

THE OTHER THAT DOES NOT EXIST: OF THE TRUE TRUTH, LYING TRUTHS AND VEHEMENT DENIALS

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ABSTRACT: The symptom structured by the duo castration-unconscious is no longer the configuration that prevails in the regulation of the contemporary psychic economy, but the duo sinthome-pedestal. In contemporary times, in place of a psychic Kantian economy based on the waiving of jouissance for the benefit of the sovereign good, we live under the Sadian imperative of jouissance. There is a prevalence of trivialized retraction (*Verleugnung*) of the function of The Name of the Father that holds the place of the agent of castration in neurotic fantasy. The subject redefined by the psychoanalysis of Lacanian orientation as a speaking body is more released from the bonds of repression and feels unwilling or unable to sublimate his drives.

Keywords: Truth, lie, denial, symptom, jouissance.

RESUMO: O sintoma estruturado pelo par castração-inconsciente não é mais a configuração que prevalece na regulação da economia psíquica contemporânea mas o par sinthoma-pedestal. Na contemporaneidade, em lugar de uma economia psíquica kantiana fundada na renúncia ao gozo em benefício do soberano bem, vivemos sob o imperativo sadiano do gozo. Há uma prevalência do desmentido banalizado (*Verleugnung*) da função do Nome-do-Pai, que sustenta o lugar de agente da castração na fantasia neurótica. O sujeito redefinido pela psicanálise de orientação lacaniana como um corpo falante está mais liberado das amarras do recalque e se mostra pouco disposto ou capaz de sublimar suas pulsões.

Palavras-chave: Verdade, mentira, desmentido, sintoma, gozo.

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As proposed by Miller (2014), the symptom structured by the duo castration-unconscious is no longer the configuration that prevails in the regulation of the contemporary psychic economy, but the duo sinthome-pedestal. A transverse concept related to the duo narcissism-sublimation is necessary to evaluate it in the light of the thesis that, in contemporary times, in place of a psychic Kantian economy based on the waiving of *jouissance* for the benefit of the sovereign good, we live under the Sadian imperative of *jouissance*. We will articulate the economic liberalism, the supremacy of the law of the market and the consumer thrust with the prevalence of trivialized denial (*Verleugnung*) of the function of The Name of the Father that holds the place of the agent of castration in neurotic fantasy. Neither psychotic, nor perverse, the speaking body these days is released from the bonds of repression and feels unable to sublimate its drives. The most important thing is that I think that it is not the vigorous thesis that “the Other does not exist” — a focus chosen by Miller (1996-1997/2005) — that best formalizes the configuration of contemporary values. On the contrary, the Other, the symbolic law, the castration that divides the subject, seems to me to be in permanent confrontation, rejected and denied. This attitude may be the result of a hysterical radicalization, rebellious to all forms of authority, ready to reveal that the “emperor has no clothes”; it may explain why there is *jouissance* only in transgressing, in exceeding all limits or in claiming to be treated as an exception. Much more than denouncing the castration of the Other — that is, the impotence in sustaining the symbolic order and its re-creation — it is about challenging it, humiliating it and declaring it definitely dead.

In this article we are going to examine the new uses we can make of the concept of castration denial in order to approach the contemporary taste for excess. To this end, we will return to the paradox of *jouissance*, a Lacanian thesis that opposes Kant and Sade, to approach some later concepts as the sinthome and the speaking-body, replacing the classic split duo symptom-subject. And, who knows, develop something that is not only meant to reproduce the orientation which prevails today in the World Association of Psychoanalysis. The hypothesis I propose in this article brings the opposition that I admit of the thesis that, in contemporary times, the Other does not exist. The realm of The Name of the Father — signifier of the Other that exists, according to Miller (1996-1997/2005), corresponds to the Freudian era. If Lacan formalized the Freudian theory of the Oedipus Complex — again according to Miller — it was not by accession, to make it continue, but to place an end. The matheme $S(\)$ designates the pluralization of the Names of the Father, and also its proliferation. The nonexistence of the Other initiates the Lacanian era of psychoanalysis, the era of the disillusioned (*Les non-dupes du nom du père*), unbelievers, wanderers (*les non dupes errent*). Miller (1996-1997/2005) concludes that, today, the individuals

would not be more or less deceived with the Name of the Father, because they know that he is just a semblant. In fact, in our time there would be nothing more that would not be just a semblant. This dramatic dematerialization of the semblants causes the being, that is, the sense of the real, to be reduced to a mere questioning. Presented in this way, the thesis that the Other does not exist does not question the postmodern subjectivity. On the contrary, it makes it a new theoretical pillar that repeals the Freudian psychoanalysis, in order to establish another psychoanalysis, the Lacanian one.

