Abstract
Lebanon is frequently referred to as a model of a plural and stable democracy in the Middle East: a multi-ethnic and pluri-religious society that guarantees political representation through a power-sharing confessional framework. Numerous authors also see the consociational model as the best democratic alternative given such a high degree of domestic heterogeneity. However, by emphasising Lebanese stability vis-à-vis a troubled regional scenario, these positive perceptions have neglected some elements of how democracy actually works in Lebanon. In this article, I analyse two domestic dimensions that hinder the success of the Lebanese democratic experience (the pre-attribution of seats and distortions of representation) and point to the limits, effects and consequences of consociationalism in this specific confessional reality. The results of this case study indicate that highly institutionalised consociational arrangements can lead to sectarianism, institutional instability, clientelism, and state frailty. I also lay out some lessons and implications that can be derived from such a framework in terms of harmful sectarian narratives at both the local and regional levels.
Keywords
Consociationalism; Lebanon; Confessional Frameworks; Democratic Limits; Case Study