Inventory [stammerer] of education problems: constitutive concepts or bloc of concepts RISEEE

Abstract

The article intends to explore the concepts that constitute the conception of an audiovisual piece produced from a research project. To this end, it points out the intention of such project; defines the concept block composed of deleuzian notions of real, inventory, stammering, encounter, estrangement and event (RISEEE bloc); finally concludes with the establishment of an articulation between the concepts and the audiovisual language of the piece, in order to show the theoretical consistency of the audiovisual production. That is, it justifies actions, choices and strategies of the piece based on the concepts presented.

Keywords
Inventory; Stammering; Encounter; Estrangement; Event

Resumo

O artigo tem a intenção de explorar os conceitos que constituem a concepção de uma peça audiovisual produzida a partir de um projeto de pesquisa. Para isso, aponta a intenção de tal projeto; define o bloco de conceitos composto pelas noções deleuzianas de real, inventário, gagueira, encontro, estranhamento e acontecimento (bloco RIGEEA); por fim, conclui com o estabelecimento de uma articulação entre os conceitos e a linguagem audiovisual da peça, a fim de mostrar a consistência teórica da produção audiovisual. Ou seja, justifica ações, escolhas e estratégias da peça com base nos conceitos apresentados.

Palavras-chave
Inventário; Gagueira; Encontro; Estranhamento; Acontecimento

Resumen

El artículo pretende abordar los conceptos que integran el diseño de una pieza audiovisual producida a partir de un proyecto de investigación. Para eso, indica la intención de este proyecto; define un bloque de conceptos compuesto por las nociones deleuzianas de real, inventario, tartamudeo, encuentro, extrañamiento y acontecimiento (bloque RITEEA); finalmente se concluye con el establecimiento de un vínculo entre los conceptos y el lenguaje audiovisual de la pieza con el fin de demostrar la consistencia teórica de la producción audiovisual. Es decir, justifica las acciones, elecciónes y estrategias de la pieza basadas en los conceptos presentados.

Palabras clave
Inventario; Tartamudeo; Encuentro; Extrañamiento; Acontecimiento

Introduction – About intentions

The Inventory [stammerer] of education problems is an audiovisual piece produced together with our research project entitled “What are the problems of education? – What teachers, students and managers say!”. In this article, we intend to explore the concepts that constitute the conception (both in terms of content and in terms of expression) of such piece; concepts of the philosophy of Deleuze (2006; 2004; 2003; 1997; 1992), of Deleuze and Guattari (2010; 1997a; 1997b; 1996; 1995; 1992; 1977) and Deleuze and Parnet (1998).

The conjunction of concepts in the RIGEEA bloc is not static. It does not presuppose the formation of a unitary totality. Nor do the concepts act separately, when imbricated in the composite, because we do not want to “compromise them, weaken them, dull them or deprive them of their cutting power of set” (CORAZZA, 2017, p. 242 – Our translation). What constitutes the alloy of the bloc is the potency of what goes on in the spaces between the elements, enabling intervals of provisional and unprecedented arrangements; the result is a process without purpose, except to produce a movement different from that already established as natural. By this, we mean that RIGGEA approaches a kind of syncope: the song of the thrush at dusk is different from the other songs that aim at mating or protection, useful for the conservation of the species. When the bird sings to the sun, there is no purpose beyond singing itself, as an effectuation of the potency of life, which is not limited to the organic life. It is the active production of nothingness (immediately useful), as a way of evoking the event.

When the research project asks itself “what are the problems of education?”, it is proposing a reflection instigated by the answers that managers, teachers and students offer to that question. The audiovisual piece, in turn, documents these speeches. Although this article does not aim to explore the content of the answers, it records here that the research ends up understanding that the different speeches can be synthesized in eleven main problems: Not knowing what is the function of education; The irresponsibility and/or lack of commitment of the family; The lack of investment and/or structure; the Government policy/management; the devaluation and/or non-recognition of the teacher; the policy of access and/or permanence and / or frequency; the methodologies used and/or the non-adaptability to the new languages; the formation geared towards capitalism and/or reproduction of the subject; the lack of planning; the easiness of the teacher; irresponsibility and/or neglect of the student.