The opposition to the thesis that the Other does not exist does not flourish, not even among the psychoanalysts who have dedicated themselves to the study of the phenomenon of the decline of the Name of the Father, but do not follow the Lacanian orientation of Jacques-Alain Miller. Lebrun reproduces, during the opening interview with Melman, the following argument of this psychoanalyst: “We went from a culture founded on repression of desires and, therefore, a culture of neurosis, to another that recommends free expression and promotes perversion” (MELMAN, 2003, p. 15). The interviewee explains that this psychic economy never existed before. It seemed to exist in the form of riots, of marginality, of fringe phenomena, in an opposition movement against firm, established references, apparently unshakable. Today we are dealing with a mutation that would have made us move from an economy organized by repression to an economy organized by the presence of *jouissance*. The emergence of a “new psychic economy” is understood as a clear one, but its explanation reduces it to an economy of the sign and not of the signifier. In this economy, the object is worth for what it is and not as the representative of the lost Thing. The sky is empty both of God and ideologies, promises, references and requirements. Individuals have to determine themselves. We agree with him to some extent. Unlike him, I believe that this psychic economy is not what it seems. We cannot confuse the dominant rhetoric — based on the hysterical subjective position that fights back or disappoints the Other — with a new psychic economy that would be organized according to a principle beyond the principle of pleasure. To demonstrate that the Lacanian psychoanalysts are not consistent at all in their diagnoses, I have found the argument that contradicts the thesis that “the sky is empty” in the same author who proposes this thesis. Melman (2003), after locating the main traits of the new psychic economy — the lack of symbolic debt, the explicit *jouissance* out of castration and the free one of the phallus primacy, the fall of subjective division and the non-accountability of the subject for his desires and acts — adds a new trait, the hysterical identification to the victim. Well, hysteria doesn’t match the thesis about the absence of the Other. The hysteric, according to Lacan (1969-1970/1991), is the one that says that the father is castrated, that is, he is not up to the function, he is sick, dying, a war

veteran, a former parent. To say that the Other (father) is barred is exactly to give him a symbolic destination, contradicting the universal belief in his power against helplessness.

I prefer to seriously take the following genealogical argument of the same psychoanalyst. The last two centuries were characterized by major inventions and by the identification of limits (the mathematics of Hilbert, the logic of Göedel, the economics of Marx and the psychoanalysis of Freud), but in the 21st century, it is predicted that nothing else is impossible. Melman (2003) ascribes to the following philosophers — whom he calls the moralists: Foucault, Althusser, Barthes and Deleuze — a thought that claims the right to *jouissance* and not to happiness anymore. And, for this reason, we watch the collective settlement of every form of transference. There is no authority anymore, no reference, nor a knowledge that can be sustained. We're just in management, there are only practices. We're exceeding all limits. In other words, the members of the International Lacanian Association who follow Melman's teaching seem convinced that it's not about a denial of castration or about a hysterical rebellion, but about a new psychic economy ruled — in my own words — by a principle beyond the principle of pleasure.

This is exactly what I'm not convinced of. I plead that the imperative of *jouissance* at stake in the contemporary psychic economy is not of an empire beyond the principle of pleasure. It's much more a reversal, a wild discharge of repression that freely exposes the pre-oedipal ghosts. Sadism, masochism, voyeurism, exhibitionism, devouring or vomiting orality, excretion or anal accumulation. If neurosis is the negative of perversion, it imposes that desires are manifested as unconscious repressed ghosts. When it is forbidden to forbid, there is no need to dissemble the phantasmic *jouissance*, to repress it or to hide it. We can show it, take it, reveal it and even sell it in the market for the satisfaction of other individuals. I believe that we should be inspired by the movements of May 1968 and start the beginning of this new era, characterized by an epidemic of dissatisfaction with all the authority limits and references.

According to Mark Kurlansky (2005), there has never been a year like 1968 and it is unlikely to be a similar one again. At that time, nations and cultures were still more separate and very different from each other. That year, in Poland, France, United States, Mexico and Brazil, there was a spontaneous combustion of rebellious spirits around incoherent issues. A desire to rebel, a sense of alienation to the established order and a profound distaste for any form of authority involved a lot of young college students. Where there was communism, they rebelled against it. Where there was capitalism, they turned against it. The rebels rejected most institutions, political leaders and political parties. Nothing was planned or organized. Important decisions were taken at the whim of the mo-

ment. The movements were anti-authoritarian and therefore had no leadership. The ideologies were not clear and very little was consensus. Abbie Hoffman, indicted with another eight demonstrators in 1968 by a federal grand jury in Chicago, declared: "We were not able to come to an agreement, not even about lunch" (KURLANSKY, 2005, p. 14). Four historical factors merged to create 1968: the example of the civil rights movement of the black people, a generation that felt so different and so alienated to the point of rejecting all forms of authority, the hatred to the Vietnam war and the birth of television, which allowed the transmission on a same day of the events of various parts of the world. We had entered the age of the media.

It is not my intention to deepen the literature on the events of May 1968 in this article. It is sufficient to indicate that the anarchic taste for defiance, the loose ideology, the diffuse cause and the effects of accelerated contagion by the media are the elements that I draw from this adventure to think about the trails that remained in postmodern mentality and behavior. What's still misses in this article is to answer whether we should blame the psychoanalysis of Lacanian orientation for contributing to the spread of this new taste. I take responsibility to distinguish the Lacanian perspective itself from its better re-reading, the one by Jacques-Alain Miller.

