INVESTMENTS IN THE SPORT AND LEISURE FUNCTION BY MUNICIPALITIES IN BAHIA FROM 2002 TO 2011

INVESTIMENTOS NA FUNÇÃO DESPORTO E LAZER POR PARTE DOS MUNICÍPIOS DA BAHIA DE 2002 A 2011

ABSTRACT

This descriptive paper aimed to analyze investments in Sport and Leisure Function by municipalities in Bahia from 2002 to 2011 and to identify possible relations with variables ‘current revenue’ and ‘municipality size’. Most the municipalities from the state of Bahia have been proactive when it comes to investment in public policies of sport and leisure during the period. That means there are internal institutional factors within municipalities allowing those policies to be decentralized.

Keywords:
Public policies; Federalism; Decentralization.

RESUMO

Este trabalho, de natureza descritiva, buscou analisar o investimento na Função Desporto e Lazer por parte dos municípios do estado da Bahia de 2002 a 2011 e identificar as possíveis relações com as variáveis “receita corrente” e “tamanho do município”. A maioria dos municípios do estado da Bahia foram proativos no investimento em políticas públicas de esporte e lazer no período. Isso significa que há fatores institucionais internos aos municípios que estão permitindo que essas políticas sejam descentralizadas.

Palavras-chave:
Políticas públicas; Federalismo; Descentralização.

Introduction

The studies in Brazil on public funding for sport and leisure have privileged the federal government public policies. On the one hand, the institutional innovation with the creation of the Ministry of Sports in 2003 aroused attention to the resources involved in federal actions. On the other hand, actions with a high financial impact, such as the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games, drained significant amounts of public resources, which became more accountable to the civil society, to the policy community and to the control bodies.

Almeida and Marchi Jr.¹ assessed the federal government's transfers to the states and municipalities. Athayde, Mascarenhas and Salvador²⁾ analysed the funding for educational sport and participation sport during Lula’s government. Teixeira, Matias and Mascarenhas³ evaluated the federal government's funding for the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Figuerôa et al.⁴ criticized the funding for high performance sport in Brazil. Recently, Castro⁵ assessed the federal government's budget planning and execution from 2004 to 2011.

However, the funding from subnational entities (states, Federal District and municipalities) still remains little explored when analysing sport and leisure public policies. Out of the 27 Brazilian states, 19 have a high-ranking structure (in terms of the State; it refers to the Secretariat status) to deal with the subject referred to as ‘sport’ or ‘sport and leisure’, thus, they have their own budget. Among them, 9 have an exclusive structure either for sport or sport and leisure together. Considering the other 10 ones, the structure of sport or sport and leisure is in conjunction with other areas. It is important that such an understanding is made clear because, although the high-ranking administrative structure is being used as an example for the government spending, the actions involving sport and leisure are often allocated to the second ranking, which also requires a funding that is disputed by the other areas within the same secretariat.

The administrative autonomy of the municipal governments also enables them to allocate resources to meet the demands of sport and leisure. Although the number of municipalities in Brazil is high (5,570), there is a lack of work focused on funding in relation to the Sport and Leisure Function (SLF). This is a unit used to justify the budget allocation for subjects related to sport and leisure, according to the Accounting and Tax Information System of the National Treasury -SICONFI⁶. In order to illustrate the importance of this analysis, in 2012, 86.01% of the city halls (n = 4.791) made some kind of investment in SLF.

Therefore, so as to understand the role played by the municipalities in the implementation of public sport and leisure policies, the state of Bahia was analysed and the following purposes were established:

a) Reviewing the literature and documents regarding the competence of the municipalities in relation to the public policies for sport and leisure;

b) Verifying which percentage of the current revenue is committed with the funding of public sport and leisure policies by the municipalities of Bahia from 2002 to 2011. ‘Current revenues’, according to the website of the National Treasury⁶, are ‘the State's nondurable assets, that is, those that run out within the annual period. [...] They comprise tax, patrimonial, and industrial revenues, besides others of similar nature, as well as those derived from current transfers’;

c) Analysing the average annual investment in the SLF by the city halls of the state of Bahia for each population class from 2002 to 2011;

d) Assessing the average annual per capita investment in the SLF by the city halls of the state of Bahia for each population class from 2002 and 2011.

