City Production Strategies in the Neoliberalization Context - Salvador as Example

Abstract

The aim of the current article is to think over economic development and urban infrastructure propositions by Salvador 360 Strategic Plan from 2017, which was elaborated by the municipal government. The plan allows analyzing the neoliberal city production approach which, despite its modernizing profile, is just an update of old models that have great potential to worsen structural socio-spatial segregation issues. Neoliberalism, urban spoliation, land value and gentrification are key concepts in this article. Neil Brenner, Nick Theodore, Jamie Peck, David Harvey, Lúcio Kowarick, Carlos Vainer and Inaiá de Carvalho are its main theoretical references. The methodology addresses documental analysis, as well as the analysis of secondary data from official sources (DIEESE and IBGE) and digital platforms analysis (AirBnB website). Based on the results, Salvador 360 Strategic Plan deepens eviction processes experienced by the poor population in the city’s central zones and increases the appropriation of private urban added value and service provision concentration, within a political setback context. This process can aggravate urban environment precariousness and quality of life in the city.

city; Salvador; neoliberalism, urban spoliation

Resumo

Este trabalho tem como objetivo refletir sobre as propostas de desenvolvimento econômico e de infraestruturação urbana elaboradas pelo Plano Estratégico Salvador 360, produzido em 2017 pelo poder público municipal, em Salvador, na Bahia. Trata-se da análise de uma experiência de cunho neoliberalizante que, apesar da feição modernizadora, atualiza modelos antigos com grande potencial de agudização de problemas estruturais de segregação socioespacial. Os conceitos que estruturam este texto são os de neoliberalização, espoliação urbana, mais-valia fundiária e gentrificação, e as principais referências teóricas utilizadas são Neil Brenner, Nick Theodore, Jamie Peck, David Harvey, Lúcio Kowarick, Carlos Vainer e Inaiá de Carvalho. A metodologia utilizada foi a de análise de documentos oficiais, de dados secundários (Dieese, IBGE) e da plataforma digital AirBnB. O texto conclui que o referido plano, em um contexto de retrocesso político e de aumento da pobreza, intensifica a expulsão da população pobre das áreas centrais, amplia a apropriação privada da mais-valia urbana e a concentração da oferta de serviços, aprofundando a precarização do ambiente urbano e da qualidade de vida na cidade.

cidade; Salvador; neoliberalização; espoliação urbana

Introduction

Historically, life in big cities has been associated with modernization, but also with segregation, violence and environmental degradation. Back in 2014, David Harvey mimicked Henri Lefebvre by saying: “The city can be killed”. But, soon after that, as by taking a deep breath, he states: “Long live the city!” (Harvey, 2014, p. 21). Would the aforementioned adjectives always apply to the city, which is seen as the locus of innovation, exchange, production, inequality, conflict, fear, power, celebration and freedom? ( Le Goff, 1988 ). Up to 1990s, the understanding about the urban condition implied the overlapping of categories such as post-Fordism, deindustrialization, globalization and the expansion to the peripheral zones. After all, what is new in production and reproduction processes in our cities?

According to Anthony Giddens (2002) , what is overall featured as post-modern condition is not exactly the overcoming of modernity fundaments, but as their radicalization. In this specific case, “post” neoliberalism has headed to the radicalization of liberal concepts and practices by deepening the conversion of material, symbolic and relational assets, as well as of the city itself, into goods. Accordingly, we are standing before the “same’ and the “new”, simultaneously – nowadays, the city more radically up-dates historical elements of its constitution process and, by doing so, it reinvents itself. Moreover, this process gains particular color shades in the periphery of the system.

Recently, neoliberalism concepts have been seen as the synthesis elements necessary to better understand the deepening in the unequal and volatile profile that the city has embodied in the last decades. Neil Brenner and Nick Theodore (2005) call the attention to the fact that neoliberalism has been understood as a contemporary urban decoding element. Nowadays, we have to face the challenge of understanding the city based on the post-neoliberalism context, in other words, after the neoliberal “landslide” triggered in the 1970s.

After almost three decades of (re)democratization in Brazil, after the neoliberal experience of the 1990s and the neo-developmentalist model from the 2000s, the implementation of decentralizing managerial instruments and the search for popular participation in the management of the res publica, the city remains a stage of contradictions, inequality and conflicts, of a “financialized” and rentier economy whose decision-making centers are guided by corporative interests.

Thus, the city has been associated with the consolidation of fortified spaces, with gentrification, where the squares and streets – in the past associated with leisure and conviviality (in a very romantic way) – have become places for crossing and for exposure to risks. On the other hand, the city of ghettos is currently associated with the return to management projects and models featured by many as segregationists – they wear up the traditional production model of the city by deepening its conversion into a good.

The case of Salvador City becomes an example, since it discloses the old, renewed and deepened contradictions of the city in the peripheral capitalism. Salvador, which was always featured as a tertiary city, with only few qualified job positions, remains as a city whose economy is mostly rentier, in the current deindustrialization context. The stimulus to the civil construction industry, and to the land and real estate market (quite heavy in the local economy) gained greater expression in the local and regional accumulation process, in the last decades. This scenario became more complex from the adoption of urban management instruments, such as Transferência do Direito de Construir – TRANSCON (Transference of the Right to Build), which was issued by the Statute of the City (Law n ^o 10.257/2001). It allows the exercise or alienation of the right to build in order to preserve real estates and areas of important historical and environmental value, but its bad application has been leading to real estate speculation due to the created soil regulation and broadening accumulation and concentration mechanisms¹ .

Based on the regional division of labor, São Paulo was the city of industry and work, and Salvador, similarly to several Northeastern state capitals, was a city of leisure, tourism, entertainment, of the preservation of specialized services, exchanges and gain, without any, or with little, work – of the revenue, mainly of revenue with urban land.

This development model typical of the 1990s was never left behind, it has been once more reset through Salvador 360 Program (Salvador, 2017), but within the deindustrialization, social inequality amplification and urban segregation and labor precariousness context, and of setbacks in conquests regarding the management plan experienced in the great metropoles. This program is a clear example of the permanence of the old touristic Salvador project in the 21st century.

Salvador 360 Program takes us back to the classic and questionable “urban (re)featuring” model implemented in the 1980s in Barcelona, which was intensified due to the 1992 Olympic Games and replicated in several cities, in different continents. The “Barcelona Model” has inspired interventions in Berlin after the reunification process due to the embodiment of the “creative city” paradigm (Antunes, Marchcd & Connollyefg, 2020).

Recently, great city requalification projects and local urban development policies have encouraged the city’s reinsertion in the European global context by deepening gentrification processes ( Levine, 2004 ). Fujitsuka (2018) shows the effects of the Housing Linkage Program² in Tokyo, Japan, which was developed for the achievement of great development in the city’s downtown area, and featured by state deregulation and strong gentrification processes.

Salvador experience is peculiar because it suggests the deepening and reedition of an urban development model that turns the city itself into a venture, within extreme poverty, inequality and setback in the democratization of res publica management. According to Marcos Nobre (2013) and Leonardo Avritzer (2019) , the redemocratization process in the 1980s brought along changes in management standards, mainly in the Brazilian state capitals. However, different from Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte and São Paulo, Salvador’s example did not experience changes in its management, certainly due to the permanence of the same political groups in the municipal administration.

