| 1. Johansson and Baldvinsdottir (2003)JOHANSSON, I. L.; BALDVINSDOTTIR, G. Accounting for trust: some empirical evidence. Management Accounting Research, Amsterdam, v. 14, n. 3, p. 219-234, 2003.
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They use ‘Old Institutional Economics’ concepts, where institutions are the social articulation of human activity, created and re-created by thoughts and habits – in this case: performance evaluation. |
They analyze performance evaluation processes considering management accounting contributes to ways of acting based on habits, routines and rules, shaping daily organizational processes. |
They do not use such classification although they consider contractual trust, for they discuss the notion that in order to win evaluator’s trust; the evaluated one has to accept control on early stages, and, once trust is proven, active control should be substituted by discreet monitoring – so as to not violate such trust; otherwise, if the evaluated one has not deserved it, control should be re-introduced. |
Performance evaluation as a tool to assure improvement on organizational performance. |
| 2. Busco, Riccaboni and Scapens (2006) |
Set of rules (formal statement of procedures) and routines (ongoing practices), linked to production and re-production of knowledge. |
They use terminology from Management Control System (they analyze company accounting and finance sector restructuring). |
They do not use such classification although they consider trust as mechanism able to reduce uncertainty in interaction contexts and to promote proper organizational system working through social behaviors, therefore regarding contractual trust. |
Efficacy on individual un-learning processes and changes in organizational culture. |
| 3. Cuganesan (2007)CUGANESAN, S. Accounting, contracts and trust in supply relationships. Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, Bingley, v. 3, n. 2, p. 104 – 125, 2007.
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Contract set. He analyses relations within a supplier network. |
He analyses formal control mechanism subgroups as contracts and accounting controls (result control – budget, or behavior – rules and regulations). |
It may be positively influenced by contracts, being accounting controls able to reinforce or to uphold it, reducing performance measure strictness through time. |
Contracts and accounting controls influence negatively whenever under strict application. |
Accounting controls may reinforce it or uphold it, reducing performance measure strictness through time. |
Performance improvement through cost reduction within supplier network. |
| 4. Emsley and Kidon (2007)EMSLEY, D.; KIDON, F. The relationship between trust and control in international joint ventures: Evidence from the airline industry. Contemporary Accounting Research, Hoboken, v. 24, n. 3, p. 829-858, 2007.
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Contract set. They verify existent relations in establishing a joint venture. |
They verify operational and executive controls, such as output and behavior controls, generated through joint venture establishment. |
It is not mentioned. |
Social control trust and small contact among joint venture governance committee executives resulted in low information level: trust was slowly developed. |
Output, behavior and social controls within operational level workers produced a high amount of information, increasing joint venture governance committee trust over them. |
Efficacy on organizational changes (joint venture). |
| 5. Langfield-Smith (2008)LANGFIELD-SMITH, K. The relations between transactional characteristics, trust and risk in the start-up phase of a collaborative alliance. Management Accounting Research, Amsterdam, v. 19, n. 4, p. 344-364, 2008.
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Uses concepts from TCE – Transaction Cost Economics, where the manager adopts certain governance strategies to minimize costs in collaborative alliances. |
Considers Management Control as a set, composed by relations between governance structure, processes towards trust development, risk mitigation and control mechanisms (behavior, output and social controls). |
It is not mentioned. |
Activities developed in the pre-alliance phase and during the interim alliance increased both communication and competence trust. |
Manager’s perception towards relational risks reduction and improvements on alliance performance. |
| 6. Vélez; Sánches and Álvarez-Dardet (2008) |
Relations among partner companies towards achieving desirable or pre-defined results. |
Focus on Management Control System main functions: Monitoring (rewarding and performance measuring) and Coordination (workload, specialization, knowledge and skill assignment). |
It is not mentioned. |
In an evolving open relation, Management Control Systems are able to build trust even when it has already been established. High trust enables success to further partners to cooperation, and, demanding higher cooperation trust levels. Formal controls enable partner reliability perception improvements towards these two varieties of trust. |
Improvements on company relations considered as ability to solve problems and to manage interdependencies, improving satisfaction and joint results. |
| 7. Pernot and Roodhooft (2014)PERNOT, E.; ROODHOOFT, F. The impact of inter-organizational management control systems on performance: A retrospective case study of an automotive supplier relationship. International Journal of Production Economics, Amsterdam, v. 158, p. 156-170, dec. 2014.
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Contingency approach in relationships between suppliers and manufacturers – subject to relational and performance risks. |
Set of formal and informal controls towards strategic objective decision-making; they analyze cases where formal controls seem not to overload operational difficulties. |
Improvement when assuring that actions were contractually sound. |
Improvement on sharing principles and regulations. Mutual willingness is necessary towards organizational bonding. |
Improvement on quality result and target reaching due to previous performance and reputed provider choices, delegating competence. |
Risk reduction and performance improvement on manufacturer and supplier relations. |
Source: produced by the author