Hierarchical Linear Regressions.
Dependent Variables: Fin_Lev1 and Lev_Mkt1. Explanatory variables: firm, macroeconomic and institutional variables.
Hierarchical Linear Regressions.
Dependent Variables: Fin_Lev2 and Lev_Mkt2. Explanatory variables: firm, macroeconomic and institutional variables.
Hierarchical Linear Regressions.
Dependent Variables: Lev_ST and Lev_LT. Explanatory variables: firm, macroeconomic and institutional variables.
Authors | Objetives of the Studies | Main Empirical Evidence |
---|---|---|
Bastos et al. (2009)BASTOS, D. D.; NAKAMURA, W. T.; BASSO, L. F. C. Determinantes da estrutura de capital das companhias abertas na América Latina: um estudo empírico considerando fatores macroeconômicos e institucionais. Revista de Administração Mackenzie - RAM, v. 10, n. 6, Nov./Dec. 2009. | To analyze the determinants of the capital structure of publicly-held companies in Latin America taking into account the specific aspects of the firm and and also the institutional and macroeconomic aspects of each country. The study comprised a sample of 388 companies from 2001 to 2006, with the companies belonging to the following countries: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru. The data analysis was performed using the econometric data panel technique. | It concludes that the Pecking Order theory explains more strongly the indebtedness of companies in the analyzed countries. It is also considered that macroeconomic and institutional factors, have collaborated to justify that, in times of economic growth, companies decrease their financial leverage, where the variable GDP growth was the most relevant statistically speaking. |
Kayo and Kimura (2011)KAYO, E. K.; KIMURA, H. Hierarchical determinants of capital structure. Journal of Banking & Finance, v. 35, n. 2, p. 358-371, 2011. | To analyze the relationship between indebtedness and 3 levels of determinants: year, firm and industry in emerging and developed markets. The work brought two important contributions to the study of capital structure, with the first being the use of the multilevel analysis model that contributed to the analysis of the simultaneous influence of the three levels of determinants on indebtedness, and the second important contribution is the analysis of two variables related to the sector: Munificence and Dynamism. | "The results show that the variance of indebtedness is explained in 65.1% by the independent firm-specific variable, 26.9% explained due to time and 8% due to the sector. Regressions were significant for most of the firm's specified variables, except for the variable Size. Regarding the variables related to the sector, Munificence showed a positive and significant sign with the indebtedness of the companies." |
Valle and Albanez (2012)VALLE, M. R.; ALBANEZ, T. Juros altos, fontes de financiamento e estrutura de capital: o endividamento de empresas brasileiras no período 1997-2006. Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações, v. 6, p. 49-72, 2012. | To analyze the influence of institutional factors represented by sources of resources with subsidized interest rates and foreign currencies on indebtedness. The period comprised the years 1997 to 2006. In the analysis of the firm's specific variables, the traditional ones found in the literature we considered and, for the institutional explanatory variable, the type of company financing was analyzed, indicating whether the type of financing is subsidized or market, in national currency or foreign currency. The quantitative method used was data panel analysis. | The results show that the differentiated sources of resources and foreign currency lines had a significant participation in the indebtedness of Brazilian companies. It was concluded that the inclusion of access to different sources in the analysis model to understand the indebtedness of Brazilian companies contributed to the understanding of the capital structure of the same, which demonstrates the importance of analyzing institutional factors in capital structure studies. |