Similarly to the rest of the country, the current scenario shows the new action of urban despoilment processes despite the improved access to infrastructure and urban services (after years of abandonment) and the broader access to consumption. This process deepened old and structural issues, such as social-spatial segregation perversely associated with new movements focused on taking poor individuals away from degraded areas in the downtown – this eviction is featured as gentrification.

Despite the aforementioned issues regarding the amplification of access to infrastructure and urban services, Salvador is far from the universalization of the right to the city, and the perspectives about overcoming such a reality are pessimistic, given the unemployment-increase scene, the popular reflux movement, the political wear of projects seen as inclusive and the proliferation of a political arena based on mostly conservative projects, on setbacks in acquired rights, on attack to individual freedom and on political-institutional disruption, as stated by Yascha Mounk (2018) .

The aim of the present study was to reason on the economic development and urban infrastructure projects addressed in Salvador 360 Strategic Plan issued in 2017 by the municipal public power due to the city’s central role in the political fight for the promotion of a fairer and more inclusive city, and to the need of reasoning on the political projects designed for Salvador City. The study was carried out within the post-neoliberalism context, since this project up-dates the developmental model implemented in the Brazilian cities in the 1990s, despite its modernization profile. Therefore, it is unable to face and overcome several structural issues experienced in cities located in the periphery of Capitalism, such as Salvador.

The herein adopted methodology consists in analyzing the literature, official documentation, mainly the Salvador 360 Strategic Plan, as well as secondary data about the production and management processes in the city based on the peripheral neoliberal context, which brings information about economic structure, and access to and investment in collective consumption services. It also provides data about shared economy, such as that of real estates like Air, Bed and Breakfast (AirBnB), which are found on the internet. The study also used data from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED) by Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconômicos (DIEESE) about productive insertion and access to infrastructure and collective consumption services.

From the methodological viewpoint, it is important highlighting the multi-disciplinary profile of different knowledge and sharing fields. The herein adopted methodological route aims at overcoming traditional positivist exteriority relationships set between the researcher and the city, and the articulation among qualitative-quantitative dimensions ( Flick, 2009 ). From the epistemological viewpoint, the aforementioned options imply assuming the historical character of all produced knowledge, and that reality always shows itself in a partial and partitioned way. However, it does not mean that it is impossible to be interpreted, but that we need to be guided by the theory.

The structuring concepts of the present study encompass neoliberalism, urban spoliation, land value added and gentrification. Authors like Neil Brenner, Nick Theodore, Jamie Peck; David Harvey, Lúcio Kowarick, Carlos Vainer and Inaiá de Carvalho are the main theoretical references in the research. The adoption of such concepts and authors takes it close to a field, although different from it, surrounded by organizational studies. It is close to this field, because the theoretical field of organizations has been consistently advancing towards the construction of the city as object of study, by approaching diversified topics and approaches based on an interdisciplinary perspective (urbanistic, architectonic, historical, anthropological, sociological, among others) ( Silva, 2004 , 2019 ; Saraiva, 2019 ). It is different, because some of the referred authors cross theoretical fields that claim for their own statute – although they are in compliance with the dialogue with different knowledge disciplines.

The present study is designed as follows: the item about City production and neoliberalism in its Periphery addresses city production processes within the peripheral neoliberalism context. Item City production strategies in Salvador approaches the city production strategies in Salvador based on Salvador 360 Strategic Plan by approaching economic, labor, land added value, access to land, and urban infrastructure and gentrification aspects associated with the structuring concepts of labor. The last item provides general conclusions about the conducted reflection.

City production and Peripheral Neoliberalism

Talking about the city at the early 21st century means reasoning about the deadlocks and challenges set by complex relationships among economy, society and territory, given the global economic changes observed in the last decades ( Queiroz, 2018 ). It means talking about “deindustrialization”, about the 4.0 industry or about the fourth industrial revolution, whose main feature lies on the complex relationship between digital and biological technologies, on changes in labor and workers’ profile, on labor flexibilization and on increased inequality in its several territorial levels. It means understanding the new configurations set for cities’ extrapolation to peri-urban spaces, as well as (re)featuring projects designed for traditional urban centers. The redesign of ghettos to the poor and rich; the setbacks in participatory planning processes after many decades of fighting for urban reforms ( Carvalho, 2013 )³ .

As aforementioned, most of the reasoning on the city up to the 1990s addressed concepts such as post-Fordism, deindustrialization, globalization – overall, associated with “urban entrepreneurship”, i.e., with the sense that the city can be treated and conceived as a company, a private entity seeking a place in the competitive market of cities ( Brenner & Theodore, 2005 ).

Brenner and Theodore call attention to the fact that the theory about the city, mostly about the urban, adopted in the last decades, has been associating the urban issue to the sense of neoliberalism and neoliberalization. What is the theoretical meaning of such a displacement? Was the debate about the multiple consequences of implementing several forms of regulations, featured as neoliberal, not yet mature enough at the late 20th century?

The aforementioned authors highlight that the concepts of neoliberalism and neoliberalization added new elements to the debate on the city in the last decades. It is essential understanding that neoliberalism is not a way to reproduce the capital that completes itself or that it did not consume itself in the last decades of the last century, but that it is the final stage of the herein addressed process. The principle that the market is the best way to produce and reproduce life and the city has been presenting an extraordinary ability to reinvent and produce quite different outcomes in different geographic spaces and levels.

It is necessary paying close attention to the fact that neoliberalism and neoliberalization do not imply the setback of the State – it means mobilizing the State to promote regulation arrangements interesting to the market. After all, given all its consequences, neoliberalism has been reinventing itself, consistently ( Brenner & Theodore, 2005 ).

Thus, depending on the viewpoint, for the good or the bad, it is important pointing out how concepts such as that of deindustrialization, informal market, periphery, gentrification, urban entrepreneurship, global city and democracy (in its classical liberal version) gain particular meaning when they refer to liberalism or to neoliberalism. Beyond the meaning of State “setback” to benefit the market, it means understanding its current forms of action, mainly of the municipal public power; in other words, its “mobilization” in cities’ reconfiguration processes, in the last decades ( Brenner & Theodore, 2005 )⁴ .

The concretization of principle more generic than the overall featuring of neoliberalism in each historical context, space, territory and different cities have been leading to a varied and complex set of possibilities, mainly if we take into account the multiplicity of determinations, inheritances, paths and ways in the very core and peripheries of capitalism, in good producer societies.

We herein understand neoliberalism as the extension of commodification processes in all domains of life. The sense of neoliberalization, in its turn, concerns the specific and unequal ways to regulate and generate huge differences between levels and territories, downtown areas and peripheral or semi-peripheral zones in the good producer system and in the city itself. Therefore, it concerns the new ways to “regulate” by having stronger competition and market as structuring elements (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010).

