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Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional

Print version ISSN 0034-7329

Rev. bras. polít. int. vol.56 no.2 Brasília July/Dec. 2013

http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292013000200002 

ARTIGO

 

India, Latin America, and the Caribbean during the Cold War

 

Índia, América Latina e Caribe durante a Guerra Fria

 

 

Cesar Ross

Researcher at the Instituto de Estudos Avançados at the Universidade de Santiago do Chile, Santiago, Chile (cesar.ross@usach.cl)

 

 


ABSTRACT

In this period, the key to the relationship between India and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was based in the political nature of this liaison: it was a "uni-multilateral" relationship, centered in India, where LAC countries operated as a group of autonomous entities (an "island chain" structure), and not as a unit of a supranational character with unified international conduct (an island structure). As we will see, faced with uniform and consistent Indian policies, LAC had national policies which make it impossible to discuss a regional policy towards India. The goal of this work is to form a general characterization of the bilateral policies during the period of the Cold War with the intent of identifying the key explanatory factors of the process. While this may be a limited objective, it addresses the non-existence of an academic debate surrounding the topic. We intend to contribute an analysis which in this phase is primarily descriptive.

Keywords: Chile; International Trade; Japan; South America; World War II.


RESUMO

Neste período, a chave para o relacionamento entre a Índia e a América Latina e o Caribe foi baseada no caráter político dessa ligação: Era uma relação "uni-multilateral", centrada na Índia, onde os países da América Latina e o Caribe operavam como um conjunto de entidades autônomas (uma estrutura de "cadeia de ilhas"), e não como uma unidade de um caráter supranacional com conduta internacional unificada (uma estrutura de ilha). Como veremos, confrontados com políticas indianas uniformes e consistentes, a América Latina e o Caribe tiveram políticas nacionais que tornam impossível discutir uma política regional para a Índia. O objetivo deste trabalho é formar uma caracterização geral das políticas bilaterais durante o período da Guerra Fria, com a intenção de identificar os principais fatores explicativos do processo. Embora isso possa ser um objetivo limitado, aborda a não existência de um debate acadêmico em torno do tema. Pretendemos contribuir com uma análise que nesta fase é basicamente descritiva.

Palavras-chave: Chile; Comércio Internacional; Japão; América do Sul; Segunda Guerra Mundial.


 

 

Introduction

This article investigates the relationship between India and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in the period of the Cold War for these principle reasons: first, because it constitutes a temporal unit of analysis with limited margins (1947-1989) and with well-defined epistemological meaning; second, because despite India and LAC's marginal role in the academic discussion regarding the Cold War, these regions were influenced by the world political structure1, albeit under a new system, that of the non-aligned; and third, because in this period the political ties that distinguish the current relationship between India and LAC were established, the political characteristics of which are the focus of this work.

In LAC, the Cold War produced effects which modified the course of national histories, the location of, and the role played by the Continent as a product of the interrelations and ideologies of the period (Brands 2010, 255). In this setting, LAC's international relations were conditioned by these characteristics, shaded by the case of each particular country.

In this period, the key to the relationship between India and LAC was based in the political nature of this liaison: it was a "uni-multilateral"2 relationship, centered in India, where LAC countries operated as a group of autonomous entities (an "island chain" structure), and not as a unit of a supranational character with unified international conduct (an island structure). As we will see, faced with uniform and consistent Indian policies, LAC had national policies which make it impossible to discuss a regional policy towards India.

On one hand, India was a state with exceptional characteristics: a country-continent in Southeast Asia, a multicultural nation, post-colonial country status, strong external policies, and was well defined as the leader of the non-aligned.

On the other hand, LAC had characteristics which constituted a challenge for the liaison: even if it was a continent in that it was geographically united, it consisted of very diverse autonomous countries; a region with a relatively homogeneous culture which was composed of Nation-States consolidated in their independence, and with heterogeneous external policies conditioned by the influence of the United States.

