International Thought in the Lula Era

Pensamento Internacional na era Lula

**Introduction**

Similarly to other governmental enterprises, President Lula da Silva’s administration was part of the governmental renewal process, economic model shaping of foreign policy and international integration strategies that characterized the transition of most Latin American countries between the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century. Renewed government alliances, and politics were the response of national societies to the crisis caused by the neoliberal model and the implementation of public policies according to ideological and fundamentalist vision of the globalization, which included the transfer of national assets (public and private) to transnational capital, the unilateral opening of economies, deregulation of markets (financial, trade and labor); in general, a policy of submission was perceived and, in some cases, also “servitude” to the United States and central capitalism. The difference with other countries is that Brazil has the attributes in terms of geography, economics, demographics and cultural challenge to apply to that part of the group formed by central actors in the contemporary international system.

During Lula da Silva’s tenures, foreign policy found a clear direction, bound to the stage of reformulation and change that had characterized the 1970s, in which policy was associated with large advancements on trade and business.

The international context, over a decade after the end of the Cold War, lived the process of building a new world order under the supremacy of the United States as the only superpower. The conditions that had characterized the international system during the previous twelve years, against which U.S. foreign policy responded with opposing trends between unipolarism and multipolarism,

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strongly reinforced unipolarity after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The United States, under President George Bush Jr. left the vision of neo-Kantian liberal internationalism, which had dominated international politics during Bill Clinton’s administration. In this context, Latin America represented less and less in U.S. foreign policy, whose concern is focused on the war against Islamic terrorism.

U.S. foreign policy in its epistemic-theoretical foundations, rose from soft power, proposed by Joseph Nye (2004) and adopted by Clinton as a means of seduction and attraction, to its renewed vision of multilateralism under the hegemonic conditions that the hard power rescued to the Republican right, in the tougher tradition of American Realism.

As noted by a great historian, the short twentieth century ended in 1991. In the late 1980s and early of 1990 an era of world history ended to start a new one (HOBSBAWM, 2007), which was closed to the Cold War and open to a new cycle of neoliberal utopia. It was this transition that justified a widespread author’s claim to “the end of history” which differentiated between those states where democracy and the free market were imposed, and those who were left aside in history. Fukuyama (1992) would represent the symbol of the liberal, simplistic and monocausal view of international relations; a worldview that would be confronted by the reality of the facts: a world fragmented by differences. They were warned by other ideologists of international relations, among which Huntington (1993, 1996) can be highlighted, who would base the new interpretations of international conflict and the struggle for power, on the basis of cultural and religious differences.

Thus, Fukuyama and Huntington expressed the image of a fragmented and conflicting world, reflecting the existence of multipolarities; a systemic context that the thinkers of the Brazilian foreign policy were able to grasp to support the fundamental backers of the new vision of foreign policy. This would be the scenario in which the theoretical foreign policy of Lula da Silva would be formulated.

Changes in the theoretical approach of the hegemony

Despite the changing times identified with the end of the bipolar order, changes in the theoretical approach to the interpretation of the world and its processes had begun earlier, in the late 1970s and 80s. US literature dominated discussions between interdependence formulators (KEOHANE and NYE, 1977) and the response of structural neorealism (WALTZ, 1979, and GILPIN, 1981); meanwhile, alternatives appeared such as a critical theory (COX, 1981)) and a renewed vision of the political economy of international relations, both being part of a systemic-structural tradition (WALLERSTEIN, 1974; ARRIGHI, 1994, 1996).

Furthermore, reaffirming the influence of Kantian liberalism – already present in the thinking of interdependence – the role of institutions and cooperation in the systemic order (KEOHANE, 1988;1993; KRASNER, 1986; HURRELL,
1992), appeared to influence predominantly the foreign policy proposals of what years later would be the period of the Clinton administration.

A vision that contributed strongly to fragment the world supposedly joining the “new order” and “globalization” was the clash of civilization paradigm, as proposed by Huntington (1993, 1996). Brazilian diplomacy responded to this cultural cleavage strengthening the idea of a “multicultural and multiracial Brazil”.

Finally, an important theoretical element to influence the Brazilian model of an ideal State should serve as the foremost instrument for insertion in the new global context: the trading state (Rosecrance, 1986), which had already been identified as a source of important influence on Chile’s foreign policy (BERNAL-MEZA, 2004) and Carlos Menem’s in Argentina (1989-1999).

Of all the debates that occurred during those years, a central point to understand President Lula’s foreign policy would be discussions between single-pole and multiple-pole and discussions with those who sought to impose certain views on globalization; on this debate also present were a few lines of the Latin American structuralist tradition, as old “dependentists” (Dos Santos), those that addressed cultural perspective (Ortiz), and some “neo-structuralist” (Ferrer, Ianni). Among the latter new contributions from the periphery to the discussions on the contemporary stage of historical capitalism would be found, with authors such as Tomassini, Ferrer, Rapoport, Bernal-Meza, representatives of the Chilean Academy and, predominantly, of the Argentine scholars, most of whom would have a strong positive impact on Brazil.

