Question 5 - Suppose that you had an income of R$ 10,000.00 and should pay R$ 1,500.00 in taxes. But if you reduce your earnings to R$ 9,000.00, you will have no tax to pay; however, if the Internal Revenue Service catches you, you will pay a fine of R$ 1,000.00. Would you run the risk of declaring the lower amount? |
External reward |
Magnitude of the reward |
The participants with a propensity for dishonesty are expected to answer “yes” or “don’t know.” |
Heider (1958Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York, NY: Wiley.), Allingham and Sandmo (1972Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3-4), 323-338.), Mazar and Ariely (2006Mazar, N., & Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(1),117-126. ) |
Penalty |
The participants with a lower propensity for dishonesty are expected to answer “no.” |
Nagin and Pogarsky (2003Nagin, D. S., & Pogarsky, G. (2003). An experimental investigation of deterrence: cheating, selfserving bias, and impulsivity. Criminology, 41(1), 167-194.), Castillo, Petrie, Torero, and Viceisza (2011Castillo, M., Petrie, R., Torero, M., & Vizeisza, A. (2011). Lost in the mail: A field experiment on crime. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies [Working Paper]. Georgia State University.) |
Question 5.1 - And if the fine was R$ 2,000.00, would you run the risk? |
External reward |
Magnitude of the reward |
The participants with a propensity for dishonesty are expected to answer “yes” or “don’t know.” |
Heider (1958Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York, NY: Wiley.), Allingham and Sandmo (1972Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public Economics, 1(3-4), 323-338.), Mazar and Ariely (2006Mazar, N., & Ariely, D. (2006). Dishonesty in everyday life and its policy implications. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(1),117-126. ) |
Penalty |
The participants with a lower propensity for dishonesty are expected to answer “no.” |
Becker (1968Becker, G. D. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economical approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.) |
Question 6 - Without counting weddings, funerals, and christenings, how often do you currently go to church? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on religious days, once a year, or never? |
Internal reward |
The individual’s religiosity |
In which “never” are the individuals with a higher propensity for tax evasion and “sometimes” and “often” are those with a lower propensity for tax evasion. |
Lau et al. (2013Lau, T. C., Choe, K. L., & Tan, L. P. (2013). The moderating effect of religiosity in the relationship between money ethics and tax evasion. Asian Social Science, 9(11), 213-220. ), Shalvi and Leiser (2013Shalvi, S., & Leiser, D. (2013). Moral firmness. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 93(C), 400-407.), and Sá, Martins, and Gomes (2014Sá, C., Martins, A., & Gomes, C. F. (2014). Tax morale, occupation and income level: An analysis of portuguese taxpayers. Journal of Economics, Business and Management, 2(2), 112-116.) |
Question 7 - “Evasion is a crime.” Suppose you had an income of R$ 100,000.00 and should pay R$ 15,000.00 in taxes. But if you reduced your earnings to R$ 80,000.00, you should pay R$ 10,000.00. Would you run the risk of declaring the lower amount? |
Internal reward |
Self-concept |
Based on the expression “evasion is a crime,” individuals who answered “yes” or “don’t know” are expected to be influenced into practicing tax evasion. Those who answered “no” are considered less dishonest. |
Heider (1958Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York, NY: Wiley.), Bem (1972Bem, D. J. (1972). Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz, Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 1-62). New York, NY: Academic Press.), Thaler and Shefrin (1981Thaler, R., & Shefrin, H. (1981). An economic theory of self-control. Journal of Political Economy, 89(2), 392-406.), Torgler (2007Torgler, B., & Schneider, F. (2007). Shadow economy, tax morale, governance and institutional quality: a panel analysis. Discussion Paper, 2563.), Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of self-concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(6), 633-644. ) |
Question 7.1 - Suppose that the tax to be paid will go to education, health, and safety and that you can verify the application of that tax through benefits to society. Would you run the risk of declaring the lower amount? |
Internal reward |
Intentionality to carry out fiscal transparency |
Individuals who answered “yes” or “don’t know” have the intention to practice tax evasion, and those who answered “no” are less likely to have the dishonest intention. |
Pashev (2005Pashev, K. V. (2005). Tax compliance of small business in transition economies: Lessons from Bulgaria. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=717041. https://ssrn.com/abstract=717041...
), Feld and Frey (2007Feld, L. P., & Frey, B. S. (2007). Tax compliance as the result of psychological tax contract: The role of incentives and responsive regulation. Law & Policy, 29(1), 102-120.) |
Question 8 - Suppose that your annual earnings were R$ 200,000.00 and that you will have to pay R$ 8,000.00 in taxes, but you can reduce that value to R$ 5,000.00. However, you will have to pay R$ 2,000.00 to understand the legislation and your rights. Would you make the payment? |
Internal reward |
Intentionality regarding the cost of tax compliance |
Individuals who answered “yes” or “don’t know” are less likely to practice tax evasion, and those who answered “no” are likely to have the dishonest intention. |
Dean et al. (1980Dean, P., Keenan, T., & Kenney, F. (1980). Taxpayers attitudes to income tax evasion: An empirical survey. British Tax Review, 1(1), 28-44.), Diniz et al. (2009Diniz, E. H., Barbosa, A . F., Junqueira, A. R. B., Prado, O. (2009). O governo eletrônico no Brasil: perspectiva histórica a partir de um modelo estruturado de análise. Revista de Administração Pública, 43(1), 23-48.) |
Question 8.1 - Would you run the risk of paying R$ 5,000.00 without understanding the legislation and your rights? |
Internal reward |
Non-intentionality regarding the cost of tax compliance |
Respondents who adopted the “yes” or “don’t know” options would be more likely to be dishonest, and those who answered “no” are less likely to have the dishonest intention regarding error in the elaboration of tax procedures. |
Dean et al. (1980Dean, P., Keenan, T., & Kenney, F. (1980). Taxpayers attitudes to income tax evasion: An empirical survey. British Tax Review, 1(1), 28-44.), Diniz et al. (2009Diniz, E. H., Barbosa, A . F., Junqueira, A. R. B., Prado, O. (2009). O governo eletrônico no Brasil: perspectiva histórica a partir de um modelo estruturado de análise. Revista de Administração Pública, 43(1), 23-48.) |