According to Brenner and Theodore (2005) , neoliberalism, which remains on evolving and reinventing itself, has been extrapolating the elements of crises in the capitalism – overall, featured as market flaws. When it comes to the city, neoliberalism can be conceived as a selective social-spatial strategy, as governance modality and policy, and as a discourse about the city. But what are we actually talking about when we report to neoliberalism or neoliberalization, mainly when – as stated by Yascha Mounk (2018) – the liberal concept of democracy is in check by political forces within the political field overall featured as “extreme right”?

One of the main challenges of the current study is to identify how on-going changes in cities such as Salvador, located in the periphery of capitalism, are specific expressions of broader and more structuring processes of neoliberalism or neoliberalization, mainly in terms of city production strategies. Some concepts can help better understanding the production and reproduction strategies within the peripheral neoliberalization context as urban spoliation, land added value and gentrification⁵ .

Originally, the concept of urban spoliation derived from the attempt of understanding the constitution of the city within the Brazilian industrialization scenario. According to Lúcio Kowarick, these processes used to gather primitive accumulation, precariousness of the urban and extensive manpower exploitation to non-inclusion in labor remuneration and to the denial of the State for affording costs with labor force reproduction (Kowarick, 1979).

The concept of spoliation aimed at understanding how an expropriated field turns itself into an urban expropriated, and the relationship between the quality of the urban and labor over-exploitation ( Kowarick, 1979 ). Is it still possible talking about urban spoliation in times of productive flexibilization and deindustrialization? Of course, since the processes determining and structuring the city nowadays not only remain unchanged, but also gained a new radical profile based on developmental propositions such as Salvador 360 Strategic Plan.

The concept of urban spoliation, which was updated in the study by Kowarick, is defined as a set of extortions materialized in the non-access or precarious access to urban services and infrastructure, to land and housing. All these access types are seen as “socially necessary for labor reproduction and tease dilapidation resulting from labor exploitation or, even worse, from the lack of it” (Kowarick, 2000, p. 22).

For the record, even if the poverty degrees could be changed, urban production and reproduction conditions would still play decisive role in life conditions in the city: “(…) urban reproduction patterns can get worse or better as long as residents can have public power in terms of collective services and equipment, subsidies to housing or easy access to land with infrastructure” ( Kowarick, 2000 , p. 23).

Irlys Alencar Firmo Barreira (2010) states that the concept of urban spoliation takes us to a scene of social need and inequality, to the concept of “added value”; in this particular case, it is addressed not only as the appropriation of labor surplus, but as the condition faced by the individual without the right to access collective assets. The locus of expropriation, production and value appropriation is not the factory and labor, but the city, the city production processes. These processes link the dynamics of labor to the likelihood of accessing housing, land, mobility, healthcare services, education and security ( Barreira, 2010 ).

Accordingly, the concept of urban spoliation, although originally addressed as a differentiated historical context, unfortunately, seems up-to-date and appropriate to understand how the city produces and reproduces itself in the current scenario, mainly in contexts featured by labor precariousness and urban land concentration. These cities did not reach satisfactory levels of universalization of access to collective consumption and urban infrastructure. Somehow, such a profile, became possible in cities featured as global for an expressive fraction of the population.

In fact, we still watch a simultaneous move focused on expanding the metropoles to their borders, on the return of the great capital and on the valorization of old and deteriorated centers (even the ones full of vitality), as well as on the formation of urban enclaves (luxurious condominiums, the self-segregation of the richest ones and the confinement of the poor).

Despite the recent attempts to universalize the access to collective consumption services and infrastructure through the market (via privatization process in the 1990s), the broader participation of the State (through direct form or through public and private partnerships – PPP) in investments in infrastructure and urban services remain below the historical demand of big cites. This frame is even more complex in Salvador, mainly when it comes to its social-spatial stratification ( Carvalho & Pereira, 2014 ).

By assessing the study by Kowarick, Gabriel de Santis Feltran (2017) , it is possible observing the contemporaneity of the concept of urban spoliation. Firstly, Feltran states that it is essential deepening the debate about the “principle” on the existence of “disorganized” and “Chaotic” growth in the peripheral zones of cities. The reproduction of similar urbanization patterns in the periphery of the system (observed in several Latin American cities) proves such a reproduction (Feltran, 2017). The seemingly disorder or asymmetry, the existence of a “formal” and of an “informal” city, are the expressions of a very clear order that expresses itself in the richness of some and in the poverty of many others. Secondly, the study by Kowarick strongly criticizes the dualist reason accountable for structuring most of the literature about the city.

Emphatically, Feltran restates Kowaricks’ finding that “there is no formal city that teleologically expands itself and civilizes the informal, which is underdeveloped, as urban modernity consolidates itself with time” (Feltran, 2017, p. 1). The concept of urban spoliation shows complementary association between these “two” cities. It is essential escaping the binary and dualist conception in order to understand the existence of “coproduction” between the formal and the informal city, and that the association among economy, politics and urban space production is more complex than the dualist reason can think of.

Therefore, the concepts of urban spoliation, land profit, urban land added value and gentrification need each other and seem appropriate to understand the production and reproduction processes of cities such as Salvador. Inaiá Carvalho used the study by Carlos Lessa (1980) to shine light on the fact that Brazil faced a holly alliance between State and capital from the 1950s on, and it has marked our industrialization and urbanization process ( Carvalho, 2013 ). According to Lessa, the historical meaning of such an alliance in the Brazilian economic internationalization and the logic of accumulation in the cities in the second half of the 20th century is quite clear (Lessa, 1980).

Carvalho calls the attention to the fact that the relevance of the real estate capital in city constitution processes was never exactly a novelty, but that the conflict between urban land use and exchange value always uses it in the neoliberalization context. However, in the current globalization scenario or even of what can be qualified as post-neoliberalization, the city changes following the logic of transformation in capitalis accumulation. Such changes have different impact on the several goods’ production and circulation levels and has different outcomes at territorial levels, where these processes become real (Carvalho, 2013; Carvalho & Pereira, 2014 ).

It is in the city, mainly in cities like Salvador – featured as a tertiary city – that urban land profit becomes one of the main assets within the accumulation process. Land profit is herein addressed as the consequence of the historical fact of private property, of the rights of exclusive use ( Harvey, 2013 ). Thus, the interdiction of access to land (urban or rural) is the main condition for absolute (when use is linked to payment) and differential (deriving from specific features, like location) profit production, as well as for monopoly of revenues (resulting from the exclusivity of certain specific features). We understand urban land added values as the appropriation and distribution of benefits provided by the urbanization process when it comes to urban land, since the production of services and infrastructure are elements of accumulation ( Botelho, 2016 ; Harvey, 2013 ).

Relative gains result from several aspects, among them: land or real estate retention, zoning and public investment ( Low-Beer, 1983 ). The fact that land added value derives from value, human labor and land embodiment makes it possible associating land profit with the theory of value.

The concepts of “downtown zones” and “periphery” in cities are nothing but the outcome of differentiated embodiment of public and private investment in the territory ( Botelho, 2016 ). This land value is always relative to its association with surrounding areas, investments in infrastructure and the existing services. These factors explain the glue among property, income and capital. According to Botelho; Harvey and the theory of value and land profit by Marx: improvement added to land is a human work. Such a formulation substantiates the association between the theory of income and the theory of value, although, as states Botelho (2016), it seems to be its denial.