International and regional contexts of the Lula era

1. The Latin American scene:

In short, scenarios were very different in the early twenty-first century and during the 1990s. A decade of strong homogeneity on the predominance of the normal or neoliberal model as the ideal type of Estado; in economic policies, adherence to the agenda of universal or hegemonic values internationally recognized, such as democratic norms throughout the world, characteristic of the American liberal internationalism; this approach, indeed, would justify the new forms of international intervention and reform of the principle of non-intervention in the UN Charter, the promotion of economic liberalism, the protection of the environment and others who contributed to the promotion of liberal views on globalization and interdependence (BERNAL-MEZA, 2000). In Latin America, the times of similar foreign policies and a strong inclination toward the United

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3 We follow here the ideal types of state developed by Amado Luiz Cervo to explain and interpret the Brazilian and Latin American foreign policy. Cf. CERVO (2000, 2001, 2008, 2008a).

4 As defined by Vigevani et.al. (1999).
States, as well as a vision of integration sustained in “open regionalism”, were followed by a decade of profound heterogeneity: in the ideal model of State (with presence of developmental, normal and logistic models), in economic policies in the views on the integration and regionalism and linkages with the United States. Topics such as the degree of economic openness, more or less globalization, accession or rejection of the FTAA, proximity or opposition to American foreign policy and regionalism model, among others, became characteristics which deeply distinguished Latin American countries one from another.

These changes also involve a thorough review of the respective foreign policies, in particular, the worldview, paradigm or doctrine that supported them, and also a reformulation of the models of regionalism (BERNAL-MEZA, 2009). “Bolivarism and XXI century socialism” (in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua); bilateralism and alignment with the United States (Colombia, Mexico); “multilateralism” and “open regionalism” (Chile), “Nationalism and open economy free-market economic nationalism” (Argentina), “special period in peacetime” (Cuba), “South American realism and regionalism” (Brazil), in time replaced, as foreign policy formulations, pre-theories and doctrines, the thought of a decade in which Kantian neo-idealism had dominated the subordinate globalism, neoliberalism and open regionalism (BERNAL-MEZA, 2009a).

Parallel to the abandonment of the “middle power” paradigm (Mexico), most South American countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Paraguay), turned to more nationalistic economic policies, returning to neo-protectionist approaches to the economic integration, which, without being dominant, began to compare with the previous prevailing view of “open regionalism” and that would also be prevalent in the Brazilian political vision, even if this would be tempered by pragmatism. Thus, the semi-protectionist vision of MERCOSUR model would be replaced by more pragmatic and flexible vision of UNASUR.

The crisis of the neoliberal model, which spread through many of the countries in the region led, in most of them, to a reformulation of the ideal type of state, associated with a restructuring of integration into the global economic system. In a variety of cases – such as Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador – as well as in other countries where the political structures had not yet reached the height of their nation-building process, such as Bolivia and Paraguay –, the new ruling alliance proceeded to a relaunching in the first case, or foundation, in the second, of the developmentalist model. Thus, at the discretion of recovering or building national capitalism, mainly public (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador), as well as private (Argentina in particular), there was a neo-developmental model variation, with strong state intervention, which involved the nationalization of large companies (gas, oil, electricity, air and services) and the creation of new state enterprises. This model is characterized by a policy of “open economic nationalism” or “free-market economic nationalism”, as would the Argentine model be, or more radical forms of economic nationalism, neo-Marxist-influenced, such being the case of Venezuela and Bolivia (BERNAL-MEZA, 2009a).
Only two countries progressed along the path of the construction of the ideal type of logistical State: Chile and Brazil (CERVO, 2008). In practice and due to having been released that way since the days of Pinochet’s authoritarian neoliberalism, the Chilean model would be a pioneer, taking on major initiatives and public policy measures that would characterize the logistic model: formation of large national economic-financial groups; internationalization of private enterprises; attraction of foreign direct investment; exporting of capital; creation of state agencies to support the internationalization of enterprises and the external projection of their business and operations; development of a strong airports, roads, telecommunications and information technology infrastructure. Associated with this was the international negotiation of a wide network of treaties and trade agreements that had facilitated the access of national production to major world markets (U.S., EU, Japan, China, etc.).

a) The review of post-neoliberal strategies: the ideal model of logistical State

This post developmentalist model of governmental organization, formulated in theory by Amado Cervo, aims to overcome the asymmetries between nations, raising the national situation at the level of advanced countries, transferring responsibilities to the societies of the former “developing State”, dealing now with societal instances in the realization of their interests. The logistical State mimics the behavior of the advanced nations, particularly the United States, a country that is considered the prototype of the model. Its component of foreign policy in the field of international economic relations, aims to reduce technological and financial dependence, to promote product innovation and other initiatives that reduce external vulnerability. Internally, it seeks to strengthen the national structural economic hub to boost internationalization (CERVO, 2008a: 82-90).

b) Evo Morales, the reformulation of the Bolivian state and its impact on Brazilian politics

The remaking of the state carried out by Evo Morales involved decision-making on a collective basis and was built under the criterion of “representativeness” that benefits the vast majority of the population of native origin, historically excluded from the structures of power. One instrument for providing resources to the project of the new state was the policy of nationalization (mainly in the area of hydrocarbons and energy), regaining state control over oil fields and refineries and therefore affecting the interests of Brazilian capital (Petrobras).

