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Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia

Print version ISSN 0100-512X

Abstract

CHIBENI, Silvio Seno. Hume e o "dogma do reducionismo". Kriterion [online]. 2011, vol.52, n.124, pp. 343-353. ISSN 0100-512X.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0100-512X2011000200006.

This work examines the charge made by Quine on Hume, that he adopted the "dogma" of "radical reductionism", in its "naïve" and "intolerably restrictive version", involving "an impossible term-by-term empiricism". It is argued that Hume's theory of knowledge does not seem to justify this serious imputation. Furthermore, it is indicated that Hume not only did not adopt these problematic epistemological theses, but also, on the contrary, effectively anticipated some of the philosophical positions usually attributed to Quine, such as epistemological holism and naturalism.

Keywords : Hume; Quine; history of empiricism; semantical-epistemological reductionism.

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