If the title of the piece is Inventory [stammerer] it is because it does not have the documentary journalistic intention or of the debate and the confrontation. We record the speaks, but not to seek to clarify which is the true, who is closer to the real, precisely because the speeches are already real in themselves (R), and not only touch or cease to touch reality. In this sense, it is not the speeches that are judged as stammerer, but it is the audiovisual piece itself that, through the elaboration of an inventory (I), of a stammerer articulation (S). The intention is, through the encounter (E) of different speeches and scenarios, to create estrangement (E), and to create conditions for the emergence of events (E).

Concepts Bloc RISEEE

Real

When Deleuze and Guattari (2010, p. 50 – Our translation) deal with the idea that there is no, on the one hand, a representational and, on the other, an inventive/affirmative desire, but that there is only one desire, although “under two different regimes”, they state, “there is only one production, which is the production of the real”.

In this sense, the dream, for example, is not only the representation of a repressed desire, but is the production of a new real, even if this new was instigated by an earlier wish. That is, the new production may even maintain relations with such repressed desire, but, in any case, the dream is already a new reality.

Thus, Deleuze and Guattari (2010, 1997a, 1997b, 1996, 1995) create a concept of reality that breaks with the distinction between real and unreal or between real and fiction. The fiction is real (even a purposeful lie produces senses) and the real is fiction (since we humans only have to create senses that are not, of course, natural).

The break with the distinction between truth and lies is already established by Nietzsche (1978, p. 49 – Our translation). Speaking the truth is nothing but, according to the German thinker, a lie “according to a solid convention ... in a style that is obligatory for all”. To speak the truth is like “to lie in the flock” (FEIL, 2005, p. 167 – Our translation). The problem, in Nietzschean reasoning, is that the way of lying that thrives to this day is the Socratic, which is problematic precisely because it lies as if it were speaking the truth. This means, “The purpose with which you lie makes a difference” (NIETZSCHE, 2011, p. 115 – Our translation). The lie that pleases the author is the artistic one, understood by Feil (2005, p. 169 – Our translation), as “that one we tell ourselves, and recount every time it is interesting”.

“To lie, therefore, is not the problem” (FEIL, 2005, p. 169 – Our translation), for both truth and lies — or both reality and fiction — are lies. If the artist is “lord over the truth” (NIETZSCHE, 1978, p. 27 – Our translation), it is precisely “because, unlike the Socratic and the Christian, who think they are in possession of a truth, he knows that it is only an invention, of a fiction” (FEIL, 2005, p. 169 – Our translation).

The idea that there is a real opposed to an unreal is problematic, according to Nietzsche’s (2011), because it denies life in its greatest definition, which is movement, transience, ephemerality. That is, in addition to breaking with the idea that there is truth on one side and the lie on the other, and then to propose that only what we can do is to lie (it is in the lie that we produce reality), the philosopher still says that the best way is to lie, being aware of the lie.

Deleuze (2006, p. 122 – Our translation) says that the simulacrum is “a demonic image”; in Feil’s interpretation (2010, p. 181 – Our translation), the simulacrum is an image “devoid of similarity, so that we can never say what a copy is and what a model is”. That is to say, the French author breaks down with the idea that there is a kind of hierarchy, in which, for example, the motive of the dream says more reality than the dream itself, since this would only be a simulacrum, a blurry outline of that.

This concept of reality, therefore, implies two delineations: the non-distinction between the real and the unreal or represented and the criterion of the production of meaning. About the first: there is no distinction between what we really think and what we say; what we think is real, but what we say about that thought is equally real, regardless of the fact that thinking and speaking are in tune. About the second: if we simulate, falsify and deceive, we are producing meaning and therefore making reality. The speech is real and not just the expression of a reality. That is, when we speak our speech is real, and not simply expresses the real that passes through the mind, just as when we report a dream we are not just telling something repressed, but we are producing a new reality.

