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The Bigger, the Better: Coalitions in the GATT/WTO

Abstract

What does it take to make a coalition successful? Bigger coalitions are more likely to be successful because the GATT/WTO is a consensus-based institution and countries are informally penalized if they isolate themselves. Through a Bayesian statistical analysis, the article corroborates the above hypothesis. To further investigate the research question, qualitative case studies of the G-10 in the Uruguay Round and the Public Health Coalition in the Doha Round are conducted. These cases show that the more convincing the framing of a position, the better are the chances of coalitions keeping a large number of followers and supporters, thereby affecting their odds of success. By building a unique database and applying a new research design to the topic, the study rigorously tests theories about coalitions that had previously only been proposed but not empirically analyzed.

international coalitions; bayesian analysis; multilateralism; economic openness; international negotiations


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Publication Dates

  • Publication in this collection
    20 Aug 2013
  • Date of issue
    2012

History

  • Received
    Dec 2011
  • Accepted
    Aug 2012
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