Methods

This descriptive study aims at understanding and analysing the investments in sport and leisure public policies in the municipalities of the state of Bahia from 2002 to 2011, in addition to identifying the possible relations with the variables referred to as ‘current revenue’ (CR), ‘municipality size’, and ‘per capita income’.

The names of the municipalities were searched directly on the website of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics,⁷ in the ‘Database’ environment, ‘Cities@’. The population class (PC) was organized in order to contemplate six realities: PC1, up to 5,000 inhabitants; PC2, from 5,001 to 10,000 inhabitants; PC3, from 10,001 to 20,000 inhabitants; PC4, from 20,001 to 50,000 inhabitants; PC5, from 50,001 to 100,000 inhabitants; PC6, above 100,001 inhabitants.

The funding for sport and leisure policies is carried out by means of the registry that the municipalities make of their expenditures in the Sport and Leisure Function. The SLF expenditure is a functional classification of the National Treasury to measure investments in sport and leisure. The total expenditure in the SLF is the sum of the expenses in the subfunctions referred to as ‘Community Sport’, ‘Sport Performance’, ‘Leisure’, and ‘Other Subfunctions’. The information related to the SLF was collected from the National Treasury website⁶, in the data referring to the annual accounts in the Accounting and Tax Information System of the Brazilian Public Service (SICONFI), between June 10^th and 12^th, 2016.

A database was created for the statistical analysis with the following information: (a) name of the municipality; (b) current revenue from 2002 to 2011; (c) sum of the SLF expenditures from 2002 to 2011. The descriptive statistics was used to identify the percentages and averages of SLF investment.

Theoretical framework - sport, leisure and competence of the municipalities

In the federated states such as Brazil, the relationship among entities is established by the constitutional framework. The main purpose of a federation is ensuring the unity of the nation by recognizing its diversity, in addition to reducing the existing inequalities in order to promote social cohesion⁸. In Brazil, the principle of reducing regional and social inequalities is expressly provided by the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (CF/88), in Subsection III of Article 3, which deals with the purposes of the Republic; and in Subsection VII of Article 170, which refers to the principles of the national economic order⁹.

Unlike the other 27 federations that exist worldwide, the form of organization of the Brazilian State, mainly since the Federal Constitution of 1988 (FC/88), added a greater complexity by incorporating the municipalities as federated entities¹⁰. Brazil is the only federation that is composed of three federated entities: Union, states/Federal District and municipalities.

For guaranteeing this format, the FC/88 focused on the political diversity as a means of overcoming the rigidity and inefficiency generated by the centralization experienced during the period of the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985)¹¹. The constituents believed that this inefficiency was motivated by the non-recognition of local realities at the moment of producing policies that would reach localities with very different realities. According to the expectation of the constitutionalists, greater accountability would be achieved with the political autonomy of the municipalities. However, as Rodden¹² states, efficiency gains and accountability are not conditional to federalism or decentralization.

Similar to all federations, the result of the policy is a mix of centralization and decentralization. All federations produce some tension between these two elements. The role of centralization is ensuring unity and reducing unequal access to public policies; and that of decentralization is enabling the local governments to be more responsive to the citizens' needs by favoring diversity.

For ensuring greater responsiveness, the constitutional design sought to define the areas of responsibility of the entities, and the ways of financing the policies as well. The financial autonomy of the entities allows decisive freedom. In this respect, Brazil is the federation with greater decentralization, since the municipalities were the main beneficiaries with the fiscal reform promoted by FC/88.