Inventory

The expression of the inventory does not attend to a hermeneutic perspective of the circumscription of meanings. There is no intent here in saying what it is or dealing with the current use of the term in the legal sphere. There is, however, the purpose of taking it according to its operability, emphasizing the thrust power of its dynamics to the movement of thought. Therefore, the interest is in dealing with what the inventory does, with the details of its operation.

Thus, the act of inventorying — more than the simple collection and organization of elements from a choice — occurs as an inventive process. We do not create the inventory by plastering it from hierarchical categorizations. In it, there is no center. Its operative disposition is rhizomatic, like the one of a kafkian hole, where one enters through any extremity, for, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1977, p. 7 – Our translation), “no entry is privileged, even if it is almost a dead end [...]. The principle of multiple entries prevents only the introduction of the enemy, the Significant”.

The inventory, fugitive from the invective of the Significant, creates possibilities of unusual encounters among heterogeneous elements that conventionally would not be in contact. It lays down the differences in provisional arrangements, always ready for dismantling and other modes of recombination, “each element does not stop to vary and to modify its distance with respect to the others” (DELEUZE, GUATTARI, 1995, p. 42 – Our translation). This ambiguous character does not concern an experiment whose purpose is to achieve the right and true connection. It is not a dialectical device that seeks to arrive at a soothing synthesis. The inventory has no external purpose to its own inventive process in constant production. Experimentation is worth it by itself.

The claim to neutrality does not fit into the inventory. It is triggered by a critical cut, assembled from a series of choices, which are not personal either in the sense of a subject’s will. The character that produces the inventory functions as something similar to what Deleuze and Guattari (1992, p. 86 – Our translation) call a Conceptual Personae, in which “I am no longer me, but an aptitude of thought to see and develop through a plan that crosses me in several places. The Conceptual Personae has nothing to do with an abstract personification”. It is this fictional character — but no less real — that, dispensed from the commitment to truth, walks along paths that no “me” is able to traverse, and thus traces the inventory map. The intentionality of the character who makes the inventory does not submit to a logic that reduces the multiple to the one, “diversity or multiplicity are not absolutely aesthetic collections (as when one says ‘one more’, ‘one more woman’), nor dialectical schemes (as when one says ‘one gives two that will give three’)” (DELEUZE; PARNET, 1998, p. 60 – Our translation). It is a trick, which seeks to divert the attention of the intellect, who can only deal with “this OR that”, to give free passage to what happens between “this AND that”:

Because multiplicity is never in the terms, [...] it is precisely in AND. [...] The AND is neither one nor the other, it is always between THE two, it is the frontier, [...] a line of flight or flow, but which one does not see [...] it is on this line of flight that things pass, desires are made, revolutions are sketched

(DELEUZE; PARNET, 1998, p. 60-61 – Our translation).

The expression of the inventory is like a game that does not end. What matters in fact is secondary to the arrangement of the pieces, which in a rigid arrangement does not distinguish large and small, true and false, nor is it organized from intrinsic properties. Such a configuration is purposely intended for collapse and this is condition for the operation of the inventory.

Stammering

In Deleuze (1997) thought, stammering is concerned with pushing language to its limit, raising it to the nth degree, producing a foreign language within its own regime of signification by imposing a continuous variation. Not a dysfunction of speech, but “a tremor that is no longer psychological but linguistic. Thus, to make the language stammer itself, at the deepest level of style, is a creative process that runs through all great works” (p. 66 – Our translation).

Deleuze (1997, p. 124–125 – Our translation) says that writers like Kafka and Beckett stammer when,

Invent a less use of the language. [...] they make the language take flight, they make it race along a line of witchcraft and and do not stop unbalancing it [...]. A great writer is always like a foreigner in the language in which he expresses himself, even when it is his native language.

It is not about mixing another language with his own, but to defamiliarize what is given in the native tongue, so that something in it is no longer recognized, in order to search for the sense, which seemed intrinsic, and to fail. It is a question of imposing a treatment on language that, when we use a term as chair, the corresponding immediate mental image will no longer appear, but instead, a gap that forces us to seek meaning, a “stammering in ideas; this can only be expressed in the form of questions, which in the best case, silence the answers” (DELEUZE; PARNET, 1998, p. 53 – Our translation).

