Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Manuscrito]]> vol. 39 num. 3 lang. pt <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> <![CDATA[Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality]]> ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario. <![CDATA[From The Begriffsschrift To "Über Sinn Und Bedeutung": Frege As Epistemologist And Ontologist]]> ABSTRACT Frege presents the eponymous distinction of "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (USB) as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those found in the later work.3 Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB, ontological.6 The two problems and Frege's solutions to them shall be explained in what follows. <![CDATA[Neopythagoreanism in the work of Johannes Kepler]]> ABSTRACT In this article I argue that the methodology in the Johannes Kepler´s work is guided by two principles of Pythagorean nature, they are: (i) sameness is made known by sameness, and (ii) harmony arises from establishing a limit to what is unlimited. By way of hypothesis, I present a general outline, which includes those principles, and I indicate how they are present in Kepler's investigations. I examine two particular cases in the light of that schema. <![CDATA[The multitemporality of life: an analysis from Philosophy of Biology]]> ABSTRACT Although the issue of temporality has mainly been studied from Physics, this topic also exhibits diverse interesting aspects that could be addressed from a biological perspective. One possible way of approaching this subject is to examine the kinds of temporalities involved in biological processes. In that vein, the aim of this article is to analyze developmental and evolutionary processes' temporality in different biological fields of study, including a novel area (Evolutionary Developmental Biology) which attempts to integrate the research of those processes. To that end, we propose a taxonomy for the analysis of the temporal characteristics of biological processes. Making use of that taxonomy, we conclude that biological processes' temporality is extremely complex since not only different fields of study present differing temporal characteristics, but also each kind of biological process shows diverse temporalities. These observations point out the pertinence of biological insights and the relevance of Philosophy of Biology's contributions to the study of the extensive and multifaceted issues of time and temporality. <![CDATA[Supervaluar o Revisar]]> ABSTRACT Los intentos de solucionar la paradoja de Sorites han generado una multiplicidad muy grande de propuestas. Tantas, que es importante detenerse a reflexionar acerca de qué criterios deberíamos usar para compararlas. En el presente trabajo voy a, en primer lugar, ofrecer una taxonomía gruesa de las teorías de la vaguedad que clasifica a las propuestas en dos grandes grupos: aquellas que consideran que Sorites se trata de un problema lógico y aquellas que no. Luego, voy a proponer un criterio general de comparación entre las teorías que pertenecen al primer grupo. Por último, voy a aplicar ese criterio a la comparación de dos casos particulares: una versión del Supervaluacionismo y una de la Teoría de la revisión aplicada a términos vagos. There are already too many attempts to solve the Sorites paradox. So many, that it becomes crucial to stop and reflect on which criteria should we use to compare them. On the present paper, I will offer, on the first place, a coarse taxonomy of theories of vagueness, that classifies them into two big groups: those which consider Sorites to be a logical problem, and those which do not. Then, I will propose a general criterion for comparing theories of the first type. Lastly, I will show how it applies to two particular cases: one version of Supervaluationism and a Revision Theory for vague terms. <![CDATA[Suerte, Seguridad y el Problema de la Generalidad]]> RESUMEN La condición de seguridad ha sido propuesta repetidamente para resolver el problema de la suerte epistémica. (Pritchard, 2015) ofrece una defensa peculiar de esta condición, basándose en una noción general (no exclusivamente epistémica) de suerte. En este trabajo argumento que la noción de suerte no es suficiente para caracterizar a la seguridad. La condición de Pritchard es vulnerable al problema de la generalidad y dicha noción no nos da las herramientas para resolverlo. Ofrezco una respuesta naturalista al problema basada en casos específicamente epistémicos.<hr/>ABSTRACT Safety has been proposed repeatedly as a condition to solve the problem of epistemic luck. (Pritchard, 2015) offers a peculiar defense of this condition, based in a general (not exclusively epistemic) notion of luck. In this paper I argue that the notion is no sufficient to characterize safety. Pritchard´s safety condition is vulnerable to the classic generality problem for reliabilism and the notion of luck does not provide conceptual resources to solve it. I propose naturalistic solution to the problem based on epistemic considerations. <![CDATA[McDowell e as estátuas de Dédalo]]> ABSTRACT The subject of this paper is the concept of 'demonstrative concept', which has been introduced in philosophy by John McDowell in Mind and World. The analysis presented in the article has a reconstructive and a critical character. Its reconstructive drive may be viewed as required by the concise mode the philosopher adopted to present his theoretical innovation and comprehends an effort to make clear: (i) what is the difference between the temporal conditions necessary (a) to give conceptual status to the color shade we have before our eyes and (b) to our possession of ordinary concepts; (ii) the sui generis character of the universality proper to demonstrative concepts and the uniformity of their relations to what they are concepts of; (iii) the equivalence of their semantical regime to that which is proper to concepts of measurement standards; (iv) the very singular function performed by memory in the constitution and possession of demonstrative concepts. Now, the critical character of the paper firstly lies in the remark that there is a kind of inconsequence in the way McDowell conceives the employment of those concepts, namely in his refusal to admit that even though it is natural to say 'I see the shade in my mind's eye', it would be a mistake to think that when we recognize a color shade as being the same as the one we have seen before there is an inner comparison of it with the retained sample. The second of the paper critical points is the warning that, considering the complex constitution process of demonstrative concepts and its exacting semantic, it seems impossible to take them as coextensive to our human experience of colors. <![CDATA[Book Review: MACBETH, Danielle. <em>Realizing Reason: A Narrative of Truth and Knowing</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 494 pp., $99.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198704751]]> ABSTRACT We review Danielle Macbeth's book Realizing Reason, published by Oxford University Press in 2014. This extensive book is composed by nine chapters in which Macbeth critically presents the development of mathematical practices in the Western world - from its founding in Ancient Greece's diagrammatic practices to the apogee of mathematical logic in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries - while offering a revaluation of its present stage by means of a reconsideration of Gottlob Frege's philosophical contributions. In this review, we present a summary of each chapter's contents and make general considerations about them. <![CDATA["Book Review: FRANKFURT, Harry G. <em>On Inequality</em>. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2015, 102 pp., $14.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780691167145."]]> ABSTRACT On Inequality is a short book that skillfully handles a challenging topic. As its title suggests, its focus is a major theme in contemporary theories of justice: equality. Contrary to what one might expect, however, Frankfurt's critique of equality is not grounded in libertarian arguments or an ideal of the minimal state. Rather, it aims to clarify a cluster of alleged conceptual confusions about equality as a constitutive moral value.