SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
vol.17 número49A institucionalização do PSDB* entre 1988 e 1999Contra-usos e espaço público: notas sobre a construção social dos lugares na Manguetown índice de autoresíndice de assuntospesquisa de artigos
Home Pagelista alfabética de periódicos  

Serviços Personalizados

Journal

Artigo

Indicadores

Links relacionados

Compartilhar


Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais

versão impressa ISSN 0102-6909versão On-line ISSN 1806-9053

Resumo

SANTOS, Fabiano  e  PATRICIO, Inês. Monetary currency and legislative power in Brazil: control of central banks in coalitional presidentialism. Rev. bras. Ci. Soc. [online]. 2002, vol.17, n.49, pp.93-113. ISSN 0102-6909.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0102-69092002000200007.

This article analyzes the relationship between the national congress and the central bank of Brazil through the concept of coalitional presidentialism. The concept is used as a mean to describe the more general functioning of the Brazilian political system. After a critical assessment of the literature on accountability of central banks, attention is given to the evolution of the Brazilian central bank’s structure, with special concern to the legal output aiming at the regulation of its activities. Finally, the discussing on the Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito , created in order to investigate the country’s financial system, shows that the conflicts and the outcomes of the CPI could be explained by the logic of interaction between governing parties in the parliament and the president in the context of our political model which combines a presidential system of government and multipartism.

Palavras-chave : Legislative Behavior; Central Banks; Executive-Legislative Relations; Coalitional Presidentialism; Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry.

        · resumo em Português | Francês     · texto em Português     · Português ( pdf )

 

Creative Commons License Todo o conteúdo deste periódico, exceto onde está identificado, está licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons