Attentiography of the Body: correlations between Lisa Nelson and Gilbert Simondon’s work from a narrative fragment

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ABSTRACT – Attentiography of the Body: correlations between Lisa Nelson and Gilbert Simondon’s work from a narrative fragment – The paper suggests an interconnection between art and philosophy through approaching the practice of attention upon a section of Tuning Scores, described by the American choreographer and videomaker Lisa Nelson and the individual’s relationship with the environment and with others thought by the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon. Lisa Nelson’s fragment describing the Attentiography of Body is presented in conjunction with Simondon’s characters by covering some interpersonal relationship traits: individuation, individuality, and personality.

Keywords: Tuning Scores. Attentiography. Individuation. Individuality. Personality.


RESUMO – Atenciografia do Corpo: interseções entre Lisa Nelson e Gilbert Simondon a partir de um fragmento de relato – O artigo propõe uma interseção entre arte e filosofia aproximando uma prática de atenção em uma seção de Tuning Scores, descrita pela coreógrafa e video-maker americana Lisa Nelson, à relação do indivíduo com o meio e com outros indivíduos, pensada pelo filósofo francês Gilbert Simondon. O fragmento de descrição de Lisa Nelson acerca da atenciografia do corpo será lido em conjugação com os caracteres que Simondon apresenta na relação interpessoal: individuação, individualização e personalidade.

A woman is entering the space. Or I notice a woman entering the space. Her walking has kidnapped my eyes. Or she has inserted herself into a recently empty room. My eyes have met her there. Or I see her now, she’s entered my image space. I arrive behind my eyes, join her here, see what’s on my plate. I am watching a woman walking away from me. Or I am watching walking. Or my eyes are stalking her heels. I notice I have leaned forward. Or I notice I have begun. I look at her retreating hips. Or I observe her breezy walk. This space is deep. Where is she going? My curiosity, taking its cue from her, is breezy too. I take time to look out a window. And back. I detect her elbow lifting slightly, a small crick of the wrist. She is banking a turn towards where I stand, soon I will see her face.

The description above is from Lisa Nelson1 (2010), during a session of Tuning Scores, a procedure to investigate motion, composition, and human behavior. It expresses what the author herself calls attentiography2 of body. A key term of her research in dance, attentiography is the sensitive mapping of attention as support of the imagination of the body that is positioned in space and prepares to respond to stimuli of the elements through which it moves (Nelson, 2010). Rather than thinking of improvisation as a game of propositions between collaborators in a setting, Lisa Nelson (2010) is interested in how each one organizes one’s movement. Attentiography, therefore, is the reading of the action triggers in improvisation and that involves simultaneously the perception of impulses and the corresponding actions in space.

Attention is constantly shifting, as is imagination, and it is in movement that both intertwine: “Attention never halts, imagination never halts. It is a consequence of attention and vice versa. Emotion never halts” (Coelho, 2012, n. p.). Attention, imagination, and emotion establish the subject’s relation with the world based on his/her orientation in space and corporal coordination in motion and in the movement. Considering this game, Lisa Nelson thinks the creation of a dance originated from the very expression of the dancer as a result of responses to coordinate in the movement and in motion3. But what exactly is the expression and what does it express? On the one hand, it may be the way the dancer presents corporally certain principles and ideas regarding oneself, the dance, and the world. On the other hand, it may be the response to near-invisible forces present in the here and now of composition in dance. Or even both, as the dancer’s atten-
tion floats between them, coordinating oneself while coordinating. Lisa Nelson (2003) reports that her discomfort with the dance in the 1970s was because dancers expressed themselves through everyday movements to put in question the consecrated structure of dance, while she sought a source subjacent to the everyday body4.

Articulating these two perspectives, I will attempt to show, in this article, how expression is the point that distinguishes the multitudinary plan of the movement as singular; or how each individuality realizes into particular movements the collective and impersonal background underlying these movements.

Based on the thought of Gilbert Simondon on individuation, I will show that expression occurs at the level of personality, passage between the individual and individualized level and the mode of participation in the collective. The fragment above describes, first and foremost, an expression and senses that it offers as a trigger of movements. Dancing, therefore, is a case of life, expression of life and that cannot be jettisoned from the world.

