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Wittgenstein by Lacan: remarks on the conception of fact

Abstract:

We examine the Lacanian approach to the concept of fact departing from a point that we repute as being a strategic one: the psychoanalyst’s considerations on Wittgenstein’s treatment of this concept in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. On the one hand, our work explores the promising character that Lacan finds in this treatment (claiming that the meta-language longed for by philosophy is impossible and that there is no other access to fact except via language), whereas, on the other hand, the elucidations concerning this point lead us to the differences between philosopher and psychoanalyst with regard to truth and to what can be said truthfully.

Keywords:
fact; language; Wittgenstein; real

Programa de Pós-graduação em Teoria Psicanalítica do Instituto de Psicologia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro - UFRJ Instituto de Psicologia UFRJ, Campus Praia Vermelha, Av. Pasteur, 250 - Pavilhão Nilton Campos - Urca, 22290-240 Rio de Janeiro RJ - Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil
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