Resumo em Português:

Quais termos são suscetíveis de operações silogísticas? Para importantes intérpretes da lógica aristotélica - especialmente Ross, Patzig e Lukasiewicz - a resposta tende a introduzir um único e homogêneo grupo de termos, aqueles de generalidade intermediária (τὰ µεταξὺ). Fundamentada basicamente na classificação tripartite de entes que aparece no capítulo 27 de Primeiros Analíticos I, essa opinião atribui à silogística a exclusão de (i) termos singulares (como "Sócrates" e "este homem"), (ii) transcategoriais (como "ente" e "um"), bem como dos chamados (iii) summa genera ("substância", "qualidade", "quantidade", etc.). Em nossa opinião, esses resultados não derivam dos textos de Aristóteles, mas de leituras, traduções e interpretações impróprias das passagens centrais da discussão. Neste artigo, faremos um novo exame desses textos, a fim de mostrar que Aristóteles jamais afastou de sua lógica os tipos de termos que os intérpretes não hesitam em excluir da silogística. Assim, esperamos reintroduzir termos singulares, transcategoriais e summa genera, no domínio da silogística aristotélica.

Resumo em Inglês:

What terms are susceptible of syllogistic operations? For important interpreters of Aristotelian logic - especially Ross, Lukasiewicz and Patzig - the answer tends to introduce a single and homogeneous group of terms, those of intermediate generality (τὰµεταξὺ). Mostly based on the tripartite classification of beings which appears in Chapter 27 of Prior Analytics I, this view attributes to syllogistic the exclusion of proper names and singular designations (such as "Socrates" and "this man"), transcategoricals (such as "being" and "one"), as well as of the so-called summa genera ("substance", "quality", "quantity", etc.). In our opinion, these results are not derived from the writings of Aristotle, but from improper readings, translations and interpretations of the central passages for the discussion. In this paper, we will make a further examination of these texts in order to show that Aristotle has never departed from his logic the types of terms that interpreters do not hesitate to exclude from syllogistic. Thereby, we hope to bring back singular terms, transcategoricals and summa genera to the operation domain of the Aristotelian syllogistic.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Las tesis de la indeterminación de Quine establecen que las condiciones de verdad de una oración sub-determinan la referencia de los términos que ocurren en la misma. La cuestión es ¿cuál es el alcance de esa sub-determinación? En Reason, Truth and History Putnam señala que la su-determinación es mayor de lo que podría suponerse a partir de los argumentos de Quine y se propone, con su "argumento modelo teorético", prolongar radicalmenteestos resultados. En este artículo pretendo mostrar que el argumento modelo teorético de Putnam no es una mera prolongación de los resultados de Quine, sino que se trata de un argumento que supone un modelo de interpretación distinto del que subyace al argumento de este último. Si estoy en lo cierto, tendríamos en este caso dos modos de entender la interpretación y dependerá de qué modo la entendamos, el alcance que le demos a la sub-determinación de la referencia por los valores veritativos. Considero, por lo tanto, que el argumento de Putnam, si bien radicaliza las conclusiones de Quine, lo hace introduciendo un modelo de interpretación diferente al que es desarrollado en Word and Object.

Resumo em Inglês:

Quine's thesis of indeterminacy states that the truth conditions of a sentence sub-determine the reference of the terms that occur in it. The question is: what is the scope of that sub-determination? In Reason, Truth and History Putnam claims that the sub-determination is greater than might be expected from Quine's arguments and proposes, with his "argument theoretical model," to radically extend these results. In this article I show that the theoretical model of Putnam's argument is not a mere extension of Quine results, but it is an argument that represents a different interpretation of the model underlying the latter argument. If I'm right, there would be two ways of understanding the interpretation and, depending on how we understand it, the extension of the sub- determination or the reference for truth values. I believe therefore that, although Putnam's argumentrepresents a radicalization of Quine's conclusions, it introduces an interpretation model different from the one developed in Word and Object.

Resumo em Português:

Os objetivos deste artigo são: (1) apresentar quatro teorias com relação à natureza das leis naturais, (2) mostrar que apenas uma delas é capaz de responder satisfatoriamente aos Casos de Tooley e (3) indicar por que tais casos são relevantes para a nossa ontologia. Estes objetivos são importantes, pois o conceito de "lei natural" é utilizado em muitos, se não todos, os domínios das ciências e em muitos domínios da filosofia; e, se tais casos forem possíveis, eles serão situações que precisariam ser adequadamente descritas. Se uma e apenas uma teoria puder descrever tais casos adequadamente, haverá fortes razões para preferir tal teoria frente às outras.

Resumo em Inglês:

The purposes of this paper are: (1) to present four theories of the nature of natural laws, (2) to show that only one of them is capable of adequately answering to Tooley's Cases, and (3) indicate why these cases are relevant for our ontology. These purposes are important since the concept of "natural law" is used in many (if not all) realms of natural science and in many branches of philosophy; if Tooley's cases are possible, they represent situations that must be adequately described. If there is only one theory that can adequately describe such cases, there are strong reasons to prefer this theory over the other ones.

Resumo em Inglês:

In this article I intend to show that certain aspects of A.N. Whitehead's philosophy of organism and especially his epochal theory of time, as mainly exposed in his well-known work Process and Reality, can serve in clarify the underlying assumptions that shape nonstandard mathematical theories as such and also as metatheories of quantum mechanics. Concerning the latter issue, I point to an already significant research on nonstandard versions of quantum mechanics; two of these approaches are chosen to be critically presented in relation to the scope of this work. The main point of the paper is that, insofar as we can refer a nonstandard mathematical entity to a kind of axiomatical formalization essentially 'codifying' an underlying mental process indescribable as such by analytic means, we can possibly apply certain principles of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme focused on the key notion of process which is generally conceived as the becoming of actual entities. This is done in the sense of a unifying approach to provide an interpretation of nonstandard mathematical theories as such and also, in their metatheoretical status, as a formalization of the empirical-experimental context of quantum mechanics.

Resumo em Inglês:

Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors (e.g., Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grünberg) maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of Carnap's philosophy. Against that reading, Oliveira and Psillos argue that within Carnap's philosophy there is no place for the Kuhnian theses of incommensurability, holism, and theory-ladenness of observations. This paper presents each of those readings and argues that Carnap and Kuhn have non-opposing views on holism, incommensurability, the theory-ladenness of observations, and scientific revolutions. We note at the very end - without dwelling on the point, however - that they come apart on other matters, such as their views on metaphysics and on the context of discovery/justification distinction.