I will begin by stating that Lisa Nelson’s report is not the description of a figure nor parts of the view, but the emergence of an event that opens to two different directions at the same time: figure and observer. What the report calls into question is the separation of two entities at the time of description. There is not a subject that observes and another that moves and is observed; there are two movements in reciprocity. The woman who walks constitutes perception problems for the observer; now she is close, now distant, or presents herself as a defined silhouette in space, or as moving parts. Following these elements forces the narrator to self-coordinate her movements because it is always from her point of observation that the woman described expresses different relations in space. Thus, the woman described emits signs that express both her participation in the common plan of humanity and the particular modes of this participation – the joyful walk, the slight rise of elbow. Meanwhile, the one that describes is transformed by the state of joy, the emotion transforms her into her affection; she describes the joy she sees and the joy she feels. Now, the act of description is the way the narrator confers sense to what she sees and to what she feels. In space, the rhythms, the trajectories, the states, are signs that the narrator makes meaningful at the moment she recounts. The narrative is the way to assign signi-
fication to what is perceived, solving the problem of multiplicity of signs. At the same time, the signification makes intelligible the relation of the observer with the woman she describes. The woman described is born to the observer at the time she elects her as object, but the election cannot be prior to the experience. The observer is born for herself, at the same time, because in the act of describing, even in real time, there is already a routing of signs to a sense that will only be resolved for her. Definitely it is not any woman, but a specific woman, that woman, which cannot be described without describing the milieu in which she is and her orientation; this would not be possible if this milieu were not also being inhabited by the one who describes. In the description, attention floats between the trajectories of a particular figure in space and the internal movements of the observer.

There is dramaturgy involved in the process if it is understood as plot, composition of lines that intertwine from a common point that unites the woman described and the observer. It is from this point that one and the other unfold. One is not prior to the other. Who binds who in the plot? The eye, which already expected to be captured in its activity of cropping the space, selecting stimuli – she kidnapped the eyes –, or the figure that emerged before the observer who awaited only this stimulus to commence her activity? Or she entered a recently empty room. Or both? Certainly even more than that, as the observer now fixes eyes on a hip, on a heel, or on the movement. Are these parts apart from the figure? Or is she a set of parts? But what unites them, the figure or the look? All these signs interlace at the instant they acquire signification; the narrative is the dramaturgy of the lines that entwine and make the two characters arise. Three moments of dramaturgy: a woman walks and her walk holds the attention of those who observe – out of all information in the milieu, that one captured the look of the observer. A woman walks in a milieu, woman and milieu complement each other. Something moves, not only the woman who walks, nor she and the milieu, and nor the gaze of the observer, but something else, which, however, they share, although it is not common to any of them.

I propose, initially, that the questions arisen from the fragment of description of Lisa Nelson (2010), presented above, are read in relation to the concepts of individuation, individualization, and personality in Simondon.
To this end, it is necessary to understand what the process of individuation is according to Simondon (2015).

**Individuation**

Dissimilarly from hylemorphic thought, which assumes the birth of an individual by action of a form on a matter, Simondon understands, first of all, the genesis of the individual (ontogenesis) as the action of a germ of formalization in a medium overloaded with potential energy which he calls pre-individual plan, since in it the phases that characterize the genesis and development of the individual are not yet present: “[...] the pre-individual being is the being in which there are no phases” (Simondon, 2015, p. 10); this means that the form does not pre-exist in relation to the medium; the germ of formalization modulates the medium, unfolding and structuring increasingly distant zones; it is the potential energy of the pre-individual plan that is responsible for the movement of taking form.