Thus, during the Cold War years, India and LAC were not only destined to organize their own political systems, but to position themselves internationally. In the reduced scope of power and dissidence permitted by the bipolarity of the Cold War, India and LAC found ways to meet (N. Khilnani 1975; N. M. Khilnani 1992; Narayanan, Nafey, and Gupta 2000): from the friendship between intellectuals such as Gabriela Mistral and Sri Aurobindo3 (Motwani 1954), and the affinity between Octavio Paz and Mahatma Gandhi, to the South-South connection between the regions, whose daily political life was experienced in discussions and votes taken at the UN4. In this last facet, the relations between India and LAC in this forum form an essential aspect of this study.

The goal of this work is to form a general characterization of the bilateral policies during the period of the Cold War with the intent of identifying the key explanatory factors of the process. While this may be a limited goal, it addresses the non-existence of an academic debate surrounding the topic. We intend to contribute to an analysis, which in this phase is primarily descriptive.

This investigation was performed through the reconstruction and analysis of the electoral conduct of India and LAC in the UN, as well as by the analysis of bilateral visits between the two. The Indian academic debate and information from Annual Reports produced by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) complement the analysis. On this basis, a general interpretation of the bilateral relations was performed, a history whose basic facts are still not entirely known to the majority of academics in India and LAC.

 

India, Latin America and the Caribbean: political relations

In the context of the Cold War and the setting of the Bandung Conference (1955), headed by leaders of the third world, the conditions for the formation of the non-aligned were created, an entity which was established at the Belgrade Summit (1961). It was initially made up of six countries, represented by its heads of state: Tito from Yugoslavia, Nehru from India, Nasser from Egypt, Nkrumah from Ghana, Sukarno from Indonesia, and Selassie from Ethiopia.

As has been stated in many texts, the international policy of the non-aligned was based in peace preservation and whose focus was the achievement of 12 fundamental principles which guided its international relations.

Authors such as Mathur and P.M. Kamath (1996) propose that in 1974 India began establishing its posture as non-aligned, rejecting the tactics of "force" and "pragmatism," and instead choosing the path of "reflection." In theoretical international relations terminology, India opted for that of idealism, choosing a foreign policy based on its own cultural identity, one which Indira Gandhi continued following after the death of Nehru.

With World War II concluded, LAC fell within the USA's sphere of influence. In this position, the region was converted into a scene of disputes, sometimes hidden and in other occasions completely overt, between those who supported the cause of Capitalism and those who subscribed to that of Socialism (Brands 2010; Pozo 2002). The political polarization that had been maintained in the formal institutional setting reached its end with the Cuban Revolution (1959), an event which accelerated the ideological polarization and militarization (formal and informal) of the structural political conflict between left and right.

In this context, both the forces of the left and those who identified themselves with the political center tended to coincide with the international vision that nonaligned countries had become configured with (Bernal-Meza 2005; Bielschowsky 1998; Devés 2003; Pérez 1973; Tomassini 1989). In particular, those which arose through the influence of Raúl Prebish's thought in the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 1949, 1952), which related to the democratic ideals stemming from the enormous influence of its leaders in LAC5 and by the receptivity that LAC's economic and social thinking had in its intellectuality (Devés 2008; Devés and Ross 2009). Thus, the liaison between LAC and India acquired a relevant potential and size for the emerging political and economic projects whose implementation was sought in Asia and LAC.

Regardless of the fact that it is possible to uncover very old ties through commercial contacts and the presence of immigrants, it was not until decolonization that India and LAC began to develop a formal and fluid relationship.

India, Latin America and the Caribbean in the UN's world politics

An interesting focus in the study of the relationship between India and LAC during the Cold War years is the analysis of the conduct of each of these actors in the principal forum of world politics, the UN. Particularly, the key issues of international politics regarding the subjects of this analysis, where the main paradox of this liaison is observed: India's foreign policies towards LAC corresponded asymmetrically with respect to the MEA's prioritization of the countries in the region6.

India opposite the world policies of Latin America and the Caribbean

If, during the Cold War, LAC was not characterized by its presentation of matters of a world scale before the international community, it was accustomed to seeing its own contingency transformed in part by discussion in world forums. In this manner, a series of events in the region were put up for international debate, symbolizing the main problem of the North-South and/or Center-Periphery relationship.

Following the focus of N.P. Chaudhary (1990), India's policy towards LAC can be examined through six critical events: 1) US intervention in Guatemala in 1954; 2) the Cuban Crisis; 3) the case of the Panama Canal; 4) the Chilean Crisis of 1973; 5) the crisis of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) of 1982; and 6) US intervention in Nicaragua.