Particularly in the case of Bolivia, the most advanced example, but also at different levels, in the cases of Ecuador and Paraguay, the reformulation of state perception would take forward the new indigenous government would confront openly with the realist conception of Hegelian roots, dominant in Brazil, as well as in other countries in the region.

The impact of hydrocarbons nationalization reflected not only on the system of bilateral relations with Brazil but also on the characteristics of regional
integration vis-à-vis global integration. It involved the inclusion of the energy issue as a priority for the South American agenda, which led Lula’s diplomacy to bring the Foreign Ministry to the new realities arising from this scenario. Thus, in April 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Policy created the Department of Energy which took the second rank in the hierarchical structure of Itamaraty.

The energy issue has changed regional thematic priorities also impacting on the other countries’ relations, as was the case of gas between Argentina and Chile, mainly because of other external factors such as rising international prices and decreasing commercialization of oil and gas in Argentina, bringing producing countries (Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador) to the center of attention in the diplomacy of integration.

c) The new South American energy policy and its impact on Brazil:
From 2000 to May 2006 – the moment hydrocarbon nationalization in Bolivia – there were two models of energy integration: the Brazil-led, via IIRSA, in which the main protagonists were the private sectors, and PETROAMERICA, an initiative of Venezuela, urging greater state intervention.

It was from Evo Morales’ nationalization that both projects would start to distance, showing differences in the conception of the energy political economy.

Lula’s government answered to this situation by strengthening Petrobras and diversifying the search for alternative energy supply sources, domestic and international. But another of the initiatives to deepen the differences on economic energy policy would be the Brazilian strengthening of biofuel development, with the U.S. signing a memorandum of understanding for cooperation in this area. The issue of biofuels would eventually oppose Brazil’s potential or important regional producers, such as Argentina and Venezuela.

The paradigmatic universe of Brazilian foreign policy and the Lula government: realism, regionalism and logistical State

FH Cardoso’s and Lula da Silva’s views on world politics and globalization were confronted and opposed. The first adhered to neoliberalism, while Lula and his colleagues adhered to neo-realism. Thus, while Cardoso confided in the ideal configuration of a new multipolar order with the progressive development of more just and harmonious international relations, Lula kept a hierarchical view of world power and was skeptical about the idealistic vision of a world overall more peaceful, cooperative and harmonious.

The opposition between these two visions of international politics was already reflected in the debate between two trends: the “bilateral hemispheric” and “global-multilateral” (CERVO and BUENO, 2002). The first, which promoted the alliance with the United States, was predominant in the Cardoso government. The second would be dominant in the government of Lula, during which Brazil
returned to *selective universalism*, by reprising its alliances and ties with India, China, South Africa and Russia.

Under the “bilateral hemispheric” trend Brazil, like other countries, joined with neoliberal governments in the region, to develop the agenda of universal hegemonic or internationally recognized values; Lula, without rejecting this agenda outright, subordinated it to the traditional topics of economic development and security.

However, both lines of thought came in a meeting point: the need to promote international cooperation to advance domestic and international goals of peace, development and justice or equity. This has been important because it stresses the coincidence in in the role played by Brazil – given its resources and capabilities – in the management of world order, as well as the country’s contribution to “global governance” (international governance); nevertheless, profound differences were seen on the perception of the viability of “economic interdependence”. At the end of his government, Cardoso expressed his frustration with the concept of *asymmetrical globalization*5, and established South American integration as a basis for coping with and encouraging dialogue with the European Union. Meanwhile, Brazilian Royalists watched integration, from MERCOSUR, as a power base to counter U.S. dominance and heighten influence in South America6.

Foreign policy formulators for Lula joined Joseph Nye’s vision of a multipolar world, an interpretation useful to make coincide both the liberal thought (Lafer) and the Brazilian nationalist realism (including Moniz Bandeira and Pinheiro Guimarães). In the first case, policy-makers shared a neo-Kantian matrix and in the second, multipolarism was functional to the concept of what they aspired to in world politics. For both, multipolarity of the emerging new order allowed a space of action for an intermediate power like Brazil.

Celso Lafer’s vision – a liberal thinker and chancellor of Cardoso – was retaken by the foreign policy-makers for Lula. His theoretical thinking is identifiable in two stages. The first (1996), when accompanied by their ideas F.H. Cardoso, is founded on the vision of the new systemic context, by comparing essences7 between the orders of the Cold War and the subsequent; the second stage, at the end of the Cardoso administration (2002) tried to maintain the continuity of Brazilian foreign policy by appealing to the “identities” that characterized Brazil (BERNAL-MEZA, 2005).

