiction comes legitimized by the yet undiscovered fragment. As a rule, he will only externalize his consent when he becomes aware of all the truth, which can be quite extensive. The only safe interpretation of his “no” is, then, that it (construction) is not integral. (Freud, 1937/1976, p. 264)

Therefore, once demonstrated the precariousness of the patient’s direct answers as single criterion to validate or not the constructions under analysis, Freud (1937/1976) draws attention to the possibilities provided by some other reactions of more indirect character. Among them, he cites as examples the “I have never thought (or I never would have thought) that” – typical phrase and that would be equivalent to something like: “yes, you’re right, this time, about the functioning of my unconscious” – and the occurrence in the subject under analysis of certain complementary memories and/or associations with content notoriously close to that of the construct stated by the analyst.

Finally, still regarding the establishment of reliable parameters in terms of greater or smaller effectiveness of a construction, Freud (1937/1976) readdresses the importance of considering the patient’s behaviors, associated, in turn, with the type of transfer (positive or negative) established along the therapeutic relationship. Thus: “if the construction is false, it does not modify the patient; but, if it is correct or close to the truth, the reaction to it will be a clear worsening of symptoms and general condition” (Freud, 1937/1976, p. 266).

That is the way, reaffirming his argumentation in favor of psychoanalysis, that Freud (1937/1976) condenses what he said so far. In addition, he takes the opportunity to defend the clinical practice from any accusations about naïve pretensions of ultimate certainty to be achieved, noting that the constructions under analysis would deserve the safeguarding of, also, containing a hypothetical nature:

Synthetically, we can establish that we do not deserve the censorship of disdaining the position adopted by the subject under analysis in relation to our constructions. We take it into account and often extract from it valuable supporting points. However, these patient reactions are often ambiguous and do not allow a definitive decision. Only the continuation of analysis can decide if our construction is correct or not viable. Each construction is assumed by us just as a conjecture that awaits to be examined, confirmed, or discarded. (Freud, 1937/1976, p. 266)

By continuing his discussion, Freud (1937/1976) rehearses some comments about the fact that it would not always be viable to follow the ideal path that would
lead from analyst construct to patient memory. It is interesting to note, however, that, shortly thereafter, he asserts that an analysis well done would hold the power to cause a too strong conviction about the veracity of certain constructions, which, in practice, would mean a therapeutic result similar to the recovery of a repressed memory. That is, albeit in other terms, there seems to be here a certain recognition of the value and even of the use of suggestion in psychoanalysis, possibility that is eminently rejected over the preceding paragraphs.

Unfortunately, Freud (1937/1976) avoids delving into the topic, opting to talk about another phenomenon that, in his opinion, would bring with it other issues of greater magnitude. This is the curious fact that certain correct constructions evoke in patients memories that, although very clear, would not be directly related to the event that was sought to be (re)constructed. For example, a subject under analysis that describes in detail some faces and furniture present when there was a possibly traumatic occurrence, however, never the event itself, which could be taken as the manifestation of a powerful resistance that would shift to objects of smaller signification the emerging drive set in motion by communicating the construction.

Continuing the reading of Freud’s text (1937/1976), it shows the analogy proposed by the author between the abovementioned memories and hallucinations of a psychotic nature, both possibly associated with the pressure exerted by a return of previously repressed psychic contents:

Maybe this is a universal trait of hallucination – not appreciated sufficiently well so far – that in it returns something long experienced and soon forgotten, something the child saw or heard at the time he or she barely had access to language and that now forces its emergence towards consciousness, probably disfigured and shifted by effect of the forces that oppose such return. And, if hallucination is taken in a closer way to certain forms of psychosis, our deduction can take one more step. Perhaps the delusional formations which we often find associated with these hallucinations are not as independent of the drive emerging from the unconscious and of the return of the repressed as we supposed before. (Freud, 1937/1976, p. 268)

With that, Freud (1937/1976) opens space for the thesis that the emerging drive could take advantage of the distancing from objective reality in an attempt to impose its contents to consciousness, being up to the resistances and the tendency to fulfill desire the role of masking and/or shifting the material to be remembered. Anyway, one might think here (even in the case of psychosis) of a formation of commitment equivalent to that produced by the mechanism of dream.