According to its principles, India gave strong support to LAC countries which saw their autonomy, independence and democracy threatened. This assured India's frequent opposition to US policies in the region.

Thus, after US intervention in Guatemala in 1954, India strongly supported Guatemala, which helps explain why Guatemala was one of the countries which most fiercely adhered to India's international agenda in the UN (59.1%)7.

Since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, India was inclined to support the cause of the country: its fight against economic embargoes imposed by the US (1960 and 1962), the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), the attempted invasion of exiled Cubans (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). The adhesion was related to the defense of the freedom and self-determination that India professed to its international8 allies and adversaries. Consequently, the support of Cuba and its generous response (64.3%) was the reflection of India's delicate political strategy on a world scale.

In the conflict between the US and Panama, India supported Panama with a position that reached its high point in the 5th Summit Conference of non-aligned countries, where leaders demanded that the US government abstain from further intervention in LAC. In the same manner, the UN Security Council considered the theme of the conflict to be a potential threat to the peace in LAC9. There, India also supported the resolution that all Latin American countries should exercise self-determination in their territories. As a result, Panama adhered to India's UN agenda decisively (68.8%), making it the LAC country that voted most in favor of India.

The Chilean Crisis of 1973, following the coup d'état and the polarization surrounding it, grabbed international attention. Consequently, the relationship between India and Chile was distant during the period, in which India advocated the carrying out of democratic elections. India's first minister, Indira Gandhi, spoke in various international forums about the implications of what happened in Chile and also did so during UN's General Assembly in 1973, where he voted in favor of a resolution which called for the Chilean Military Junta to free political prisoners. Despite the impact from this span, and considering the entire period which this work covers, Chile's support of India's international agenda was high (61.5%).

During the Crisis of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) in 1982, India was entangled in its principles, given that both belligerents represented and violated fundamental values of India's international vision. On one hand the matter of decolonization was at play. On the other, India was against the existence of armed conflict. The latter explains why Argentina's adhesion to the international agenda proposed by India in the UN was the lowest among the LAC countries, supporting only 48.1% of effective votes.

As in Panama, faced with US intervention in Nicaragua, India insisted on monitoring the US's conduct in LAC, sharing Mexico's perspective, given that the crisis was an example of intervention by the world's superpowers. Thus, India supported the president of Nicaragua's petition that the principle of self-determination of Latin American countries be maintained and coincided with the document written in Guatemala and signed by India, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Given this Indian policy, Nicaragua adhered to India's international agenda in the UN, above the average of LAC, to the tune of 61.7%.

 

India and Latin America: bilateral visits and international policy

In regards to relations between countries where the State fulfilled the role of entrepreneur, it can be affirmed that even relations of an economic nature were essentially political in nature as well, since during the Cold War the political-ideological element shaded all aspects of international relations10.

During the Cold War years, personal meetings between representatives of the States (diplomats and representatives of the central government) were key moments during which international ties were built and rebuilt, relegating documentation recorded from the meetings to a complementary level, and, to a very secondary one, the technological options available for long-distance communication11. In the case of relations between India and LAC, this assertion is even truer when the geographical and cultural distance between the actors is taken into account. Bilateral visits became a privileged instance for the articulation of the interests of very diverse actors, such as the one that was constituted in an indicator of the specific emphasis of the relationship12.

As can be seen in Table 1, from the analysis of visits made by representatives of India and LAC, in each direction, five specific observations can be gathered. First, that the bilateral visits were concentrated in four countries (Cuba, 18; Mexico; Nicaragua, 11; and Peru, 10), showing a distribution which responded to the economic and political interests of India's foreign policy during the period (Ross 2010b). The structure revealed a great amplitude which varied between 1 and 18 visits13.

 

 

Second, the contacts reveal an erratic consistency of visits, with highs and lows difficult to correlate with the agendas of the involved countries and/or with the dynamic of world politics and the economy. This is apparently due to the greater and/or lower interest of India and the LAC countries to relate with each other in a more profound, ample and strong manner.

