Political Dynasties, Bolsonarismo, and the Environmental Agenda during the 2022 Elections in the Brazilian Legal Amazon

Abstract

The objective of this article is to evaluate how the most important political families in the nine states of the Brazilian Legal Amazon responded to two aspects of the 2022 elections: the advance of ‘bolsonarismo’ as a political force in the Amazon, and the environmental agenda. Based on the concept of political dynasties, the main family groupings (one per state) were selected. Our research question is: did the support of candidates backed by these families for Lula or Bolsonaro imply the reproduction of their respective environmental agendas? Two of the selected families have a well-defined ideological trajectory, while seven are marked by great ideological flexibility and are considered ‘swing families’. However, the majority of the families have agendas related to environmental degradation, and their trajectory converged towards candidates linked to anti-environmentalism. One family deviates from the analytical expectation, following a dynamic of economic interests and political calculation specific to the current situation. Evaluating the government programs of the state-level candidates launched or supported by these dynasties, we find that, in a national context marked by a well-defined ideological and programmatic dispute (in which the environmental agenda occupied a strategic place), support for Lula or Bolsonaro also led, in all cases, to the broad reproduction of their environmental agendas.

Political dynasties; Brazilian Legal Amazon; ‘bolsonarismo’; environmental policy

A lthough the Brazilian Legal Amazon is a region made up of a plurality of political and institutional trajectories, as well as distinct patterns of electoral competition and party structure, there has been an important unifying trait since 2002 (and, more notably, since 2014): despite their specificities, all nine states in the region have observed a robust electoral realignment, with their voting patterns moving — across the board — towards the right of the ideological spectrum (SANTOS, 2022)

This trajectory reached its peak in 2018, following the election of Jair Bolsonaro (then a member of the Social Liberal Party, or ‘PSL’) as President. Of the nine governors elected at that time, seven openly aligned themselves with the ‘bolsonarista’ camp, including governors from center-left parties with a tradition of alignment with the Workers’ Party (or ‘PT’), as was the case with Governor Waldez Góes (PDT) in Amapá. At the same time, twelve of the eighteen senators who won a mandate in the Amazon supported Bolsonaro.

Although the 2022 elections represented a small setback for the conservative movement in the region, the strength of the ‘bolsonarista’ vote was once again evident. This time, six out of the nine elected governors closed ranks with Bolsonaro, against two ‘lulistas’. In addition, four out of the region’s nine senators openly supported the former President, while three sided with Lula and two remained neutral. It is worth noting that Governor Wilson Lima (PSC) of Amazonas managed to be re-elected with a clearly ‘bolsonarista’ identity, despite the trauma experienced by the state capital of Manaus during the Covid-19 pandemic.

There is another political force that brings together various groups in the Amazon: the presence of families that, through their possession of capital – particularly in the primary sector – constitute important local elites, sometimes making political parties an extension of their family structures. Indeed, in the Brazilian Legal Amazon, there is an overlap between the private and political fields that merits consideration, particularly, given the institutional trajectory of the region's states, some of which are former federal territories.

The presence of these families in each of the Amazonian states has been the subject of analysis in a series of bulletins produced by the Laboratory of Geopolitical Studies of the Legal Amazon (LEGAL), available on their website¹. Our analysis also draws on the contributions made by the nearly 40 researchers from LEGAL contained in these bulletins.

The question that drives this article is: how did the main political families in the states of the Brazilian Legal Amazon behave in the 2022 gubernatorial elections in the face of the consolidation of ‘bolsonarismo’ as a regional political force, as well as in relation to the environmental agenda (elevated to the discursive and programmatic center of the Bolsonaro government, on the one hand, and the Lula government elected in 2022, on the other)?

Given the early polarization of the 2022 electoral dispute into two antagonistic and hegemonic camps, with two opposing environmental projects, the central objective of this analysis is to investigate, first, how the political families positioned themselves in relation to the advance of ‘bolsonarismo’ in the Amazon, and, second, whether their support for one candidate or the other also implied the reproduction of the environmental agenda linked to ‘bolsonarismo’ or ‘lulismo’.

Our choice of these families is informed by two factors: first, they are locally structured familial political groups, acting as elites understood as organized minorities that hold significant power in comparison to disorganized majorities (MOSCA, 2007). Second, these families structure themselves as political dynasties (BOURDIEU, 1996), which means that they not only have lasting political and electoral relevance over time — sometimes for several generations — but also the ability to draw on inherited political capital transmitted through familial ties (BOURDIEU, 1996). If formal and/or competitive democracies create a governing minority (the elite) and a governed majority (MICHELS, 1982), there is an important distinction here: the predominance of these families in a diachronic perspective represents a subordination of these dominant groups by a small fraction of the same elites (ARRUDA, 2015).