Santos (2013)SANTOS, M. A. Determinantes da estrutura de capital de empresas em diferentes cenários econômicos e institucionais: um estudo comparativo. Dissertação de Mestrado - Departamento de Contabilidade, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto, Universidade de São Paulo, Ribeirão Preto, 2013. | To analyze the importance of the firm and country-specific variables in the companies' indebtedness and if there is a variation of the importance of these variables in countries with different economic contexts and in periods of economic growth or contraction. We analyzed 10,243 companies based in 61 different countries from 2002 to 2011. The three-level hierarchical linear regression model with repeated measures is used. | The results show that the indebtedness is explained to a greater degree by the characteristics of the firm and time and, to a lesser extent, but also significant, by the characteristics of the environment. The study also identified that the firm's specific variable did not have significant changes in its behavior even in distinct economic environments and in periods before and after economic crises. In relation to the analyzed country variables, these presented a behavior that was adverse and little explanatory, and neither did it show any behavioral changes when compared in different economic environments. |
Martins and Terra (2014)MARTINS, H. C.; TERRA, P. R. S. Determinantes nacionais e setoriais da estrutura de capital na América Latina. Revista de Administração Contemporânea - RAC, v. 18, n. 5, p. 577-597, 2014. | To analyze the role of the national scenario (Macroeconomics, Financial Development and Institutional Quality) and characteristics of the sectors of activity in determining the capital structure of companies in Latin America. A total of 612 publicly traded companies from 7 Latin American countries were analyzed. A comparison was also conducted with 847 companies from the United States. The period of analysis comprised the years 1996 to 2009. The Linear Hierarchical Model was used for the analysis. | The result is that Financial Development facilitates access to third-party capital resources and Institutional Quality is negatively related to corporate indebtedness. Additionally, there is evidence that the Institutional Quality can promote the asymmetric development between the stock market and credit. |
Martins and Terra (2015)______.; ______. Maturidade do endividamento, desenvolvimento financeiro e instituições legais: análise multinível em empresas latino-americanas. Revista de Administração da Universidade de São Paulo - RAUSP, v. 50, n. 3, p. 381-394, 2015. | To analyze the influence of different groups of factors (firm and macroeconomic variables) in the variance of corporate debt maturity in Latin America. Publicly held companies from 7 Latin American countries were analyzed, in addition to American companies as a comparison, totaling 1820 companies. The period of analysis covered the years 1996 to 2009. Linear Hierarchical Model and Factor Analysis were used for the analysis. | The results suggest that the variations over time and between firms are the major sources of variations in the maturity of the debt. The size, liquidity of the company, the real interest rate and the financial development of the country stand out as the main determinants of the maturity of the debts. Also, the financial development and quality measures of the institutions indirectly impacted the indebtedness maturity by means of the size variable. |
Macroeconomic Factors | Expected Relationship to Leverage (Hypotheses) |
---|---|
Growth of Gross Domestic Product | Negative |
Per capita income | Undetermined |
Annual inflation rate | Positive |
Participation of open economies | Negative |
Average time to open a business in the country | Negative |
Institutional Factors | Expected Relation to Leverage (Hypotheses) |
Level of Protection of Property Rights | Positive |
Legal Risk Level | Positive |
Level of Protection to Minorities | Negative |
Level of Protection to Creditors | Positive/Negative |
Level of Corruption and Ethics | Negative |
Attribute | Acronym | Proxy | Expected Sign |
