Estrutura de governança e valor das companhias abertas brasileiras

Silveira, Alexandre Di Miceli da; Barros, Lucas Ayres B. de C.; Famá, Rubens

doi:10.1590/S0034-75902003000300005

Resumos

A governança corporativa visa a aumentar a probabilidade de os fornecedores de recursos garantirem para si o retorno sobre seu investimento, por meio de um conjunto de mecanismos no qual se inclui o Conselho de Administração. Este artigo investiga se a estrutura de governança foi relevante para o valor das companhias abertas no Brasil entre 1998 e 2000. Três variáveis de governança foram consideradas: separação dos cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho (DE), tamanho do conselho (TOT) e grau de independência do conselho (INDEP). Utilizou-se uma regressão múltipla do tipo seção transversal. DE foi a variável com os resultados mais importantes, apresentando evidência de que, em média, as empresas que têm pessoas distintas ocupando os cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho são mais valorizadas pelo mercado.

Governança corporativa; conselho de administração; valor da empresa; teste empírico; problema de agência

Corporate governance seeks to increase the probability that suppliers of financial resources will assure themselves the return on their investment through a set of mechanisms including the Board of Directors. This paper investigates if the governance structure was important to the value of Brazilian listed firms from 1998 to 2000. Three governance variables were considered: the separation of chief executive officer and chairman positions (DE), board size (TOT), and board independence (Indep). The multiple regression method with cross sectional data was applied. The variable chief executive officer as chairman (DE) showed the most important results, with evidence that, on average, firms with different people in charge of the chief executive officer and chairman positions have higher market value.

Corporate governance; board of directors; firm value; empirical test; agency problem

FINANÇAS

Estrutura de governança e valor das companhias abertas brasileiras

Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira; Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros; Rubens Famá

FEA/USP

RESUMO

A governança corporativa visa a aumentar a probabilidade de os fornecedores de recursos garantirem para si o retorno sobre seu investimento, por meio de um conjunto de mecanismos no qual se inclui o Conselho de Administração. Este artigo investiga se a estrutura de governança foi relevante para o valor das companhias abertas no Brasil entre 1998 e 2000. Três variáveis de governança foram consideradas: separação dos cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho (DE), tamanho do conselho (TOT) e grau de independência do conselho (INDEP). Utilizou-se uma regressão múltipla do tipo seção transversal. DE foi a variável com os resultados mais importantes, apresentando evidência de que, em média, as empresas que têm pessoas distintas ocupando os cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho são mais valorizadas pelo mercado.

Palavras-chave: Governança corporativa, conselho de administração, valor da empresa, teste empírico, problema de agência.

ABSTRACT

Corporate governance seeks to increase the probability that suppliers of financial resources will assure themselves the return on their investment through a set of mechanisms including the Board of Directors. This paper investigates if the governance structure was important to the value of Brazilian listed firms from 1998 to 2000. Three governance variables were considered: the separation of chief executive officer and chairman positions (DE), board size (TOT), and board independence (Indep). The multiple regression method with cross sectional data was applied. The variable chief executive officer as chairman (DE) showed the most important results, with evidence that, on average, firms with different people in charge of the chief executive officer and chairman positions have higher market value.

Key words: Corporate governance, board of directors, firm value, empirical test, agency problem.

Texto completo disponível apenas em PDF.

Full text available only in PDF format.

Artigo recebido em 14.11.2002.

Aprovado em 14.04.2003.

Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira

Doutorando e Mestre em Administração de Empresas FEA/USP. Interesses de Pesquisa: Governança Corporativa, Finanças Corporativas e Avaliação de Empresas. E-mail: alexfea@usp.br Endereço: R. Afonso de Freitas, 320, ap. 71. São Paulo, SP. CEP 04006-051.

Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros

Doutorando e Mestre em Administração de Empresas FEA/USP. Interesses de Pesquisa: Finanças Econômicas e Corporativas. E-mail: lucasayres@hotmail.com Endereço: R. Florália, 103. São Paulo, SP. CEP 05451-130.

Rubens Famá

Professor Doutor do Departamento de Administração de Empresas pela FEA/USP nos programas de graduação e pósgraduação. Interesses de Pesquisa: Finanças Econômicas e Corporativas, Governança Corporativa E-mail: rfama@usp.br Endereço: R. Morás, 656, ap. 5. São Paulo, SP. CEP 05434-020.

