Presidents face a dilemma of whom to appoint for cabinet positions. They need to secure legislative support for their government and at the same time achieve their goals in terms of public policy. This work analyzes the portfolio allocation of Brazilian presidents in Brazil’s multiparty system. This study tests some hypotheses using multinomial logistic regression to identify appointment strategies adopted by the presidents in four different governmental sectors from 1990 to 2016. To do so, first, we create an index of ministerial politicization (IMP) and aggregate the ministries in these four sections, employing cluster analysis. The results show that appointments to the core positions in government tend to be less politicized. Moreover, the president’s personal nominations were greater in the presidential units that carry out the political coordination and typical functions of the State.
Brazilian multiparty presidential system; cabinet ministers appointment; government coalition management; Brazil
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Source: Elaborated by the authors grounded in their own database of cabinet appointments in Brazil (1990 to 2016).
Source: Elaborated by the authors grounded in their own database of cabinet appointments in Brazil (1990 to 2016).
Source: Elaborated by the authors grounded in their own database of cabinet appointments in Brazil (1990 to 2016).
Source: Elaborated by the authors grounded in their own database of cabinet appointments in Brazil (1990 to 2016).
Source: Elaborated by the authors, grounded in data provided by Mauerberg Jr. (2016).