Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Manuscrito]]> http://www.scielo.br/rss.php?pid=0100-604520170002&lang=pt vol. 40 num. 2 lang. pt <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.br/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.br <![CDATA[A note on the introduction of Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000200005&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT We present and discuss a change in the introduction of Hilbert’s Grundlagen der Geometrie between the first and the subsequent editions: the disappearance of the reference to the independence of the axioms. We briefly outline the theoretical relevance of the notion of independence in Hilbert’s work and we suggest that a possible reason for this disappearance is the discovery that Hilbert’s axioms were not, in fact, independent. In the end we show how this change gives textual evidence for the connection between the notions of independence and simplicity. <![CDATA[Leibniz on the existence of atoms]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000200019&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT In this paper I present and evaluate Leibniz’s two main arguments against the existence of atoms. In this context atoms are extended particles that are absolutely hard, homogeneous, indivisible, and indestructible by natural means. As we shall see, Leibniz’s arguments are flawed in a very instructive way. The first argument is in tension with the claim that God created the best possible world. The second argument overgeneralizes in an undesirable way. However, as I shall discuss in the last section of the paper, even if the arguments are somehow defective, at least the first one contributes valuable insights to contemporary metaphysics. <![CDATA[Can we make sense of MacFarlane’s relative truth?]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000200039&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT John MacFarlane’s truth relativism (2005, 2007, 2011, 2014) makes use of two notions of propositional truth: a monadic assessment sensitive one taken to be our ordinary truth notion, and a non-monadic one that is meant to account for the assessment sensitivity of the former notion. Some authors (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, 2011; Montminy, 2009; Soames, 2011) contend that any theory introducing a technical non-monadic truth notion has to make sense of it (i.e. show that it is a truth notion) by defining or characterizing it in terms of ordinary monadic truth. First, I give some reasons why the relativist should not discard this approach to make sense of the notion of truth relative to a context of assessment. Second, I argue that an illuminating characterization of this notion must provide an answer to a dilemma Paul Boghossian (2011) poses to the relativist. Third, I single out the characterization that can answer this dilemma. Finally, I contend that the relativist still needs to show that this solution works for each case subject to a relativist treatment. <![CDATA[Realismo Estructural Óntico y estructuras físicas]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000200071&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt RESUMEN El Realismo Estructural Óntico (REO) afirma que la ontología del mundo físico debe ser (re)concebida de modo que las puras estructuras sean sus entidades básicas. Objetos y propiedades deben ser eliminados en favor de las estructuras. No obstante, sus defensores afirman que dichas puras estructuras son capaces de dar cuenta de la realidad física, o bien porque identifican el mundo físico con una estructura matemática, o bien porque sostienen que las estructuras postuladas por el REO no son estructuras abstractas, sino físicas. En el presente trabajo analizo críticamente ambas estrategias a fin de mostrar sus limitaciones. Asimismo, propongo un nuevo marco fisicalista, adecuado para las ontologías estructuralistas.<hr/>ABSTRACT Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) states that the ontology of the physical world must be (re)conceived in order to take pure structures are its basic entities. Objects and properties must be eliminated in favor of structures. However, its proponents claim that these pure structures are suitable to account of physical reality, either because they identify the physical world with a mathematical structure, or because they maintain that the structures posited by OSR are not abstract structures, but physical structures. In this paper, I critically analyze both strategies in order to show their limitations. In addition, I propose a new physcalist framework suitable for structuralist ontologies. <![CDATA[Revisitando a Lógica de Dunn-Belnap]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000200099&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt RESUMO O presente artigo apresenta uma semântica baseada nas atitudes cognitivas de aceitação e rejeição por uma sociedade de agentes para lógicas inspiradas no First Degree Entailment (E) de Dunn e Belnap. Diferente das situações epistêmicas originalmente usadas em E, as atitudes cognitivas não coincidem com valores-de-verdade e parecem mais adequadas para as lógicas que pretendem considerar o conteúdo informacional de proposições “ditas verdadeiras” tanto quanto as proposições “ditas falsas” como determinantes da noção de validade das inferências. Após analisar algumas lógicas associadas à semântica proposta, introduzimos a lógica E B cuja relação de consequência semântica subjacente - o B-entailment - é capaz de expressar diversos tipos de raciocínio em relação às atitudes cognitivas de aceitação e rejeição. Apresentamos também um cálculo de sequentes correto e completo para E B .<hr/>ABSTRACT In the present work I introduce a semantics based on the cognitive attitudes of acceptation and rejection entertained by a given society of agents for logics inspired on Dunn and Belnap’s ‘First Degree Entailment’ (E). Distinctly from the original epistemic situation of E, the cognitive attitudes do not coincide with truth-values and it seems more suitable for logics that intend to consider the informational content of propositions “said to be true” as well as propositions “said to be false” as determinants of the notion of logical validity. After analyzing some logics associated with the proposed semantics, we introduce the logic E B , whose underlying semantic entailment relation - the B-entailment - is able to express several kinds of reasoning towards the cognitive attitudes of acceptance and rejection. Acorrect and complete sequent calculus for E B is also presented. <![CDATA[Book review: GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, Manuel & TORRE, Stephan (eds.). <em>About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication</em> . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 368pp., ISBN 9780198713265.]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000200127&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT We review the book About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication, a compilation of papers on de se thought and its implications for a theory of communication. We critically examine the main themes put forward by the papers and try to show how, when put together, they point the way for future discussions about the issue of indexical thought and communication.