In each of the states of the Brazilian Legal Amazon, one such family was selected. Our investigation examines the Cameli family in Acre, the Capiberibe family in Amapá, the Cidade family in Amazonas, the Sarney family in Maranhão, the Campos family in Mato Grosso, the Barbalho family in Pará, the Donadon family in Rondônia, the Jucá family in Roraima, and the Barbosa family in Tocantins.

The official government programs of the candidates for state governors in the Amazon, which were registered with the Electoral Court prior to the elections, were analyzed. Our objective was to determine whether there is a convergence between the support of candidates backed by the families for Bolsonaro and Lula, on the one hand, and these candidates’ support for the ‘bolsonarista’ and ‘lulista’ environmental agendas, on the other. Our hypothesis is that, given the political dominance of two candidates with obvious ideological and programmatic differences, and the concurrent elevation of environmental and climate issues to the center of the public debate, support for one of the ideological fields should lead to support for its respective environmental agenda.

The ‘new rights’, ‘bolsonarismo’, and the Amazon

The election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 represented not only the return of the right to the Presidency (via elections) for the first time since 1998 - when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso was re-elected by the center-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party, or ‘PSDB’ - but, above all, the rise of a set of new political groups in Brazil: the ‘new rights’.

The concept of ‘new rights’ refers to the social movements and political groups that emerged in the Brazilian public arena in the mid-2010s, following large-scale protests such as the June 2013 protests and the marches for the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 2015 and 2016 (OLIVEIRA, 2018). Its novelty is justified by the combination of five fundamental characteristics: a metapolitical framework, i.e., the understanding of the cultural arena as a privileged locus of political struggle, with its hegemony as a condition ‘ex ante’ for the contestation of institutional spaces; anti-intellectualism, understood as the open and frontal rejection of traditional instances of production, legitimation, and reproduction of regimes of truth, notably universities, research centers, and schools; anti-elitism, politically translated as the ethical, aesthetic, and epistemological appreciation of the average citizen and common sense as a tool for grasping reality; the instrumentalization of politically incorrect discourse as a weapon of an anti-system rhetoric; and the synthesis of economic liberalism and moral conservatism, united around the elevation of the patriarchal family as the ordering category of the social world (SILVA, 2021).

In the political discourse of Brazil's new right in general, and of ‘bolsonarismo’ in particular, the environmental agenda is viewed as a political weapon of two subversive movements: the environmentalist movement and the political organization of indigenous peoples. According to this narrative, the Brazilian left and international ‘globalism’ use the environmental agenda to undermine Brazilian national sovereignty, making economic development impossible, and threatening border security by creating supranational enclaves such as indigenous lands (LEIRNER, 2020).

From an ideological point of view, based on the understanding of environmentalism and the political organization of indigenous peoples as political weapons of the globalist left, or from a concrete point of view, based on the alliance between politicians and sectors of capital linked to agribusiness and extractivism, the reversal of protective environmental legislation — which were built with great effort in Brazil — and the re-conversion of the Amazon to the status of a frontier for the expansion of agribusiness, have been presented as fundamental tenets of ‘bolsonarismo’.

There is an additional factor to be considered: although the Amazon has become one of the main Brazilian biomes to suffer from the effects of wildfires and deforestation in recent years, the climate issue does not concretely present itself as a central concern for the electorate in the region. As a result, climate is not a determining factor in the electoral calculus of the families analyzed here.

Throughout 2022, LEGAL conducted three rounds of focus groups (led by researchers Carolina de Paula and João Feres Jr.) in both state capitals and in smaller cities, seeking the perceptions of citizens of the Legal Amazon regarding climate, the environment, and elections. The issues addressed included the set of concerns motivating the choice of candidates, and the responses were broadly similar: with the exception of rural Mato Grosso (a region affected by wildfires), the environmental issue did not appear spontaneously. Once prompted, however, respondents were generally unanimous in pointing out climate change as a serious problem (DE PAULA and FERES JR., 2022a, 2022b).

In the next section, we will discuss how some of the main political families in each of the states of the Legal Amazon region positioned themselves in relation to these factors in the 2022 electoral contest.