The pre-individual plan, in turn, experiences metastability. Metastability is characterized by high load of potential energy. The action of the formalization germ changes the metastability; the potential energy, in turn, extends the action of the germ in the direction of realization of a structure. An individual is a structure that is realized by the modal action of a formalization germ in a metastable pre-individual plan, loaded with potential energy. To explain this process, Simondon takes as model the appearance of a physical individual, water crystals, for example: in this process, water molecules gathered in a supersaturated solution (pre-individual, metastable instance) communicate with a crystal germ, i.e., a structured particle, which carries in itself the sign of the form to be created; the appearance and growth of the ice crystal, as a physical individual, operates the communication of these two orders of magnitude: the oversaturated medium and the crystallization germ. From this point, and opening up in all directions, the process of taking form unfolds and structures zones that are increasingly distant from the original center, but carrying, point to point, the information given by the formalization germ. The expansion of formalization zones is called *dephasing* (Simondon, 2015). That is, the individual, according to Simondon (2015, p. 10), shows phases, becoming step by step in the process of individuation. This means that becoming is not an instance that
connects to the being, coming from outside, to deform it subsequently, rather that it is one of the powers of being: “[...] becoming is not a milestone in which being exists; it is dimension of being, mode of resolution of an initial incompatibility that is rich in potential”.

Furthermore, non-formalized oversaturated molecules remain guarding the pre-individual plan in the constitution of the individual in formation. Thus, the pre-individual is in the genesis of the individual and accompanies this individual throughout existence, as an extra one ready to activate new individuations.

Individuation, as resolution of the energetic incompatibilities, brings out not only the individual, but the “individual-medium pair” (Simondon, 2015, p. 10). Muriel Combes (2013, p. 4) exemplifies how dephasing of being originates an individual who mediates between an order of cosmic magnitude and one of inframolecular magnitude:

A plant, for instance, establishes communication between a cosmic order (that to which the energy of light belongs) and an inframolecular order (that of mineral salts, oxygen etc.). But the individuation of a plant does not only give birth to the plant in question. In dephasing, the being always simultaneously gives birth to an individual mediating two orders of magnitude and to a milieu at the same level of the being (thus the milieu of the plant will be the earth on which it is located and the immediate environment with which it interacts).

Dephasing and relation with the milieu is what differentiates the physical individuation from the individuation of the living. The first, in a single blow, determines the phases of its growth: an ice crystal grows the same way, repeating the initial individuation. This is because the physical individual, in arising, establishes a boundary between this individual and the milieu, and its growth will always be within the limits of this boundary.

According to Simondon (2015, p. 14), as opposed to physical individuation, the living, at the time of birth, gives rise to an external associated milieu and also to an internal milieu; such birth does not solve once and for all the incompatibilities with the pre-individual instance, the metastable power it keeps. In this sense, the living is a problem of incompatibility with oneself and the becoming is the movement of the resolutions of this incompatibility: “The living keeps in oneself a permanent individuation activ-
ity; it is not only a result of individuation, as the crystal or molecule, but also theatre of individuation”. Such incompatibilities cannot be resolved in the current structures of the living individual, in this case it is necessary that individuation leaps to broader structures; the becoming of the living individual is that leap to a new structure from a previous one. Thus, it goes from biological individuation to psychic and collective individuation. It is not a continuous progress; each leap is a plunge into the initial conditions of individuation, and so the individuation of the living does not succeed the physics, but stops before it is completed (Simondon, 2015). And every time the new structures compose with new elements available in the milieu without completely abandoning other older ones; the earlier elements remain unusable once and for all, or return in another moment of structuration (Simondon, 2015).

Simondon (2015, p. 502) finds the generalization of this system in the research of North American psychologists Gesel and Carmichael, from the idea of ontogenesis of behavior:

[...] speaking of a human infant about one year old, Gesel finds four successive cycles: reptation; then, crawling, kneeling; extended crawling; finally walking straight. However, the patterns acquired in reptation reach a sort of perfection at the end of the first period; soon, abruptly, when maturation is sufficient, an inadaptation is produced, the child creeps poorly; creeps poorly and rises by the arms, stands on knees; does not advance, is unadapted. Then a new kind of adaptation is sought and, within that new type of adaptation, reuse contralateral ipsilateral relations, of inhibition, of facilitation that existed in reptation; reptation is lost, but the content of reptation is not completely lost, is reincorporated.