Political autonomy, that is, the capacity of making decisions, is limited by the constitutional norm (which may also be infraconstitutional). It aims at defining two types of behavior in what concerns the implementation of public policies, which can be established through laws or not: exclusive competences and common or competing competences. Such competences may be related either to certain actions or to the power of legislating on certain subjects.

The unique competencies allow assessing very precisely who is responsible for a particular policy. In this case, decision-making does not require compliance with the preferences of other federated entities, which are always hierarchically determined (when competence is common or competing, the states must act/legislate in accordance with the Union, in case it has acted/legislated about it; if the Union has not acted/legislated on the subject, the state is free to do so; the same is true for the municipalities in relation to the Union and the states. As an example, only the Union can legislate on civil law (Subsection I of Article 22 of FC/88). As previously mentioned, the Union plays a strategic role in preserving national sovereignty, which guarantees the unity of the State. The Union, states/Federal District and municipalities are responsible for health, public assistance and the protection and guarantee of disabled people (Section II of article 23 of FC/88), which exemplifies a decentralization logic.

Therefore, considering the common competences, the constituents perceived that political autonomy would pressure on a greater diversity in public policies (municipal managers autonomously deciding on what to invest) and it would guarantee space for policy coordination in order to reduce inequalities¹³. In this case, the population may compare the public policies by pressuring on more responsiveness and efficiency. This would allow rewarding the most efficient manager by offering a particular good or service. The Union and the states, the Federal District and municipalities could develop a certain action without taking into account the political preferences of the other two federated entities. This means either pure competition or inaction, that is, whereas more than one entity may perform actions on certain subjects, it is also possible that neither of them will do so. Everyone is allowed to act and no one is obliged to perform such an action,¹⁴⁾ and in any case, the population may plead for the best policies either from one or all of them.

More specifically, common competence enables two types of behavior: either producing politics autonomously or producing politics in a cooperative way¹³. The politics offer may be a response to the party program or to certain pressure on social actors. Inaction is the decision that nothing will be done about a particular policy while maintaining the status quo. The competition aims at placing the competence in the execution of the policy available to the political dispute. Two or more federated entities may act on a particular area by searching for recognition and greater efficiency.

Cooperation can be vertical and horizontal. Vertical cooperation is when two federated entities (Union/municipalities, states/municipalities, Union/state) act together in the confrontation of a certain subject. Horizontal cooperation, at least in Brazil, is when subnational entities (states/states and municipalities/municipalities) cooperate to solve a common problem. Partnership is the best example for solving the problem of urban waste.

No exclusive competence has been guaranteed in the constitutional text with regard to sport and leisure public policies, and, thus, in theory, any federated entity is allowed to take action in this regard. Considering the effectiveness of actions in relation to sport and leisure, although they are not explicit among the articles that attribute competences on subjects specific to federated entities (Articles 21, 23, 25 and 30), Article 6 establishes leisure as a social right and, thus, it should be guaranteed (provided) by the State; Article 217 establishes sport as a right of each individual and duty of the State, which also suggests an obligation in the form of provision by the State. Therefore, the federated entity is not specified, but the obligation of the Federative Republic of Brazil to guarantee sport and leisure.

A contradiction is exposed, because, as Santos and Freitas point out¹⁵, the State established a duty for itself, but it did not specify who should comply with it. Since no federated entity is obliged to develop sport and leisure policies through its administrative bodies, inaction may be justified by the fact that an entity understands that such policies would be the function of the other entity

and, by entering the buck passing, the constitutional principle of reducing the regional inequalities and, above all, the social ones, as far as sport and leisure are concerned, runs the risk of not being attended to.

On the other hand, the FC/88, Subsection IX of Article 24, expressly attributes competence concurrent to the Union, states and the Federal District to legislate on sport. Although the FC/88 does not predict the concurrent competence of the municipalities to legislate on the specific subjects inserted in Article 24, it foresees that such federated entities legislate on ‘subjects of local interest’ and in addition to the federal and state legislation, as applicable (Subsections I and II of Article 30, respectively). The majority view of legal doctrine, as Almeida states¹⁶, is that, based on the systematic interpretation of the FC/88, the municipalities are included in the competence for legislating on the subjects provided in Article 24; among them, sport.