Celso Lafer was able to propose the *aggiornamento* of traditional principles of foreign policy to support the change, to adapt it to what he saw as the “new

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5 See *La Nación* and *Clarín*, Buenos Aires, January 5, 1999.
6 See, in this regard, Moniz Bandeira (1996); BERNAL-MEZA (2000).
7 The idea of change of essences or change of ontological identity was not new, though. Raúl Bernal-Meza addressed both ideas in key books of the *New World Order* (1991) and *Latin America in the World Political Economy* (1994).
systemic context” which flourished in the 90’s and in which the country should be inserted. The novel turned out to be the appeal to “external credibility and reliability”, in conjunction with the epistemic community that supported Argentina peripheral Realism, like conditions of access to the world in three integrated areas of international life: the strategic, the economic one, and values (LAFER, 1996:72). The fundamental idea was that a country of continental features, such as Brazil, should review and adapt its previous worldview, the one dominant under the developmentalist model, between 1930 and 1990.

In his 2001 work, Lafer expressed his vision of the new system context, comparing the essence between the order of the Cold War, characterized by “defined polarities” and the current transition, the “indefinite polarities”; then he pointed out the continuities of Brazilian foreign policy, by appealing to the identities that characterize this country.

The essences indicated by him implied that the international system had changed from “a period defined polarities” to one of “undefined polarities”. While the former reflected the existence of a bipolar system, in the second the contradictions were presented in each of the essential components of previous systemic order, giving rise to a multipolar scenario in which there was a space of action for a rising power like Brazil; in this context it was necessary to make sense of economic issues to the parcerias internacionais (“international association”, Lafer, 1992) and to adherence to the “universally accepted values agenda” under the logic of globalization (in its liberal vision) and fragmentation (of identities, the secession of States, of fundamentalism, of social exclusion, etc.), which diluted the logic of the old and classic Westphalian order.

It is clear that the vision of a world of “indefinite polarities” was a space for insertion on the rise of Brazil in the global power structure. This vision ingratiated the most liberal ideas which represented the Cardoso government policy. That same view Cardoso expressed as he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the realist tradition of Itamaraty. Holding in the models of historical analysis formulated by Renouvin and Duroselle8, which pointed out the existence of “deep forces” among the factors of persistence of a country’s international insertion, Lafer appealed to the central concept of national identity to explain the continuities and changes of Brazilian foreign policy.

National identity is the source of differentiation, also to nationalism. Its components are the historical legacy and significance of international identity in a globalized world. Brazil, as a country of continental scale, is inserted in the context of its neighborhood. Brazil takes part in the asymmetric axis of the international system and the nationalist vision of the pursuit for development. These are elements that justify the need to differentiate to Brazil from other

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countries in South America; they allow to justify the breaks and long-term trends in foreign policy and to dissociate the political regime from the practicing and formulating of foreign policy.

The paradox is that the vision of Lula's foreign policy was close to neoliberalism, when he believed that cooperation through institutions and international agreements (UN, WTO, G-20, etc.) could soften the effects of anarchy and the imposition of imperial power; but Lula was also purely realistic when pursued building alliances to face the challenge that the rise of new powers imposed to hegemony; this can be understood in Brazil’s concern to integrate and promote the BRIC group – or construction of an emerging power- that challenges institutionalized power. With this type of cooperation there was an attempt to improve the relative position of Brazil in the global power structure, while through the integration of South America Lula sought to preserve the position of superiority over the other South American countries (MONIZ BANDEIRA, 1996; BERNAL-MEZA, 1999; 2000, 2008, SOUTO MAIOR, 2006; SOARES DE LIMA, 2008).

The perception of weakness was replaced by a re-evaluation of the role of Brazil as a middle power and emerging nation that required a high-profile diplomacy, suited to the country’s abilities and needs (PECEQUILO, 2008:143); the “presidential and personalist” diplomacy, would be replaced by “diplomacy of the nation” (CERVO, 2002), strengthening the vision of Brazil as a great country. In the words of its Chancellor: “o Brasil não é um país pequeno. Não tem e nem pode ter uma política externa de país pequeno” (AMORIM, 2007: 7).

A very important element in the evolution of thought supporting foreign policy would be “formation of concepts in international relations”, developed by professor Amado Cervo. Brazilian concepts would replace the macro-theories of (supposed) universal scope, developed by the academic thinking of the “centers”, mainly the United States.

From a methodological perspective, which has had a clear application in the foreign policy of Lula, this approach is interpreted as a conceptual development that replaces the theoretical elaboration of others, because it is a systemic period of “indefinite polarities”.