At international scale, this city production logic is reinvented by the current scenario of huge urban investment and (re)featuring projects that have been triggering a “new”, “old’ logic of valorizing the urban and urban land. As if we could see the 1990s, in Brazil, by the eyes of Carlos Vainer (2002) – he is an expert in experiencing Rio de Janeiro’s strategic plan implementation -, we are once more before the city business. The city that “left the passive form of objected and embodied the active form of subject”, the city that gains a “new”, “old” identity ( Vainer, 2002 , p. 83).

Therefore, based on such a scenario, talking about gentrification means addressing people’s mobility, social classes and capital in voids and empty spaces built, consolidated and featured as “deteriorated”. Gentrification can be conceived as a new frontier for urban expansion. This phenomenon has several milestones, depending on the concept. Somehow, the return to the “downtown”, which was conceived as a particular form of urbanism or post-modernism, uses the myth of homesteaders’ return, of the adventurers, new settlers, the “chic cowboy”, the place where “no white man has ever gone before” ( Smith, 2005 , p. 11).

Gentrification is the move to return to the “old city”, which focus on the city through the capital, rather than through the people. The concept of gentrification up-dates the myth of reinventing the lost quality, “the geographical and historical quality of things so lost” ( Smith, 2005 , pp. 11-39). The role of State and the municipal public power must be pointed out within this scenario during the creation of the necessary conditions to insert the city in this logic of the capital, invest in new business, mainly based on new investments – in infrastructure, in the redefinition of parameters, urbanistic legislation and in the elaboration of a strategic plan.

The association among concepts such as urban spoliation, land added value and gentrification suggests how hard it is to distinguish the social subjects producing the city, since the difference between national and international capital vanishes after a while, as well as among different segments of the land, industrial and financial segments, mainly when the financial capital is heterogeneous.

Salvador 360 Strategic Plan – as city production and managerial strategy - must be discussed within a setback scene in the democratic management models and of increased urban poverty. Therefore, we must report to the study by Mounk (2018) , who addresses the challenges set by democratic construction nowadays; in other words, by neoliberalism, in its post-globalization version, which deepens urban spoliation and quits renown principles and practices to benefit the old and traditional bourgeois democracy.

It was not so long ago that “the liberal democracy reigned alone” and it seems that “future would not be different from the past”. Actually, they would look pretty much alike, and it would allow us saying that the liberal democracy rules in an almost “absolute” way. “Future has arrived”, and everything seems quite different ( Mounk, 2018 , pp.15-16). The so-called “non-liberal democracy” and the “authoritarian populism” – with strong roots in the displacement of significant fractions of the population – threat the recent conquests of the Brazilian democratic process (materialized in the Statute of City – Law n ^o . 10.257, from July 2001) and put the historical principles of the liberal democracy at risk – also capable of absorbing the recent social participation broadening that has been observed in the management of the res publica⁶ .

Mounk (2018) advocates for the principles of liberal democracy and warns about the risks of democracy/liberalism disruption by calling the attention to the radicalism of on-going projects, i.e., we are facing not only the process to deconstruct models featured as progressists (or neoliberal), but the structures that have set the old liberal democracy.

So, let’s formulate the question guiding the current study: what are the economic and social consequences of implementing Salvador 360 Strategic Plan, nowadays, by taking into account the current urban poverty amplification, intensified gentrification process, private appropriation of the urban added value, broad offer of services and democratic setback contexts? We address the thesis that, based on the current neoliberalization and post-neoliberalization scenario, as it happened in cities such as Barcelona, several Brazilian state capitals and Latin American cities, Salvador 360 Strategic Plan encourages investments in sectors of the highest classes’ circuits and, selectively, in territories and niches of the so-called popular economy. This process deepens the process to take the poor populations away from the downtown areas in order to increase the appropriation of urban added value and the concentration of service supplying within a context of political setback. It makes the history of urban spoliation and gentrification process in the peripheries of the capitalist system more acute. Yes, we are before the “old”, “new” neoliberal model from the 1980s and 1990s 90s, of strategic planning that produced the “thing-city”, the “object-city”, the “goods-city” and luxurious goods. ( Vainer, 2002 ). However, it is the new city, under new conditions: amplified poverty and crisis of the representative democracy.

Production Strategies in Salvador City

Analyzing the production and reproduction strategy in Salvador - as peripheral city – means reporting to the structuring issues observed in our big cities. According to Francisco de Oliveira (1997), there is “no dimension of the national life that does not immediately reflect itself on an urban issue”. Talking about the city means talking about “a ‘never ending issue’, and it makes readers breathless, and takes us to the disruption of the urban mirror into a thousand pieces, this mirror reflects the same image in each of its thousand pieces” ( Oliveira, 1977 , p. 68). However, similar to ground water, something gives some unit to the city’s disruption look: the city is the locus of control, management and production.

Accordingly, urbanization “is the extension of all corners of the national life in capitalist production relationships (…)” ( Oliveira, 1977 , p. 68). Was it always like that? Yes. But, the great challenge lies on understanding how these structuring elements gain shape within the different historical and territorial contexts, mainly after neoliberalization. But, after all, how did Salvador produce and reproduce itself in the periphery of the capitalist system in the early 21st century?

Economy and Labor

Salvador 360 Program was elaborated by the political group in charge of the municipal management (Democratas Party), in 2017. It is the biggest developmental program in the history of Salvador and promises to encourage the city’s growth and to make its economy dynamic: “A new city deserves a new perspective of development. Thus, the City Hall launched Salvador 360. A great program with 8 axes and 360 measures to accelerate economic and social growth in Salvador” (Salvador, 2017).

The aforementioned axes consist in a set of propositions in the following fields: (a) business; (b) investments; (c) economic inclusion; (d) creative city; (e) intelligent city; (f) sustainable city; (g) simplicity and (h) Historical zone. We will analyze their contents in order to check whether the suggested actions up-date the segregating city production process by taking the poor population away from the downtown areas and broadening urban added value appropriation and service offer concentration – with an after neoliberalization context.

Actually, this “new developmental perspective” introduced by Salvador 360 Program reproduces the neoliberal development models implemented in Brazilian cities back in the 1990s in the “letter” and in actions. Therefore, the analyses carried out by Brenner and Theodore (2005) , Vainer (2002) and Carvalho (2013) , about the neoliberal city production strategy and its management, about the city as business and venture, are more than up-to-date. The public power becomes a “supporting actor that corroborates private decisions by prioritizing big constructions and adjusting the urbanistic juridical framework to the demands of the capital, based on the narrative that it is essential to attract investments and increase the number of job positions” ( Carvalho, 2013 , p. 558).

With respect to the economic sphere, the activities suggested by Salvador 360 Program consist of a package of taxation simplification and bureaucracy modernization investments aimed at speeding up businesses. The sense of development based on job-position generation and sustainability is linked to this proposition. Among actions, one finds: (a) “Creation of a taxation incentive package to attract investments; (b) manpower qualification; (c) structuring projects to promote economic development” (Salvador, 2017).

