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What is the Best Strategy to Obtain Legislative Support?: Survey Evidence from Brazilian State Assemblies

Abstract

The legislative success of governments in Latin America has been explained by two main theories. For some authors, the main explanation involves the proactive and reactive powers of the chief executive. Other scholars argue that negotiations with deputies for portfolios and pork are the most important factors behind success in approving legislation. This paper proposes an innovative methodological strategy to test the mechanisms behind each of these theories. Original survey data of 12 Brazilian state-level assemblies is examined to assess elites' attitudes in regard to governors' strategies to obtain legislative support. Results suggest that there is not a unique equilibrium to the problem of coalition formation in multiparty settings. Deputies with concentrated constituencies, from more decentralized parties, and from conservative parties, tend to believe that the most efficient way a governor can obtain legislative support is to negotiate amendments with deputies. On the other hand, the more scattered a legislator's constituency and the more liberal or centralized his or her party, the more likely a deputy is to think that governors achieve better legislative success when they negotiate cabinet positions.

Executive-Legislative relationship; subnational politics; survey data; legislators' attitudes


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Publication Dates

  • Publication in this collection
    20 Aug 2013
  • Date of issue
    2012

History

  • Received
    Aug 2011
  • Accepted
    June 2012
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