The main concept was made about the “logistical State”. This system of ideas provides strategic guidance for the dynamics of Brazil in international arenas and supports its expansion in terms of influence. It also involves a set of concepts shared by the leading sectors of the roles of the state structure. In this regard, the State, “plays the role of supporter and legitimacy bearer of the initiatives of other economic and social actors” (CERVO, 2008, 2008a); the state also takes on a

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9 On the application of the concept of ”countervailing power”, cf. DUPAS (2005) and CERVO (2008).

10 In free translation: “Brazil is not a small country. It does not have and cannot have the foreign policy of a small country.”
series of tasks that allow it to become a launch pad – mainly economic but also political – for the public and private activities in the country.

It is possible to identify two dimensions to this approach. It can be analyzed as: a) a series of perceptions of recent changes in the international system and the role of Brazil on the world stage and b) a set of policies guiding the strategy of internal development and international relations.

Images of the international order are related to the recognition of globalization, global interdependence and regionalism, as the dynamic processes that mark the contemporary world (SOMBRA SARAIVA and CERVO, 2005). Another significant factor is the conviction of the loss of unilateral hegemonic stability by the United States and therefore, the birth of a world order based on multilateralism, which would imply a historic structure different from above. With this new international order responsibilities for countries (and other actors) of the executive aristocracy would emerge and they would participate in a decision-making process characteristic of a kind of global governance (MASERA, 2010).

The concept of logistical State permits, from the ideational point of view about economic development, to delink Brazil from the theoretical vision of the Dependence on the “center” and “periphery”. Brazil is not periphery. It’s in a middle, transitional, position, able to reach the select group of states that command the patterns of status, wealth and power in the world system11. The elite now leading Brazilian government seeks to improve the relative position of the country by accepting the competence and, at the same time, seeking a policy of matching, as it would be explained in the participation and political positions from the IMF and the G-20.

The logistical state tends to accumulate attributes of power to reinforce what Cervo called the “national economic hard core” (CERVO, 2008a: 87). This strategy is found in the search for various foreign policy objectives: consolidation of prestige, leadership in regional conciliation, and key presence in international forums like the G-20, etc.

**Realism and accumulation of power**

Brazil became the only Latin American country12 to re-take realism as a paradigm of foreign policy. Under that vision, policy makers, decision-makers and influential epistemic community members who accompany them considered Brazil as the only player that could compete with the United States for the “hegemonic influence” in South America. The idea of hegemony has evolved from the “leadership vacuum”, established since the mid-1990s (BERNAL-MEZA, 2000), to a conviction on the leadership itself, which began to be projected on

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the concept of due role played by Brazil in the regional scene. It is a fact that in the Lula years Brazil is involved internationally in a much more active and multilateral projection than it had during the late 90's; this has happened both in international economic relations and in security matters, which showed a new international action, taking on increasingly global dimensions. In terms of neorealism: for more power, Brazil was interested in changing its own position in the international system (SCHIRM, 2007).

Two groups of emerging powers came to dominate the preferences as a mechanism for reshaping the global order, through multilateralism: the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa). While the latter reaffirmed a return to Africa from a strategic perspective of the southern hemisphere, the first represented the emerging global power group. The presence in both groups is indicative of the reasons why Brazil wants to be present at all negotiating tables of the world, as it is in the WTO and the G20, and wants to become a permanent member in the Security Council, where the rules are decided, many of which may be harmful.

For Brazil, the BRICs are very important, because in the new vision of order and global power, this grouping will transfer size (hierarchy) in international politics and agree on their desire to be influential in it, increasing their relative value.

Leadership, aspiration for recognition as a global power, accumulation of power resources made evident the overall objectives and interests of the new foreign policy. As one ambassador noted, “simplificadamente, pode-se dizer que a idéia-chave subjacente à nossa atual política regional é a construção de uma base subcontinental tão ampla e sólida quanto possível, de modo a firmar a liderança brasileira na América do Sul, o que deveria facilitar, no âmbito mundial, o exercício de uma política de potência emergente”13 (SOUTO MAIOR, 2006:54).

However, the logic of this overall strategy has not been uniform: in the case of South-South cooperation with countries in South America, Brazil takes a strategy close to the pattern of dominance, while in the South-South international-multilateral sphere, it assumes the behavior of collective leadership, in partnership with other countries also system-affecting, such as India and China (SARAIVA, 2007).

Changes in the concept of regionalism and integration:

Lula found a large spread of regionalism models and economic integration strategies on the continent; joining them with a pragmatic and flexible proposal – the South American Community of Nations, Unasur today – Lula sought the inclusion of the five existing tariff schemes South America (ALBA, Mercosur, CARICOM, Chile, the Andean Community of Nations).

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13 In free translation: “It can be simply put that the key idea underneath our current regional policy is the construction of a subcontinental base as ample and solid as possible, in order to consolidate Brazilian leadership in South America. This should facilitate, in worldly terms, the exercise of an emerging power’s foreign policy”.
For this strategy, Brazil counted with strong support from the Chilean government of Michelle Bachelet, also devoted to a multilateral approach and flexible strategy; both countries then shared – albeit under different economic policies – the model of “logistical State”.