The suggested intervention activities are stimuli to new ventures (My First Business Project and the Municipal Entrepreneurship Center); concession of infrastructure (allow land and/or real estate use for the implementation and/or broadening of strategic segments) and taxation reduction (reducing the onerous granting of ventures by 50%); renewing the shared financial law concerning differences in the “letter” of the Soil and Territorial Use Ordering Law – LOUOS -; interest-free installments and debt arrears of Building and Urban territorial Taxes (IPTU); installment of tax collection on the Transfer of Assets (ITIV) applied to real estates; non-restriction to issuance of the building permit in case of debit in the Municipal Informative Register (CADIN); 50% exemption in IPTU for the implementation of call-center companies; reduced taxation in Tax over Services (ISS) to 2% for tele-billing companies; 50% exemption in IPTU for the implementation of tele-billing companies ( Salvador, 2017 ).

Furthermore, the program suggests the creation of a Manpower Qualification Pole for call-centers and tele-billing companies, stimuli and optimization of touristic and hotel equipment thought the recovery of the hotel sector through ISS reduction; the production of Branding Salvador Digital; reduction by 2% in the ISS of retailing ventures, such as shopping malls, retail chains and supermarkets; reduction by 50% in IPTU for new ventures in the textile sector; implementation of the Individual Micro Entrepreneurs’ Pole for clothing manufacture services and 2% ISS reduction for technological base ventures and for formal and informal job positions (qualification and manpower mediation) (Salvador, 2017).

In general terms, actions concerning economic development consist in encouraging companies’ implementation for the generation of new job positions, manpower mediation and qualification in partnership with employers and, most of all, in the concession of infrastructure (land and real estate) and taxation reduction for strategic business, such as flexibilization of the onerous concession of undertakings, repeal of the counterpart law, IPTU and ITIV instalments, elimination of limits to issuance of building permit in case of debit in CADIN, IPTU exemption and reduction in IS aliquots.

The main aim of economic inclusion lies on “reinforcing the economy on the very basis of the pyramid” by dividing it into two branches: entrepreneurship and land regulation. Based on data in the 2015 Annual Social Information Report (RAIS), Salvador 360 Program addresses that 42% of the active population is involved in informal activities. Therefore, it is necessary qualifying and facilitating the access to credit – women are the main target of the program (based on data provided by Banco do Nordeste), which states that 67% of bank clients in this category are women. In comparison to other Northeastern states, micro-credit remains little accessed in Bahia State.

Stimuli to entrepreneurship have the Entrepreneurship Agent Project as instrument, which is mainly focused on women, black women and women living in urban peripheries, and on youngsters (qualified as entrepreneur leaders). The aim is to reach small entrepreneurs (with emphasis on using the Municipal Manpower mediation Service app – SIMM Serviços) through the articulation with the Brazilian Service for Support to the Micro and Small Business (SEBRAE), which accounts for qualification programs and for facilitating the access to Banco do Nordeste’s Friendly Credit. The other economic inclusion branch lies on the land regulation program, which states that acknowledging the right to land-use and property can “increase prosperity by seven times in a given zone”. Accordingly, it is important highlighting the regulation of Social Interest Zones (ZEIS) as essential element for infrastructure implementation and for legal access to land ( Salvador, 2017 ).

Stimuli to the construction of a city based on creative and intelligent economy are also associated with the aforementioned actions, since they aim at regulating audio visual, design/architecture companies; media companies, creative services; cultural sites and expressions; visual and dramatic arts; publicity and technological hub creation, big data and apps. With respect to sustainable city, green IPTU stands out among incentives to mixed and institutional real estate ventures, as well as stimuli to selective garbage collection, city afforestation and overall references to the need of building a resilient city within the current climate change context.

The Selective Social Spatial Strategy unifies the aforementioned programs. It prioritizes public and private segments, and also emphasizes entrepreneurship, which is herein understood as the individual, corporative and city ability to compete in the market of cities ( Brenner & Theodore, 2005 ; Vainer, 2002) .

Actions for Salvador Historical Zone stand out among the whole set of propositions in Salvador 360 Program, namely: transference of the municipal managerial center to the Downtown Area, opening of museums, informal work regulation and elaboration of the mobility and housing plan. The proposition to make people closer to their jobs and houses is an outstanding aspect – this articulation was not taken into account when Salvador Historical Center was (re)featured in the 1990s, when a considerable fraction of residents in this area (mainly composed of lower income populations) was taken away from it in order to open room for an outdoor shopping mall. The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) implementation is among the outstanding big-sized ventures ( Salvador, 2017 ).

The analysis of the aforementioned Salvador City production propositions addressed in the Multiannual Plan (PPA) from 2018 to 2021 - requires the reflection about the neoliberal model in its after neoliberalization version, at city level (Salvador, 2018a). This debate regards deindustrialization and changes in the labor world as highlighted by Harvey: “most of the capitalist world factories disappeared or their number decreased so drastically that it has decimated the classic industrial working class”, and it led to the fact that “the precarious” replaced the “traditional worker” (Harvey, 2014, p. 17).

Harvey shines light on the fact that changes in production and reproduction relationships necessarily influence and change the city. Cities located in the peripheries of the capitalist system tend to over-exclude and broaden inequality. Lets’ see some data indicative of specificities of the city subjected to Salvador 360 Strategic Plan.

As pointed out by a significant part of the literature available, Salvador was always known as a tertiary city and such a condition traditionally finds explanation in national economy constitution processes based on different regional insertion forms in the Brazilian industrialization process throughout the 20th century. Data about the number of individuals working in the second sector in metropolitan regions illustrates the weight of commerce and services in some state capitals and metropolitan regions. Whereas in 2017 Salvador and its metropolitan region presented 7.2% rate of employment in the transformation industry sector, in São Paulo such a number reaches 14.2% and 17% in Porto Alegre City ( Carvalho, 2013 ; Carvalho & Pereira, 2008 , 2014 ; DIEESE, 2017; Queiroz, 2018)⁷ . The deindustrialization scenario (with generalized impact) has shown deepening and reinforcement of Salvador’s history of tertiary condition. Therefore, Salvador 360 Strategic Plan reinforces the model based on encouraging the real estate capital, the creative industry, tourism, the policy of mega-events and activities linked to the entertainment circuit (city speculation), which has great repercussion in access to new job positions, infrastructure, services and urban land.

It is important recalling that these moves take place within the context where Salvador, and its metropolitan region (RMS) – like what happened in other state capitals in the last decades -, record significant internationalization of local capitals due to the acquisition, incorporation and fusion, and consequent concentration, of capital⁸ . In addition, it is possible observing a move to concentrate and internationalize supplying services such as telecommunication, power distribution and financial services by privatizing Telebahia and Coelba, and by the incorporation of Banco do Estado da Bahia (BANEB) by Banco Brasileiro de Desconto (BRADESCO) ( Superintendência de Estudos Econômicos e Sociais da Bahia, 2012 ). There was a change in the management standards in these services, which are seen as global and of global knowledge. It means that the radicalization of service sector processes are facing demands to adopt a global standard.

