A supremacia judicial em sua essência: para além do casuísmo teórico

Bolonha, Carlos; Faroni, Fabrício; Rangel, Henrique

doi:10.5007/2177-7055.2013v34n66p261

Resumos

Este artigo busca uma compreensão filosófica, no plano da ontognosiologia, acerca da supremacia judicial, discutindo o que seria este fenômeno jurídico-político em sua essência. Acredita-se que essa compreensão abstrata da supremacia judicial possa ser obtida por uma análise hipotética de situações correspondentes a fatores de potencial aproximação ou afastamento de uma preponderância da atividade judiciária perante os poderes eleitos. Considera-se a existência de, pelo menos, quatro fatores: (1) o bom funcionamento dos poderes eleitos; (2) o bom funcionamento da atividade judiciária; (3) o comprometimento com os direitos; e (4) o desacordo moral sobre o conteúdo dos direitos.

Judicial Review; Supremacia Judicial; Desenhos Institucionais

The present study develops a philosophical conception of judicial supremacy, in the ontognosiology level. Observing this legal-political phenomenon in its core, we defend that the abstract conception of judicial supremacy can be obtained by an exam of hypothetical situations corresponding to potential approach or potential removal factors of a judicial superiority before elected branches. In this sense, it is possible to consider at least four factors: (1) the well-functioning of the elected branches; (2) the well-functioning of the judicial activity; (3) the commitment with rights; and (4) the moral disagreement on the content of rights.

Judicial Review; Judicial Supremacy; Institutional Design

BOLONHA, Carlos; RANGEL, Henrique; ALMEIDA, Maíra. A teoria de John Rawls e as instituições democráticas. Revista JurisPoiesis, Rio de Janeiro, ano 14, n. 14, p. 89-102, jan.-dez. 2011.
BRANDÃO, Rodrigo. Supremacia judicial versus diálogos institucionais: a quem cabe a última palavra sobre o sentido da Constituição? Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2012.
DIXON, Rosalind. The Supreme Court of Canada: charter dialogue and deference. Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers Series, Chicago, n. 284, 2009.
______. Weak form judicial review and the american exceptionalism. Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Chicago, n. 348, 2011.
DWORKIN, Ronald. Taking rights seriously Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.
ELY, John. Democracy and distrust: a theory of judicial review. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
GRIFFIN, Stephen. American constitutionalism: from the theory to politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
______. The age of Marbury: judicial review in a democracy of rights. In: TUSHNET, Mark (Ed.). Arguing Marbury v. Madison. Sanford: Sanford University Press, 2005.
HABERMAS, Jürgen. Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006.
HART, Herbert. The concept of law Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.
HOGG, Peter; BUSHELL, Allison. The Charter dialogue between courts and legislatures: or perhaps the charter of rights isn't such a bad thing after all. Osgoode Law Review, Toronto, v. 35, n. 1, 1997.
LARENZ, Karl. Metodologia da ciência do direito. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1997.
NELSON, Willam. Marbury v. Madison: the origins and the legacy of judicial review. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
PILDES, Richard; LEVINSON, Daryl. Separation of parties, not powers. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, v. 119, n. 1, 2006.
PILDES, Richard. Why the Center Does Not Hold: the causes of hyperpolarized democracy in America. California Law Review, Berkeley, v. 99, n. 2, 2011.
RAWLS, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
SUNSTEIN, Cass. Incompletely theorized agreements in constitutional law. Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Chicago, n. 147, 2007.
______. One case at a time: judicial minimalism in the Supreme Court. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
THAYER, James. The origin and scope of the American doctrine of Constitutional Law. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, v. 7, n. 3, 1893.
TUSHNET, Mark. Popular constitutionalism as political law. Chicago-Kent Law Review, Chicago, v. 81, n. 991, 2006.
______. Taking the Constitution away from the courts Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
VERMEULE, Adrian. Mechanisms of democracy: institutional design writ small. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2007.
WALDRON, Jeremy. A right-based critique of constitutional rights. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Oxford, v. 13, n. 1, 1993.
______. A essência da oposição ao judicial review. In: BIGONHA, Antonio; MOREIRA, Luiz. Legitimidade da jurisdição constitucional. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2010.
WHITTINGTON, Keith. Political foundations of judicial supremacy: the Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Datas de Publicação

Publicação nesta coleção
31 Jul 2013
Data do Fascículo
Jul 2013

Histórico

Recebido
21 Jul 2012
Aceito
08 Nov 2012
Revisado
07 Out 2012

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

[1] BOLONHA, Carlos; RANGEL, Henrique; ALMEIDA, Maíra. A teoria de John Rawls e as instituições democráticas. Revista JurisPoiesis, Rio de Janeiro, ano 14, n. 14, p. 89-102, jan.-dez. 2011.

[2] BRANDÃO, Rodrigo. Supremacia judicial versus diálogos institucionais: a quem cabe a última palavra sobre o sentido da Constituição? Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2012.

[3] DIXON, Rosalind. The Supreme Court of Canada: charter dialogue and deference. Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers Series, Chicago, n. 284, 2009.

[4] ______. Weak form judicial review and the american exceptionalism. Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Chicago, n. 348, 2011.

[5] DWORKIN, Ronald. Taking rights seriously Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

[6] ELY, John. Democracy and distrust: a theory of judicial review. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

[7] GRIFFIN, Stephen. American constitutionalism: from the theory to politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

[8] ______. The age of Marbury: judicial review in a democracy of rights. In: TUSHNET, Mark (Ed.). Arguing Marbury v. Madison. Sanford: Sanford University Press, 2005.

[9] HABERMAS, Jürgen. Between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006.

[10] HART, Herbert. The concept of law Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

[11] HOGG, Peter; BUSHELL, Allison. The Charter dialogue between courts and legislatures: or perhaps the charter of rights isn't such a bad thing after all. Osgoode Law Review, Toronto, v. 35, n. 1, 1997.

[12] LARENZ, Karl. Metodologia da ciência do direito. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1997.

[13] NELSON, Willam. Marbury v. Madison: the origins and the legacy of judicial review. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

[14] PILDES, Richard; LEVINSON, Daryl. Separation of parties, not powers. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, v. 119, n. 1, 2006.

[15] PILDES, Richard. Why the Center Does Not Hold: the causes of hyperpolarized democracy in America. California Law Review, Berkeley, v. 99, n. 2, 2011.

[16] RAWLS, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

[17] SUNSTEIN, Cass. Incompletely theorized agreements in constitutional law. Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Chicago, n. 147, 2007.

[18] ______. One case at a time: judicial minimalism in the Supreme Court. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

[19] THAYER, James. The origin and scope of the American doctrine of Constitutional Law. Harvard Law Review, Cambridge, v. 7, n. 3, 1893.

[20] TUSHNET, Mark. Popular constitutionalism as political law. Chicago-Kent Law Review, Chicago, v. 81, n. 991, 2006.

[21] ______. Taking the Constitution away from the courts Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

[22] VERMEULE, Adrian. Mechanisms of democracy: institutional design writ small. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2007.

[23] WALDRON, Jeremy. A right-based critique of constitutional rights. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Oxford, v. 13, n. 1, 1993.

[24] ______. A essência da oposição ao judicial review. In: BIGONHA, Antonio; MOREIRA, Luiz. Legitimidade da jurisdição constitucional. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2010.

[25] WHITTINGTON, Keith. Political foundations of judicial supremacy: the Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

Brasil

Brasil

A supremacia judicial em sua essência: para além do casuísmo teórico

The judicial supremacy on its core: to beyond theoretical casuism

Resumos

Datas de Publicação

Histórico