THE "THE THOUGHT OF 68" OR THE PHILOSOPHICAL DECONSTRUCTION OF METAPHYSICS

Luc Ferry and Alain Renault (1988) carry out a critical analysis of the anti-humanist philosophy that emerged at the time of the events of May 1968. It closely interests me, because it underlies, in the philosophical field and in the field of the history of ideas, the observation by Melman (2003) about the moralists mentioned above. The hypothesis that the motto of the events of May 1968 "it is forbidden to forbid" articulates with the deconstructionist philosophical thinking, anti-metaphysical and anti-humanist, designated by the two authors as "the thought of 68", consolidates my thesis that this is a rebel retraction of the function of the Name of the Father. For this manifestation of polymorph perversion of the unconscious ghosts infected every contemporary taste — eliminating the consideration by common sense — there would have been the contribution of the philosophical thinking inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger who guided several postmodern trends in the art of deconstructing the Western metaphysics.

These authors make it clear that the French philosophy cannot be reduced to what is called as "the thought of 68". Philosophically, the 60's were also scarred by the works of Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean Beaufret, Georges Canguilhem, Michel Serres, Jacques Bouveresse and Raymond Aron, just to name a

few of those who didn't belong to the deconstructionist lineage. By "the thought of 68", or the French philosophy of the 68's, the authors aim exclusively at a constellation of works, chronologically next to May, whose authors recognized almost always explicitly a kinship of inspiration with that movement. Most of the works of this philosophical generation is almost contemporary to the crisis:

"Foucault, whose *History of Madness* dates back to 1961, publishes *The Words and the Things* in 1966 and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* in 1969. Althusser — his *For Marx* and the first volumes of *Reading Capital* appeared in 1965 — pronounced in February 1968 the conferences published the following year, *Lenin and Philosophy* and *Marx before Hegel*. Derrida publishes in 1967 *Writing and Difference* and *Of Grammatology*; when in October 1968 he presents his text entitled *The Ends of Man* at a colloquium organized in New York, he makes sure to emphasize, to clarify 'the historical and political horizon' of his presentation that was written and typed in April 1968 — a time when 'the universities in Paris were, for the first time, at the request of a dean, overrun by the forces of social order and then reoccupied by students in this movement of excitement you well know' (FERRY & RENAULT, 1988/1985, p. 12).

The authors include in this group *The Inheritors* by Bourdier and Passeron, dating back to 1964, and *The Reproduction*, which came out in 1970. Gilles Deleuze (1969, apud FERRY & RENAULT, 1988/1985) begins to leave the field of the history of philosophy with *Difference and Repetition* and *Logic of sense*. And they conclude that this chronological concentration is certainly striking. This does not mean that they have influenced the movement of 1968, but that they may have taken part in the same cultural movement and, in different ways, become symptoms. For example, Foucault (1977, apud FERRY & RENAULT, 1988/1985), in an interview, stated that there was a dominant acceptance of the events of May by the philosophers of 68. He acknowledged that his previous books were received with great silence by the French intellectual left. He admitted that his reflections on the relationship between knowledge and power had been very timid and confused by this date. Only after 68, the issues he had explored until then were recognized as political ones. And, finally, he recognizes that without the political opening held in those years, he wouldn't have had the courage to resume the thread of these problems and pursue his investigation in terms of penalty, prisons and disciplines.

This shared inspiration in the 1968 movement was also featured in the more recent works of Jean Francois Lyotard. In 1984, he declares that what remains "alive" of Marxism is the meaning of "challenge" and that the "works of spirit" (and, among them, the philosopher's) must witness. He adds that "something similar took place in 1968" (LYOTARD, 1984, p. 29, apud FERRY & RENAULT,

1988/1985, p. 41). Even Louis Althusser (1969, apud FERRY & RENAULT, 1988/1985), contrary to the communist orthodoxy, would have expressed sympathy in an article of May-June 1969 for the student revolt, because it challenges the “indoctrination apparatus of the bourgeois ideology par excellence, which is the capitalist school system” (ALTHUSSER, 1969, p. 11, apud FERRY & RENAULT, 1988/1985, p. 14) and that it should deserve to be recognized for its unprecedented innovation, for the reality and progressive importance as an intellectual uprising that would favor the revolutionary struggle of the working class.

The question that is raised in Ferry and Renault’s work is really essential to the progress of my reflection. Is May 1968 an individualist or a humanist uprising? The authors argue that since the Foucauldian proclamation of “the death of man”, in *The Words and the Things*, up to the Lacanian statement of the radically anti-humanist character of psychoanalysis, the autonomy of man is considered only an illusion. Lyotard [1] (1984, apud FERRY & RENAULT, 1988/1985) states that it is characteristic to the contemporary thought to venture beyond the boundaries of anthropology and humanism, without making concession to the spirit of time. Derrida (1981, p. 141, apud FERRY & RENAULT, 1988, p. 35), in *The ends of Man*, recalls the “dismissal of humanism”, an effective dissipation of the darkness of the humanist metaphysics, as to search even in Heidegger, an expert in the field of anti-humanism, the survival of a “man’s thought”. They still recall that Althusser, in his *For Marx*, celebrates the definition of “humanism as an ideology” and “the break with the whole anthropology or any philosophical humanism” as “sympathetic to Marx’s scientific discovery” (ALTHUSSER, 1965, p. 233, apud FERRY & RENAULT, 1988, p. 46), openly defending the thesis of a philosophical or theoretical anti-humanism of Marx.

