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Revista de Administração Pública

versão impressa ISSN 0034-7612versão On-line ISSN 1982-3134

Resumo

CARVALHO, Márcio André de. How logrolling can explain the failure of the government coalition in Brazil. Rev. Adm. Pública [online]. 2006, vol.40, n.5, pp.865-882. ISSN 0034-7612.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0034-76122006000500006.

This article presents an analysis of the behavior of federal representatives in the Brazilian House of Representatives between 1995 and 1998, when a series of constitutional amendments were presented by the president to be voted on by Congress. The objective is to show that the lack of a stable government coalition resulted in costs to society that were not anticipated by the government. The study argues that a logroll - a trade of votes - was the strategy used by the government in order to guarantee the number of votes necessary to approve the amendments. This strategy created a vicious system in which representatives would only vote with the government if they had benefits in return.

Palavras-chave : logrolling; trade of votes; strategic voting; government coalition; Brazilian House of Representatives; constitutional amendment in Brazil; public choice; rational choice theory.

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