Such an internationalization of capitals in Salvador, and in its region, takes place within an economic structure seen as precarious and little dynamic, from the job and income generation viewpoint. Historically, Salvador presents the highest unemployment rates in the country. Just for comparison purposes, back in 2017, when Salvador recorded 24.1% total unemployment (opened and hidden rate), São Paulo recorded 18% and Porto Alegre, 11.2% (DIEESE, 2017). This unemployment rate is higher among black women living in urban peripheries – in theory, the ones who are the object of the policy Entrepreneurship Agent Project by Salvador City Hall.

Moreover, data analysis about the real mean-income in 2017 also depicts the unfavorable situation in Salvador and in its region in comparison to the other state capitals. Salvador presented real-income mean of employed and wage earner population of R$ 1,448 in 2017, whereas it was R$ 2,033 in São Paulo and R$ 1,900 in Porto Alegre (DIEESE, 2017). What is the impact of Salvador 360 Program on a city that was not industrialized and that has significant contingent of its population working in little economically productive sectors, within scenarios such as the herein described one? The impact is actually very small.

Salvador, similar to several other state capitals, faces an investment concentration process (at public or private level) in quite specific segments of economy and territory due to the intensification of labor precariousness within an unequal and remarkably informal economic structure. Such a process reinforces and broadens inequality conditions. The concentrated and selective profile of incentive policies suggested by Salvador 360 Program does not deal with these structuring issues and even makes this frame more complex and severer.

The suggested development strategy consists in the selective association of exempts for private investments, which means high cost for the exchequer, although it does not ensure return in terms of generating new job positions (despite the continuous references to the need of generating new job positions). Actually, it ends up deepening income concentration. According to Vainer, about the analysis by Francisco de Oliveira in the 1970s, and by addressing the experiences with the implementation of strategic plan in the 1980s and 90s: “Planning is a transformed profile of class struggle” and strategic planning is the selective planning of and to the bourgeoisie” ( Vainer, 2002 , p.117).

It is also important recalling that, as previously pointed out by Brenner and Theodore (2005) , neoliberalization does not need the State, in this particular case, the municipal public power. Strategic planning is just one more example of how the State can be mobilized within the implementation of regulation arrangements interesting to the market, such as LOUOS, IPTU and ISS, among others – these are mechanisms for economic stimulus. Accordingly, there is no guarantee of effective mechanisms to ensure return to the set of city residents; and this is a risk well-known in our big cities.

Social segments benefited by Salvador 360 Strategic Plan are always the same: the real estate sector, tourism and the so-called creative industry. Actions in the manpower qualification field, which are necessary and admirable, are limited to a target public and faces limitations set by the precarious access by the poor population to the formal education system, and by the ability of generating job positions or business opportunities to the local economy.

Entrepreneurship proposition has little chances of succeeding within a low economic dynamism scenario. In addition, the suggestion for the land regulation program linked to the “Cool House” Program can be a boosting element of the local economy. The land market is actually a concerning factor since urban land regulation and the proposed urbanistic investments have led to replacement of local residents’ use and profile. It might benefit the always dynamic and speculative land market – be it of low, middle and high income.

Land Added Value, Access to Land and Urban Infrastructure

Urban land scarcity and the disputes for it, as well as the dynamism of the civil construction industry, and the real estate capital have deepened the social-spatial stratification in the last decade – after decades fighting for turning slums and invaded land into popular neighborhoods. Salvador 360 Program must pay close attention to urban land added value production processes, on the private appropriation of urban land valorization due to its condition as a “good”, on selective public investments in infrastructure and on soil use and occupation regulation aimed at valorizing strategic spaces in the city ( Carvalho, 2013 ; Harvey, 2013 ; Low-Beer, 1983 ).

The land added value analysis and access to land in Salvador must take into account the recent housing policy, which focuses on the lower income populations, such as Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life Program). These policies fulfil the fair demand for housing at broadened social segments, up-dates the displacement process lived by lower income populations towards the new urbanization borders, in another political scenario – the old and known “displacement to peripheries”.

The land regulation suggested and implemented by Salvador 360 Program: the “Cool House” Program, which aims at “promoting legal access to land use appropriation”. The Concession of Special Use for Housing Purposes (CEM) and the Concession of the Right to Real Use (CDRU) are the instruments of reference for these programs (Salvador, 2016)⁹ . The action by the program consists in having the City Hall financing the registry office of real estate featured as social housing (Federal Law n ^o 11.481/2007). The following criteria were set for a person to participate in the program: real estate location, having up to 250m² and being used for housing purposes.

Besides, the suitor cannot be “the owner or concessionaire of other urban or rural real estate; non-beneficiary of the land regulation program; having family income up to six minimum wage” ( Salvador, 2016 ). The program aims residents living with up to six minimum wage and provides the following benefits: “register the construction of the house; taking loans to housing renewal; legally transferring the land for sale based on City Hall’s awareness, as long as the program participation criteria are met and the land is legally transferred through heritage” ( Salvador, 2017 ).

Access to land and its regulation is a historical demand of movements that struggle for housing. However, this initiative is discrete given the demand in Salvador. It is important recalling that this initiative type - as a contradiction - reinforces the segregation processes in poverty, real estate and real estate speculation contexts. As previously pointed out, titration (no doubt, the right of all citizens) is a requirement for the creation or potentiation of a land market in popular neighborhoods – and it can also encourage residents’ replacement and eviction. The idea is to associate land profit and private gains resulting from public investments to the dispute for urban land ownership in times of scarcity, to permanent eviction of the lower income populations from valorized areas ( Carvalho, 2013 ; Low-Beer, 1983 ).

It is important understanding the actions of Salvador 360 Program by associating them to initiatives to up-date the Urban Development Plan (PDDU) and the Soil Use and Occupation Law (LOUOS), with emphasis on Salvador Coastal Shore. By the way, it is worth recording the fact that the referred management instruments turn the occupation of this vector into a more “permissive” expansion, since it encourages city development based on the statement by a member of the Association of Business Managers of Bahia Real Estate Market (ADEMI): “Finally, we can undertake based on clear rules and, thus, generate new business. Consequently, we will have more job positions available and better income, so necessary for our state capital” (ADEMI, 2016, p. 12).

ADEMI representative highlights the “advancements in incentives to social housing constructions, and it is confirmed by the establishment of new ruled for actions in Special Social Housing Zones (ZEIS), which account for 20% of the city territory and concentrate almost 50% of the population” (ADEMI, 2016, p. 12), regarding the regulation of new instruments aiming areas occupied by the lower income populations.

Salvador 360 Program also suggests the implementation of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) – which “must reach areas where the Subway does not”. BRT is part of Salvador Urban Mobility Plan (PLAMOB), from 2018, which aims at “structuring the mobility (…), promoting integration among modals, universal accessibility, reducing social-spatial inequalities and at sustainability (social, economic and environmental)” (Salvador, 2018b).