Therefore, since the legislation on ‘sport’ is a competence competed among the federated entities (through their legislative houses), they may produce norms that formulate the sport public policies (e.g.: sports incentive laws) or require management for developing actions in sport field. Even in practice, the municipal laws on sport are common. In relation to leisure, at no moment the FC/88 accredit competence to any specific federated entity for making or legislating. Miranda¹⁷, however, understands that sport was the means, that is, the tool by which the constituent has chosen the State to fulfill its obligation of the social right to leisure; see the insertion of paragraph 3 in Article 217, which establishes that ‘the government shall encourage leisure as a form of social promotion’ in the constitutional Section about ‘sport’ (Title VIII - The Social Order, Chapter III - Education, Culture and Sports, Section III - Sports).

In any case, the same way that it occurs with the competence of doing, that is, by not specifying which federated entity has the obligation of legislating on sport and leisure, in the legislative sphere the FC/88 also enabled inaction. Since legislation in this area is competing, there is nothing to be done about inaction, although sport and leisure are obligations of the State. Therefore, the regulation of public policies ends up being done through the political sphere, in the sense of politics.

As an example of this praxis, in order to establish its political priorities, Lula’s Government proposed a round of discussions on sport and leisure to subsidize the National Sports Policy by holding the 1^st National Sports Conference in 2004. In other words, the government has taken to the federal political agenda something that is not obliged by the norm.

In addition to doing so, the Conference established the need for decentralizing sport and leisure policies as one of its guidelines¹⁸. The third purpose of the National Sports Policy, which corroborates the discussion of the Conference, is ‘implementing the decentralization of sport and leisure public policy management’¹⁹. Given the reality described in the document of the 1^st Conference and in the National Sports Policy itself, it is important to evaluate specific cases, such as the participation of the municipalities of the state of Bahia in the decentralization of sport and leisure public policies based on the investment in the SLF.

Results

The percentage of the revenue invested in SLF from 2002 to 2011 per population class (PC) in the 417 municipalities (n = total) of the state of Bahia can be seen below:

Table 1
Percentage of the revenue invested in SLF from 2002 to 2011 per population class