Third, two general stages in the relations between India and LAC can be observed. The first was between 1952 and 1967, before the Indira Gandhi's visit (1968). The second was after the visit, between 1969 and 1990.

Fourth, in the first stage of the formation of relations, the contacts were limited. The second stage reveals much greater activity and demonstrates the efforts to amplify and deepen relations.

Fifth, in the second stage there is a cycle of expansion and crisis, with a peak in 1984, which tends to drop until the end of the period of study in 1990.

As a consequence, the relation was one whose behavioral pattern was relatively erratic, without much relevant information to be scrutinized such as to guide a standard interpretation, and without significant milestones, except for the visit from the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi.

However, an analysis of India's prioritization of the LAC countries, both in its foreign policy and in its actual results, allows the identification of some important clues for the outlining of a more specific characterization.

As can be seen in Table 2, if we pay attention to a relatively small stratification, the concentration of the prioritization of the relations between India and LAC was quite low. The positions varied depending on the relation's classification (visits, total commerce, and UN votes), demonstrating the apparent absence of an explanatory pattern.

 

 

While India's official foreign policy tended to coincide with commercial trends, visits also tended to coincide with UN support. Up to this point, there is not an academic debate that has addressed this particular topic. Thus, the previous analysis does not manage to explain the deeper logic of the liaison, in terms of the definition of a guide prioritizing the relations between these actors, such as the keys which could explain their location within it, and consequently, specifics of the relationship.

From there, and starting with Table 3, it is possible to redefine the prioritization of these relations, establishing a certification of the prioritization of the three variables (visits, total commerce, and UN votes), through the selection of a maximum of 11 cases and through the use of a point scale of 1-1114, intended to give a single value to the position each LAC country held within each variable. That way, and regardless of the fact that it is not possible to measure the specific influence of each variable, the establishment of a consolidated prioritization regarding the relations between India and LAC is feasible.

 

 

These three variables provide the basis for proposal of the following conclusions. First, that the prioritization stated by India's official foreign policy favored Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela (in that order), adjusted predominately towards its economic interests. Second, despite the above, the result of the partnership arising from relations between India and LAC was guided by ideological considerations and political interests (in that order), demonstrating a different emphasis than that stated by official discourse. Third, that the prioritization established by India's foreign policy with respect to LAC was contradicted by the empirical evidence of its relations: although it had prioritized Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, it ended up developing close relations with Cuba, Mexico, and Chile.

 

Latin America and the Caribbean opposite India's world policies

All international political activity in the UN left important traces as to the behavior of the LAC countries with respect to India, which offered a view into how relations were developed between these two world regions.

UN Discussions allow for the visualization of how the two analyzed regions maintained a complex relationship with a shared agenda in some respects, which was held in a certain intellectual abstraction by the teams which designed, led, and administered India and LAC's foreign policy. In other words, the occurrences were as much a genuine resemblance of visions as they were the will of those in a position to decipher and consider those points of view.

Without a doubt, that which constituted the essence of India's international politics was made clear by its international agenda. India did not only procure its own interests, but also of those which it claimed to represent15.

Thus, UN voting records during the period in question allows us to establish that: A) 20 LAC countries16 participated; B) 69 votes were taken; C) a total of 1,38017 decisions were made which permit the analysis of this bilateral liaison, lessening the usual slant left by politically correct documents such as speeches, treaties, and ministerial records; D) India promoted issues in its neighborhood agenda and other matters of a world character that were related to India's vision of international relations, from which two groups can be extracted.

D.1. India's Neighborhood UN agenda, which corresponded to the topics directly related to India's interests (11 votes).

D.2. India's international UN agenda, related to topics which India wanted to address in what we will now call global agenda (58 votes).

Specifically, 18 topics18 were debated and voted on, which can be grouped into three large categories, shown in Table 4, and whose analysis allows the visualization of the emphasis India placed on world politics during those years.

 

 

D.1. India's Neighborhood UN Agenda

D.1.1 Neighborhood Policy

As seen in Table 5, LAC's conduct in the 11 votes showed clear indifference. This affirmation is based on a series of data processed in this investigation: out of 220 votes, LAC did not participate with 159 votes (72.3%); LAC was in favor of India's position with only 23 votes, which were concentrated in the Indian-Chinese war (18 of 20 countries); LAC voted against India's position with 18 votes, especially in the Kashmir conflict; LAC took a neutral position with 18 votes; and in many of the votes LAC was absent from the voting booth20.