BARNHART, Scott e ROSENSTEIN, Stuart. Board composition, managerial ownership and firm performance: an empirical analysis. The Financial Review, n. 33, p. 1-16, Nov. 1998.
BAYSINGER, B. e BUTLER, H. Corporate governance and the board of directors: performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, v. 1, p. 101-24, 1985.
BHAGAT, Sanjai e BLACK, Bernard. The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance. Business Lawyer, v. 54, p. 921-63, 1999.
BHAGAT, Sanjai e BLACK, Bernard. Board independence and long term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law (Forthcoming), v. 27, n. 1, 2002.
BROWN, William e MALONEY, Michael. Exit, voice, and the role of corporate directors: evidence from acquisition performance, 1998. Unpublished working paper.
CHUNG, Kee e PRUITT, Stephen. A simple approximation of Tobin's Q. Financial Management, v. 23, n. 3, p. 70-4, Autumn 1994.
DALTON, Dan e DAILY, Catherine. The board and financial performance: bigger is better. NACD Director's Monthly, p. 1-5, Aug. 2000.
EISENBERG, Theodore, SUNDGREN, Stefan e WELLS, Martin. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 48, p. 35-54, 1998.
FAMÁ, Rubens e BARROS, Lucas Ayres. Q de Tobin e seu uso em finanças: aspectos metodológicos e conceituais. Cadernos de Pesquisa em Administração, v. 7, n. 4, p. 27-43, Out. /Dez. 2000.
FÜERST, Oren e KANG, Sok-Hyon. Corporate governance, expected operating performance, and pricing. Work in Progress, Yale School of Management, New Haven (CT), v. 2, n. 2, 2000.
HERMALIN, Benjamin e WEISBACH, Michael. The effect of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management, v. 21, n. 4, p. 101-12, 1991.
JENSEN, Michael e MECKLING, William. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, p. 305-60, Oct. 1976.
JENSEN, Michael. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, v. 48, p. 83180, 1993.
JENSEN, Michael. A theory of the firm: governance, residual claims, and organizational forms. 1st. ed. Boston : Harvard University Press, 2001. 320p.
LA PORTA, Rafael, SHLEIFER, Andrei, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, Florencio e VISHNY, Robert. Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 58, p. 3-27, Oct. 2000.
SHLEIFER, Andrei e VISHNY, Robert. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, v. 52, n. 2, p. 737-83, 1997.
TOBIN, James. A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, v. 1, n. 1, p. 15-29, Feb. 1969.
TOBIN, James e BRAINARD, W. Pitfalls in financial model building, American Economic Review, v. 58, n. 2, p. 99-122, May 1968.
YERMACK, David. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of Directors. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 40, n. 3, p. 185-213, 1996.

Datas de Publicação

Publicação nesta coleção
15 Fev 2011
Data do Fascículo
Set 2003

Histórico

Aceito
14 Abr 2003
Recebido
14 Nov 2002

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

[1] BARNHART, Scott e ROSENSTEIN, Stuart. Board composition, managerial ownership and firm performance: an empirical analysis. The Financial Review, n. 33, p. 1-16, Nov. 1998.

[2] BAYSINGER, B. e BUTLER, H. Corporate governance and the board of directors: performance effects of changes in board composition. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, v. 1, p. 101-24, 1985.

[3] BHAGAT, Sanjai e BLACK, Bernard. The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance. Business Lawyer, v. 54, p. 921-63, 1999.

[4] BHAGAT, Sanjai e BLACK, Bernard. Board independence and long term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law (Forthcoming), v. 27, n. 1, 2002.

[5] BROWN, William e MALONEY, Michael. Exit, voice, and the role of corporate directors: evidence from acquisition performance, 1998. Unpublished working paper.

[6] CHUNG, Kee e PRUITT, Stephen. A simple approximation of Tobin's Q. Financial Management, v. 23, n. 3, p. 70-4, Autumn 1994.

[7] DALTON, Dan e DAILY, Catherine. The board and financial performance: bigger is better. NACD Director's Monthly, p. 1-5, Aug. 2000.

[8] EISENBERG, Theodore, SUNDGREN, Stefan e WELLS, Martin. Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 48, p. 35-54, 1998.

[9] FAMÁ, Rubens e BARROS, Lucas Ayres. Q de Tobin e seu uso em finanças: aspectos metodológicos e conceituais. Cadernos de Pesquisa em Administração, v. 7, n. 4, p. 27-43, Out. /Dez. 2000.

[10] FÜERST, Oren e KANG, Sok-Hyon. Corporate governance, expected operating performance, and pricing. Work in Progress, Yale School of Management, New Haven (CT), v. 2, n. 2, 2000.

[11] HERMALIN, Benjamin e WEISBACH, Michael. The effect of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. Financial Management, v. 21, n. 4, p. 101-12, 1991.

[12] JENSEN, Michael e MECKLING, William. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, p. 305-60, Oct. 1976.

[13] JENSEN, Michael. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance, v. 48, p. 83180, 1993.

[14] JENSEN, Michael. A theory of the firm: governance, residual claims, and organizational forms. 1st. ed. Boston : Harvard University Press, 2001. 320p.

[15] LA PORTA, Rafael, SHLEIFER, Andrei, LOPEZ-DE-SILANES, Florencio e VISHNY, Robert. Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 58, p. 3-27, Oct. 2000.

[16] SHLEIFER, Andrei e VISHNY, Robert. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, v. 52, n. 2, p. 737-83, 1997.

[17] TOBIN, James. A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, v. 1, n. 1, p. 15-29, Feb. 1969.

[18] TOBIN, James e BRAINARD, W. Pitfalls in financial model building, American Economic Review, v. 58, n. 2, p. 99-122, May 1968.

[19] YERMACK, David. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of Directors. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 40, n. 3, p. 185-213, 1996.