PLAMOB, based on the Origin Destiny Survey (OD), reinforces that the time spent with house-work displacement in Salvador reaches 40 minutes; it is the third longest time in the country – it is only shorter than that in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. It is important having in mind that, due to poverty, 38% of the total of daily trips are made on foot. BRT emerges as one of the main actions by Salvador 360 Program. Among the lines drew by PLAMOB for BRT, BRT Lapa-LIP (via Varco da Gama Av. and Antônio Carlos Magalhães Av. – two important commercial and service supplying centers in the city¹⁰ ) is the one in place.

It is important making it clear that the highest demand for mobility in Salvador is experienced in the peripheral zones, where the lower income populations live in, since they oftentimes cannot afford the costs with public transportation and often adopt on-foot routes. However, the greatest investment in mobility was made in the central zone, which is already relatively well-served by it. The choice for such a public/private investment can be explained by the interest of transportation companies in broadening the offer of these high-demand lines to the detriment of low demand lines. This process compromises the functional coherence of the system and favors the exchange value to the detriment of the use value ( Moreno & Brito, 2018 ).

Accordingly, the main propositions about access to urban land and mobility, despite the inclusive discourse, disregard job position generation, income redistribution and the concern with the democratic access to urban land, as well as to transportation networks. They can also have opposite effects, i.e., they can encourage the “peripherization” process and up-date the urban spoliation concept and, consequently, punish a significant fraction of the population.

Gentrification

Salvador 360 Program propositions for the Historical Zone, which is another axis of the program, include (re)featuring the squares and avenues, and addresses “the public interventions in structuring housing programs, mobility and anchoring transformation projects to boost the region based on an economic and urban manner” by focusing on tourism (Salvador, 2017).

These urban (re)featuring projects involve Sete Av, Cairu Square, Music Museum, Salvador History House, Carnival House, and the new public management center. Actions regarding Salvador History Center resemble the propositions in strategic plans mainly based on Barcelona’s “successful” model; in other words, city adjustment to an international standard to attract the international financial capital. However, the program is not concerned with the likely gentrification assumingly generated by these actions, as it was seen in some examples around the world and with its own experience back in the 1990s. Such a second wave of Downtown (re)featuring will significantly rise the land and real estate price – and it will likely make the permanence of the popular shops and lower income populations, still observed in this zone, infeasible in it. Actually, it is essential taking back the formulations by Smith (2005) about the well-known consequences of the myth of the lost quality and of the urban (re)featuring.

A close look over the production of shared assets and services, such as Uber and AirBnB, for example, highlights the selective profile guiding the gentrification profile of such ventures. Services related to shared economy, broadly known by David Wachsmuth and Alexander Weisler (2018), are common examples in the global literature of the urban gentrification process around the world.

Actions to (re)feature the Historical Zone in association with the “spatialization” of AirBnB offer point towards the reproduction of traditional social-spatial stratification standards. Just as an example, we can observe some patterns in AirBnB service supplying in Salvador, mainly the spatial-social concentration (in the so-called noble areas or locations for houses for the lower income populations), in service supplying, namely: 89% of posts in websites are made by self-declared white individual; only 11% of them were black; in other words, this process is mainly “whitening”, although Salvador is a mostly black city¹¹ .

Yet, based on AirBnB data as proxy of effects caused by a likely gentrification in Salvador, one can notice that the rate of foreign posts is expressive and that they are concentrated in areas seen as noble in the city ( Figure 1 ). It is essential remembering that (re)featuring projects, mainly focused on the city’s Historical Center, have opened and still open a quite attractive speculation market for foreign investments in these areas.

Figure 1
AirBnB posts gathered by neighborhoods – foreign posts in comparison to the total number of posts

The structure of the AirBnB model, based on examples of impacts worldwide, embodies its own features in Salvador: it is the complete twist in the racial distribution in the city, and it makes clear the relationship among race, poverty and access to the market. It is worth recalling, by taking back matters concerning urban land profit, the meaning of public investments in urban (re)featuring and in private property of profit resulting from public investments. Briefly, the main question structuring this reasoning lies on: Who do investments by Salvador 360 Program in the Historical Center favor?

There are several struggles between the City Hall and resident’s organizations in the historical and central zones about (re)featuring projects implemented by the public power in association with the private sector. The main threat has lied on eviction, on “sanitation” – and the poor, black population is the most affected one. In Salvador, like what happens in other cities, gentrification is closely associated with income, as well as with race and ethnicity.

Conclusion

The analysis applied to Salvador 360 Program allows concluding that there are several economic and social consequences of Salvador 360 Strategic Plan implementation. This Plan puts at practice a set of actions focused on boosting the higher spheres of the economy and, residually, it regards segments of the so-called popular economy. However, fact is, that the referred Plan does not reach the most expressive fraction of city residents – who strongly fight for survival under precarious conditions and poverty. In concrete terms, it means that the alternative strategic plan in place, which aims at presenting an innovative and inclusive profile, does not get to reach territories and populations located in areas featured as peripheral by encouraging entrepreneurship among the lowest income and professional qualification populations.

In addition, the referred program broadens urban added value ownership, as well as the concentration of service offering. Briefly, the set of interventions proposed by Salvador 360 Program, which focuses on the generation of new job positions in centralities that already count on better services, does not reach the populations living in the “informal” sector of the economy.

Despite its new garment, Salvador 360 Program up-dates, reedits and encourages city production and reproduction processes that deepen urban spoliation and make structure issues more acute, such as income concentration and social-spatial segregation – this trace is seen as being among the most characteristic urban conditions within the post-neoliberalization context. Thus, Salvador is another example of how time, “old” and “new” neoliberal models – accountable for the good-city production - are associated with each other.

Salvador 360 Program shows that the municipal management logic follows a rationality that fulfils the capitalist production and reproduction of the city where urban spoliation, urban added value production and gentrification are permanent structuring features. As previously mentioned, Salvador 360 Program (re)up-dates and reinforces the trend to city commoditization and seeks to adjust it to the new demands of the current international accumulation standard – within an economic crisis and political deepening context.

It is also essential recording that the capture of the public policy and of planning by public forces traditionally in charge of municipal management is recurrent, mainly in Salvador. This scenario shows the complex relationship among capital concentration, exclusion, spatial segregation and gentrification in Salvador. It is a typical example of neoliberal and illiberal production, based on Brenner et al. (2010) and Mounk (2018) .

We reinforce the need of facing the theoretical challenge of thinking the city and its multiple determinations within the current after neoliberalization process. Advancements reached by social movements in Brazil, which were institutionalized by the Citizen Constitution and by the Statute of the City, still need to be turned into reality in this second decade of the 21st century, which remains notably neoliberal ( Brenner & Theodore, 2005 ). If it is true for the set of new cities, it is even more important for Salvador, a nice city, pleasant and, yet, had to live in.

This reasoning highlights the need of going onwards in the understanding of the city and of its interface with organizational processes moored in mid- and long-reach theories capable of getting closer to the contribution of knowledge produced in a disciplinary manner, but that, above all, seeks such limits. As reinforced several times by the herein referenced authors, the city becomes and presents itself within its complexity and totality. Therefore, a good reasoning about it demands gathering multidisciplinary efforts to get closer to its multiple determinations and possibilities.