 

 

D.2 India's International UN Agenda

Regarding this agenda, 58 votes (Table 6) demonstrate that there was in effect an agreement among LAC with India's proposed international agenda and that in many respects corresponded to the Ten Bandung Principles. This assertion is founded in the following data: out of a total of 1,160 votes, LAC representatives were present to vote on 903 occasions (77.85%)21; in favor of India with 539 votes (59.69%)22; against India's position with 362 votes (40.08%)23: neutral with 148 votes24; and LAC's representatives were absent, to subtract from the final tally, for a total of 257 votes25.

 

 

D.2.1 Indian policies associated with its Philo-Political Principles

Of the 58 votes, 23 are related to India's policies regarding its philo-political principles (Table 7). In this table the effective agreement of LAC with the international agenda proposed by India is shown. This assertion is founded in the following data: out of a total of 460 votes, LAC's representatives were present to vote on 404 occasions (87.8%); in favor of India there were 356 votes (77.39%); against India's position there were 12 votes (2.60%); no neutral vote was recorded; and LAC's representatives were absent, to subtract from the final tally, for a total of 56 votes (12.17%).

 

 

D.2.2 Asian and Third World Policy

Of 58 votes, 35 are related to Asian and Third World Policy (Table 8). A relative agreement among LAC with regards to the international agenda proposed by India is shown. This assertion is founded in the following data: out of a total of 460 votes, LAC's representatives were present to vote on 499 occasions (71.28%); in favor of India there were 183 votes (26.14%); against India's position there were 136 votes (19.42%); there were 148 neutral votes recorded (21.14%); and LAC's representatives were absent, to subtract from the final tally, an important number of votes totaling 201 votes (28.71%).

 

 

As can be seen in Tables 5 through 8, while India's International Agenda counted with the support and adhesion of LAC, the same could not be said for India's Neighborhood Agenda.

The LAC countries tended to support India in global matters not as an articulate block of countries, but as a heterogeneous group of States with very diverse foreign policies and ideological visions. Beyond the "idealist" voluntarism of Academia, that which shows most eloquently what occurred with LAC's policy choices during the Cold War, and afterwards, is its diversity of paths and its incapacity to understand itself, in the long term, as only one actor. On the contrary, as can be seen in Table 9, the position of the region with respect to India was an expression of its condition as an "island chain."

 

 

The extensive database which has supported this part of the work and whose synthesis appears partially reflected in the previous tables allows us to uphold that India's foreign policy towards LAC corresponded asymmetrically with respect to the MEA's prioritization of countries in the region26. Such that the countries which gave stronger support to India's policies were the least concerned for by India (the least powerful and least wealthy), with the sole exception of Mexico. Meanwhile, the wealthiest, most powerful countries and those prioritized by India's foreign policy were the ones that least adhered to India's international agenda.

This paradox is shown by the contemplation of net votes by the LAC countries with regards to India's international agenda. Taking into account the 69 net votes of the 20 countries analyzed, it is concluded that the overall average of adhesion was 58.4%, and, by extension, rejection, neutral votes and/or absences on average represented 41.6% of the votes27.

There were 11 countries above, and 9 countries below the average. We can conclude that the 11 countries which surpassed the average were closer in sharing the vision and international politics of India, creating a relation of greater affinity. Among them were Chile (61.5), Cuba (64.3), El Salvador (61.4), Guatemala (59.1), Haiti (61.7), Mexico (58.7), Nicaragua (61.7), Panama (68.8), Paraguay (65.1), Uruguay (60.4), and Venezuela (58.5). In the same manner, it can be concluded that the 9 countries below the average disagreed or at least were farther from the vision and international politics of India. Among them were Argentina (48.1), Bolivia (57.8), Brazil (51.9), Colombia (48.0), Costa Rica (57.8), Ecuador (57.7), Honduras (54.5), Peru (54.2), and the Dominican Republic (56.5).