Political families in the Amazon and the 2022 elections

The selected families can be broadly divided into two categories: a group marked by great ideological flexibility (Jucá, Sarney, Barbosa, Barbalho, Cameli, Cidade, and Donadon) - defined here as ‘swing families’ - and two families with a more defined ideological trajectory, one on the right (Campos) and one on the left (Capiberibe). Practically all swing families have historically had very close relationships with environmental degradation, either in the context of their private businesses or in their trajectories within the Brazilian state. In 2022, these trajectories have converged both towards Bolsonaro's national candidacy and towards anti-environmentalist local candidates. There is, however, one important exception: the Barbalho family in Pará.

The definition of swing families is based on the appropriation of the concept of swing states, a term which originated in the United States to identify states marked by four fundamental characteristics (SCHULTZ and JACOB, 2018): their bellwether status (that is, winning in those states is crucial to winning the national contest); their competitiveness (there are generally no winners with wide margins in swing states); their mutability (swing states exhibit changes in voting patterns over time); and the widespread perception that these states have become political battlefields. Two of the above characteristics are relevant to the definition of swing families: their bellwether status and their mutability.

Some swing families reach national prominence, such as the Jucá family in Roraima. Romero Jucá, a former president of Funai and governor of the Federal Territory of Roraima (a position to which he was appointed by then-president José Sarney, with whom he has historical ties), served as a state senator from 1995 to 2018 and was affiliated with two political parties (PSDB and PMDB/MDB) during his tenure, holding significant sway in the governments of both the PSDB and the PT. He served as vice-leader of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) government and as leader of the Lula and Dilma (PT) governments. Jucá was later one of the main orchestrators of the impeachment of Rousseff in 2016, and became a key leadership figure in the subsequent Temer government. His ex-wife, Teresa Surita (MDB), was a federal deputy and mayor of Boa Vista for four terms. His son, Rodrigo Jucá (MDB), was a state deputy and ran for governor of Roraima on the Chico Rodrigues (PSB) ticket as a vice-candidate. His daughter, Marina Jucá, is not notable for her political career, but for her economic ties to mining. This is considered an extractive activity of particular interest for Romero Jucá.

As president of Funai, Jucá was the author of the Meridian 62 Project, which designated areas for the settlement of gold miners within the Roraima National Forest. In addition, as a senator, he presented bill 1610/1996, which authorized mining activities on indigenous lands.

At the state level, the family has adopted a regressive environmental agenda since at least Romero Jucá’s appointment to the government of the Federal Territory of Roraima in 1988. During this period, Jucá formed a support base of miners and traders through his advocacy of mining in the Yanomami Indigenous Land.

Since then, the Jucá family has launched its own candidates for governor in five elections, all of which were defeated at the polls: in 1990, Romero Jucá (PPR); in 1998, Teresa Surita (PSDB); in 2006, once again Romero Jucá (PMDB); in 2014, Rodrigo Jucá (PMDB), running as vice-candidate on the ticket led by Chico Rodrigues (PSB); and in 2022, again Teresa Surita (MDB). The Jucá family had the support of Lula's PT in 2006 and of Bolsonaro's PL in 2022.

In 2022, the Jucá family sought to distance themselves from Lula's candidacy and, despite the MDB having its own candidate (Simone Tebet), attempted to approach Jair Bolsonaro's campaign. Despite publicly declaring support for the MDB candidate, Romero Jucá sought to strengthen his ties with the PL. Teresa Surita, the Jucá family candidate for the state government, openly supported Bolsonaro and headed a coalition consisting of MDB, PL, PSB, and PMB.

Teresa Surita's environmental agenda — as outlined in her government plan — was in line with the one carried out by Bolsonaro at the national level (with some exceptions, as it included incentives for the creation of alternative and clean forms of energy generation) and was based mainly on two principles: streamlining the environmental licensing process and promoting the mining industry in the state.

In Maranhão, the main swing family is the Sarney family. The son of a judge, José Sarney (MDB) was governor, President of Brazil, senator, and president of the Senate for several years. In addition, Sarney was an ally of every administration since the reestablishment of Brazilian democracy with his own election in 1985. Sarney’s party trajectory unequivocally translates this ideological mutability: he started in the PSD, and was affiliated with the UDN, ARENA, and PDS before reaching PMDB/MDB. Sarney also transmitted his political capital to his children: Sarney Filho (PV), who was state congressman, federal deputy, Minister of the Environment (during the FHC and Temer governments), and Secretary of the Environment (during the Ibaneis Rocha government in the Federal District); and Roseana Sarney (MDB), who was a federal deputy, governor, and senator, as well as a presidential candidate. His third son, Fernando Sarney, is the main shareholder of the largest communication group in the state. Sarney’s grandson, Adriano Sarney (PV), is a state congressman.