---|---|---|---|
Dependent Variables | |||
Financial Leverage 1 | Fin_Lev1 | Gross Debt / Asset | |
Financial Leverage 2 | Fin_Lev2 | (Current Liabilities + Noncurrent Liabilities) / Asset | |
Leverage at Market Value 1 | Lev_Mkt1 | Gross Debt / Assets at Market Value | |
Leverage at Market Value 2 | Lev_Mkt2 | (Current Liabilities + Noncurrent Liabilities) / Asset at Market Value | |
Short-term Leverage | Lev_ST | Current Liabilities / Asset | |
Long-term Leverage | Lev_LT | Noncurrent Liabilities / Asset | |
Explanatory Firm Variables | |||
Size | Size | Ln (Net Operating Revenue) | Neg./Pos. |
Tangibility | Tang | (Fixed assets + Inventories) / Assest | Neg./Pos. |
Profitability | Prof | Return on Asset - ROA | Neg./Pos. |
Risk | Risk | ROA standard deviation | Neg. |
Liquidity | Liq | Current Assets / Current Liabilities | Neg. |
Growth Opportunities | Gr_Opp | (Salest / Salest-1) - 1 | Neg./Pos. |
Market-to-Book | MB | Asset at Market Value / Assets at Book Value | Neg./Pos. |
Explanatory Country Variables - Macroeconomic Factors | |||
Growth of Gross Domestic Product | Growt_GDP | Average annual GDP change between 2009 and 2014 | Neg. |
Per capita income | Income | Natural logarithm of GDP/Total population | Undetermined |
Annual inflation rate | Infl | Average annual inflation rate between 2009 and 2014 | Pos. |
Participation of public-traded companies in the economy | Part_Comp | Total in US$ of the market value of publicly traded companies/GDP | Neg. |
Average time to start a business | T_Buss | Natural logarithm of number of days | Neg. |
Explanatory Country Variables - Institutional Factors | |||
Property right | Prop_Rig | Level of property rights protection-GCI (1 worst-7 best) | Pos. |
Legal Risk | Legal_Risk | Efficiency of the legal framework in litigation-GCI (1 worst-7 best) | Neg. |
Minority Protection | Min_Prot | Legal Protection for Investors-GCI (1 worst-7 best) | Neg. |
Creditors Protection | Cred_Prot | Legal protection to the creditor World Bank (0 weak-12 strong) | Neg./Pos. |
Level of Corruption and Ethics | Corrup_Eth | GCI aggregate indicator (the higher the better) | Pos. |
Variables | N. Obs. | Argentina | Brazil | Chile | Colombia | Mexico | Peru | Overall Mean | Overall Std. Dev. |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Fin_Lev1 | 3358 | 0,2070 | 0,2776 | 0,2483 | 0,1323 | 0,2489 | 0,2526 | 0,2525 | 0,1704 |
Lev_Mkt1 | 3104 | 0,1897 | 0,2360 | 0,2119 | 0,1275 | 0,1977 | 0,2505 | 0,2188 | 0,1651 |
Fin_Lev2 | 3462 | 0,5555 | 0,5576 | 0,4562 | 0,3131 | 0,4763 | 0,4142 | 0,5004 | 0,1985 |
Lev_Mkt2 | 3203 | 0,4916 | 0,4665 | 0,3882 | 0,3110 | 0,3641 | 0,3981 | 0,4263 | 0,2214 |
Lev_ST | 3462 | 0,3634 | 0,2564 | 0,2145 | 0,1808 | 0,2227 | 0,2181 | 0,2477 | 0,1561 |
Lev_LT | 3462 | 0,1921 | 0,3012 | 0,2417 | 0,1323 | 0,2536 | 0,1962 | 0,2526 | 0,1606 |
Size | 3648 | 11,7086 | 13,1370 | 12,3085 | 12,8009 | 13,5636 | 11,9835 | 12,7424 | 2,0332 |
Tang | 3648 | 0,5209 | 0,3402 | 0,4770 | 0,2386 | 0,4951 | 0,5902 | 0,4355 | 0,2351 |
Prof | 3648 | 0,0732 | 0,0661 | 0,0599 | 0,0831 | 0,0736 | 0,1169 | 0,0733 | 0,0990 |
Risk | 3648 | 0,0368 | 0,0462 | 0,0434 | 0,0504 | 0,0238 | 0,0521 | 0,0421 | 0,0607 |
Liq | 3648 | 1,6102 | 2,0412 | 2,1412 | 1,6094 | 2,9575 | 2,1195 | 2,1489 | 2,6973 |
Gr_Opp | 3648 | 1,0780 | 0,2569 | 0,4450 | 0,2183 | 0,3530 | 0,1702 | 0,3844 | 2,7460 |
MB | 3648 | 1,2905 | 1,5163 | 1,4506 | 1,2199 | 1,5635 | 1,3835 | 1,4609 | 0,8633 |
Growt_GDP | 3648 | 0,0367 | 0,0265 | 0,0369 | 0,0429 | 0,0200 | 0,0500 | 0,0319 | 0,0091 |
Income | 3648 | 9,4291 | 9,3218 | 9,5260 | 8,8518 | 9,1436 | 8,6446 | 9,2503 | 0,2651 |
Infl | 3648 | 0,1859 | 0,0575 | 0,0279 | 0,0300 | 0,0413 | 0,0292 | 0,0587 | 0,0457 |
Part_Comp | 3648 | 0,0997 | 0,5278 | 1,1516 | 0,5879 | 0,3992 | 0,5007 | 0,5823 | 0,3081 |
T_Buss | 3648 | 3,2222 | 4,6839 | 2,3932 | 2,4482 | 1,8560 | 3,3383 | 3,4161 | 1,1168 |
Prop_Rig | 3648 | 2,6774 | 4,3855 | 5,1672 | 3,8708 | 4,0475 | 3,7766 | 4,2140 | 0,6864 |
Legal_Risk | 3648 | 2,6390 | 3,3330 | 4,7271 | 3,3422 | 3,2136 | 3,0540 | 3,4788 | 0,6471 |