A key element of the new realism of Brazil has been the accession of President Lula to the concept of “spheres of influence”. This approach emphasized a division of Latin America into a Caribbean area, North Central and North-southern (Mexico), all of which under the sphere of North American influence, and another area, the South American, under the influence of an expanding Mercosur, whose dynamic axis of power is Brazil. No further work is required on this reflection; suffice it to say that foreign policy documents by Itamaraty stopped referring to “Latin America” as a region for more than five years. (BERNAL-MEZA, 2008).

In this regard, the perception of Argentina, according to which the then President Kirchner rejected the South American Community of Nations, was that “it could limit the Mercosur and is perfect for the Brazilian strategy of creating a Latin America without Mexico”14.

Regionalism in Brazil under Lula is in close relationship with the logistical concept of State. It promotes productive integration through infrastructure, energy and Brazilian investments, while, at the global level, it has forged coalitions that strengthen the role of Brazil as a “global” actor.

As noted by several authors, the Brazilian foreign policy abandoned the idea of a Latin America as an expression of “regional unity and subsystem” in the middle of 199015.

The vision of a Latin America as a non-homogeneous region, thus justifying the differentiation of South America, was heavily championed by Brazilian diplomats and scholars of international relations. The lack of interest in what happened to Mexico in intra-regional relations turned Lula and some of his advisers to the governments of Lagos (Chile) and Néstor and Cristina Kirchner (Argentina); additionally, it could not be ignored that the Aztec country did not belong to any sub-hemispheric strategy always being considered a natural part of a Hispano-Lusitanian America in search of the unit.

However, Brazil returned to Latin America and the Caribbean during the second presidency of Lula. This return is exemplified by his visits to Mexico and by the meetings that convened Brazil and the CARIFTA countries, a process that began in 2007 when Lula’s government began deploying its influence in Central America through the biofuel issue.

The new view is that failed economic, political and security integration slowed the expansion of Brazilian companies. This process happened despite

the agreements reached at the Unasur, because in these areas there are many misunderstandings, which add to the already existing with Venezuela and Argentina, and because of the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay as well as policies of economic nationalism in other countries. In short, Brazil went back to “Latin America” because the “South America” project failed.

The evolution of the Brazilian model of State: The Logistical State under President Lula

While Cardoso sought to replace the “developmentalist State” for the normal (neo-liberal) State, Lula would advance in the implementation of the ideal type of logistical State.

With the purpose of promoting this model of international integration to lead to development, the Lula government made up a political and economic strategy, whose central issues would be finding a new role in the international order; this central role would be achieved by: generating confidence among the major world powers on reliability and moderation of its policy of multilateralism; seeking to create agreements with them to strengthen the United Nations system; promoting the idea of political importance of integrating Brazil as a permanent member of the Security Council and its role in mediating and stabilizing on the Third World. And in the context of international political economy, the directions were: trying to save the WTO negotiations, separating from its previous alliances (Argentina, India, China) who held tougher positions on the demands on developed countries, by strengthening the G-20; approaching “global governance” as carried out by major powers (U.S., EU, Japan); strengthening the role of the IMF and separating from the above critical positions, through the payment of its debt with the Fund; helping it to strengthen its role as lender and watchdog, taking away from “neo-protectionist” regionalism as Mercosur and opting for a new one: the “Brazilian regionalism”, more flexible and pragmatic (Unasur). All these processes should be backed by a set of national strategies that sought to improve the international position of the Brazilian economy and its main actors, private and public.

In this perspective, a key role is the strategy of internationalization of domestic companies, helping big business groups (industrial and services) and enhancing the development of new ones. Under the guidance of this model, the outward expansion of the Brazilian economy – a necessary condition for achieving real interdependence in the world of globalization, as the logistical ideology – works in two ways: by the aggregation of national enterprises to the international production chains and direct investment abroad, starting with neighboring countries (CERVO, 2008).

For this strategy, the Lula government conducted a study, created an ad hoc working group and made a proposal for public policy-making. Also, the
government of Lula da Silva induces the formation of mega-corporations, capable of competing on the world market. Through funding from the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) and a fund of 58 billion dollars, it promotes the formation of “national giants” through mergers and acquisitions in industries such as food, cellulose, telephony and ethanol; this vision is, by the way, projected in the proposals of the PT candidate to the next presidential election.

Conclusions

At the beginning of the XXI century there was a wide multiplicity of ideas trying to interpret the causes and consequences of the transition of world order, with the end of the Cold War and the doctrines and theories that should inform foreign policies in a rapidly changing world system.

For a period Brazilian foreign policy seemed to lose direction. It showed contradictions, drastic changes and open infighting that characterized the 1980-1992 years (HIRST and PINHEIRO, 1995; BERNAL-MEZA, 2000). The consistence of F.H. Cardoso’s foreign policy did not mean the absence of profound questions for his neo-idealistic vision, that put it away from the more autonomic and Third World traditions. Nevertheless, Lula da Silva would promote the rebirth of an idea: Brazil as a power aligned with the foreign policy guidelines of 1974 -1979: autonomy, pursuit of power, aspiration to compete for a major role in regional hemispheric and systemic hegemony.