The Sarney family’s dominance over politics in Maranhão is obvious: members of the family have occupied the position of state governor an astonishing five times. José Sarney ruled beginning in 1965, and Roseana Sarney was elected governor in 1994, 1998, 2009 (after the impeachment of governor Jackson Lago from PSB, who had defeated her in the 2006 election), and 2010.

The family's environmental agenda is ambiguous: on the one hand, during José Sarney's presidency, the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) - led by Romero Jucá - directly worked to loosen regulations and pave the way for mining in indigenous lands, a policy that was replicated at the state level. On the other, Sarney Filho (PV) has a long history of advocating for environmental preservation, often in direct opposition to the agenda of the Bolsonaro government. Along with Senator Randolfe Rodrigues (REDE-AP) and newly-elected federal deputy Marina Silva (REDE-SP), Sarney Filho was mentioned in focus groups conducted by LEGAL as a politician symbolically linked to the environmentalist movement (DE PAULA and FERES JR., 2022a).

Although in 2018 the Sarney family declared support for Jair Bolsonaro in the second round of the presidential election, in 2022, also in the second round, the patriarch of the family supported Lula's candidacy, invoking the need to defend democracy. The national repproach was also reflected at the state level, leading to an unexpected reconciliation between the political group aligned with the Sarney family and the group led by Flávio Dino (PSB), the former governor and senator who was instrumental in reducing the Sarney family's political influence in Maranhão. For the Maranhão state government, the Sarney family supported the candidacy of Carlos Brandão (PSB), who was elected in the first round.

Regarding the environmental agenda, the elected governor proposed the implementation of a state program of carbon credits for small and medium-sized rural producers, as well as the development of a plan for the control of deforestation and wildfires. Brandão also launched an incentive for reforestation and a program of scholarships for families enrolled in projects involving conservation and environmental restoration. In Maranhão, therefore, we observe a clear alignment of the elected government with the environmental agenda advocated by Lula.

However, the official program of the governor-elect is indifferent to the fact that, after decades of large mining and metallurgical projects and years of MATOPIBA (a new agricultural frontier located in the states of Maranhão, Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia), problems related to deforestation and attacks on indigenous territories, as well as pollution by heavy minerals, have become more urgent.

In Pará, the Barbalho family is an example of the strength of family tradition in state politics. The patriarch of the family, Laércio Wilson Barbalho, was a state deputy for the PSD party for several terms until he was removed from office by the military dictatorship after the 1964 coup. His son, Jader Barbalho (MDB), is a senator (elected for the third time in 2018) and has served as a city councilor in Belém, state deputy, federal deputy, governor twice, president of the Incra agency, and minister of Agrarian Development and Social Security in the Sarney government. Jader Barbalho was also a central figure in Brazil’s process of redemocratization in the 1980s. The third generation is represented by Helder Barbalho (MDB), Jader's son, who was re-elected governor in the first round of the 2022 election. Helder was a city councilor and mayor of Ananindeua, state deputy, and minister in three governments: Lula, Dilma, and Temer. Elcione Barbalho (MDB) - Helder's mother and Jader's ex-wife - was a city councilor in Belém and federal deputy for several terms, being re-elected in 2022. Finally, Simone Morgado (MDB) - also Jader's ex-wife - was a city councilor in Bragança, state deputy, and federal deputy.

The Barbalho family has long-standing ties with President Lula, contributing to the electoral success of the PT in all presidential elections in Pará since 2002. In 2022, not only did the Barbalho family support Lula in the first round, but also actively participated in his campaign in the second round, mobilizing their local bases. At the state level, the group was represented by Helder Barbalho, who was reelected as governor with the backing of a broad coalition that brought together 15 political parties from various ideological fields (ranging from the PT on the left to Republicanos on the right).

The environmental agenda present in Helder Barbalho's government program includes advances such as legal frameworks related to climate change, coastal management, bioeconomy, conservation units, and combating deforestation. As a corollary, the program highlights an 11% reduction in deforestation in the state between 2021 and 2022.

These data need to be considered in light of a still very sensitive context: Pará remains the state that deforests the most among the nine states in the Legal Amazon². Furthermore, even with the creation of important mechanisms to improve land regularization and environmental preservation, deforestation has accelerated under Barbalho’s administration³.