Consequently, considering each country's voting conduct, we can propose that the greatest affinity towards India came from Panama, Paraguay, and Cuba. Three countries whose international and continental sway can be considered insignificant, with exception to the ideological influence Cuba held in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, the most distant in regards to Indian policy were Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, the two first being (especially Brazil), the countries to which India gave the greatest importance in its policies towards LAC.

Until now there has not been dedicated research which can explain this paradox. However, the sources allow the conjecture of a few options: it was due to LAC's poor understanding of Indian matters; it had to do with the US influence and the conduct of LAC in the United Nations; it was due to the fact that the topics did not motivate the LAC's genuine adhesion; and, finally, it had to do with the fact that Indian diplomacy was not able to convincingly and efficiently persuade LAC countries.

 

Conclusion

Once dedicated research has been made into the nature of relations between India and its principal LAC partners, a characterization can be reformulated with greater certainty.

Firstly, it is maintained that India's foreign policy towards LAC corresponded asymmetrically according to the MEA's prioritization of the countries in the region. Similarly, the wealthiest, most powerful countries and those prioritized by India's foreign policy were the ones that least adhered to India's international agenda. As has been previously signaled in this work, this contradiction (apparent or actual) should be resolved by future research.

Secondly, it proposes that India gave decisive support to the LAC countries which were threatened in their essential condition as autonomous, independent, and democratic countries. In this sense, adhesion to India on these issues was frequently in opposition to US policy in the region. There lies the explanation regarding why certain powerful LAC countries kept distant from India, responding to the US's hegemonic role in the region.

The third similar characteristic is the territorial distribution and interspersed nature of the visits, grouped in five arguments. One, that the visits were concentrated in 4 countries (Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru), exhibiting a distribution which correlated to India's economic and political interests (Ross 2010b), revealing a large amplitude which varied between 1 and 18 visits28. Two, the contacts reveal an erratic regularity of relations, difficult to correlate with the agendas of the countries involved and/or with the world political and economic dynamics, apparently due to the varying interest of India and the LAC countries to develop deeper, ample and strong relations. Three, two general stages in the relations between India and LAC can be observed, in the lapse of 1952-1967, before Indira Gandhi's visit, and the other in the posterior phase, in the period of 1969-1990. Four, in the first stage, in the formation of relations, contacts were limited. The second stage revealed a much greater activity and demonstrates the attempts to amplify and deepen relations. Five, in the second stage there is a cycle of expansion and crisis, with a peak in 1984, tending to drop until the close of the period in question in 1990.

Fourth, despite the fact that India aligned its foreign policy with the prioritization of its economic interests, the result of the partnership arising from the relationship between India and LAC was guided by ideological considerations and by political interests (in that order), demonstrating an emphasis differing from that proposed in official discourse. This shows that India's official foreign policy with respect to LAC was contradicted by the empirical evidence of its relations. Consequently, despite having prioritized Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, India ended up developing closer relationships with Cuba, Mexico, and Chile.

 

Bibliographic references

Devés, E. (2008). La circulación de las ideas económico-sociales de Latinoamérica y el Caribe, en Asia y Aófrica ¿Cómo llegaron y cómo se diseminaron? (1965-1985). Universum, 23(2),86-111.         [ Links ]

Devés, E., & Ross, C. (2009). Las ciencias economico sociales latinoamericanas en Africa Sudsahariana (1. ed.). Santiago: Ariadna Ediciones : Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales - CLACSO.         [ Links ]

Drake, P. W. (1989). The money doctor in the Andes : the Kemmerer missions, 1923-1933. Durham: Duke University Press.         [ Links ]

Marichal, C. (1988). Historia de la Deuda Externa en América Latina. Madrid, España: Alianza Editorial.         [ Links ]

MEA. (1948-1991). Annual Report. Nueva Delhi: Retrieved from http://mealib.nic.in/ en http://meaindia.nic.in/.         [ Links ]

ONU. (1948-1989). Resultados de las votaciones: 1948-1989. Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. Organización de Naciones Unidas. Washington, DC. Retrieved from www.un.org/es/ ga/documents/voting.asp         [ Links ]

Ross, C. (2010). India y América Latina y el Caribe: relaciones económicas durante la Guerra Frióa,. The Asian Journal of Latin American Studies, 23(4),7-42.         [ Links ]