Individuation, Individualization, and Personality

In the fragment *The individual and the milieu*, Simondon (2015, p. 336) states that the interpersonal relation summons our individual nature, as a gesture that challenges us, showing “[...] through emotion that the principles of the existences of individuated beings are questioned. Fear, cosmic admiration, affect the being in its individuation and situate it again in itself in relation to the world”. These are states of ordeal that put in question the existence of the individual as individuated being, Simondon continues. One could even say at risk, as a matter of life or death, not necessari-
ly by the allusion to fear in the phrase. These are haunting experiences that show the individual that his existence extends to a much broader plan than he can perceive and only in these moments of risk he may have a vague idea of himself as more than individual (Combes, 2013).

In the fragment of description presented at the beginning of the essay, the narrator is before a woman – a woman is entering the space – and this is the first point of contact. The woman is perceived in that which both have in common, in this case, one might say, humanity. Both are the result of the same process of individuation and in it lies the thrill of being in front of something much larger than oneself. The other questions the limits of the being as individuated.

When, on the other hand, the relation concerns the *individualization*, the other and the milieu are in the plan of the particular and everyday life, taking the one that perceives oneself “[…] in one’s particularity, through the property of familiar things, of the customary and regular events, integrated into the rhythm of life, not surprising, integrated into previous milestones” (Simondon, 2015, p. 336). Individualization has a particular history, spatial and temporal milestones that singularize the problematics of individuation. And there is also a specific mode, a style, a way of being that aggregates itself into the whole of individuation. In the fragment of description, individualization is revealed in the rhythm of hips, in joy, in the slight rise of elbows. The first reality of individuation is not completely outside of the individualization, as well as it is not fully inside.

Individuation is the common structure shared by all human beings or, as argued by Pascal Chabot (2003, p. 112-113), “individuation is transcendent, it concerns the formal structures of the subject”. While individualization is the way each one realizes and gives style to the individuation, based on their history and preferences. The two relations are asymmetrical and, according to Simondon (2015), individuation poses problems for all beings who share it; and in this sense individuation is transcendental. Nevertheless, if the individuals’ communion is at the level of questionings, it is at the level of individualization that the answers operate (Simondon, 2015).

At the same time, every individualized being shares problems proposed by individuation with the others, but diverging from them in dealing with these problems. And Simondon (2015, p. 336) points out that: “The im-
pression of a deep participation or the current perception are the aspects of these two relations. These two types of relation just combine, because they happen in life”. Individuation and individualization combine in life; that means that both participate in the process of continuous genesis that is life. Therefore, each individualized realization for the problems proposed from individuation competes to maintain the living movement of the metastability of the being: “Each thought, each conceptual discovery, each affective emergence is a resumption of the first individuation” (Simondon, 2015, p. 332).

Furthermore, individuation, as transcendental plan, is concretized in each particular mode of existence. However, the particular modes cannot contain the whole of individuation, as the being does not allow itself to be completely individuated. On the other hand, there cannot be a set of non-individualized individuals as well, which means that the being would have been exhausted at the time of individuation. Thus, it is necessary that another figure arises to combine individuation and individualization. Then, Simondon (2015, p. 336) completes: “[...] the personality comprises the presence of two aspects, and the experience that corresponds to the personality is relative to the two conditions”.

Personality is that which maintains the coherence of individuation and the permanent process of differentiation of individualization. Initially there is the individuation of the living, followed by his psychosomatic individualization, the personality makes the transition between the two. It is the personality that articulates the initial moment of individuation with the continuous movement of individualization, since, without it, both would remain as two closed and uncommunicable substances. Thus, there would be absolute common or absolute individualities. According to Barthélémy (2012, p. 220), the personalization “[...] enables the transition from the properly vital regime of individuation to the psychosocial regime; the individual personality is built within a group that has its own unit and its own group personality”. Founded on the personality the particular individuals come into the community; if on the one hand they differ, on the other they share the same individuation.

Consequently, the narrative cannot be a cropping of a figure separated from the space and from other figures; as argued by Simondon (2015), this is not a case of communication between consciousnesses. Both communi-
cate in that regarding which they differ, that is, the unique way of corres-
ponding to the common problems proposed by the individuation they
share. At this point, it is possible to say that what they have in common is
the uncommon.