Min_Prot | 3648 | 3,4750 | 4,6443 | 4,7109 | 4,0678 | 4,2492 | 4,3251 | 4,4146 | 0,3763 |
Cred_Prot | 3648 | 2,0000 | 2,0000 | 4,0000 | 8,0000 | 7,5000 | 8,0000 | 4,1373 | 2,5068 |
Corrup_Eth | 3648 | 2,0728 | 2,5840 | 4,6644 | 2,6587 | 2,7955 | 2,8480 | 2,9989 | 0,8433 |
Fin_Lev1 | Lev_Mkt1 | Fin_Lev2 | Fin_Mkt2 | Lev_ST | Lev_LT | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Observations | 3358 | 3104 | 3462 | 3203 | 3462 | 3462 | ||||||
Fixed Effects | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | ||||||
Intercept | 0,237 | *** | 0,209 | *** | 0,469 | *** | 0,410 | *** | 0,244 | *** | 0,226 | *** |
Estimators (Variance) | ||||||||||||
Parameters of Random Effects | ||||||||||||
Country | 0,001 | 0,001 | 0,006 | 0,002 | 0,003 | 0,002 | ||||||
Firm | 0,023 | 0,021 | 0,030 | 0,037 | 0,017 | 0,018 | ||||||
Time | 0,005 | 0,006 | 0,007 | 0,011 | 0,006 | 0,006 | ||||||
Total | 0,030 | 0,028 | 0,042 | 0,050 | 0,026 | 0,026 | ||||||
Intraclass Correlation Coefficients | ||||||||||||
Level 3 (Country) | 3,08% | 1,83% | 13,66% | 4,55% | 11,80% | 8,17% | ||||||
Level 2 (Firm) | 78,40% | 75,35% | 70,13% | 74,53% | 64,84% | 69,86% | ||||||
Level 1 (Time) | 18,51% | 22,82% | 16,21% | 20,92% | 23,36% | 21,97% | ||||||
Total | 100,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% | 100,00% | ||||||
LR Test (Chi2) | 3657,010 | *** | 2778,150 | *** | 4075,790 | *** | 3127,060 | *** | 3104,980 | *** | 3375,890 | *** |
Hierarchical Linear Regressions.
Dependent Variables: Fin_Lev1 and Lev_Mkt1. Explanatory variables: firm, macroeconomic and institutional variables.
Fin_Lev1: Gross Debt/Asset | Fin_Mkt1: Gross Debt/Assets at Market Value | |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Firm Variables | Firm and Macroeconomic variables | Firm and Institutional Variables | Firm Variables | Firm and Macroeconomic variables | Firm and Institutional Variables | |||||||
Fixed Effects | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | ||||||
Intercept | 0,013 | 567,845 | *** | 0,158 | 0,125 | *** | 433,024 | *** | -0,187 | |||
Year | 0,007 | *** | 0,007 | *** | 0,007 | *** | 0,014 | *** | 0,014 | *** | 0,014 | *** |
Size | 0,020 | *** | 0,020 | *** | 0,020 | *** | 0,010 | *** | 0,010 | *** | 0,010 | *** |
Tang | 0,034 | 0,026 | 0,026 | 0,069 | *** | 0,064 | ** | 0,064 | ** | |||
Prof | -0,185 | ** | -0,184 | ** | -0,184 | ** | -0,163 | ** | -0,167 | ** | -0,167 | ** |
Risk | -0,082 | -0,084 | -0,084 | 0,042 | 0,034 | 0,034 | ||||||
Liq | -0,011 | *** | -0,011 | *** | -0,011 | *** | -0,010 | *** | -0,010 | *** | -0,010 | *** |
Gr_Opp | 0,000 | 0,000 | 0,000 | -0,001 | -0,001 | -0,001 | ||||||
MB | -0,019 | ** | -0,020 | ** | -0,020 | ** | -0,066 | *** | -0,066 | *** | -0,066 | *** |
Growt_GDP | -1215,186 | *** | -925,792 | *** | ||||||||
Income | -64,419 | *** | -49,113 | *** | ||||||||
Infl | 388,870 | *** | 296,262 | *** | ||||||||
Part_Comp | 65,860 | *** | 50,188 | *** | ||||||||
T_Buss | 1,666 | *** | 1,276 | *** | ||||||||
Prop_Rig | 0,092 | -0,056 | ||||||||||
Legal_Risk | -0,342 | ** | -0,151 | |||||||||
Min_Prot | 0,032 | 0,179 | ||||||||||
Cred_Prot | -0,014 | ** | -0,006 | |||||||||
Corrup_Eth | 0,197 | ** | 0,108 | |||||||||
Random Effect Parameters | ||||||||||||
Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | |
Country | 0,001 | 3,90% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,001 | 3,89% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,000 | 0,00% |
Firm | 0,020 | 75,73% | 0,019 | 78,58% | 0,019 | 78,58% | 0,016 | 70,29% | 0,015 | 72,89% | 0,015 | 72,89% |
Time | 0,005 | 20,37% | 0,005 | 21,42% | 0,005 | 21,42% | 0,006 | 25,82% | 0,006 | 27,11% | 0,006 | 27,11% |
Total | 0,026 | 100,00% | 0,025 | 100,00% | 0,025 | 100,00% | 0,022 | 100,00% | 0,021 | 100,00% | 0,021 | 100,00% |
Verification Tests | ||||||||||||
Wald's Test | 3096,159 | *** | 3104,870 | *** | 3104,870 | *** | 2793,260 | *** | 2801,682 | *** | 2801,682 | *** |
LR Test (chi2) | 3395,560 | *** | 3292,100 | *** | 3292,100 | *** | 2477,380 | *** | 2369,390 | *** | 2369,390 | *** |
Observations | 3358 | 3358 | 3358 | 3104 | 3104 | 3104 |
Hierarchical Linear Regressions.