Year	PC	Nº	Lower Invest. (R$)	Higher Invest. (R$)	Average Invest. (R$)	Nº below 1%	% Below 1% Total
	PC1	8	0,1	8,32	2,06	4	50
	PC2	46	0,01	3,59	1,13	26	56,52
2002	PC3	136	0,003	9,53	1,24	84	61,76
	PC4	80	0,001	5,61	1,06	48	60
	PC5	19	0,01	4,77	0,7	16	84,21
	PC6	8	0,04	2,49	0,59	7	87,5
	PC1	8	0,1	1,83	0,6	7	87,5
	PC2	40	0,01	4,75	0,79	30	75
2003	PC3	126	0,001	8,01	0,94	93	73,81
	PC4	82	0,003	9,72	0,88	56	68,29
	PC5	20	0,1	3,86	0,33	17	85
	PC6	10	0,001	1,96	0,78	8	80
	PC1	6	0,16	1,54	0,78	5	83,33
	PC2	39	0,006	4,17	0,73	26	66,67
2004	PC3	124	0,005	8,72	0,83	35	28,23
	PC4	78	0,008	6,14	0,91	58	74,36
	PC5	15	0,02	2,1	0,39	14	93,33
	PC6	11	0,02	1,57	0,59	8	72,73
	PC1	8	0,03	2,25	0,5	7	87,5
	PC2	37	0,02	2,83	0,38	35	94,59
2005	PC3	118	0,003	4,95	0,65	90	76,27
	PC4	76	0,002	4,45	0,73	58	76,32
	PC5	12	0,06	3,37	0,61	12	100
	PC6	9	0,001	1,36	0,54	9	100
	PC1	9	0,03	1,66	0,44	8	88,89
	PC2	52	0,01	3,29	0,77	36	69,23
	PC3	134	0,003	6,18	0,81	104	77,61
2006	PC4	94	0,002	4,1	0,64	74	78,72
	PC5	24	0,06	1,95	0,55	19	79,17
	PC6	13	0,05	1,42	0,52	12	92,31
	PC1	6	0,13	1,79	0,7	5	83,33
	PC2	48	0,003	1,06	1,09	34	70,83
	PC3	144	0,001	3,07	0,56	119	82,64
2007	PC4	104	0,001	4,11	0,58	86	82,69
	PC5	21	0,07	1,57	0,61	17	80,95
	PC6	15	0,01	1,6	0,48	12	80
	PC1	6	0,02	0,5	0,18	6	100
	PC2	44	0,02	3,39	0,77	32	72,73
	PC3	142	0,001	5,07	0,75	107	75,35
2008	PC4	111	0,004	4,9	0,71	85	76,58
	PC5	23	0,03	2,28	0,69	17	73,91
	PC6	15	0,03	1,94	0,65	12	80
	PC1	7	0,01	1,16	0,22	6	85,71
	PC2	49	0,006	4,22	0,42	42	85,71
	PC3	133	0,001	6,03	0,49	112	84,21
2009	PC4	104	0,001	3,25	0,45	93	89,42
	PC5	24	0,001	1,44	0,51	21	87,5
	PC6	15	0,04	1,66	0,57	12	80
	PC1	8	0,05	2,66	0,75	5	62,5
	PC2	47	0,03	4,47	0,64	38	80,85
	PC3	151	0,001	4,77	0,57	128	84,77
2010	PC4	103	0,003	3,44	0,54	87	84,47
	PC5	25	0,01	2,96	0,62	20	80
	PC6	14	0,1	1,45	0,58	12	85,71
	PC1	7	0,11	2,37	0,89	4	57,14
	PC2	44	0,001	1,99	0,55	35	79,55
	PC3	148	0,001	4,14	0,68	117	79,05
2011	PC4	103	0,002	1,4	0,66	88	85,44
	PC5	24	0,002	1,98	0,54	20	83,33
	PC6	14	0,01	1,47	0,47	13	92,86

• Source: Research data

Even though there is not a reliable metric for indicating the involvement level of the city halls with sport and leisure policies in order to guarantee their effective decentralization, the results found in the present study are quite positive. The year of 2005 had the lowest percentage (62.35%), and 2010 showed the highest percentage (83.45%) of the municipalities that invested in the SLF (n = 260 and 348, respectively). In the historical series herein shown, in six years (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011) the percentage of the municipalities that invested in the SLF was over 75%.

This first analysis shows that the municipalities of Bahia are proactive in the sense of creating sport and leisure public policies. Most municipalities of the state of Bahia invested in the SLF from 2002 to 2011. During that period, 21.34% (n = 89) of the municipalities made investments in each year. Only 4 (0.96%) municipalities did not make investments during the 10 years, that is, Campo Alegre de Lourdes (PC4), Coração de Maria (PC4), Firmino Alves (PC2) and Jussari (PC2). This result indicates that the decentralization of sport and leisure public policies is a reality in the state of Bahia.

As shown in Table 1, there is a huge variation in the percentage of revenues invested in the SLF. Given the autonomy of the municipalities for creating policies according to the pressures and interests of the political buck passing, the variation of the results in terms of investment is compatible with Brazilian federalism²⁰. There was a high variation in the lower and higher values invested in all population classes and years. It is not possible to establish any investment pattern per population class/year.

An important variation also occurred among the municipalities that spent less than 1% of current revenues. Although it is possible to realize that we are far from the proposal approved at the 1^st National Sports Conference to invest 1.5% in the SLF¹⁸, it is worth observing the percentage of municipalities that have an investment equal to1% or more. In 2002, 112 city halls (26.86%) and in 2004, 127 (30.46%) invested more than 1%. The overall result shows that there is an effective creation of sport and leisure public policies by the city halls of Bahia.

