One of the controversial points of the debate regarding the uses of biotechnology is the normative function of the boundary between therapy and improvement. For those who defend such a boundary, bio-techno-scientific interventions in human beings must be restricted to therapy, such that improvement must be prohibited. In this paper, we defend the viewpoint that this boundary has important empirical imprecisions and conceptual problems, such that it is normatively inappropriate to justify the difference between what what must be prescribed and proscribed. In the first place, we analyze the distinction between normal and abnormal, in view of the foundations for such a boundary. Next, we examine the boundary per se, in order to point out its problems. Identifying such problems and postulating that biological normality is bereft of intrinsic moral relevance, we infer that it is not clear why it would be morally forbidden for biotechnology to advance beyond therapy.
Bioethics. /therapeutic use; Biomedical enhancement; Biotechnology