Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Print version ISSN 0100-512X
WILLIGES, Flavio. Agentes morais e a identidade da filosofia de Hume. Kriterion [online]. 2011, vol.52, n.124, pp.397-415. ISSN 0100-512X. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0100-512X2011000200010.
The standard interpretion of Hume's philosophy presents him both as a radical skeptic regarding rational claims about the adequate foundation of our belief system and as a naturalist who maintained that our beliefs (though rationally ungrounded) cannot be given up in ordinary life, due to natural drives and sentiments. This paper purports to show that Hume's naturalism can and should be interpreted as a method for addessing philosophical concepts (ideas and beliefs,to use Hume's jargon) that incorporates unreflected elements ofordinary life (such as natural sentiments and drives) and assigns to them the same theoretical status that abstract processes such as reasons and arguments have. A philosophy that warrants unreflected mechanisms in the treatment of philosophical problems is what Hume calls a "true philosophy". Such philosophy is compatible with the more radical forms of skepticism, because the unreflected mechanisms that bring about ideas are imune to doubt. To ilustrate the theses put forth here and so as to render my characterization of naturalism more persuasive, I describe briefly and in broad terms at the end of the paper Hume's view of moral agency.
Keywords : naturalism; scepticism; Hume; moral action; sentiments.