As an immediate result of such line of reasoning, comes to us the Freudian proposition that, in the midst of the psychic reality, it would be possible to reach the traumatic fragment of a historic-experiential truth. And more: that this would found, at least in a sense, both madness and the very work of the analyst, which would turn to a new form of therapeutic approach to delirium.

Still under the influence of such ideas, Freud (1937/1976) proposes a last analogy. This time, between the patient’s deliriums and the analyst’s constructions, both thought of as attempts of cure and/or explanation. There would be, however, limits to this approach, since the first would not go beyond a replacement of the fragment of reality rejected in the past. Thus, as we saw above, it would be up to psychoanalysis to reveal the connections between the material provided by the current rejection and the content originally repressed, and it could even conjecture about the content of reminiscence present in the very delusional contents. Here is the final message of Freud’s text, expressed by him in the following terms:

Just as our construction produces its effect by restoring a biographical fragment (“Lebengeschichte, “objective history of life”) from the past, delirium also owes its power of persuasion to the part of historical-experiential truth that it puts in place of the rejected reality. Indeed, it would also apply to delirium the assertion that, some time ago, I declared as exclusive of hysteria. Namely, that the patient suffers from his reminiscences. (Freud, 1937/1976, p. 269-270)

Whether we accept it fully or not, the fact is that the whole argument of Freud (1937/1976) in favor of psychoanalysis in relation to the always recurring accusations of suggestion and/or quackery provides us with a considerable range of themes for reflection – particularly concerning the establishment of criteria for the clinical “truths.” For example, when it calls our attention to the ambiguity of the yes and no coming from subjects under analysis, ambiguities that, often associated with enormous resistances to treatment, lose the status of clear and definitive answers concerning the progresses or regresses of the analytical process.

In this same sense of relativization of parameters that could measure the greater or smaller effectiveness of psychoanalysis, it is also worth remembering that Freud (1937/1976) safeguards his practice by denying it the claim to ultimate certainty, emphasizing instead the hypothetical and approximate character of the analytical construction. In fact, it would be an uncertainty constituting the analyst’s very work, as determined by the object of study: the unconscious, so refractory to the dictates of instrumental reason to the extent of forcing us to recognize the existence of a division in reality, now split into psychic and material.

Anyway, in spite of these important clarifications, it does not seem possible to dispel definitely the impression that the enlightened in Freud still remains...
a prisoner of the belief in “buried” truths to be reached by the analytical pair. To put it in a different way, we return to the question of the possibility of a true conscious translation of the psychic material of the other scene (that of the unconscious). This is the opinion of an author such as Viderman (1990), on which we will focus from now on.

**Second part: Serge Viderman and the construction of the analytical space**

To better support his own (and poignant) argument, Viderman (1990) follows a path through much of Freud’s work to point in it an only partial abandonment of the Neurotic, or theory of seduction, which – it is worth remembering – related to the beginnings of psychoanalysis, postulated the existence of a childhood trauma of sexual nature as etiological origin of neurosis. In fact, suggests the French psychoanalyst, even with the later emphasis on the Oedipus complex (which gives greater openness to fantasy and, with it, to the desiring and imaginary dimension of seduction), Freud would never have ceased to seek the “sources of the Nile” of psychopathology. That is, the delimitation of an undeniable historical event that, also, founded the very theoretical framework of psychoanalysis.

According to Viderman (1990), however, it could very well be asked: would it be even possible to clinically reconstruct the history of a patient? If so, based on what? It is considering such issues that Viderman (1990) dedicated to what he called the diffractions of the analytic space, directly associated, according to him, with the dynamics of the transference phenomenon, which, let us recall, initially constituted a setback to the analytical work, but would later acquire the status of essential tool for a supposed recovery of experiences until then inaccessible to memory. The problem according to Viderman (1990) is that, in order to manage such an instrument, there would have been created the ideal of an analyst free of ambiguities that, with absolute transparency, would collect the essence of the past projected by the patient.