Dependent Variables: Fin_Lev2 and Lev_Mkt2. Explanatory variables: firm, macroeconomic and institutional variables.
Fin_Lev2: CL+ NCL/Asset | Lev_Mkt2: CL+NCL/Assets at Market Value | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Firm Variables | Firm and Macroeconomic variables | Firm and Institutional Variables | Firm Variables | Firm and Macroeconomic variables | Firm and Institutional Variables | ||||||||
Fixed Effects | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | |||||||
Intercept | 0,226 | *** | 643,314 | *** | 1,767 | *** | 0,464 | *** | 366,020 | ** | 0,877 | ** | |
Year | 0,011 | *** | 0,011 | *** | 0,011 | *** | 0,022 | *** | 0,022 | *** | 0,022 | *** | |
Size | 0,022 | *** | 0,022 | *** | 0,022 | *** | 0,005 | 0,005 | 0,005 | ||||
Tang | -0,003 | -0,007 | -0,007 | 0,066 | ** | 0,063 | ** | 0,063 | ** | ||||
Prof | -0,212 | *** | -0,208 | ** | -0,208 | ** | -0,257 | *** | -0,254 | *** | -0,254 | *** | |
Risk | 0,199 | * | 0,205 | * | 0,205 | * | 0,236 | ** | 0,240 | ** | 0,240 | ** | |
Liq | -0,025 | *** | -0,025 | *** | -0,025 | *** | -0,021 | *** | -0,021 | *** | -0,021 | *** | |
Gr_Opp | 0,006 | ** | 0,006 | ** | 0,006 | ** | 0,003 | 0,003 | 0,003 | ||||
MB | -0,011 | -0,011 | -0,011 | -0,126 | *** | -0,126 | *** | -0,126 | *** | ||||
Growt_GDP | -1378,973 | *** | -783,734 | ** | |||||||||
Income | -72,959 | *** | -41,480 | ** | |||||||||
Infl | 441,504 | *** | 251,004 | ** | |||||||||
Part_Comp | 74,627 | *** | 42,424 | ** | |||||||||
T_Buss | 1,897 | *** | 1,095 | ** | |||||||||
Prop_Rig | 0,449 | *** | 0,106 | ||||||||||
Legal_Risk | -0,743 | *** | -0,300 | * | |||||||||
Min_Prot | -0,377 | *** | -0,029 | ||||||||||
Cred_Prot | -0,042 | *** | -0,024 | *** | |||||||||
Corrup_Eth | 0,342 | *** | 0,144 | * | |||||||||
Random Effect Parameters | |||||||||||||
Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | ||
Country | 0,006 | 17,37% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,002 | 7,72% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,000 | 0,00% | |
Firm | 0,023 | 64,42% | 0,023 | 77,77% | 0,023 | 77,77% | 0,020 | 64,44% | 0,020 | 69,58% | 0,020 | 69,58% | |
Time | 0,006 | 18,21% | 0,006 | 22,23% | 0,006 | 22,23% | 0,009 | 27,85% | 0,009 | 30,42% | 0,009 | 30,42% | |
Total | 0,036 | 100,00% | 0,029 | 100,00% | 0,029 | 100,00% | 0,032 | 100,00% | 0,029 | 100,00% | 0,029 | 100,00% | |
Verification Tests | |||||||||||||
Wald's Test | 2880,825 | *** | 2893,262 | *** | 2893,262 | *** | 2249,620 | *** | 2259,780 | *** | 2259,780 | *** | |
LR Test (chi2) | 3589,090 | *** | 3236,170 | *** | 3236,170 | *** | 2385,310 | *** | 2174,360 | *** | 2174,360 | *** | |
Observations | 3462 | 3462 | 3462 | 3203 | 3203 | 3203 |
Hierarchical Linear Regressions.