The volume of resources invested is not negligible either. In 2002, the total invested by the municipalities was of R$ 37.799.502, 18. This amount corresponds to 15.21% of the total amount paid by the federal government for the Sports and Leisure Function from 2004 to 2011.⁵⁾ This means that the highest investments made in sport and leisure, when compared to the federated entities, are made by the municipalities, since a single state of the Federation is being considered.

The variation in nominal funds invested grew 167.5% from 2002 to 2011. In 2011, R $ 101.116.304,22 were invested. In only two years, that is, 2005 and 2009, there was a decrease of investment when compared to the previous year. From 2004 to 2011, the municipalities invested R $ 531.530.210,46, 113.9% higher than that invested in the SLF by the federal government in Bahia in the same period. The ten years closed out with an investment of R$ 610.264.545,08.

Table 2
Percentage per capita in SLF invested by the city halls of Bahia from 2002 to 2011

Year	PC	Nº	Lower (R$)	Higher (R$)	Average (R$)	Nº below R$ 12.00 per year	% of mun. below R$12,00
	PC1	8	0,86	86,53	20,35	5	62,5
	PC2	46	0,06	21,61	6,37	36	78,26
2002	PC3	136	0,02	70,03	6,1	111	81,62
	PC4	80	0,03	21,1	5,01	70	87,5
	PC5	19	0,07	27,84	5,69	18	94,74
	PC6	8	0,16	13,45	3,84	7	87,5
	PC1	8	0,96	29,35	8,36	6	75
	PC2	40	0,03	37,19	5,05	36	90
2003	PC3	126	0,01	260,67	7,42	117	92,86
	PC4	82	0,01	72,03	5,36	77	93,9
	PC5	20	0,44	25,9	3,65	19	95
	PC6	10	0,01	12,62	3,81	9	90
	PC1	6	1,84	18,83	9,95	4	66,67
	PC2	39	0,05	21,26	5,12	34	87,18
2004	PC3	124	0,03	475,1	8,31	107	86,29
	PC4	78	0,01	87,65	6,05	69	88,46
	PC5	15	0,07	11,42	2,15	15	100
	PC6	11	0,11	25,14	4,89	10	90,91
	PC1	8	0,56	31,87	5,37	7	87,5
	PC2	37	0,2	24,72	4,35	36	97,3
2005	PC3	118	0,03	178,68	6,16	105	88,98
	PC4	76	0,01	84,79	5,94	66	86,84
	PC5	12	0,34	20,6	4,88	11	91,67
	PC6	9	0,01	14,38	3,12	8	88,89
	PC1	9	0,67	22,57	9,07	8	88,89
	PC2	52	0,06	43,56	7,82	39	75
	PC3	134	0,02	40,37	6,71	107	79,85
2006	PC4	94	0,01	96,33	6,2	84	89,36
	PC5	24	0,28	27,25	4,15	23	95,83
	PC6	13	0,31	8,75	4,04	13	100
	PC1	6	2,37	28,03	8,9	3	50
	PC2	48	0,05	173,26	12,59	35	72,92
	PC3	144	0,01	38,96	5,65	124	86,11
2007	PC4	104	0,01	44,46	5,6	87	83,65
	PC5	21	0,53	26,14	5,94	19	90,48
	PC6	15	0,16	18,54	4,5	13	86,67
	PC1	6	0,47	9,19	3,41	6	100
	PC2	44	0,27	40,78	9,55	32	72,73
	PC3	142	0,01	32,89	9,02	109	76,76
2008	PC4	111	0,04	63,11	8,01	93	83,78
	PC5	23	0,27	26,62	8,35	18	78,26
	PC6	15	0,27	18,45	5,48	13	86,67
	PC1	7	0,13	20,54	4,3	6	85,71
	PC2	49	0,1	64,45	5,55	43	87,76
	PC3	133	0,01	68,64	6,2	116	87,22
2009	PC4	104	0,01	69,47	5,48	94	90,38
	PC5	24	0,02	14,79	5,79	21	87,5
	PC6	15	0,41	12,88	3,82	14	93,33
	PC1	8	1	57,52	16,45	5	62,5
	PC2	47	0,48	62,82	9,73	35	74,47
	PC3	151	0,02	125,19	8,46	146	96,69
2010	PC4	103	0,02	54,34	7,3	87	84,47
	PC5	25	0,16	28,89	7,57	19	76
	PC6	14	1,3	18,56	6,06	10	71,43
	PC1	7	2,88	59,19	13,89	3	42,86
	PC2	44	0,01	40,22	10,31	31	70,45
	PC3	148	0,01	131,59	11,85	104	70,27
2011	PC4	103	0,03	80,72	10,23	76	73,79
	PC5	24	0,02	28,1	6,55	18	75
	PC6	14	0,16	24,09	6,19	11	78,57