In Brazil, the arrival of President Lula signaled a drastic change in relation to the Cardoso period: a shift in the conception that policy and decision-makers had on global politics, although not on the objectives of the country’s international integration. The visions, strategies and alliances changed deeply.

With Lula, Brazil became the only South American (and Latin American) country to re-take realism as foreign policy paradigm; the same realism had been abandoned, by Brazil itself, and Argentina and Chile, between the middle and in the late 1980s. Taking this path, the definition of “spheres of influence” would be an absolutely obvious of this realistic aggiornamento.

Lula da Silva’s choices in foreign policy involved a transition from the neo-idealism in Cardoso’s utopian multilateralism to the classical realism dominant in international relations (CERVO, 2002; BERNAL-MEZA, 2002). Brazilian foreign policy rediscovered, in the beginning of XXI century, the thought on which Rio Branco sustained his foreign policy a century earlier.

Under the recovery of this classical conception of world politics, the new Brazilian foreign policy devised the international system as a power game, a fight

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17 Brasil impulsa las megaempresas, in Clarín, Suplemento 1 ECO Economía y Negocios; Buenos Aires, may 17, 2009; p. 21.

18 In definitions of eventual future government, the candidate Dilma Rousseff said: “En Brasil (para nosotros), el Estado es socio de los empresarios”. See: Clarín, Buenos Aires, September 26, 2009, p. 52.
among the most powerful actors in the system. In view of the rise of the “low politics” agenda and the methodological and conceptual renovation of the new economic diplomacy (Bayne & Woolcock, 2007), multilateralism was stripped of utopia and became the game of interests, with gains and losses distributed as a result of trade negotiations, for which it was essential to recover the importance of coalitions and alliances between similar countries.

However, this is not pure realism but it is combined with the Grotian vision19 of the international system by following the rules and institutions of the multilateral order, although simultaneously promoting their redesign, in all agendas, and seeking their own active participation in the mechanisms of global governance.

Returning to the thought of Celso Lafer, the future of global scenarios departs from the vision of a world order where loss of unilateral hegemonic stability is perceived. This allows Brazil to have a space of action for its repositioning as a global actor, based on the recognition of its status as an emerging world power.

The key instrument of that position, through the international re-integration would be the application of the ideal of “logistical State”.

In this way, Brazil has combined in recent years an active participation in multilateral fora, to promote its national interests from a realistic perspective. The novel element is that – parallel to the pursuit of power measured in terms of accumulation of military capabilities – the country points to a strategy based on a “multilateralism of reciprocity” (CERVO and BUENO, 2008). This view suggests that Brazil has progressively held a prominent place in the various domains of international relations, from regional security to the finance arena.

Concerns about the emphasis in South America as a region distinct from the rest of the hemisphere (particularly from Central America and Mexico) came from the vision of Brazilian foreign policy adopted by the middle 1990s and remained dormant until it was designed with strong dynamism in Lula da Silva’s foreign policy (BERNAL-MEZA, 2006, 2008, 2008a). The synthesis of this vision showed that to the south of the Rio Grande there were two well-defined areas of influence; one that includes Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America, perceived as economically and politically dependent on the United States; and another, South American, that regionally integrates more independent and autonomous projects – the Mercosur and the CAN. This South America, under the leadership of CAN, would be setting up a project of political cooperation, the Unasur, supported by an infrastructure integration program, which would be the IIRSA20. Lula has worried constantly to ensure the future of the Unasur, one of the biggest assets of Brasilia in foreign policy21.

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19 Gustavo Masera calls this combination of ideas as “expanded neo-Grotianism”, cf. MASERA (2010).
21 As he noted in lanacion.com, August 29.
However, negative reactions to both the Brazilian government and its internationalized companies were found in most South American countries due to the implementation of nationalist and reactive policies against free market; this criticism referred also to the unilateral opening of the preceding neoliberal period, which would lead to the conclusion that the South American scene was now very complex for political strategies in Brazil. Against this complexity, the Brazilian diplomacy would begin the return to Central America, Mexico and Caribbean.

Lula used international multilateralism as an instrument to curb the power of the only superpower and as a way for global recognition to the new emerging power centers, among which is Brazil.

The convergence of interests of Lula’s foreign policy and some areas of developed countries, in particular the European Union and a bunch of its leading members, has enabled them to strengthen multilateralism. It has been argued that both segments of this global world share the same vision of “multipolarity and multilateralism”, which has been the basis for the creation of the G-20 (replacing the old G-7), the strengthening of the UN structure, the rescue of multilateral trade negotiations (Doha) and the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change (2009).

