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Print version ISSN 0100-6045On-line version ISSN 2317-630X

Manuscrito vol.41 no.4 Campinas Oct./Dec. 2018 





1 University of Toronto, Department of Philosophy, 170 St. George St. Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5R 2M8, Canada

2 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Department of Philosophy, Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil

This issue aims to explore the nature of rational agency, both practical and epistemic. Typically, exercises of our rational agency are governed by certain practical and epistemic norms. However, it is far from clear what exactly these norms are, or how we are to understand the way in which they govern us in acting and believing. Thus, understanding rational agency requires addressing issues that cut across different philosophical areas, such as ethics, philosophy of action, and epistemology. It raises questions concerning both the nature of normativity and the nature of belief and action. On the one hand, there are questions concerning the ground, scope, and content of practical and epistemic norms: Can fundamental practical and epistemic norms be grounded in the nature of action and belief? What are instrumental norms and how do they relate to actions? Must all genuine norms be understood in terms of reasons? On the other hand, there are questions concerning the metaphysics and epistemology of action and belief: How are we guided by various normative phenomena (reasons, norms, rules) in acting or in believing? What is the relation between agency and self-knowledge? Do we exercise agential control over our beliefs?

This volume brings together contributions by philosophers who approach these issues from both the perspective of ethics and the perspective of philosophy of mind and action. By assembling these papers in a single volume, we hope that philosophers from these overlapping fields can benefit from each other’s insights.1


HORST, DAVID (2015). Actions and Accidents. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):300-325. [ Links ]

HORST, DAVID (2017). Enkratic Agency. European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):47-67. [ Links ]

TENENBAUM, SERGIO (2007). Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. [ Links ]

TENENBAUM, SERGIO (2016). Reconsidering Intentions. Noûs 52 (2):443-472. [ Links ]

1 The idea for this issue grew out of a conference we organized together at the University of Campinas and our common interest in the topics discussed here (e.g., Tenenbaum [2007; 2016] and Horst [2015; 2017]). Special thanks are due to the participants of the “Agency and Rationality” conference in Campinas, to Marco Ruffino for all his help with this issue and the conference, and to FAPESP for its generous support.

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