Thus, Simondon presents three modes of being that are complemen-
tary but do not exhaust one another: the individual, conjugation of the in-
dividual and the more than individual; the individualized, consistency with
itself and with some aspects of the world common to other individualities;
and, finally, the personality that articulates the first two instances for certain
periods, tending to construct, deconstruct and rebuild itself. Therefore, in-
dividuation is unique while individualization is continuous and personaliza-
tion is discontinuous (Barthélémy, 2012; Simondon, 2015).

Relation with the Milieu, Relation with the Other

The other, according to Simondon (2015, p. 337), is a questioning to
the being as individuated; each sees each other that is always young, or sick,
or old and healthy. But this other is not taken in itself, within the limits of
its constitution, isolated, it is taken relatively to the beholder: “[... ] in this
relation, one is not absolutely younger or older, notwithstanding younger or
older than another; one is also stronger or weaker; being a man or a woman
is being a man in relation to a woman or a woman in relation to a man”.
The narrative of Lisa Nelson (2010) is related first to a woman who walks
while the observer is standing; or she is approaching a certain point relative
to the observer. Simondon (2015, p. 337) shows that perceiving a woman
as such “[... ] is not inserting a perception in already established conceptual
milestones, but situating oneself in relation to her, in turn while individua-
tion and individualization”.

Simondon (2015) states that the relation with the milieu is equivalent
to the relation with the other; this means that there is no possibility of ex-
istence of an individual who does not bear an aggregate milieu. Moreover,
the relation unfolds into two relations; one with emotions that can only be
experienced and that question the individuated being, relatively to the oth-
er, and another related to the preestablished milestones of an individual’s
private life. Well, these milestones, says Simondon (2015, p. 337), are not
sufficient to characterize a woman, substantiate her in a specific and sta-
tionary form: “Therefore, the specific characters may not be enough to explain the unity of experienced and perceived, no more than a habit or any other principle of external reality”.

Perception is already in that which is perceived, as orientation, says Simondon, and is not determined by other reality acting upon it (Simondon, 2015). Yet, beyond this condition, although perception may be relative to formal and particular characteristics, it points to something more than that.

Individuality is a particular case of participation, it is not substantial, does not keep in itself all potentials of mankind or of the living, although it is through it that these expanded universes are reached. There is no gap that separates the woman perceived and the narrator who perceives, in the case of Lisa Nelson’s description, as there is no substantial difference between the woman and mankind: individual and collectivity are not distinguished as isolated realities, as well as individual and milieu. They are correlative, point to each other in their orientations. The individual participates in the collectivity, as well as the collectivity participates in the individual. Complete knowledge, says Simondon (2015, p. 337):

[...] corresponds to a complete haecceity (this woman, that woman) being that in which coincide individuation and individualization; it is a certain expression, a certain signification that makes this woman be this woman; all aspects of individuality and of individuation that the being may have if it is really unified.

Expression is the way the personality makes the transition between the individual and the pre-individual. Faithful to Simondon’s thought, we cannot consider both instances as isolated substances, but constituents of a same reality that is organized in common structures, on the one hand, and particular modes of existence, on the other. The expression of a being, continues Simondon (2015, p. 337):

[...] is a true reality, but it is not a reality apprehendable otherwise than as an expression, that is, as personality; there are no elements of expression, but there are bases of expression, because the expression is a relational unity maintained in the being by an incessant activity; it is the individual’s life itself expressed in its unity; at the level of expression, the being is to the extent that it expresses itself, which is not right for individuation or for individualization.
Neither the unique principle of individuation nor the continuity of each individualization, only the personality presents expressivity, only it remains in the constant activity that makes the transition between the individual individuation and the individualization. With that it approaches that which Lisa Nelson considers a dance act and which stands out in the description of the woman she sees move? First of all, according to her dance is not dissociated from the movement of life, both in the body and in relation to the collective:

I think of the eyes. Many moving parts. I think of the seeing. There is more to it than meets the eyes. I think of vision and movement. One gives rise to the other. Dialogue comes to mind. That is how I experience their wedding. And that is how I experience my dance – within my body and in society with people, things, and space (Nelson, 2003, p. 1).