Minorizing the language in such a way as to deprive it of its communicative function. This does not mean that you give up the major language or produce another one to replace it. It is a bifurcation of the same linguistic system, by means of another treatment, which, being in perpetual variation, does not submit to the realm of constant forms.

Of course, the minor treatment of the language is not merely hermetic and unpalatable, but rather works as a poison in honey; there is something accessible in it, but also something else that does not fit, and bewilders, something molecular that cannot be identified. An incommunicability that forces the invention of a communication-flow, destined to a new sensibility, because “the problem is not in communication, but, specifically, in the communication that wants to communicate, that wants to effectively make it common” (FEIL, 2005, p. 10 – Our translation).

We can say that different forms of expression, which becomes stratified and dominant models, such as audiovisual language, are susceptible to a minor treatment that makes them stammer. Godard makes the cinema “an active line of flight, all the time broken, zigzag, underground” (DELEUZE, 1992, p. 52 – Our translation), with a logic distinct from that which Hollywood consecrated with a linear and accessible narrative. The piece that stammers is not interested in telling a story and, even if it uses this artifice, the concatenation of events is loose, always collapsing.

Encounter

For Deleuzian thought, things are composed only by encounters: “An encounter is perhaps the same thing as a becoming or nuptials [...]. You encounter people [...], but also movements, ideas, events, entities” (DELEUZE; PARNET, 1998, p. 6 – Our translation). A hat, a ball, a cup, a piano, all are made up of encounters. Physical particles (or bodies) meet and form. A concept, an opinion, an argument, a reasoning, all are composed of encounters. Particles (or bodies) of thought also meet and form. That is, for the idea of encounter, there is no distinction between organic and inorganic.

This is a first point, but there is another: the encounter is nuptials and not marriage. Nuptials refers to bodies that meet; marriage concerns the attempt to force this chance encounter to stop moving, preventing further encounters. This is why Deleuze and Parnet (1998) place the encounter in opposition to recognition. It is that recognition is only possible when the encounter is sacramental, receiving name and surname. The encounter is “this ‘between-two’ of solitudes” (p. 8 – Our translation). There is a lonely moving body, there is a second body in solitary motion and there is, perhaps, the encounter, but not the end of solitude.

Encounters are combinations. In the combination of such particles with such particles, we have such an object or such an idea. But they are fortuitous combinations/collections, although they can be planned. Planning may exist, but bodies are intense, uncontrollable, and disobedient (from the point of view of logic). “Everything is just an encounter in the universe, good or bad encounter” (DELEUZE; PARNET, 1998, p. 49 – Our translation). We may experience interesting combinations (in the sense of potent ones) or uninteresting combinations (when an encounter weakens us).

Among the encounters explored by Deleuze and Guattari (2010, p. 298–299 – Our translation), the most notorious is the encounter that makes possible the formation of capitalism:

On one side, the deterritorialized worker who has become free and naked, having to sell his labor capacity; and on the other, decoded money that has become capital and is capable of buying [...]. The encounter might not have taken place, with the free workers and the money-capital existing ‘virtually’ side by side.

In this example, five constituent elements of the encounter concept appear: a) whether they are ideas, whether they are things, everything is composed of encounters; b) the bodies / particles that meet are independent; c) therefore the encounters are nuptials, they are ephemeral; d) the combinations are fortuitous; e) the encounters can potentiate some and weaken others.

There is still at least a sixth constituent element. In fact, it is rather a presupposition; and not only of this concept, but of all Deleuzian thought: the immanence of Difference; before, during, after the encounter.

It is not one term which becomes the other, but each one encounters the other, a single becoming which has its own direction [...]. This is it, the double capture, the wap AND the orchid: not even something which would be in the one, or something which would be in the other, even if it had to be exchanged, be mingled, but something which is between the two, outside the two

(DELEUZE; PARNET, 1998, p. 6-7 – Our translation).

