ABSTRACT
The goal of this paper is to find out if Michael Smith's version of the causal theory of action is able to solve David Velleman's agency par excellence challenge. Smith (2012)_______. "Four objections to the standard story of action (and four replies)". Philosophical Issues, Vol. 22, pp. 387-401, 2012. has claimed that his theory can deal with the challenge insofar as the exercise of the capacity to be instrumentally rational plays the intermediating role which Velleman (1992a)VELLEMAN, D. "What happens when someone acts?" Mind, Vol. 101/403, pp. 461-81, 1992a. thinks of the agent as playing in the causation of action. However, I argue Smith misunderstands the challenge at hand, thereby failing to find the agent's proper role in action explanation. Moreover, I claim Velleman's objection puts Smith's account of the causal theory in trouble by showing it cannot reconcile the causal explanation of intentional action with our ordinary conception of agency. If Smith intends to explain what a 'full-blooded' intentional action is, I then believe he needs to incorporate into his theory a more robust account of rational guidance.
Keywords:
Action explanation; Causal theory of action; Agency; Michael Smith