Finally, they recall the publication of Jacques Lacan’s *Writings* in 1966. They plead that also Jacques Lacan is part of the philosophical tradition of deconstruction. Lacan radicalizes the disjunction between the subject of the unconscious and the self, making the latter the place of alienation and of the unknowing of the emptiness of the truth that inhabits the subject. The truth is located in the splitting of the subject, unlike the traditional discourse that places it as an adequacy or identity. He considers that the idea of a true truth would be ideological, because it forgets the real. As the Freudian subject of the unconscious cannot be reduced neither to one nor to the other notion of truth, at the end of this article, I develop a discussion about the concept of truth at stake in the Lacanian conceptions of the subject and of the speaking being. I approach the concept of the speaking body and other related concepts in the context of a second reading of Lacan by Jacques-Alain Miller. Before that, I propose to make a brief digression on the status of truth in the psychoanalysis of Lacanian orientation and in the society of information.

POST-MODERNITY AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY

To support my own point of view on the subject of truth after May 1968, I propose to make a brief articulation of the relations among the theories of the social bond in civilization and the psychoanalytic conceptions of the subject of the unconscious, of the speaking being and of the speaking body in the psychoanalysis of Lacanian orientation. I will start by briefly defining each one of these terms.

The historic birth of the subject of the unconscious coincides with the arrival of modernity, as he is the very subject of science. It was up to the philosopher René Descartes (1988), in his *Metaphysical Meditations*, to reduce him to the formula: *Cogito, ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am). The subject of science is not a substance itself, it is deduced from the thought. Jacques Lacan takes up this formula, redefining it in terms of Linguistics as a barred subject, that is, what a signifier represents to another signifier. As a body, he is mortified by the effect of the primacy of the master-signifier, the Name of the Father. In psychoanalytic practice, he is revealed in discourse flaws such as a lapse, a Freudian slip, a dream or a pun. The unconscious meaning requires to be deciphered because the truth of desire is subject to the operation of repression.

Differently, the speaking being is one whose existence we encourage thanks to the analytical apparatus. We have asked him to say everything that comes to his mind without any censorship, according to the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis. We have submitted the analyzand to the imperative of jouissance with the speech. He speaks, and as he speaks, he comes to a climax. The signifier vivifies him, makes him talkative, someone who talks right and left and doesn't want to necessarily say anything. The speaking being doesn't define himself as an unconscious desire, encrypted, but as one whose jouissance with the speech is impossible to repress. The speaking being is not a body; he has it both imaginarily and symbolically.

The concept of the speaking body includes the real. There are two types of jouissance: the one of the speech and the one of the body. The former leads to sublimation and the latter to the sinthome. The latter is a drive circuit subjected to the law of the signifier, but connected to the body as a substance of jouissance. According to Miller (2014, s.p.): "It is from the body that the objects *a* are extracted and it is in the body that the jouissance to which the unconscious works for is searched". It mingles with the uniqueness of the way by which it enjoys a body. The subject of the unconscious should be articulated to the transformations that followed the cut represented by the advent of science in modernity, as well as to the emergence of capitalism and to the arrival of labor in the market. Based on the Freudian theory, he defines himself as the truth of sexuality that is subjected to repression, in favor of the interests of civilization. However, after Lacan, it's important to outline the effects of surplus-value that

can be extracted from the relations of production. Repression is not just for the encryption of sexuality, because the symptom is also good as a means of jouissance. The speaking being is precisely that effect of surplus-jouissance that the capitalist machine produces.

The transformations in the relationship between capital and work under the impact of the globalization of economy and the expansion on a planetary scale of the financial market contribute to produce it and to amplify the proliferation of his jouissance. He isn't even a being; he is just a body. The speaking body relations with the truth are highly relativistic. I highlight the importance of the scientific relativism in the deconfiguration of the relationships between truth and reality, consensus, verification and demonstration. The advent of the press, of the communication industry and of the commercialization of information on the relationship between capitalism and subjectivity are remarkable. I still remember the effects of the rapid evolution of the media in the 20th century, noting that these days, information gets to the market in real time and social reality has become a largely virtual one. The concept of the speaking body — a manifestation of the unconscious in the 21st century — needs to be understood in the light of the contemporary phenomenon of the proliferation of versions, fictions, lying truths and vehement denials that the media makes up or simply diffuses. We cannot forget that the dissemination of psychoanalysis has played a key role in this whole process of transformation that has been producing *impasses* rather than symptoms.

I also recall Lacan's observation (1968-1969/2006) on the relationship among the movements of May 1968 and the emergence of a new era, the era of the reduction of knowledge to the merchandise that goes hand in hand with the rise of the value of university degrees, establishing its introduction in the market where things are sold and bought. Lacan's observation takes place after the formalization of the object a as a "surplus jouissance" object, based on the Marxist theory of profit. The latter is seized by the capitalist to compensate labor only with the value that was necessary for maintenance and reproduction. The difference between the amount spent to produce goods and their sale price is a "surplus-value" gained by the owner of the means of production. Labor, with the arrival of the capitalist mode of production, had already become a commodity to be bought and sold, and free from the feudal ties of the reciprocal obligation to those it was tied during the middle ages. Also the usufruct of the body and the time dedicated to leisure are separated from its "use value" and placed in the service of productivity, for the benefit of the profits, of the surplus-jouissance. The relegation of all "use values" to "surplus-jouissance" objects obeys the law of the market according to the liberal conception of economy. The concept of the speaking being comes exactly to emphasize that repression is productive.