The animal relates to the plant, it becomes its reproductive apparatus, but the new plant that emerges has nothing to do with the wasp, although it has participated actively in the relationship. It is like attending a lecture and leaving with an idea for a new project. We created this idea in relation to the speaker, along with the speaker, but most likely (this is a hypothetical case) the speaker had never imagined that idea. It is not a question of the functioning of the dialectic synthesis, since the new plant (or the new idea) is not a debtor or heir to the two terms that were found.

Estrangement

Thinking presupposes estrangement. Because of the predominance of a conservation instinct, we reduce our power to become, and ordinarily we relate to the world from mere recognition. Deleuze (2003, p. 26 – Our translation) says: “We recognize things without ever knowing them [...]: we prefer the ease of recognitions than the deepening of encounters”. When recognition prevails, there is apparent stability, a comforting familiarity; we deal not with things, but with images of things, clichés reproducible in a world known and protected from the onslaughts of never-seen chaos. When we recognize, we do not think. Thinking is always about an outside, an “original violence done to the thought, a strangeness, an enmity” (2006, p. 121 – Our translation).

Plato, using Socrates, says that philosophy begins with admiration, followed by Aristotle who claims that thought arises from astonishment. Contradiction breaks with recognition and raises the nuisance of doubt. However, for such philosophers, the function of thought is reduced to seeking rational answers in order to restore the peace that the admiration and astonishment have removed, dialectical syntheses resolving the clash of opposites in a chain that increases the recognition. From this thought model, we spend time buffering the inevitable cuts that the potency of indomitable life operates in the stability of our system of signification, “clichés that stop the connections, dry the flows and replace the cuts with a kind of plaster” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 2010, p. 409 – Our translation). However, what exists in the first place is the stranger, “the relationship with the unfamiliar is always first” (p. 473 – Our translation). The foundation, the familiarity, the small-stratified self of the conscience and the plaster we take as the ultimate reality result from a slowing down of the speeds of chaos that, upon being operated, founds the human kingdom as an ice cube that forms from the stabilization of a flow of water. Thus, the ice cube, in the middle of the endless ocean, with the illusion of solidity, forgets that it is made of flux and builds an entire universe on its surface (a universe that is a stable image of the ocean itself), depreciating the chaotic speeds that threaten its foundations. To recognize is to repeat what is given on the surface of the ice cube of human reason; estrangement is giving back the thought its main power.

Like Plato and Aristotle, Deleuze (2003, p. 121 – Our translation) also states that thought comes from a strangeness, from the “contingency of an encounter with that which forces one to think”. But instead of the search for recognition through a relieving synthesis, the act of thinking in Deleuze affirms the stranger, the paradox, and uses the thrust of the encounter with the chance of the world to raise the thought to the maximum of its potency with no other purpose besides the increase of the own potency of thinking. Instead of the familiarity of an image of thought to buffer the cuts, lowering life by interrupting the flow, the suspension of meaning from a thought without image, which no longer recognizes, but begins to create.

Event

On its nature: events are haecceities, “that is to say, individuations without subject” (DELEUZE, GUATTARI, 1995, p. 8 – Our translation); in other words, are absolutely unique and devoid of subjectivities. Traditionally, notions of subject/subjectivity are associated with those of individuality/singularity; in this sense, it is considered that the singularity is a result of the fact that each one has its subjectivity. That is not what this is about! An event is a haecceity one because it is absolutely singular/individual (it does not repeat itself without differentiating), but it is, at the same time, devoid of subjectivities, qualities, identities. Subjectivity is expressed by representations, by coding systems; the event is before or after that (in other words, it is always outside or between): between “the determined subjects, [...] [there is] a natural set of haecceities, degrees, intensities, events, accidents, which compose individuations, quite different from those of the well-formed subjects who receive them” (1997a, p. 32 – Our translation). The individuation in question is of life and not “of the subject who carries it or supports it” (p. 41-42 – Our translation).