We have reached an important moment of the work of Viderman (1990), which reminds us that the search for truth in psychoanalysis and, by derivation, the very constitution of the analytical setting – including the demarcation of roles, the management of the transference, and the abovementioned ideal of psychoanalyst neutrality – do not appear by chance, but are guided by a previously defined theoretic arsenal. This finding is crucial, since it leads Viderman (1990) to point a progressive reordering in terms of transference, now no longer associated with discovery, but with creation.

A natural consequence of such discussion appears in the emphasis of Viderman (1990) as to the importance of countertransference, since, according to this point of view, not only the theory would previously delimitate the analytical field, but also the very person of the analyst would have relevant participation in this process. According to the author, denying this fact would mean incurring serious mistake. After all, such conception is not abstracted only from the evidence that it was by unilateral decision of the analyst that such situation was imposed, but also (and it is equally the most important and more laden with consequences), that it is on his attitude and his decisions that will depend, in fact, all development of cure... In this sense, it is not possible to separate the means from the end — in other words: separate that which was obtained from that through which and by whom it was obtained. ... Believing that the analyst precisely does not respond is to avoid posing the problem, problem that depends on the real understanding of the analytical process. (Viderman, 1990, p. 44)

We have there that the paradox of the analyst’s situation would lie in the difficulty in finding a sort of Archimedean point capable of sustaining the balance between observation and participation, which would only confirm the coefficient of uncertainty to which would be submitted any discovery of meaning in psychoanalysis, thus making inviable the “purity” of the Freudian claim of reaching the truth through neutrality. Given this aporia, it is highlighted the problem of excessive stress on either interpretation or on the one that states it, in the second case, in particular, with the danger that the analyst’s task was reduced to a mere set of regulatory rules.

Viderman (1990), then, advances in his argument explaining in detail the relationship between psychoanalysis and language, identifying this as a network of intelligibility that the analyst would cast on the unconscious, organizing a second degree reality that would not necessarily be equivalent to the crude qualities of drive. Thus, also considering the overdetermined character of the symptom, it would be possible to sustain only conjectures that, in turn, would mean no safe havens, but new ambiguities for a meaning that would not be anywhere if not in the very reading. Therefore, contrary to the perspective previously defended by Freud (1937/1976), here is the clear proposal that the history made in the analytical situation, in the analysis path that the analyst constructs through language, is not the archaeological reconstitution of a building ravaged by time whose disappeared set could be replaced by the discovery of the trace of a column... In the interpretation of fantasy there is no conventional bond between signifier and signified. The signifier, contradicting all linguistic laws, does not lead us to a signified concept existing independently; rather, it makes it exist by saying it. (Viderman, 1990, p. 58-59)
We can understand, thus, the huge emphasis given by the work of Viderman (1990) to the conceptual apparatus that precedes the interpretation, which appears as artificial representation, but not absolutely arbitrary – since guided by a theory – that would aim to bring together in the word the drive shattered by the patient’s defenses. To that end, it would organize associations often superficial in an order structured by theoretical models that, previously established, would subvert what is said from the couch. That is, it would, inevitably, be an arbitrary choice of meaning, even if justified by good technical reasons.

Then, says Viderman (1990), in the case of clinical activity, there would be no rigid separation between lie and truth, but a dialectic of opposites in which the lie, in its own way, would also be a truth to be constructed in and by the analytical situation. How, then, asks the author, to seek “scientific” guarantees to support interpretations of the word of others? Acting in this manner, would end up leading to the same paradox of Freud (1937/1976): that of intending to base the construction of fantasies on elements that are supposedly real in historical terms.

In fact, psychoanalysis would become a result of the encounter between a theory that guides certain lines of reasoning and the clinical procedure – strictly associated, in turn, with the transference phenomenon, unique and related with the particularities of each case. From the mixture of these two elements comes the fundamental assertion of Viderman (1990), according to which there would not be one ultimate truth of the Platonic type to be reached by the analytical pair, with the knowledge conceived by Freud holding the status of something inevitably constructed in and by the restricted space of the setting. That would invalidate any claim to, at the same time, emphasizing its extraordinary character and limiting its explosive force to a fixed and predictable framework such as that of the experimental situation. And it is precisely there, concludes Viderman (1990), that would lie the fertile potential of psychoanalysis both as a therapeutic modality and in the quality of research branch. Its main virtue? Being supported not on the technical rigor, formalist and generalizing, but on an appreciation for the individual that, ready to take the risk of error, would acquire an air of aesthetic of creation.