It is not only good to the encryption of the sexual as an unconscious truth. It is good to produce a profit, a gain of a new *jouissance*, which is the *jouissance* with speech.

In a recent article (COELHO DOS SANTOS, 2015), I have posed the following question: has intimacy turned into a commodity that is bought and sold? I've noticed that the appearance these days is one "without veils". The instinctual satisfaction in showing off requires better justifications for breaking the limits of the modesty barrier. The introduction of intimacy in the market had been slowly pulling it out from its traditional discretion to submit it to the law of the market and to extract its added value, as to the interest of capitalism. It's not just *jouissance* with speech that reveals the extent of surplus *jouissance* at stake in the law of the market. Also the body deprived of its "value in use", that is, the use of privacy, originates a product that is foreshadowed through the hyper-exhibition of the image. The speaking body is this merchandise body that is exposed, is displayed, which is permanently looked at and invited to testify publicly how it enjoys itself. What for? For the enjoyment of all other bodies.

I come back to the theme of the passage from the private to the public; this time to question whether, in the age of the media, the dignity of the "truth" is not also reduced to the merchandise form. Emptied of its absolute value — as opposed to lie — it is no more than a truth-fiction today. The value of truth is measured more and more by the impact given by the sensationalist media. Manipulated, disguised, exacerbated, a truth is worth what its sensory impact is able to cause.

I'm going back to the starting point. It is a consensus among the analysts of Lacanian orientation — under the leadership of Jacques-Alain Miller — the support to the thesis that, with the decline of the Name of the Father — signifier that the Other (God) exists — we begin an era in which the Other does not exist. Since the advent of modernity, the exclusion of God in the world, the advent of scientific reason and the founding of the secular state have been some indicators of the loss of consistency of the Other in religion. However, according to Lyotard (1989), the scientific relativism has moved the truth to the field of fiction. Truth has spread and multiplied. Lacan — according to Jacques-Alain Miller (1996-1997/2005) — formalized this era of the pluralization of the Names of the Father with the matheme $S(\)$. A time of wandering, of disbelief and of reduction of the Other to a mere semblance, of the accelerated dematerialization of the sense of the real. According to Miller (1996-1997/2005), we have started the Lacanian era of psychoanalysis. Postmodern relativism leads to a pluralization of the identifications in the society that discusses and decides through its ethics committees. The generalized mental debility and the anguish of helplessness in the absence of certainty are the signs of the disconnection from the Other.

I take this opportunity to recall the seminal hypothesis by Jean-François Lyotard (1989): knowledge changes status when societies reach the so-called post-industrial age. This fact coincides with the end of the 50's and the period of the reconstruction of Europe. The forefront of scientific knowledge focuses on language: phonology and linguistic theories, problems of communication and cybernetics, modern mathematics and computer science, computers and their languages, translation problems and cross-language compatibility, memory problems and database, telematics and the installation of intelligent terminals, paradoxology, are some of the examples listed by the author. Research and knowledge transfer are affected by the incidence of all this technological information. It's interesting to point out in this article the dissociation between spirit formation (*Bildung*) and the acquisition of knowledge. Because, as we have anticipated above:

This relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge with the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and will increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity producers and consumers of the commodities they produce and consume — that is the form of value. Knowledge is and will be produced in order to be sold; it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its "use value" (LYOTARD, 1989, p. 15-16).

To what extent does truth suffer from the same fate of any and every type of knowledge? And the truth in psychoanalysis? I would like to clarify the different definitions taking into account the different concepts of the subject of the unconscious, of the speaking being and of the speaking body. I would like to highlight that the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan never abandoned the reference to the oracular and arbitrary authority of the master signifier. And rarely can one accredit to Lacan the thesis that the Other doesn't exist. Wouldn't it be a thesis that derives from the rereading of Jacques-Alain Miller?

THE SUBJECT OF THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THE TRUTH AS A CAUSE

In *Science and Truth*, Lacan (1965-1966/1966, p. 873) establishes the following axiom: "To say that the subject on which we operate in psychoanalysis can be the subject of science may appear as a paradox". A paradox that is explained according to the proposition: "We are always responsible for our position as subject" (LACAN, 1966/1965-1966, p. 873). He continues by stating that "there is no science of man because the man of science doesn't exist, only its subject" (LACAN, 1966/1965-1966, p. 873). The structuralist approach of the Freudian

unconscious leads to the thesis that the subject of science is constituted in an internal exclusion to the object of the sciences of man. The man of science does not exist. The Cartesian *cogito* leads to the conclusion that if “I think, therefore I am”, the subject of science is a deduction of thought. It is something that exists, when he thinks.