The dubious character of the family's environmental agenda is also evident in its historic ties to agribusiness and connection to land grabbing. The Land Grabbing Congressional Investigation Committee of 2001 pointed to Jader Barbalho as owning 07% of all land in Pará at the time⁴. Despite the attention given to environmental protection in the 2022 government plan, the Barbalho family has a trajectory closely linked to an anti-environmental perspective, constituting a historically consolidated pattern of land exploitation in the Amazon.

However, by staying away from the climate denialism advocated by ‘bolsonarismo’ (and thus approaching the environmental agenda defended in Lula's government program), Helder proposed, for his second term, to develop incentives aimed at those who protect the forest and collaborate to address climate change, in addition to combating deforestation. He also supported the implementation of a program for the socioeconomic use of public forests and sustainable-use conservation units.

Despite its historical relationship with agribusiness, the 2022 state election marked a turning point (which had actually been unfolding since the first term of Helder Barbalho) in the family's trajectory with respect to environmental issues. Following this shift, the reelected governor of Pará has established himself as an important national (and even international) leader in defense of the Amazon. Barbalho was one of those responsible for President Lula's attendance at COP-27 in Egypt, and was recently able to launch Belém as the Brazilian candidate city to host COP-30.

In Tocantins, one of the main political groups is the Barbosa family. A crucial figure in the making of this political dynasty, Fenelon Barbosa (PDC) was the first mayor of Palmas. His son, Wanderlei Barbosa (Republicanos), is today the most important member of the dynasty; in 2022, Barbosa was reelected in the first round as governor. He was a councilman, state deputy, and vice-governor on the ticket of Mauro Carlesse (PHS), who resigned from office in March 2022 after being removed from office amid a series of allegations of corruption.

A grandson of Fenelon and son of Wanderlei Barbosa, Yhgor Leonardo Castro Leite (known as Léo Barbosa) was elected once as councilman and twice as state representative (the first two times by the Solidariedade party and the third by Republicanos, following his father's party changes). Marilon Barbosa (UNIÃO), Fenelon's son and Wanderlei's brother, is a councilman in Palmas.

In 2022, the Barbosa family, led by Wanderlei, declared support for Jair Bolsonaro in the second round, although the group had declared themselves as Bolsonaro allies as early as 2019. At that time, Wanderlei was already linked to a regressive environmental agenda as vice governor for Mauro Carlesse, a governor who was fined by IBAMA⁵.

In Wanderlei Barbosa's government plan, there is a proposal for the reorganization and monitoring of the ‘ecological ICMS’ (a tax in Brazil that incentivizes states to preserve their environment), as well as the strengthening of environmental education and access to clean water. However, the proposals lack details, especially regarding their execution. The focus rests on defending the centrality of agribusiness, the economic sector with the greatest weight in the state. Despite mentioning the importance of environmental preservation, there is no convincing response about the sustainability of farming. Therefore, Barbosa’s plan exhibits consonance with the environmental agenda of the Bolsonaro government, despite some rhetorical concessions to environmentalism.

In Acre, the Cameli family also expresses this ideological pendulum pattern clearly, depending on the circumstances. In the past, the group’s members have shared tickets with PT governors. As of 2022, however, the Camelis were dedicated supporters of Jair Bolsonaro. The family's political history begins with Orleir Messias Cameli (PPR), who was mayor of Cruzeiro do Sul and governor of the state between 1995 and 1999 for PPB and PFL. His cousin, César Messias, was his Secretary of Social Assistance, state deputy for three legislatures (for PPR and PPB), mayor of Cruzeiro do Sul for PPB, vice-governor in 2006 and 2010, for PP - in both cases on tickets led by a PT member (first Binho Marques and then Tião Viana) - and a federal deputy for PSB. Gladson Cameli (PP), Orleir's nephew, was a federal deputy, senator, and twice elected governor of Acre in the first round (in 2018 and 2022).

The group's environmental agenda is also pendular: they participated in two PT governments strongly identified with the discourse of environmental preservation and the reduction of deforestation. However, with the election of Gladson Cameli in 2018, Acre went from being a vanguard state in forest preservation to one marked by unbridled deforestation and wildfires⁶.

After years of close relations between the Cameli family and the PT, and having twice launched a vice-governor on the PT’s ticket, the group supported Jair Bolsonaro both in the 2018 second round and in 2022, since the first round. The movement observed in the 2018 elections was thus maintained in the 2022 election.