Erin Manning (2013, p. 19) calls a life, in the Deleuzian sense, the impersonal force that animates the life lived at every moment: “A life is another term for the preindividual. It is what accompanies, what remains unresolved, in the taking of form, what defies the hierarchy of the organic with respect to the inorganic in the organization of what we commonly understand as ‘life’”. The process of dephasing, according to Simondon, as the movement of a life – that Manning borrows from Deleuze –, are not linear, causing the change of the body as a whole, but micro explosions of differences bursting inside that which Manning (2013) describes as a same ecology of processes.

Each particular mode is a continuation of the initial individuation; faithful to it (Simondon, 2015), even distant, each one experiences an opening to the pre-individual, that extra one that cannot be individualized and that will be resumed for new leaps of individuation. Finally, again with Simondon (2015, p. 337), the expression, life itself is “a relational unity maintained in the being by an incessant activity.” Then, Simondon is saying that life is an incessant and active movement, that acts and does not stop acting, but that, however, is not given, not stable, in the sense of a constant and calculated rhythm; the movement is negotiated at every minute. Here fits what Lisa Nelson (2003, p. 1) considers dancing:

We are constantly recomposing our body and our attention in response to the environment, to things known and unknown. This inner dance is a
most basic improvisation – reading and responding to the scripts of the environment. It’s our body’s dialogue with our experience.

The movement is caused by the passage between the moving and nonmoving parts, known and unknown signs, continuous resumption of action, right after repose and the opposite, constantly. According to Lisa Nelson, to dance is to read the dialogue between the body and the experience, and there is no signification without experience, hence there is no individual. What she is calling body is only taken in the continued and metastable rearrangement in relation to what surrounds us, be it known or not. Leaps and stops; resuming the difference between individual relation and individualized relation, the leaps correspond to the risk of life that unites perception and emotion before an event that cannot be apprehended completely by the individuality, and the resting related to the integration with the milestones acquired. We improvise initially and ever. Improvisation, however, is not the marked card game that uses movements that are always encoded. It is the continuing shift of body structures in response to the changes in that which is perceived. It is necessary to coordinate, manage, create a certain expression, to follow the change. Thus, the individual knows the self and the other, because the changes send signs that cause him to orient himself orienting the world.

As I demonstrated above, according to Simondon there is no difference in engaging in a relation with the milieu and with the other individual. Hence, the milieu also has its coordinations and re-coordinations. We were face to face with the other and with the associated milieu that keep re-coordinating themselves. But being face to face is to be perceived, thus, we enter the individual-milieu system that constitutes the other as another datum of metastability. Of course, also conversely. This is dancing. And what articulates all of this is the movement that expresses a certain response to a certain situation. That is what Lisa Nelson (2003, p. 1) describes as a casual dance at the moment we are on the verge of meeting someone who we do not want to see and who we do not want to see us: “Before we know it, we’ve composed our body to the invisible, or composed our eyes to be elsewhere on the chance that we’ll be overlooked”.

Only in pathological cases the other is taken only as unity and identity with self, stability that the perception would recognize as being distin-
guished from emotivity. Entering the world of the other, therefore, is having to coordinate with the arrangements that the other coordinates with the self and with the associated milieu. It is not excessive to repeat, each individual according to Simondon (2015) is inseparable from their milieu. On the other hand, this same individual experiences arrangements and rearrangements that do not cease or, if they do, it is just to resume the movement.

In the narrative fragment something escapes which cannot be of the order of the interindividual relation: neither the unity of individuation, nor the continuity of individualization, but the discontinuity of personality (Simondon, 2015, p. 340):

The personality appears as something more than relation: it is what keeps the coherence of individuation and the permanent process of individualization: individuation takes place only once; individualization is as permanent as the perception and the current conducts; the personality, conversely, is a domain of the quantical, of the critical ...