Thorp, R. (1998). Progreso, Pobreza y Exclusión: Una Historia Económica de América Latina en el siglo XX. Washington D.C.-United States.: BID-UE.         [ Links ]

 

 

Submitted December 28, 2012
Approved February 5, 2013

 

 

1 LAC fell under the hegemonic influence of the US, though it was clear since the economic crisis of 1921 (Drake 1989; Marichal 1988; Thorp 1998). India was strained among the influence of the USSR and its own vocation of leading a third position, the Non-Aligned one, as well as intending to unite the South-South relations.
2 India acted as a homogeneous entity and LAC as a heterogeneous entity.
3 Indian poet and philosopher (1872-1950).
4 The highest level of overlap between India and LAC occurred in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) III meeting in 1972.
5 Principally J. Nehru and M. Gandhi.
6 The prioritization proposed by India's official foreign policy favored Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela (in that order), and adjusted depending on its economic interests.
7 The calculation of LAC's support of India's UN agenda (International and Neighborhood Agenda) is done by the weighing of net votes, including effective feedback (criteria: in favor, against, abstentions, and neutral position) with the criteria "absent" excluded. See Annex 2.
8 Very early on, the Cuban regime declared itself part of the Soviet block and closely related to China. India maintained a delicate balance with the USSR, with China (with which it had permanent conflicts), and with the US, because of Pakistan.
9 According to Escudé and Cisneros, Panama had shown its desire to symbolically establish its sovereignty in the region, raising its flag on it, a right that it was finally conceded in 1963. But the armed conflicts that followed the first incidents in the School of the Americas ended in the rupture of diplomatic relations between both countries and the accusation by the Panamanian government of aggression by the US before the UN's Security Council and the Organization of American States (OAS) (1998).
10 "During the Cold War India and LAC not only complemented the State Entrepreneur model with a strong political-ideological nature, but also configured the model to position themselves internationally. In the reduced scope of power and dissidence that the bipolarity of the Cold War afforded, LAC and India found ways to meet" (Ross 2010).
11 Such as the information and communication technology which appeared at the end of the period.
12 While the visits can be seen as a diplomatic gesture, they also should be considered as relevant indicators of the state of the relationships. The greatest effort was on the part of India, with the LAC less active and without the proper understanding of the potential options of an economy like India's. I have published details of these visits in Ross (2010, 13).
13 The distribution in quintiles was as follows. 1-5 (11 countries): Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay; 6-10 (4 countries): Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Peru; 11-15 (1 country): Nicaragua; 16-20 (2 countries): Mexico and Cuba.
14 Eleven being the highest registered number in each column. Inverted scale from 1 to 11 assigns 11 points to the country that is at the top of the column, descending in each position finally to 1 point.
15 Non-aligned and Third World.
16 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
17 That is: 60 votes per country (20), which yields 1,380 decisions.
18 More detail on the topics in Annex 1.
19 See details on by topic in Annex 1 of this article.
20 Kashmir Conflict (60 votes), Indian-Pakistani Conflict (36 votes), Indian-Pakistani War, 1965 (16 votes), and Indian-Pakistani Conflict, 1971 (30 votes)
21 This statistic considers votes in favor, against, abstentions, and neutral.
22 Especially in: the End of Colonialism (69 votes), Anti-Racism (71 votes), Cyprus (49 votes), Afghan Crisis (33 votes), see votes in Tables 8 and 9.
23 North Korea (37 votes) and the Congo Crisis (58 votes), see votes in Table 9.
24 Hungary (74 votes) and Afghani Crisis (56 votes), see votes in Table 9.
25 North Korea (37 votes), Palestine-Israel Conflict (60 votes), and the Congo Crisis (48 votes), see votes in Table 9.
26 A more detailed, dedicated investigation with ministerial or secretarial records regarding international relations of the countries involved is still required, a topic that will be viable beginning with the hypotheses and conjecture that have been established during the course of this investigation.
27 See explanation of calculations in footnote 7 of this article.
28 The distribution by quintile is the following: 1-5 (11 countries): Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay. 6-10 (4 countries): Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Peru. (1 country): Nicaragua. (2 countries): Mexico and Cuba

