Scielo RSS <![CDATA[Manuscrito]]> http://www.scielo.br/rss.php?pid=0100-604520170003&lang=pt vol. 40 num. 3 lang. pt <![CDATA[SciELO Logo]]> http://www.scielo.br/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.br <![CDATA[EDITORIAL NOTE]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000300001&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt <![CDATA[A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000300002&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing. <![CDATA[Endurantism Endures: Rejoinder to Barker and Dowe]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000300029&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT In Barker and Dowe (2005), Stephen Barker and Phil Dowe present a range of arguments which they take to demonstrate the paradoxical nature of endurantism. I claim that the endurantist has convincing replies to each argument. <![CDATA[<strong><em>Globally</em> and <em>locally</em> applied naturalistic metaphysics</strong>]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000300033&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT This article addresses the prospects of applied naturalistic metaphysics from both a global and a local perspective. Adopting a broad Sellarsian approach, I look into whether metaphysics has a place and role in the overall scientific image and assess whether it has its own subject matter as a first- or second- order discipline. After outlining the general argument in section 1, section 2 examines our construal of science and metaphysics, drawing some considerations for restating the question about the viability of naturalistic metaphysics. Sections 3 and 4, in turn, suggest two styles of naturalistic metaphysics that can be respectively applied on a global and on a local basis. I briefly outline their respective goals, problems and categories. I argue, in particular, that globally applied naturalistic metaphysics deals with issues about the fundamental structure of reality, whereas locally applied naturalistic metaphysics tackles riddles arising from the examination of specific unobservable posits in the frontiers of scientific ontology. Section 5 closes with concluding remarks that put metaphysics within the scientific image. <![CDATA[Algunas precisiones acerca de la filosofía moral experimental de David Hume]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000300051&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt RESUMEN A pesar de que existe un consenso entre los estudiosos respecto de establecer una filiación entre Hume y la filosofía experimental, prevalecen importantes divergencias al momento de determinar el objeto de estudio de la “ciencia de la naturaleza humana,” como así también de establecer las razones que legitiman la aplicación del método experimental a las cuestiones morales y el modo en que lo lleva a cabo. Nos proponemos esclarecer estas tres cuestiones con el fin de precisar en qué sentido debe comprenderse el experimentalismo de Hume. Respecto de la primera, sostenemos que la ciencia de la naturaleza humana no sólo comprende el estudio de la mente, sino que abarca también el de la interacción en el marco de la sociedad a lo largo de la historia. En cuanto a la segunda, consideramos que existe un fundamento ontológico común a los fenómenos morales y naturales, en tanto ambos quedan comprendidos bajo las cuestiones de hecho, lo que habilita la aplicación del mismo método de investigación a los dos. Para echar luz sobre la tercera cuestión, profundizaremos en la centralidad conferida a los hechos, entendidos como eventos epistémicamente relevantes que son procesados mediante la reducción explicativa, Finalmente, ofreceremos algunos ejemplos para mostrar cómo Hume pone en acto el método.<hr/>ABSTRACT Even though there is a general agreement among the scholars concerning the relationship between Hume and experimental philosophy, yet important disagreements prevail regarding the subject of the “science of human nature,” as well as the reasons that ground the introduction of the experimental method into moral subjects, and the way in which Hume does it. Our aim is to shed some light into these three items in order to specify the sense in which Hume’s experimentalism should be understood. Regarding the first one, we maintain that the science of human nature not only deals with the study of the mind but also with human interaction within society through the course of history. Concerning the second one, we consider that there is a common ontological ground to moral and natural phenomena, because both fall into what Hume calls ‘matters of fact.’ This, in turn is what enables him to apply the same research method to both. In order to clarify the third item, we will delve into the central role that is given to facts, which Hume understands as epistemically relevant events, which are handled through explanatory reduction, Finally, we will show through some examples how Hume uses the method. <![CDATA[Book review: COLIVA, Annalisa. <em>The Varieties of Self-Knowledge</em> . London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 288p.]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000300087&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT In this review, I argue that Coliva's strong transparency admits three possible interpretations: (a) a Wittgensteinian interpretation, (b) a metaphysical interpretation, and (c) an epistemic interpretation. I favor (c) over (a) and (b). <![CDATA[Book review: GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, Manuel. Relatar lo Ocurrido como Invención: Una Introducción a la Filosofía de la Ficción Contemporánea (Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra, 2016).]]> http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000300093&lng=pt&nrm=iso&tlng=pt ABSTRACT The book reviewed here advances a fregean theory of reference able to stand up to Kripekean objections to descriptivism. It also claims that fictions are an invitation to imagine situations or pretending assertions and, in spite of it, fictions are objects of knowledge too, since they can refer to reality and we refer to fictional objects. In this review I present a summary of García-Carpintero's ideas and outline some objections to them.