Acessibilidade / Reportar erro
Articles • Rev. Bras. Econ. 70 (1) • Jan-Mar 2016 • https://doi.org/10.5935/0034-7140.20160002   copy

Optimal Insider Strategy with Law Penalties* * I would like to thank the comments of an anonymous referee that helps to improve the present version of the paper. Also, I would like to thank CNPq from Brazil for financial support. The usual disclaimer applies.

Authorship SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

We study the optimal continuous trading strategy of an insider who is subject to the possibility of law penalties due to her illegal trading activity. Also, we discuss how to obtain the optimal penalty rule in order to maximize a welfare function.

Keywords:
Insider Trading; Law Penalties; Social Welfare

Fundação Getúlio Vargas Praia de Botafogo, 190 11º andar, 22253-900 Rio de Janeiro RJ Brazil, Tel.: +55 21 3799-5831 , Fax: +55 21 2553-8821 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil
E-mail: rbe@fgv.br
Acompanhe os números deste periódico no seu leitor de RSS