Regarding environmental issues, Gladson's government plan, despite making nods to environmental preservation, has two elements that bring it closer to the environmental management model implemented by the Bolsonaro government: the defense of the deregulation of environmental licensing (a measure unequivocally advocated by groups that act towards weakening environmental legislation in the country) and the strategic centrality given to agribusiness (mirroring the example of Rondônia).

In Amazonas, the Cidade family was selected for analysis. Orlando Gualberto Cidade (patriarch of the family) was a councilor in Manicoré between 1948 and 1952. One of his sons, Orlando Gualberto Cidade Filho, was a state deputy for two terms, with passages through PDS, PTN and, now, PV. Roberto Maia Cidade Filho (UNIÃO), a grandson of the patriarch, was elected state deputy in 2018, by PV, and re-elected in 2022, by the same party as the re-elected governor of the state. Roberto Cidade's trajectory clearly reflects the family's pendular relationship with the environmental issue: not only did the deputy migrate from PV to UNIÃO between 2018 and 2022, but he also acted, in the first term, in defense of conscious consumption, reuse of waste, and environmental conservation.

In 2022, through its main representative, Roberto Cidade, the family supported Jair Bolsonaro's candidacy at the national level, as well as the re-election of Governor Wilson Lima (UNIÃO), a strong ally of Bolsonaro in Amazonas. Among the proposals for the environment in their government plan is the creation of a legal framework for the carbon market, strengthening public policies for the bioeconomy in conservation units, and the Guardians of the Forest program, which pays conservation unit residents for forest protection activities and maintenance of environmental services. However, it does not propose actions aimed at combating illegal deforestation and wildfires, which remain at high levels in the state. While the proposals in the environmental area were vague, one of the main promises was the re-pavement of BR-319, whose potential impacts could aggravate the environmental scenario in the state. Therefore, among the Cidade family also there is greater adherence to the Bolsonaro environmental agenda.

The last swing family is the Donadon family, in Rondônia. The grouping has gone through several parties with different ideological inclinations. Marcos Donadon, the patriarch of the family, was the founder of the cities of Cerejeiras and Colorado do Oeste (of which he was mayor, for PDS, in the early 1980s). Melkisedek Donadon (PDT), his son, was mayor of Colorado do Oeste and Vilhena (twice). Natan Donadon (MDB), also a son of the patriarch, was municipal secretary of Colorado do Oeste and federal deputy three times. He became nationally known for being Brazil’s first sitting deputy to be imprisoned. Marcos Antônio Donadon (MDB) was state deputy for five terms (1995-2014) and president of the Legislative Assembly of Rondônia twice. Finally, Raquel Donadon (PL) was mayor of Colorado do Oeste and Vilhena.

In the only Brazilian state where all municipalities gave victory to Jair Bolsonaro in both rounds of the last two presidential elections, the Donadon family supported the candidate of the PL for the presidency. At the state level, the family backed Marcos Rocha (UNIÃO), the sitting governor who was re-elected by a narrow margin (52% of the vote) in a pureblooded ‘bolsonarista’ dispute against Senator Marcos Rogério (PL). With their electoral stronghold located mainly in the southern cone of the state - a region marked by the weight of agribusiness - the family's trajectory is also marked by strong anti-environmental action.

Anchored in the discourse of defending agribusiness, the environmental agenda of the re-elected candidate for the government of Rondônia has a strong identification with the agenda of the Bolsonaro government. His plan proposed to accelerate (and streamline) environmental licensing and advance in the process of land regularization with the federal government, as well as making very generic and superficial nods to environmental preservation. The rhetoric of the dichotomy between economic (and social) development and environmental preservation, so dear to the ‘bolsonarista’ discourse, is the backdrop for the proposals of the re-elected governor.

The only family with a clearer identification with the right (and, in this case, with the military dictatorship itself) is the Campos family in Mato Grosso. Júlio Domingos de Campos was a councilman and mayor of Várzea Grande between 1948 and 1961. Júlio José de Campos, his son, was mayor of Várzea Grande (for ARENA) and federal deputy for four terms - the first, for ARENA, and the following three for PFL - as well as a senator and the first governor of the state elected by direct vote between 1983 and 1987. In 2022, he was elected state deputy by União Brasil.

His other son, Benedito Paulo, was the State Secretary of Culture (2003) and mayor of Jangada (2004) for the PFL. Márcia Campos, the patriarch's third child in politics, was a councilwoman in Cuiabá for the DEM, elected in 2008. Finally, Jayme Campos, also a son of Júlio Domingos de Campos, was mayor of Várzea Grande three times (all for the PFL), governor of the state, and senator twice (in 2006 for the PFL and in 2018 for the DEM, now União Brasil).