A good word to describe the personality is malémolência. The sound of the word is ideal, a little smooth, sustained, in motion. Nobody still is malémolente. Aulete Dictionary (2016, online) provides a suitable meaning for malémolência: “Form of behavior that denotes guile/malice, manha (artfulness), dexterity, or elegance of someone”. Malémolência ranges from the spectrum of guile/malice to elegance; in the carioca jargon, manha is related with skill - that guy has manha, so he knows how to do it, knows the means. This is also related to the ability of attention that is employed in an activity, even if guileful or malicious.

Tim Ingold (2015), as Deleuze and Guattari (1997), conceive this attention as the ability to act rightly in the movement, in motion, as in the case of a seasoned craftsman who obtains proper results from his movement, but who shows no regularity in execution. Deleuze and Guattari (1997) call it itineration, rather than iteration. It is not the regularity of movement that leads to accurate result, but the resourcefulness in uncertain curves that lead from intention to result; that is dexterity. Finally, elegance; set of uncertain curves with the accurate result, something else that accompanies the craftsman, his instrument, and worked material, set of forces acting in accordance, which Tim Ingold (2015) and Gilbert Simondon (2015)
call synergy. And what if we think of another word for elegance? If we think about that which Deleuze (Deleuze; Parnet, 1996, online) calls “charm”? Deleuze says that:

All people only have charm through their madness (folie). What is charming is the side of someone that shows that they’re a bit unhinged (où ils perdent un peu les pédales). If you can’t grasp the small trace of madness in someone, you can’t be their friend. But if you grasp that small point of insanity, ‘démence’, of someone, the point where they are afraid or even happy, that point of madness is the very source of his/her charm.

Finally, malemôlência is a charm, due to the uncertain balance of the body’s relation with the milieu, which is constituted on the plan of the somatic, of the perception, and of the milieu. Deleuze’s reference to madness reminds that which Simondon says about the schizophrenic individual who differentiated perception from emotion, when seeing a woman on the street. Madness lies in not capturing the uncertain curve, the malemôlência, and in taking the certainty of the result as a model. Furthermore, we understand better Simondon’s argument; personality is a domain of the critical, structures that remain for a time, that resist in their difficulties and, unable to keep the old relations, collapse and give way to new ones. They are like the people that Deleuze mentions above, who lose ground, but do not collapse, they dive into a self that is deeper than their own individuality and return. What is its relation with dance?

Notes

1 Lisa Nelson is a performer, improviser, video-maker, and collaborative artist who explores the role of the senses in the execution and observation of movement since the early 1970s. Researcher of movement, she was Steve Paxton’s collaborator in the creation of contact improvisation. She created the Tuning Scores method and since 1977 is coeditor of Contact Quarterly magazine – a Vehicle for Moving Ideas.

2 Silvia Pinto Coelho, researcher of Lisa Nelson’s work, reported to me that the first time she had contact with the term attentiography was in an interview with Lisa Nelson in 2010 and that she did not find, in her notes, a correlated term in French. Thus, I decided to use two possible translations in the resumé,
which are *attentiongraphie* and *attention vivace*, taking into account the indications of translators Lau Santos and Nadia Luciani.

3 The body is a tuning instrument composed of finely differentiated antennas. These are our senses and they measure changes. Soon after birth, we learn to focus our senses on what we need to survive. Culture adds a layer of instructions for constructing the perceptual filters it expects we’ll need to make sense of the world (Nelson, 2003, p. 2). Translated by Silvia Pinto Coelho.

4 “Although the dancers of that time were temporarily cut loose – sweeping the movements of daily life, “natural” movement behaviors, and athleticism onto stages and proposing new frames for looking at dance – I yearned to see something else. Something underneath the dancers’ interaction with each other and the architecture of the space, something of the dancer’s interaction with herself – the internal dialogue that shapes the surface” (Nelson, 2003, p. 2).

5 The reference here is to associationism and Theory of Form, theories that Simondon defines as incomplete to determine the constitution of the Psychic Individuation, chapter of which the excerpt analyzed is part.

6 The perceived and the experienced only unfold in the sickness of personality. Minkowski cites the case of a young schizophrenic individual who questions why seeing a woman on the street causes him a certain emotion: he sees no relation between the perception of the woman and the emotion experienced (Simondon, 2015, p. 337).

References


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