The effect of social stigma on fare evasion in Stockholm's public transport

O efeito do estigma social sobre evasão de tarifa no transporte público de Estocolmo

Abstracts

This study examines if there is any social stigma associated with ticket-controls in Stockholm's subway. We used a survey-based model that measures the willingness to pay for a subway card given different types and number of ticket-controls. By comparing the willingness to pay between the different scenarios we obtained the perceived social stigma in local currency (SEK). Our main result is an increase in the willingness to pay for a subway card of SEK 612 per year when controls are associated with social stigma. However, already fare evading respondents do not react as heavily to social stigma as non-fare evaders. These finding suggest that investing in more stigmatizing ticket controls is not preferable since fare evaders will not be affected by it.

social stigma; fare evasion; free-rider problem; public transport; social norms

Este estudo examina se há algum problema de estigma social associado aos controles de bilhete no metrô de Estocolmo. Usamos um modelo baseado em pesquisas que mede a disposição a pagar por um cartão de metrô dados diferentes tipos e números de controles de bilhetes. Ao contrastar a disposição a pagar nos diferentes cenários obtivemos o valor estigma social percebido em valores monetários locais (SEK). Nosso principal resultado é um aumento na disposição de pagar por um cartão de metrô de SEK 612 por ano quando os controles estão associados com o estigma social. No entanto, respondentes evasores de tarifas não reagem tão fortemente ao estigma social como os não-evasores. Esses resultados sugerem que investir em controles de mais bilhetes que contenham mais estimas sociais não é estratégia preferível, uma vez que os evasores de tarifa não serão afetados por ela.

estigma social; evasão de tarifa; free-rider problema; transportes públicos; normas sociais

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Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  07 Nov 2013
• Date of issue
  Oct 2013

History

• Received
  29 Dec 2012
• Accepted
  21 Jan 2013
• Reviewed
  14 Jan 2013