It seems, therefore, that we are in an impasse that focuses directly on the object of this article: the problem of otherness and the imposition/negotiation of meaning in psychoanalysis. In these terms, the question is how to reconcile the vestiges of realism in Freud (1937/1976) – that is, his “archaeology” present on the hypothesis of possible historical-existential origins for the psychic trauma – with the constructivism proposed by Viderman (1990), according to which the unconscious, never a natural element, would express itself solely through a (meta)language that, by telling fantasy, would also create it. Well, which of the two parties is right in this dispute? Or could it be that, overcoming dichotomies of simplistic character, there would be some other way of thinking about the issue? In our last paragraphs, we will focus on the latter alternative.

**Final considerations**

On the pages above we have established a counterpoint between two trends that seek space in psychoanalysis. We talked about constructivists and realists. As to the first ones, here represented particularly by Viderman (1990), their main characteristic is, roughly speaking, emphasizing the lack of guarantees of correspondence between the representation and the represented thing. In clinical terms, this means the hypothesis of a perennial inadequacy between the metapsychologies and the functioning of the psychic apparatus. Therefore, we also have in the constructivist perspective the frustration of any expectation that the interpretations or constructions in analysis show to be adequate as instrument for contact with the “true” history of the subject who submits to treatment.

While the versions of psychoanalysis that seek support in an epistemology of the realist type, apparently closer to the perspective originally conceived by Freud (1937/1976), seem to be united in the belief concerning the possibility of obtaining clinical knowledge that is reliable and independent of subjective “contaminations.” In spite, perhaps, of the good intentions present in such discourse, the problem starts to appear when we observe more closely the issue of the facts. After all, this is a shifting ground on which truth acquires marked contours of precariousness, since it is invariably crossed by the artifices of the unconscious.

Then, once configured such counterpoint, which – it is important to add – brings with it a considerable didactic dimension, now it should be emphasized that our movement will not be to remain in the sphere of a merely descriptive comparison between realists and constructivists, demolishing, perhaps, the idea of an absolute opposition between them. Rather, following closely a perspective previously advocated by Figueiredo (1994a, 1995, 1998, 2002) based on readings of the dialogues of Heidegger (1956/1989, 1990) with the idea of modernity – dialogues marked by questioning of the so-called “metaphysics of presence,” according to which there would be consistency and/or permanence of the being in time and in space –, we are interested in demonstrating that both (realists and constructivists) are incompatible with what is suggested and even required by analytical practice, since they adopt a conception of experience that, surely, should be rethought.

And why? Well, considering the danger of, following much of the tradition of Western thought, continuing taking this same experience under the primacy of presentification – that is, as that which takes place in the presence, leaving to memory and expectation the predicate of deficient modes of finding something...
that would be revealed in its greatest fullness only or preferably in the perception of the here and now. In this perspective, it is worth noting, the past appears as a “was present,” and the future as a “will be present,” while the narrative would have the role of bringing them together (past and future) in a single and “true” present.

But what is the implication of this for our discussion so far? As well pointed out by Figueiredo (1998), it appears more clearly if we consider that, in the opposition between realists and constructivists that we highlight here, it does not matter, in a final analysis, if the narrative appears taken “as reconstruction (reproduction) or construction (creation)” (p. 277). After all: “What matters is seeing that the meaning of experience as presentification is the same in both cases” (Figueiredo, 1998, p. 277).

Something different occurs, however, if we take into account the untimely character of the unconscious, the Freudian Nachträglichkeit as theoretical elaboration of the traumatic effects of events “of the past” updated through certain conditions provided by subsequent events. Here, the presence loses its status of foundation of experience because the out of time comes to be recognized as an integral and inseparable part of all that takes place as presentified experience. This is the fundamental difference between psychoanalytic temporality and conventional narrative, that carrying one or more meanings and a well-defined beginning, middle, and end.