About your capture mode: those who better capture subjective aspects are those more integrated to the representational systems, more accustomed to the established codes; on the other hand, “it happens then that very limited or very old people catch the event better than the more advanced political men” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1996, p. 87 – Our translation). It is that an event does not touch the code, on the contrary, it touches the unspeakable, the inexplicable. It becomes an expression only through neutral features of the code. “May 68 is the same thing: all those who judged in terms of macro politics did not understand the event, because something unspeakable escaped” (p. 87 – Our translation).

About its temporality: the time of the event is also not the same that gives rhythm to the life of the subject: “Aeon: the indefinite time of the event, the floating line that knows only speeds [...]. And Chronos, the time of measure that situates things and persons, develops a form, and determines a subject” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997a, p. 42 – Our translation). In Aeon’s work there is only the instant; in the workings of Chronos there is the past, the present and the future. In the second operation, a fact occurred is associated with other facts that have already occurred, are occurring or are being projected, because this is how an object gains history or that an individual becomes subject: accumulating meanings in a process that has beginning, middle, and end, so that what occurs in that process is delegated to the particles that more or less make up that object or individual. In the first operation, an event concerns only the moment: it happens and that is it!

On the fact of breaking with the organic vs. inorganic opposition: an event is not of the logic of planning, on the contrary, it is accidental. This does not mean that it has nothing to do with human beings. It has, but just when they cease to be. There is no difference between the way a thing or a subject is formed and deformed:

You are [...] a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles [...]. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year [...]; a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack [...]. It is the wolf itself, and the horse, and the child, that cease to be subjects to become events

(DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997a, p. 42-43 – Our translation).

The difference between one thing and another is only a difference in speeds. Smaller velocities for particles that are composing a shape, higher velocities for the particles suspended chaotically. There is the event when the form accelerates in dilution.

About his expression via verb in the infinitive and via proper name: according to Deleuze and Guattari (1997a, p. 44-45 – Our translation), the verb in the infinitive expresses the event itself: “Cutted” is a quality, but “to cut” is the act of transgression of form; is the live testimony of undo. The proper name, in turn, is a resource of language that ends up guarding the event; gathers a set of effects and expresses it: “Hurricane Katrina” is a proper name for storing all the effects produced by an event.

On its effect: the event “appeals to the people instead of being taken for a ministry” (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1997b, p. 40 – Our translation). In other words, the event sets in variation and continues in variation; it is not an undertaking that transforms to, finally, stabilize.

On his imperceptibility: Deleuze (2004, p. 181 – Our translation) says that Nietzsche refers to “small silent events, which are like the formation of new worlds”. The event is not revolutionary in the manner of the famous revolutionaries; it revolutionizes the details.

On his relation to the Stoics: Deleuze and Parnet (1998, p. 52 – Our translation) claim the event as “a kind of incorporeal vapor which no longer consists of qualities, actions, or passions”. The event flies over the surfaces of the bodies, which does not mean that it is not real; on the contrary, it is real, even if it is not of the order of being: events “participate, before, of an extra-being which involves the concepts of: ‘to redden’, ‘to turn green’, ‘to cut’, ‘to die’, ‘to love’...”. That is, the event is not in a world different from the world of being, but it differs, above all, in terms of speed. It is the Stoics who depart from the logic of separation “between the sensible and the intelligible”, “between the soul and the body”, and affirm the functioning of the forms on one side and the informed on the other: “Mixtures, causes, souls and bodies, actions and passions, qualities and substances, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the impassible, unqualified, infinite events or incorporeal effects resulting from these mixtures”. To consider as real only the side of bodies is nothing more than a habit and it is up “to the verb to be, like an original taint, of referring to an I”, and there we are in the universe of representational qualities.

We need to understand that “the event is always produced by bodies that clash, cut themselves or penetrate” (DELEUZE; PARNET, 1998, p. 53 – Our translation), but that the effect of this “is not of the order of bodies”. “Yes, death begets in our bodies, it takes place in our bodies, but comes from outside, singularly incorporeal, and fusing over us like the battle that flies over the combatants”. If our body decomposes, it is because it is constantly in contact with forces from outside, which make it falter, stir, dissolve. “The wound is something I receive in my body, in such a place, in such a moment, but there is also an eternal truth of the wound as an impassive, incorporeal event. ‘My wound existed before me; I was born to incarnate it’”. The parts/particles that make up the wound pre-exist to that skin, just as they exist later as well. Bodies or incorporeal, subjects or simple matter, everything “is an atmospheric variation, a change of color, an imperceptible molecule, a discrete population, a haze or fog” (p. 54 – Our translation), and the event is the act or effect of mounting and disassemble, form and deform.