For science, the cause is formal. For psychoanalysis, the cause is the signifier. The novelty — introduced by Lacan — is the presumption of the materiality of the signifier. For this reason, we can say that psychoanalysis reintroduces in the scientific consideration the value of the signifier causes arbitrary of the Name-of-the-Father. The science of the subject or the subject of science are not the opposite of the authority of tradition. Because, from our position of subjects, we are always responsible. Lacan got to consider Logic as the science of the real, as well as Linguistics would be the science of language. The condition of psychoanalysis would be the science, but it does not have a science status, so it can only wish for it. The condition for the possibility of the emergence of logical consistency is the existence of a point on which we cannot decide, a real outside meaning, about which is impossible to say whether it is true or false. But, the truth as the cause is a version of the true truth. It's not the truth as an adequacy to things, the material reality. It is the truth that is faithful to the irrerepresentable Thing (*das Ding*), as its cause.

Both science and psychoanalysis are defined by Lacan as discourses, because they presuppose the logical primacy of that impossible real. A discourse is a device of reason, a creation from that point — empty of sense — in the infinite universe of science. A discourse is not defined by the truthfulness or falsehood of the starting point but by its consequences. The starting point is always arbitrary and, in order to be considered scientific, it must open a series. The discourse of Physics needs to have consequences on nature. To undergo the analytic discourse, the analyzand enters the series when he admits the hypothesis of the unconscious: “Freud underlines, is something which, which cannot hold up except by supposing the Name-of-the-Father. Supposing the Name-of-the-Father, certainly, is God” (LACAN, 1975-1976/2005, p. 136). The field of analytic discourse is founded on an act of faith in logic. The subject of the unconscious is not an immediate sensitive data; it can only be supposed. What we call the unconscious is a truth whose structure is only manifested through fiction, the ghost, the dream and the Freudian slip.

Everything we are, feel and think is a consequence of the discourse: “To call things by their names, this mathematical logic is essential to your existence, whether you know it or not” (LACAN, 1968-1969/2006, p. 35). The emergence of the discourse of mathematical logic, in that it reduces all susceptible objects to “objects without qualities”, is the condition of the emergence of the analytic

discourse, because the subject of the unconscious, as well as the subject of science, define themselves as “subjects without qualities”. Psychoanalysis is distinguished by the emphasis given to what does not work, cannot be reduced, is not appropriate and eludes formalization, i.e., the truth of the subject.

The truth is not the real. The real is impossible. The truth, however, concerns the relationship of the subject with the cause of desire. As we point out above, the incidence of truth as a cause in the field of science is reduced to the formal cause. Psychoanalysis, in contrast, takes the truth as a material cause. This is its originality in the field of science. The signifier is taken by its literal character, separated from significance. This failure can only be suppressed by means of a device: the hypothesis of the existence of God, that is, the Name-of-the-Father. The subject becomes what Logics names as an ordered pair ($S1 \ S2$), i.e., in a signifier ($S1$) that represents it to another signifier ($S2$), with a retroactive effect of meaning. This other signifier ($S2$) represents knowledge, an opaque term in which the subject fades away on primary repression. The subject originates from this deleted primordial nucleus, that repression itself doubles, constituting it as a puzzle. The structure of this failure in the field of knowledge triggers the movement of repetition of the same proportion: *knowledge is not known*. This *knowledge gap* works as a *material cause* of the subject’s relationship with the Other. The failure leads him to wonder: what does that mean?

THE TRUTH AS SEMBLANCE

In 1968, Lacan (1968-1969/2006) experiments a formalization of what would escape the structure, that is, the very dimension of *jouissance*. The real that Lacan speaks about at this time is redefined thanks to the formalization of the object a . This concept allows him to go from the big Other (A) to the small other (a), demonstrating the close relationship and extimacy between the signifier and the real. To undertake this redefinition of reality, he proposes a new equivalence between the value of “surplus *jouissance*” of the object a and the concept of profit or surplus value introduced by Marx. Lacan proposes to grasp the dimension of *jouissance* with support of the political economy, and not only of the equivalence between the theory of the signifier and the Freudian thermodynamics that inspired him in his *The Seminar, Book II, The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis* (LACAN, 1954-1955/1978). *Jouissance* is this established term because it is an absolute outer to the field of the Other as the place of speech. The object a , on the other hand, is a concept that was created to cross this limitation. It is conceived as the only infringement to the absolute exteriority of the Thing (*das Ding*) in relation to the field of the Other, because it involves a libidinal factor that integrates to the significant field, which is the *plus-de-jouir*

(*Merlust*). The object *a*, thanks to its topological structure, can function as an equivalent of *jouissance*. This object is not a part of the set of the big Other (A), but a residue of the same importance. Because it is, at the same time, what the big Other has deep inside, a hole, and more exterior to the set. For this reason, in the relationship of the subject to the Other as an effect of the signifier, the object is a topologically structured edge. At the time of Lacan's teaching, we've found the real as a residue determined by the action of the signifier. During this time, the symbolic and the real are not approached as disjoint dimensions.

The most important change consists of separating from the subject submitted to repression and taking it to the speaking being as a being that comes to a climax with the discourse. This conceptual turning is observed in analytical practice, because the speech of the analyzand does not end on the question: "what does that mean?" Now it's necessary to take into account the dimension of what is satisfied through it. At this point, we start to reverse the significance to satisfaction, opening another dimension of the saying that invites us to find something there where "this comes to a climax".

