Resumo

CALEMAN, Silvia Morales de Queiroz  e  ZYLBERSZTAJN, Decio. Falta de garantias e falhas de coordenação: evidências do sistema agroindustrial da carne bovina. Rev. Econ. Sociol. Rural [online]. 2012, vol.50, n.2, pp.223-241. ISSN 0103-2003.  https://doi.org/10.1590/S0103-20032012000200002.

The role of formal and informal institutions in the economy of organizations is traditionally analyzed in terms of efficient governance mechanisms which minimize transaction costs. Based on a different perspective, this paper focuses on coordination failures and the problem of lack of guarantees in sequential transactions. In particular, this research examines a bundle of guarantees which supports the transaction between producers and the meatpacking industry in the Mato Grosso do Sul state regarding the inefficiencies in the trading of ready-to-slaughter animals. A theoretical model based on Barzel (1997) involving property rights, guarantees and institutions is proposed for the understanding of coordination failures. This model is empirically tested with two multiple logistic regressions: i) an ordered logit model based on the producer's risk perception and ii) a recursive bivariate probit model based on producer's risk perception and on the role of collective action. The findings suggest that formal institutions and collective actions play a relevant role in providing guarantees and, thus, representing a source of transaction costs minimization.

Palavras-chave : coordination failures; guarantees; complex transactions; beef.

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