Given the Campos family's ties to agribusiness - both from the perspective of their personal businesses and their electoral bases - their actions have always been in defense of the relaxation of Brazilian environmental legislation, under the argument of favoring the business environment for rural producers. In 2022, the Campos family supported the candidacy of Bolsonaro, to whom they had already pledged their support in 2018. In the state race, they stood with candidate Mauro Mendes (UNIÃO) - also an ally of Bolsonaro - who was reelected in the first round with 68.45% of the votes.

Notwithstanding the space devoted to environmental policies, which are presented in a more or less generic manner - summarized from the perspective of defending the economic and technological development of the state based on a sustainable model - the government plan presented by Mauro Mendes did not provide specific goals for each of the biomes that make up Mato Grosso (the Pantanal, the Cerrado, and the Amazon).

Some of the planned actions involve decentralizing environmental licensing and strengthening the environmental and land regularization policy of the state's conservation units, as well as sustainable forest use as a mechanism for reducing deforestation rates.

Beyond the superficiality of the environmental debate presented, some promised infrastructure works may generate controversies due to the possibility of causing environmental impacts, especially the paving of the Juína-Colniza highway and the construction of the Rio Juruena Complex (which includes paving a highway and building a concrete bridge). Here, once again, there is some alignment (although not as emphatic) with the environmental agenda of the Bolsonaro government.

Finally, there is a family with a strong identification with the left: the Capiberibe family in Amapá. This identification is not only ideological, but also partisan: the Capiberibes are linked with the Brazilian Socialist Party, or ‘PSB’. The patriarch of the family, João Capiberibe, was the mayor of Macapá, state governor twice, and senator. In addition to being a historical member of the PDB (since 1988), he was an important leader in the armed resistance to the military dictatorship in the Amazon, along with his wife, Janete Capiberibe (PSB), both belonging to the National Liberation Action. They were arrested, tortured, and later exiled from the country. Janete, in turn, was a councilwoman in Macapá, state deputy, federal deputy, and currently holds the mandate of councilwoman once again. The couple's son, Camilo Capiberibe (PSB), was a state deputy, federal deputy, and governor. Raquel Capiberibe (PMN), João Capiberibe's sister, was a federal deputy (the first in the history of Amapá) and vice-mayor of Macapá.

The family has historical ties to the PT and Lula, having even been resistant to the presidential run of Eduardo Campos (PSB) in 2014, which caused the split between PSB and PT. In 2022, the Capiberibe family - whose party composed the presidential ticket, in the figure of vice-presidential candidate Geraldo Alckmin - once again supported the candidacy of Lula. At the state level, the family backed the former mayor of Macapá, Clécio Luís (SOLIDARIEDADE) in a ticket also supported by Lula. Once again, the group launched their main leader, João Capiberibe, to the Senate.

Regarding the environmental agenda advocated by the Solidariedade candidate for the Amapá state government, there is also convergence with the ideas advocated by Lula. Indeed, their proposals are in convergence with recent theoretical and normative developments and with an important part of the international agenda, which assumes as a fundamental premise the complementarity between economic and social development and the preservation of the environment, based on the exploitation of the economic potential of biodiversity, in line with the ways of life of traditional populations.

In more detail, the environmental agenda includes the promotion of a sustainable productive matrix from both an environmental and sociocultural perspective, through the strengthening of the bioeconomy, indigenous production, and the local market in the municipality of Oiapoque. Other proposals follow the line of policies combining the promotion of local productive matrices, strongly anchored in the activities of traditional populations, and the preservation of the environment, focusing on the productive chains of açaí, Brazil nut, and fruit cultivation, as well as the construction of the Fruit Agro-Industry Center, in partnership with the Federal Institute of Amapá (IFAP).

The following table summarizes the attributes of the family dynasties addressed based on three characteristics: profile, trajectory of relation with the environmental agenda, and their position in the 2022 elections.

