Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade

RAE CLÁSSICOS

Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedade

Michael C. Jensen^I; William H. Meckling^*

^IHBS

RESUMO

Este artigo integra elementos da teoria da agência, da teoria dos direitos de propriedade e da teoria das finanças para desenvolver uma teoria da estrutura de propriedade da firma. Definimos o conceito de custos de agência, demonstramos a sua relação com a questão da "separação e controle", investigamos a natureza dos custos de agência resultantes da presença de capital de terceiros e capital próprio externo, demonstramos quem arca com esses custos e por quê, e investigamos o ótimo de Pareto para a sua existência. Também fornecemos uma definição de firma e mostramos como a nossa análise dos fatores que influenciam a criação e a emissão de capital de terceiros e os direitos sobre o capital próprio cobre um caso especial do lado da oferta no que se refere à totalidade do problema dos mercados.

Palavras-chave: Teoria da agência, custos de agência, estrutura de propriedade, estrutura de capital, direitos de propriedade.

ABSTRACT

This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of fi nance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the fi rm. We defi ne the concept of agency costs, show its relationship to the "separation and control" issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demon strate who bears these costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new defi nition of the fi rm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem.

Key words: Agency theory, agency costs, ownership structure, equity, property rights.

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Michael C. Jensen

Professor da Havard Business School, Harvard University

Doutor em Economia pela Universidade de Chicago

Interesses de pesquisa nas áreas de teoria da agência e estrutura de propriedade

E-mail: [e-mail]

Endereço: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Baker Library 265, Soldiers Field, Boston, MA 02163

William H. Meckling (

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^*

in memoriam)

Ex-professor da Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester, Rochester

Datas de Publicação

• Publicação nesta coleção
  23 Nov 2012
• Data do Fascículo
  Jun 2008