Lacan's second teaching advances — far beyond the truth as a cause — the concept of *jouissance* with the *plus-de-jour* object. In *The Seminar, Book 17, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan defines: "the essence of psychoanalytic theory is a discourse without words" (LACAN, 1968-1969/2006, p. 11). He is based on the writing. However, the logical structure does not separate the function from the semblance in its relationship with the truth: "*The structure is therefore the real. It is determined, in general, by a point of convergence towards impossibility*" (LACAN, 1968-1969/2006, p. 30). The practice of psychoanalysis is distinguished from science because it shows consistency in truth, adding something about the semblance (LACAN, 1971/2006, p. 25).

Lacan, despite demarcating the border between the fields of psychoanalysis and science, is neither a relativist, nor a nominalist. He declares himself a realist. The real that interests him is reduced to castration. The presidency of the *phallus*, a signifier that guides the whole field of *jouissance*, guards the reality of castration. "The fact is that for men, the girl is the *phallus*. And this is what castrates them. That for women, the boy is the same thing, the *phallus*, and this is what castrates them also, because all they acquire is a penis and that spoils things" (LACAN, 1971/2006, p. 25). The semblance of the Name-of-the-Father, essentially, founds the sexual difference as such. The relationship between man and woman with the semblance is not the same. The woman is the truth of man (LACAN, 1971/2006). This structural difference is equivalent to reaffirm that the ghost, truth and fiction don't have the same status for one or the other (LACAN, 1971/2006). The truth is in the field of ghosts that are built as a defense against the real. The more something is presented in experience as real, the less real it is.

In the analytical experience, every sense is reduced to the semblance, something that is *imaginarily symbolic*, that is, a discourse. To address the real, it's necessary to promote the dimension of the myth, that is, the truth of the ghost. The impossible real in psychoanalysis is *jouissance*. The nature of the discourse is to be a semblance, a defense against the real. At this time, despite the fact that the real is the impossible *jouissance*, in the defensive shield of discourse, it is reduced to an element, to a crumb of pleasure: the object *a*. This object is the most real. In the analytical experience, the object *a* logically precedes and anticipates the subject of the unconscious about to arise. It is a proto-subject, an *affekt*, what has the structure affinity with what it is a subject.

THE TRUTH IS NOT THE REAL

With the review of Lacan's last teaching by psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller, a whole theory and practice of psychoanalysis arises around the thesis that the Other does not exist and around the promotion of the concept of the speaking body. The expression "lying truth" was extracted from the text *Preface to the English edition of Seminar 11* (LACAN, 1976/2003).

It is not a question of opposing the lying truth to the true truth, but to consider the connection of the truth with the lie as essential and constituent. The true-lying is a lie that responds to the truth, that reveals it. According to Miller (2009/2011) — this is his interpretation of Lacan — the truth itself is a lie. He even recognizes that it is daring to assume that Lacan would have said that, because the latter extracted the reason of the analytical experience from truth. However, he corrects himself stating that the truth is inherently a lie. He believes that this statement is compatible with the fact that Lacan took the truth as an effect, whose cause is the signifier. As for me, it seems obvious that the truth as an effect of the signifier is not the same thing as the lying truth. Mainly because the chain of signifiers is not arbitrary. It is determined by the master signifier, the Name of the Father. But, if we abolished the role of the Name of the Father in place of the agent of discourse or in place of the master signifier — claiming that the Other does not exist — indeed, we would conclude that every truth is a lie. It is nothing more than a solitary invention, any speculation about the real.

The body is now addressed as a substance with *jouissance*. There is *jouissance* with the speech, with the thought and with the writing. Language is a *jouissance* apparatus, and not only a signification apparatus. There is even a level of the language apparatus, the *lalangue*, where the isolated signifiers (S1) take the advantage of a certain inertia that resists in allowing them to connect to the other signifiers (S2). That's why they are presented as a scattered and chaotic swarm. The interpretation does not decipher the truth; it just connects the signifiers

differently. What's produced through it is just a speculation of knowledge about *lalangue*. Or rather, it's just a lying truth about the meaningless real.

Consequently, according to Miller (2006/2010), psychoanalysis is divided between science and praxis. The perspective of truth and the perspective of *jouissance* justifies this division. He claims that psychoanalysis in the absolute sense leads to an existence devoid of meaning. The practice of psychoanalysis is exactly the opposite. The horizon of psychoanalysis is the real, insofar as it excludes (S1//S2) all meaning. The practice, in contrast, works with the connection (S1-S2) of interpretation, because we assume that there is a relationship between the meaning and the real through the symptom. Because the meaning varies but the symptom remains. In practice, the symptom is identical to the real. Far beyond practice, the real is lawless and meaningless.

A *sinthome* is the rest of the drive satisfaction which is rebel to the civilization that cannot be modified by interpretation. The symptomatic rest is the incurable residue of the traumatic event that will have been the first encounter of the signifier with the real. An encounter that opened the singular way by which a speaking body expresses *jouissance* with the body itself. Silent or talkative, the "*sinthomens*" remain marked by the splitting (*Spaltung*). It is expected that a know how to do it comes up at the end of the analysis. Is this scientific in any way? Is this real rebel to the sense of the same nature as the real of science? Would the real of science be more docile to the research of the scientist? The *sinthome*, according to Miller, is the only breaking rule where there is no sense in the real.