Table 01
Synthesis of the political families

Family	Status	Environmental agenda	2022 position
Barbalho	swing family	anti-environmentalist	Lula/environmentalist
Barbosa	swing family	anti-environmentalist	Bolsonaro/anti-environmentalist
Cameli	swing family	pendular	Bolsonaro/anti-environmentalist
Campos	right	anti-environmentalist	Bolsonaro/anti-environmentalist
Capiberibe	left	environmentalist	Lula/environmentalist
Cidade	swing family	pendular	Bolsonaro/anti-environmentalist
Donadon	swing family	anti-environmentalist	Bolsonaro/anti-environmentalist
Jucá	swing family	anti-environmentalist	Bolsonaro/anti-environmentalist
Sarney	swing family	pendular	Lula/environmentalist

Source: Elaborated by the author.

Conclusion

The last two elections for the Presidency of Brazil, particularly the 2022 election, had a distinct feature. Since the establishment of the Nova República, there has been a tradition of weakening ideological differentiation between the main political forces in dispute. However, the two candidacies that mobilized the Brazilian electorate in 2018 and 2022 not only had evident ideological and programmatic differences but also incorporated these distinctions into their discursive platforms.

These differences were also present in the government programs and in the policies defended by each pole of the 2022 dispute, such as the environmental agenda. The Bolsonaro government considers the dismantling of Brazilian environmental legislation and its systemic unfeasibility as a core part of its presidential platform. This has resulted in the advancement of forest fires (especially in the Amazon and Pantanal), illegal mining, and illegal exploitation of timber (with the consent of state structures), which have become unmistakable symbols of the political group that won the Presidency in 2018. President Lula's candidacy, which was elected for a third term, aimed to create an antithesis to the model represented by President Bolsonaro. In this regard, one of the core components of its platform was to form an alliance with former Minister Marina Silva (REDE), who is globally recognized for her environmental preservation work. Additionally, the candidacy promised to establish a Ministry for Indigenous Peoples to be led by an Indigenous person.

The high degree of politicization and ideological specificity of the candidates seems to have decisively influenced electoral disputes at the state level. The ideological trajectories of seven of the nine political families analyzed were more flexible, while others had clearer contours to the right or left. However, in all cases where state candidacies were led or supported by these families, their adherence to either Lula or Bolsonaro coincided with the reproduction of their respective environmental agendas, albeit with some nuances on a case-by-case basis. State candidacies aligned with the PL candidate locally reproduced environmental agendas focused on the flexibilization of environmental legislation (referred to as the ‘streamlining’ of environmental licensing), while candidacies aligned with the PT candidate reproduced, locally, agendas focused on environmental preservation and, ultimately, on so-called ‘development with a standing forest’.

Moreover, the results obtained here were, in general, quite intuitive: swing families generally have trajectories marked by anti-environmentalism - only three were pendular (two of which supported Bolsonaro and only one of which supported Lula) - and practically all families with anti-environmental trajectories reproduced this agenda in the 2022 state elections. At the national level, these families also supported Bolsonaro. However, there is a counterintuitive exception: the Barbalho family, whose representative in the Pará dispute - despite belonging to a swing family and having an anti-environmental trajectory - not only supported the PT presidential candidate, but also incorporated environmental preservation into his electoral platform as a structural element. Political calculation can help understand this inflection, which made the governor of Pará an important leader on the subject.

There is another element to be highlighted: even the state candidacies that reproduced the environmental agenda championed by the Bolsonaro government did not fail to make gestures - albeit rhetorical or superficial - to the imperative of environmental preservation, which may suggest an important turning point in public perception around environmental and climate issues, despite the evident rooting of ‘bolsonarismo’ in the region.

Also due to the legacy of destruction of the mechanisms of protection of the environment and of indigenous populations left by the Bolsonaro government, the results of the 2022 election open an important window of opportunity for Brazil to realize a Machiavellian moment regarding the environmental agenda, in general, and the Amazon, in particular. Despite a potentially resistant Congress, the country has a chance to rescue a perspective that overcomes the dichotomy between development and environmental preservation, which has structured the way the Amazon has been incorporated into the Brazilian development agenda for decades. However, given the conditions, there must be enough ‘virtù’ for this new arrangement.

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  See ˂https://legal-amazonia.org/˃.
• 2
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• 4
  See ˂https://www.correiodobrasil.com.br/jader-vai-depor-na-cpi-da-grilagem-nesta-quarta-feira/˃.
• 5
  See ˂https://racismoambiental.net.br/2020/02/04/carlesse-dem-to-e-unico-governador-com-mandato-na-lista-de-multados-por-desmatamento-do-ibama/˃.
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Edited by

Translated by Thomás Abers Lourenço

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  28 Apr 2023
• Date of issue
  2023

History

• Received
  15 Dec 2022
• Accepted
  24 Jan 2023