The pragmatism of Lula’s realist foreign policy has led to the paradox that developed countries have conferred Lula the title of “global statesman” (World Economic Forum, Davos, January 2010), while, simultaneously, his country is headquarters and takes the leadership of the World Social Forum, which represents just the rebellious example of the global economic order represented by Davos. This is a contradiction that many South American socio-political sectors do not understand.

The instrument for the new global destination and insertion of Brazil is now the “logistical State”. This paradigm, in the words of Amado Cervo, “does not go passively to market forces and the hegemonic power”, but involves a comprehensive set of public policies at the scientific-technological, industrial, commercial, educational areas, as well as external ones. It involves coordination of internal development and international action based on a country-strategy and a broad vision of the international scenarios, and Brazil’s role in them. Thus, Brazil is seeking its place in the XXI century world setting, from active participation in the design and management of world order.

However, the great overarching objectives of Brazil will present enormous challenges, among them being part of the BRIC’s. In this arrangement, Brazil is aiming to take some of the new international management as the only non-nuclear power of the group. In this respect, there is already some internal debate among those who find it necessary to keep a Brazil free of nuclear weapons and those others, closer to the hard positions of realism, who think that there can be no world power without strategic nuclear development. This position being accepted, Brazil should not only renounce the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but also to the Agreements – “Commitment” of Mendoza, 1991, about banning chemical and
bacteriological weapons, signed between Brazil, Argentina and Chile. This step, if taken, would, logically and certainly, give Argentina reasons to retake the path of military-strategic nuclear development, a dispute that would put a definite end, to the projects of South American integration and cooperation, which have as a base the cordial, entente relationship between Brazil and Argentina.

Brazil begins to abandon the unified position regarding the Mercosur free trade agreement with the European Union. That old order, signed in Madrid in 1995, is not any longer part of Brazil’s interests because its policymakers believe that now would undermine the national potential of integration into the global economy and regional and multilateral trade agreements (CERVO, 2009a: 85). It will therefore be a matter of time before their South American partners, and particularly Argentina, perceive that the interests of its big neighbor do not coincide with theirs.

The final thought has to do with the approach from which we have addressed the text. Obviously, the vision has been State-centric, because that is what decision-makers, elites and power groups in Brazil have imposed, predominantly to the logic of foreign policy and the perspective with which to view world politics. We incorporate the critics on weaknesses facing, in Brazil, the effort to democratize the formulation of foreign policy. It can be said that in this arena, there is limited participation of other social actors that can express their interests in the policy, precisely because of the realistic vision. We also maintain that social inequalities determine the future prospects and options of the country to become a regional leader and global, despite the enormous economic growth and its progress on the path of becoming a world power with a significant increase of its international relevance and influence. As one expert on this country once said,

Although Brazilian economy is large and vibrant, the distribution of income in the country is among the worst in the world. The fruits of this great economy have not been distributed or have spread down / ... / It is hard to imagine that a nation-State that fails to address the basic needs of its population being able to play a significant leadership role on the world stage” (ROETT, 2003: 227).

In this regard, an important thing should be noted: the decision and will of the government of President Lula da Silva to put his country in the club of rising powers of the new international order, doing so with considerable progress in eradicating poverty and extreme poverty. The Lula administration proposed placing Brazil amongst new world rising powers, while also improving the living conditions of the poorest half of its society. This has so far been achieved.

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Abstract

In the last fifty years, Brazil began a rapid process of structural transformation, following the first stage of industrial development in the 1930s. Currently the country integrates the small group of countries which evolved from an initial peripheral and subordinate insertion dating back to the nineteenth century, part of the most dynamic segment of the semiperiphery. But this category, intermediate between the “maturity” and “backwardness”, according Modernization theorists, or between the “center” and “periphery”, as theorists of the Dependence defend, has undergone a process of overcoming considerable positive progress in the direction of the group of states that dominate the current world system. In this way, during the years 2003-2010, foreign policy, along with the formulation of a new regionalism as a strategy of global integration and a new ideal model of State, has been a key factor.

Resumo

Nos últimos 50 anos, o Brasil passou por um processo de rápidas transformações estruturais, seguidas do primeiro estágio de desenvolvimento industrial nos anos 30. Atualmente, o Brasil integra um pequeno número de países que saiu da condição de periferia e subordinação do século XIX para um grupo mais dinâmico de semi-periferia. Porém, essa é uma categoria intermediária entre maturidade e atraso, de acordo com teóricos da modernização; ou uma categoria entre centro e periferia, segundo teóricos da Dependência. Esse é um estágio do processo de superação de progressivas considerações positivas na direção de um grupo de Estados que dominam o sistema mundial atual. Nesse sentido, durante os anos 2003-2010, a política externa tem se tornado um fator fundamental, junto com sua formulação de um novo regionalismo como estratégia de integração global e um novo modelo de Estado.

Key-words: Brasilian Foreign Policy; Lula’s administration; Brazil.

Palavras-chave: Política externa brasileira; Governo Lula; Brasil.