Considerations – How each concept works in the audiovisual piece

Real (Presupposition)

The piece documents what people directly involved in the educational sector of São Borja speak from what they believe to be the problems of education today. However, this does not mean that the objective implies in seeking the real problems, since it is not a metalinguistic piece, which separates the true speech from the false. This, precisely, because of the concept of real presupposition:

• The speeches are already real in themselves and not only touch or cease to touch reality;

• If the interviewee lies, deceives or talks without consistency, it is still a real speech; still involves the production of meaning;

• Thus, the piece does not simply present different realities, as, and above all, produces a real, registers a real one.

Inventory ([dis]assemblyl)

Due to our understanding of the concept of inventory,

• The problems are grouped together from a movement that allows the audiovisual piece to be divided and even separated, but not in the style of chapters, but of aphorisms (in the sense that each part can be seen independently and outside of the sequence, although the whole also builds a meaning — in the style of fragmentary writing);

• The inventory, besides being about the problems, also ends up being the educational scenarios: images and sounds of the educational landscape make up the piece. A disjunctive composition, since images and sounds do not come together in an illustrative relation; on the contrary, they are manipulated from the “logic” of stammering;

• The building is open. Respondents are instigated with a single question: “what are the problems of education?”. A broad question, precisely, to allow each interviewee to direct his or her speech to what it affects. In this sense, those who answered the problems are the interviewees themselves;

  It does not imply an earlier reference; that is, the groupings are inventoried by the interviewees’ own speeches.

Stammering ([dis]assembly)

There are not the speeches that are judged as stammerers, but it is the audiovisual piece itself that imbues itself with a stammerer articulation.

• The intention is to record the event, so this does not imply offering answers;

• There is no narrator. The piece does not lead to a response; does not take a determined stance in favor of a substantive message;

• The content of the interviewee’s speech does not have to match the expression of the piece: it does not assume, in terms of expression, the content of the interviewee’s speech (someone says that the problem is in the school structure, and the camera immediately captures a wall crack — this does not occur).

Encounter ([dis]assembly)

The audiovisual piece seeks to provide encounters. The different speeches taken in isolation produce a meaning, but once collected/grouped, they produce another.

• The encounter of the different speeches is by nuptials and not by marriage. Nuptials are not synthetic (as in dialectical logic) or hereditary (as in the logic of DNA), but they are relationships that form a body without abandoning solitude. That is, particles that form a shape, but which remain pulsating;

• The encounter does not allow the public to recognize or feel the identification (at least not intentionally), but it allows an experience;

• The combinations / collections provided by the encounter are fortuitous, and therefore may or may not be interesting, may or may not work.

Estrangement (Effect)

The audiovisual inventory deals with estrangement in two distinct ways:

• As an assembly procedure: considering that the production of the inventory does not happen, at first, without the interference of assumptions rooted in our own organization as subjects — because, as much as we have an empty space before us for the arrangement of the pieces, we are populated by images and by naturalized and, therefore, dominant ways of doing —, the assembly process constitutes, above all, a clash against the cliché, that plaster resulting from a vice of thought based on the dialectic and the will of truth. Initially, therefore, there is a procedure of defamiliarization: it is the scraping of the cliché, the displacement of the common, making the inventory stammer;

• As an effect of the montage: not being the piece configured for the purpose of communicating, but of providing unusual encounters between the speeches, it is presumed a violence to the faculties of the intellect. However, the character that produces the inventory does not deal with the reaction of a possible receiver; he arms the pieces of the device and launches the arrow, so that what happens afterwards escapes his control.

Event (Effect)

The audiovisual piece seeks to approach the different speeches in the expectation that, with the encounters, something happens.