In these terms, if time in psychoanalysis changes, so should discourse, which, to acquire greater effectiveness, instead of fabricating beautifully finished tales, should enable an acceptance of the untimely of the unconscious to which we referred above, making it free to exercise its unpredictable germinative activity. It is evidenced here, therefore, a critique of the idea of truth as correspondence, critique which, extending also to the context of analytical clinical activity, is based on the use of a strange or foreign word that, free from merely communicative or representative tasks, responds more from itself, and not from any place preestablished by language or by a specific author. As it is in this manner, in its eminently disruptive character, that it can best favor the development, freeing the subject by reinstalling in him the movement of a history until then paralyzed by the trauma.

As can be observed, this is the search, always provisional and without prior guarantees of success, for a correlation between the renunciation of full representation and the aspiration after meaning. Furthermore, with the hypothesis that, with this openness to difference and incompleteness, there is also openness to the possibility of a discourse that results from listening to the being as abyss, a discourse marked by the approach to the real as a field full of possibilities, and not to reality as closed representation. To put it succinctly, a discourse that situates the word (or the truth) in psychoanalysis in the moment, in the transition between an a priori and an a posteriori of the meaning.

Apparently, we have here a sort of acknowledgement of much of what has been said so far, with the power of construction in analysis appearing not in its logic quality or in its objective correspondence with a “forgotten” past, but in the capacity of providing some figurality to this same past, so what previously was disconnected fragments can be (re)experienced in more elaborate way. And this is how, in broader terms, the very metapsychological dialects can be taken as possible places of listening and acceptance of the radical alterity that founds psychoanalysis, which deals with a man inhabited by that which is not himself.

Therefore, approaching the signifiers with which we worked since the title of this article (otherness, truth, construction, and meaning in psychoanalysis), we argue that, with regard to the type of knowledge and clinical practice conceived by Freud, the interpretive ideal should neither be restricted to the reconstruction of a content or ultimate intention of the patient, nor to a total subjective immersion of the analyst, thus creating a text strictly distinct from its source. Instead, we propose the possibility of a “fabrication of the strange,” here taken as the necessary distancing from any a priori, reductive or defensive understanding, in order to perpetuate in the interpretive process its original strangeness produced by the surprise caused by the difference which the other requires we face (Figueiredo, 1994b; Souza, 2006).

Thus, if any “final consideration” can be taken from this work, whose value seems to reside more in its inclusions, it lies on the recommendation that, as an interpreter, the analyst seeks the middle ground between a translation that metabolizes and incorporates fully the discourse that is directed to him and an other reading that, abdicating oneself, let oneself be flood with the discourse of the other. To that end, to follow the ebbs and flows of this fluid emerging, a very special exercise is imposed: that of waiting, of letting oneself be affected by the unheard of as a condition for the opening to the knowledge of the other as possibility. In other words, it is about sustaining a willingness toward the difference that, not perchance, approaches a willingness toward the very movement of thought.

---

**O jogo dos sentidos em psicanálise: alteridade, verdade e construção**

**Resumo:** Este artigo se apresenta como uma contribuição ao debate acerca do problema da alteridade em psicanálise. Para tanto, remete-se à noção de construção, discutindo o dilema da imposição/negociação de sentido no setting clínico por meio de uma pesquisa teórica que esmiúça duas perspectivas específicas: a original freudiana, mais próxima ao realismo de uma
equivalência entre as metapsicologias e as expressões do inconsciente, e aquela outra, posteriormente sugerida por Serge Viderman, construtivista e desconfiada quanto à possibilidade de correspondências bem-definidas entre fenômenos clínicos e representações teóricas predeterminadas. Em termos conclusivos, após se aproximar de alguns diálogos propostos por Luís Claudio Figueiredo entre psicanálise, temporalidade, narratividade e elementos da filosofia de Heidegger, defende um ideal interpretativo que metabolize a fala que lhe é dirigida, mas que também suporte e acolha as diferenças a ela inerentes, revelando assim uma disponibilidade para com o próprio movimento do pensamento.

**Palavras-chave:** psicanálise, alteridade, verdade, construção.

---

**References**


Received: 10/31/2017
Approved: 8/1/2018