It is the rest of the analytical work of reduction of the quaternary structure of discourse to a traumatic event — the encounter with the non-sexual relationship — in which the conjunction between the signifier (S1) and a body (object *a*) happens. Let's leave to Lacan the task to determine the relationships between the real of *sinthome* and the real of science. The *sinthome* is real, as a hole in semblance, and is distinguished from the ghost and the truth. "The articulation, and I mean the algebraic articulation, of the semblant — and because of this we are only dealing with letters — this is the only apparatus which enables us to designate what is real. What is real is what opens up a hole in this semblant, in this articulated semblant which is the scientific discourse "(LACAN, 1971/2006, p. 28).

For Lacan, the scientific discourse and its network allow the good holes in the right place to be seen. The only reference is the impossible real that his deductions permit to be reached. The consistency limits are given for the accuracy of the discourse apparatus. Psychoanalysis takes the interest for the truth to the extent that its limit is revealed: the uniqueness of *sinthome*. For beyond what is universal and what is particular, the clinic of *sinthome* wouldn't be in my point of view outside the field of science. From the point of view of psycho-

analysis in the absolute sense, the analyst's discourse is scientific. It is scientific in that it reduces the subject of the unconscious to the subject of science. Miller (2009/2011), unlike me, opposes the barred subject that analysis would produce to the thesis that the uniqueness of *sinthome* is a hole in the clinical classifications and diagnoses: "everyone is crazy, everybody makes a knowledge speculation about one's *sinthome*" (MILLER, 2009/2011, p. 71). With this, he goes further "that *psychoanalysis is not the clinic*" (2009/2011, p. 63). Once again Miller chooses the path of the inexistence of the Other to address the relationship between the universal, the particular and the singular.

I believe that this is not the best approach. In addition to the universality of the ghost of castration — that configures the particular position to the man and to the woman before castration — every *sinthome* involves a real contingent, a unique articulation between the master signifier and the object *a*. It is knowledge made of *lalangue*, of drive mounts, of substance with *jouissance* that won't talk to anyone. No interpretation can dissolve it, reducing it to a fiction. To the analyzand, at the end of his analysis, what's left is to make virtue from this vice, embodying his *sinthome*: a unique version of the Name-of-the-Father. The *sinthome* is a way to make the sexual relationship exist, so as a subject, the "sexual responsibility" is only what's left for him (2009/2011, p. 64).

The effects of the truest interpretation never demonstrate their suitability to the real because they can't separate the signifier (S1) from the body (object *a*). So, the therapeutic failure is the only condition of the analytical success. After all, Lacan says, in *The Seminar, Book 16, From an Other to the Other*, that there would be neither an analytic discourse, nor the revelation of the function of the object *a*: "If the analyst, himself, wasn't this effect, I would say more, this symptom that results from a certain impact in history, resulting in a transformation of the relationship to knowledge, as a determinant of the position of the subject, with the enigmatic background of *jouissance*." (LACAN, 1968-1969/2006, p. 46). Psychoanalysis in the absolute sense demonstrates the impossibility that the sense includes all the real. The therapeutic failure demonstrates the analytical success. The actual balance of the analysis is the analyst, a living witness that the *sinthome* carries an incurable dimension.

GOING BACK TO THE STARTING POINT, TO CONCLUDE

Would each one's commitment with their own incurable *jouissance* necessarily imply an aversion to all forms of authority? Would the affirmation to the right of unique *jouissance* necessarily leave us more rebels to the collective forms of vertical, hierarchical organization, subjected to the primacy of the Name of the Father? The analytical effect of radicalization of hysteria that the *sinthome*

denotes would take all the speaking bodies to the end of their analyses to claim the right to be treated as an exception. If this were true, what would become the social bond under these circumstances? Wouldn't this subjective setting favor the formation of small tribes, communities of *jouissance* around segregated lifestyles and more subject to the only consensus produced by the law of the market? Or maybe this radicalization of hysteria — that Miller's interpretation of Lacan suggests — would not lead to a strong ideological content of the analytical process and of the psychoanalyst himself and also establish a community segregated of *jouissance*? Don't The School of Lacan and the World Association of Psychoanalysis run the risk of developing their own rhetoric, the analytic discourse?

These are some questions to which I don't have definitive answers. I risk only some hypotheses about the phenomena of tribalization that I have been observing in the social scene (COELHO DOS SANTOS, 2014). Nowadays everything indicates that the sexual sense is no longer mysterious, enigmatic and private. It has become a shared, common, ordinary sense. Lacan describes this new social order as "iron order" (LACAN, 1973-1974/unpublished), because it is fiercer than the ban by The Name of the Father that gives way to desire. The correlate of the "iron order" is the imperative of *jouissance*. Perversion becomes ordinary, in the sense of banal, and it corresponds to the "iron order". The speaking bodies do not respond to the traditional master signifiers anymore. The decline of the power of standardization is observed — in the sense of sublimation — as the paternal metaphor, the Name of the Father, as the only signifier of the symbolic law. The speaking bodies, without being psychotic, dedicate themselves to embody the place of exception that lacks in the symbolic order. What seems to me to explain the over-exposure of the body, of the image and of the sexual ghost that serves as *jouissance* to each and every one. Maybe the community of psychoanalysts of Lacanian orientation, with their public testimonies of the pass, has also started the era of media.

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