• The elaboration of the piece can create favorable conditions for the emergence of events, but cannot predict them. This is an uncontrollable effect;

• The event is of the order of detail and not of identification and recognition; then it is not intended that the public identify events or identify with them. As we have already said, the play seeks to provoke estrangement, not to illustrate;

• The event is not in this or that scene, but it is flying above the surfaces, in suspension.

This is not the well-known effort to abandon all formats to do something new. It’s not the nonsense “let’s do something different”. It is true that we do not want the piece to follow the established formats (using persuasive techniques and/or facilitating public understanding, such as “using few texts because nobody has the patience to read”), but does not mean that we want give up all the lines. Deleuze and Guattari (1997a, p. 141 – Our translation, emphasis in original) themselves, when they talk about music, talk about it:

It has the same ambiguity, perhaps, as the modern valorization of children’s drawings, texts by the mad, and concerts of noise. Sometimes one overdoes it, puts too much in, works with a jumble of lines and sounds; then instead of producing a cosmic machine capable of “rendering sonorous”, one lapses back to a machine of reproduction that ends up [...] all lines, a scramble effacing all sounds. The claim is that one is opening music to all events, [...] but one ends up reproducing a scrambling that prevents any event from happening. [...] One makes an aggregate fuzzy, instead of defining the fuzzy aggregate by the operations of consistency [...] pertaining to it.

The great challenge is precisely to find this degree of consistency; this measure between the encoded formats and pure chaos. Because if on the one hand we do not want the established formats, on the other one, we also do not want intentional incommunicability. Moreover, if it is a great challenge is because the right measure is mobile, it is treacherous; the doses always depend on each experience.

Referências

• CORAZZA, S. M. Ensaio sobre EIS AICE: proposição e estratégia para pesquisar em educação. Educação e Filosofia, Uberlândia, v. 31, n. 61, p. 233–262, jan./abr. 2017.
• DELEUZE, G. Conversações Rio de Janeiro: 34, 1992.
• DELEUZE, G. Crítica e Clínica São Paulo: 34, 1997.
• DELEUZE, G. Proust e os signos Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 2003.
• DELEUZE, G. A gargalhada de Nietzsche. In: DELEUZE, G. A ilha deserta e outros textos – Textos e entrevistas (1953 – 1974) São Paulo: Iluminuras, 2004.
• DELEUZE, G. Diferença e repetição Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2006.
• DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. Kafka: por uma literatura menor. Rio de Janeiro: Imago, 1977.
• DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. O que é a filosofia? Rio de Janeiro: 34, 1992.
• DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. Mil platôs: capitalismo e esquizofrenia, vol. 1. Rio de janeiro: 34, 1995.
• DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. Mil platôs: capitalismo e esquizofrenia, vol. 3. Rio de Janeiro: 34, 1996.
• DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. Mil platôs: capitalismo e esquizofrenia, vol. 4. São Paulo: 34, 1997a.
• DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. Mil platôs: capitalismo e esquizofrenia, vol. 5. São Paulo: 34, 1997b.
• DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. O anti-Édipo: capitalismo e esquizofrenia 1. São Paulo: 34, 2010.
• DELEUZE, G.; PARNET, C. Diálogos São Paulo: Escuta, 1998.
• FEIL, G. S. Comunicação e fuga: por uma educação-fluxo. 2005. 203 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Educação das Ciências) – Universidade Regional do Noroeste do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Ijuí, 2005.
• FEIL, G. S. O simulacro e o biografema – de A a Z. In: CORAZZA, S. M. (Org.). Fantasias de escritura: filosofia, educação, literatura. Porto Alegre: Sulina, 2010, p. 79–91.
• NIETZSCHE, F. Sobre verdade e mentira no sentido extra-moral. In: NIETZSCHE, F. Obras incompletas / Friedrich Nietzsche São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1978.
• NIETZSCHE, F. O anticristo: maldição contra o cristianismo. Porto Alegre: L&PM, 2011.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  19 Aug 2019
• Date of issue
  May-Aug 2019

History

• Received
  09 Feb 2017
• Accepted
  31 May 2019