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Notes

• 1
  . Salvador Urban Development Direction Plan (PDDU), Law n ^o 7.400 from 2008 encompasses TRANSCON as urban management instrument (Art. 259) and defines it as: “the instrument through which the Municipal Public Power will allow urban private and public real estate owners to exert the right to build in another place, or to alienate, based on the public deed, which is addressed in the Direction Plan or in the urbanistic legislation deriving from it, when the real estate in its property is seen as necessary for the following means: I – implementation of urban and community equipment; II – creation of outdoor spaces for public use; III- preservation of environmental value zones highlighted in this specific law; IV – preservation of real estate seen as of historical, cultural, landscape or social interest; V – regulation of ZEIS I, II, IV and V; VI – implementation of Social Housing in ZEIS III” ( SALVADOR, 2008 ). The 2016 Direction Plan also addressed this urban policy instrument.
• 2
  . Because of population decrease in the downtown area in the mid-1980s, local regulations were set to insert housing among business offices. Such a process had strong impact on the attraction of white collar workers and led to residents’ replacement ( Fujitsuka, 2018 ).
• 3
  . Talking about the city, in the singular, as stated by Adrián l Gorelik (2005) , to refer to the production of a given imaginary about the “Latin American city”, means facing a difficulty of cultural order, or even ontological order. Gorelik advocates that the “Latin American city” category “produced” itself as cultural construction, as a structuring element of the social Latin American imaginary. Such a reasoning challenges one to weight the historical and ideological profile of categories and, in the case of the concept of city, the need of associating it to overall theories of society. In this specific case, we herein understand the city as the expression and outcome of global structuring processes, as well as elements that gave it singularity. Out sight over the city, over any city (São Paulo, Porto Alegre, México, Bogotá, Salvador), has the concept of periphery as category, and it takes us to the specific approach of the theory of society, mainly, of the Capitalism, according to authors such as Brenner and Theodore (2005) .
• 4
  . Check on the text:“Private is profit and the public is dead?” by Mark Davidson, about the complex relationship between public and private: “Some say we live in ‘post-political’ times (...), that the demise of political choice has resulted in a technocratic dictatorship which tightly circumscribes social possibilities (...). This technocratic dystopia is defined by the neoliberal hegemony, where private interests dominate politics and exclude all forms of collectivism (...). The idea of the public—public interest, public space, public good — can, under this post-political lens, therefore seem anachronistic. Where publicness still survives, in health care, parks or intellectual property, it is simply waiting for its turn to be drown by the unstoppable tide of privatization (...)” (Davidson, 2018).
• 5
  . As states Brenner et al., it does not mean making a vast conceptual review of the sense of neoliberalism: “(...) review the diverse epistemological, methodological, substantive, and political positions that have been articulated through these discussions of post-1970s regulatory restructuring (but see Clarke, 2008; Peck, 2004; Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; as well as Brenner et al., 2010) . Instead we move directly into an overview of our own theoretical orientation, which will then be further elaborated in relation to the problem of periodization and with reference to the challenges of deciphering contemporary developments (for previous statements, see Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck & Theodore, 2007; Peck & Tickell, 2002)” (Brenner, Peck & Theodore, 2010, p. 329).
• 6
  . The concepts of “non-liberal democracy” and “authoritarian populism” resembles the formulation by Yascha Mounk (2018) , in his work O Povo contra a Democracia. Author of liberal bias, Mounk warns about the risk of disassembling the liberal democracy through the emergence of leaderships such as Donald Trump in the United States, Nigel Farage in the U.K., Frauke Petry in Germany, Marine Le Pen in France and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. Such a disassembling consists, according to the author, in disrupting the state of law through the disrespect to individual rights and the election of “aspiring despots” – that is it, the democratic procedures led to power leaderships that, in their political actions, deny the political structure in compliance with the liberal democracy. Accordingly, the authoritarian populism, according to Mounk, would result from the non-mediated relationship between leadership and led ones. This formulation has been triggering deep debates about the concepts of democracy and populism. Although we do not intend to go deeper in such discussion, it is important highlighting the need of carefully approaching the aforementioned concepts. According to Enrique Dussel, in Cinco tesis sobre el ‘populismo”, the use of the concept of “populism” nowadays to feature governments in the “leftist” field cannot the mixed to the “historical populism of the 20th century”. We agree with Dussel, we agree that this same formulation can be applied to feature “right wing” governments as populists, similar to the statement by Mounk. It is certain that a consistent approach of this topic requires an epistemological ride in political categories such as people, popular, class, among others (Dussel, 2012, p. 5). We herein used the study by Mounk to illustrate the complexity of the debate when it comes to the current political conditions the plans under discussion have been implemented under.
• 7
  . The comparison between the aforementioned state capitals and their metropolitan regions is explained by their relevance in the national scenario and by the availability of aggregated data in the referred year.
• 8
  . It is the case of the incorporation of Copene, OPP, Trikem, Nitrocarbono, Prospet and Polialden assets by Brasken, the biggest oil company in Latin America and of Usiba privatization, which was incorporated by Gerdau Group, which is one of the biggest steel groups in Latin America, besides the transference from the company’s decision-making center from Bahia to the Center-South Region ( Superintendência de Estudos Econômicos e Sociais da Bahia, 2012) .
• 9
  . Instruments about the Statute of the city (Law n ^o 10.257/2001), MP 2.220/2001 and municipal Law n ^o 6099/2002, Decree-Law n ^o 271/1967, Amendment n ^o 16 and the Organic Law of Salvador County (Salvador, 2016). The Cool House Program addresses the concession of the right to the real use of real estates, it is ruled by the City Hall. It concerns the mechanism through which the City Hall legalizes its own patrimony (and it allows the collection of the forum).
• 10
  . The lines suggested by PLAMOB are: BRT Lapa-LIP (via Vasco da Gama Av. and Antônio Carlos Magalhães Av.); BRT Paripe-Corsário (via 29 de Março Av.); BRT Lobato-Paripe-Pituaçu-Corsário-Calçada-Lobato (Bi-Circular, via Gal Costa Av.); BRT Airport-Sé Square Subway station (via Octávio Mangabeira Av.); BRT Corsário-Retiro (via Magalhães Neto Av. and Luis Eduardo Magalhães Av.); BRT Águas Claras-Bairro da Paz (reinforcement of 29 de Março BRT); BRT Corsário-Pituaçu-Pirajá (reinforcement of Gal Costa BRT) (Salvador, 2018b).
• 11
  . Data were collected through computation techniques based on the scratch and mining od data about Salvador within 24-h, back on July 01st, 2017. We collected approximately 4,000 posts, geo-codified and aggregated by neighborhood limits – a random sampling was adopted at 95% confidence (109 samples).
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• Funding: The authors did not receive financial support for the research, authorship or publication of this article.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  25 Oct 2021
• Date of issue
  Jul-Sep 2021

History

• Received
  29 June 2019
• Accepted
  18 Nov 2020