• Source: Research data

It was not possible to identify any vector that could associate either an increase or decrease in the average per capita of the investment in the SLF per population class (Table 2). However, only in 2006 there was a decrease in the average.

The lowest per capita investment of 70% during such years occurred in the largest population class (PC6), that is, considering these years, the increase in population impacts on the average amount of resources available for sport and leisure policies. In only one year, that is, 2008, the lowest value occurred in the first population class (PC1).

It is worth mentioning that during 60% of the years, the highest average investment in the SLF occurred in PC1. In case of joining PC1 and PC2, that is, the cities up to 10 thousand inhabitants, in 80% of years the biggest investment was in small cities. The smallest number of population has a positive impact on the increase in the average value per capita invested in the SLF.

In 70% of the cases, the highest percentage of cities with investments higher than R $ 12,00 inhabitant/year was in PC1 (2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2011). The smallest cities are able to make higher investments in the SLF per inhabitant/year. In this case, the smallest number of inhabitants has a significant impact on the provision of public policies. In none of the scenarios, the highest percentage of cities with investment higher than R $ 12.00 inhabitant/year occurred in PC5 and PC6. The best results with the lowest number of cities with investments below R $ 12,00 inhabitant/year were: PCI in 2002 and 2010 (62.50%), in 2007 (50%) and in 2011 (42.86%). Therefore, regarding these scenarios PC1 managed to make a significant portion of their cities invest more than R $ 12,00 per inhabitant/year.

A pattern of average per capita investment in the SLF by the municipalities was not seen in any of the scenarios, nor considering the percentages of revenue available. What is perceived is that the city halls of Bahia have different behavior regarding investment in the SLF, regardless of revenue and size. The common/competing competence of the municipalities with the other federated entities established by the FC/88, the autonomy of the municipalities and the pressures and interests of the already mentioned political buck passing²⁰, may be reasons for such lack of standardization.

Conclusions

Although not obliged to invest in sport and leisure public policies, the municipalities of the state of Bahia were proactive during the years assessed in the present study. This means that there are institutional factors internal to the municipalities that have been allowing these policies to be decentralized. Decentralization is already a reality, at least since 2002, despite the warning made at the 1^st National Sports Conference in 2004 of the need for its effectiveness.

The volume of funds invested by the city halls of the state of Bahia from 2002 to 2011 is not negligible either. It is far higher to what the federal government was able to invest in the state. Further studies that address the quality of policies are necessary, in addition to knowing how and where the resources have being invested.

Acknowlegements:

Research supported by Brazilian Sport Council and developed at Center of Research in Policies to Development in Sport and Leisure-PI and in parternship with Group of studies in Research in Sports Public Policies - UEM.

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Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  04 Oct 2018
• Date of issue
  2018

History

• Received
  18 Mar 2017
• Reviewed
  23 Jan 2018
• Accepted
  23 Mar 2018