Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Manuscrito]]> http://www.scielo.br/rss.php?pid=0100-604520160001&lang=pt vol. 39 num. 1 lang. pt <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.br/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.br <![CDATA[How to (dis)solve Nagel's paradox about moral luck and responsibility]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100005&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Abstract In this paper I defend a solution to the moral luck problem based on what I call "a fair opportunity account of control." I focus on Thomas Nagel's claim that moral luck reveals a paradox, and argue that the apparent paradox emerges only because he assumes that attributions of responsibility require agents to have total control over their actions. I argue that a more modest understanding of what it takes for someone to be a responsible agent-i.e., being capable of doing the right thing for the right reasons-dissolves the paradox and shows that responsibility and luck aren't at odds. <![CDATA[Singular Reference Without Singular Thought]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100033&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Abstract In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price. <![CDATA[Paradoxical versus modulated conditional inferences: An explanation from the Stoicism]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100061&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Abstract According to standard propositional logic, the inferences in which the conditional introduction rule is used are absolutely correct. However, people do not always accept inferences of that kind. Orenes and Johnson-Laird carried out interesting experiments in this way and, based on the general framework of the mental models theory, explained clearly in which cases and under which circumstances such inferences are accepted and rejected. The goals of this paper are both to better understand some aspects of Stoic logic and to check whether or not that very logic can also offer an account on this issue. My conclusions are that, indeed, this later logic can do that, and that the results obtained by Orenes and Johnson-Laird can be explained based on the information that the sources provide on Stoic logic. <![CDATA[Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Consequence Argument]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100073&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Abstract Scott Sehon (2011) argues that the conception of determinism employed in the Consequence Argument is implausible because it rules out the logical possibility of the laws of nature being violated. Sehon says, for instance, that determinism is incompatible with the logical possibility of an interventionist God (IG). His objection to the Consequence Argument boils down to a way of reading the box in what is implied by van Inwagen's conception of determinism. Sehon reads the box as logical necessity, and this clearly precludes the logical possibility of the laws of nature being violated. However, I argue that determinism as employed in the argument is not implausible. First, I try to show that it is legitimate to read the box of □((P0 &amp; L) ( P) as either metaphysical or logical necessity depending on the account of laws that one assumes. If one accepts a fully Humean account of laws, then the box should be read as logical necessity. Nevertheless, I argue that this is not a problem for the Humean. On the other hand, if one reads the box as metaphysical necessity, which is mainly motivated by the dispositional account of laws and might be motivated by Armstrong's account, then determinism is compatible with the logical possibility of the laws being violated. <![CDATA[Review of FERREIRÓS, J; LASSALLE CASANAVE, A. El árbol de los números. Editorial Universidad de Sevilla: Sevilla, 2016]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000100097&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt Abstract We review Ferreirós and Lassalle Casanave's recently publishedbook "El árbol de los números". The book is a result of the Brazilian-Spanish conference "Sobre la elucidación del concepto de número: cognición, lógica y práctica matemática" hosted in Sevilla in 2013, and collects new papers on History and Philosophy of Mathematics as well as Mathematical Practice. These papers present results of investigations in Cognitive Sciences, Logic and Epistemology of mathematical certainty. In this review we present a general overview of the papers' contents, and advance a critical analysis of them.