 

 

Annex 1: votes promoted by India in the UN

Indian-Pakistani Conflict

1. Respect citizen's will in a referendum held in Pakistan

2. Condemn India's military entry into Pakistan

Kashmir Conflict

3. Condemn India's position

4. Vote for a ceasefire resolution

5. Vote for a ceasefire resolution bilateral negotiation for those affected

6. Vote for conflict resolution by plebiscite

Goa Conflict

7. Condemn India's military action in Goa

Indo-China War

8. Resolution condemning Chines attack on India

India-Pakistani War of 1965

9. Condemn hostilities

India-Pakistani Conflict of 1971, invasion of Bangladesh

10. Pakistani attack of Indian oil pipeline in the region

11. UN motion to end the conflict

End of Colonialism

12. Vote of the congress of oppressed peoples, against colonialism

13. Incorporation of South African Territories

14. UN Anti-Colonialism vote in South Africa's inclusion.

15. New UN vote for the annexation of territories in South Africa

16. Motion that South African territories remain under the ward of the UN

17. Vote in the International Court of Justice for the annexation of South African territories

18. Creation of a 5 member UN council to monitor South Africa

19. New vote on the South African issue in the UN

20. Definitive motion against colonialism voted in UN

21. Motion for the implementation of a motion which eliminated colonialism

22. South African motion to support the creation of institutions in its ex colonies

23. Motion in the favor of Namibia's right of self-management

24. Motion for the UN support in the process of institution formation in ex colonies

25. Motion barrier placed by the US for Namibia's independence

Anti-Racism

26. Resolution sent by India in regards to the situation of South African citizens

27. Resolution to deal with racism in South Africa in the next UN meeting

28. Resolution acknowledging South Africa's sovereignty with regards to racial issues

29. Resolution for the UN consideration of racial issues in general

30. New resolution for the UN consideration of racial issues in general

31. Resolution for the release of South African regime opponents

Disarmament - Chemical and Biological Weapons

32. Agreement to address the prohibition of these weapons in the UN

33. Motion for the prohibition of all types of weapons

Complete and General Disarmament, all types of weapons

34. Motion to work toward achieving total and complete disarmament

Nuclear Disarmament

35. Motion to restrict the nuclear power of the superpowers

36. Signing of Treaty of Cessation document called Partial Nuclear Test

37. Treaty signature on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

38. Resolution for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

39. New Resolution for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

North Korea

40. Resolution that North Korea be declared an aggressor

41. Petition to sanction North Korea for not respecting ceasefire

42. Motion to declare as aggressors Chinese forces for their intervention in Korea

43. Proposal for meetings in both Koreas, with non-belligerent countries, as a way to solve the problem

Palestine-Israel Conflict

44. Implementation of a Federated State in Palestine

45. Cessation of hostilities in the context of the Suez Canal

46. Resolution for ceasefire

47. New Resolution for ceasefire

Hungary

48. Resolution for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary

49. Resolution to develop a referendum in Hungary

50. Internationally condemn USSR

51. New resolution to internationally condemn USSR

52. Resolution against the entry of new Soviet troops in Hungary

Congo Crisis

53. Resolution to rescind the Congo Crisis

54. Resolution for the right of self-determination of the Congo

55. Resolution to welcome new members as representatives of the Congo government's before the UN

56. Motion that Congo's parliament become operational when the situation calms down

57. Resolution criticizing murder of Patrice Lumumba

58. Resolution to remove the Secretary General of the UN for management of Congo case

Cyprus

59. Resolution in favor of Cyprus's right to independence

60. Resolution to send UN forces to Cyprus

61. Resolution for the continuation of the UN forces in Cyprus

62. Resolution against external intervention in Cyprus

Cambodian Crisis

63. Resolution that representatives of Cambodia's new regime represent them at the UN

64. Resolution to establish Cambodia as a territory free of attacks

Afghan Crisis

65. Letter to the Secretary General of the UN to address the issue

66. Motion repudiating the invasion of Afghanistan

67. Resolution condemning invaders of Afghanistan

68. New resolution condemning the invaders of Afghanistan

69. Resolution to implement a peaceful solution in the conflict

 


Annex 2 - Click to enlarge

 

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