Dependent Variables: Lev_ST and Lev_LT. Explanatory variables: firm, macroeconomic and institutional variables.
Lev_ST: CL/Asset | Lev_LT: NCL/Asset | ||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Firm Variables | Firm and Macroeconomic variables | Firm and Institutional Variables | Firm Variables | Firm and Macroeconomic variables | Firm and Institutional Variables | ||||||||
Fixed Effects | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | Coef. | |||||||
Intercept | 0,172 | *** | 295,207 | ** | 1,094 | *** | 0,055 | 348,509 | ** | 0,676 | * | ||
Year | 0,003 | *** | 0,003 | *** | 0,003 | *** | 0,008 | *** | 0,008 | *** | 0,008 | *** | |
Size | 0,007 | ** | 0,007 | ** | 0,007 | ** | 0,015 | *** | 0,015 | *** | 0,015 | *** | |
Tang | -0,021 | -0,024 | -0,024 | 0,018 | 0,017 | 0,017 | |||||||
Prof | -0,082 | -0,083 | -0,083 | -0,137 | * | -0,126 | * | -0,126 | * | ||||
Risk | 0,280 | *** | 0,284 | *** | 0,284 | *** | -0,085 | -0,079 | -0,079 | ||||
Liq | -0,016 | *** | -0,016 | *** | -0,016 | *** | -0,009 | *** | -0,009 | *** | -0,009 | *** | |
Gr_Opp | 0,003 | * | 0,003 | * | 0,003 | * | 0,002 | 0,002 | 0,002 | ||||
MB | 0,006 | 0,006 | 0,006 | -0,016 | ** | -0,017 | ** | -0,017 | ** | ||||
Growt_GDP | -631,435 | ** | -748,396 | ** | |||||||||
Income | -33,477 | ** | -39,528 | ** | |||||||||
Infl | 203,142 | ** | 238,634 | ** | |||||||||
Part_Comp | 34,222 | ** | 40,451 | ** | |||||||||
T_Buss | 0,860 | ** | 1,038 | ** | |||||||||
Prop_Rig | 0,136 | 0,313 | *** | ||||||||||
Legal_Risk | -0,320 | ** | -0,424 | *** | |||||||||
Min_Prot | -0,186 | * | -0,192 | * | |||||||||
Cred_Prot | -0,022 | *** | -0,020 | *** | |||||||||
Corrup_Eth | 0,176 | *** | 0,166 | ** | |||||||||
Random Effect Parameters | |||||||||||||
Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | Estimate | ICC | ||
Country | 0,003 | 13,34% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,002 | 8,00% | 0,000 | 0,00% | 0,000 | 0,00% | |
Firm | 0,015 | 61,37% | 0,014 | 70,59% | 0,014 | 70,59% | 0,016 | 68,66% | 0,016 | 74,41% | 0,016 | 74,41% | |
Time | 0,006 | 25,29% | 0,006 | 29,41% | 0,006 | 29,41% | 0,006 | 23,34% | 0,006 | 25,59% | 0,006 | 25,59% | |
Total | 0,024 | 100,00% | 0,020 | 100,00% | 0,020 | 100,00% | 0,024 | 100,00% | 0,022 | 100,00% | 0,022 | 100,00% | |
Verification Tests | |||||||||||||
Wald's Test | 3115,695 | *** | 3127,392 | *** | 3127,392 | *** | 3197,257 | *** | 3207,377 | *** | 3207,377 | *** | |
LR Test (chi2) | 2838,450 | *** | 2560,240 | *** | 2560,240 | *** | 3135,670 | *** | 2907,580 | *** | 2907,580 | *** | |
Observations | 3462 | 3462 | 3462 | 3462 | 3462 | 3462 |