RESULT |
The outcome. Has the coalition pact survived or terminated? |
1: survived coalition pact 0: broken pact |
Observation of the coalitions |
MAJ |
H1: If a coalition cabinet in a presidential regime has a bicameral majority, the coalition agreement would survive |
Regarding the legislative majority of the coalition: 2: bicameral majority 1: majority in one chamber 0 No majority |
Correspondence of the coalition members to their legislative strength |
REELECT |
H2: If an incumbent president could not run for re-election, coalition survival would be affected |
1: the president can run for re-election 0: the president cannot or cannot anymore run for re-election |
Altman (2000)ALTMAN, David (2000), The politics of coalition formation and survival in multiparty presidential democracies: the case of Uruguay, 1989–1999. Party Politics. Vol. 06, Nº 03, pp. 259-283.; Garrido (2003)GARRIDO, Antonio (2003), Gobiernos y estrategias de coalición en democracias presidenciales: el caso de América Latina. Politica y Sociedad. Vol. 40, Nº 02, pp. 41-62.; Chasquetti (2008)CHASQUETTI, Daniel (2008), Democracia, presidencialismo y partidos políticos en América Latina: evaluando la "difícil combinación". Montevideo: Ediciones Cauce. 180 pp..
|
PART |
H3: If the number of parties in the coalition is high, the number of veto players increases and the lifespan of the coalition's agreement should decrease |
Considering the most favourable configuration: 2: 2-party coalition 1: 3-5 party coalition 0: 6 or more parties in the coalition |
Tsebelis (2002)TSEBELIS, George (2002), Veto players: how political institutions work. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 344 pp..; Alemán and Tsebelis (2012); Saalfeld 2011SAALFELD, Thomas (2011), Veto players, agenda control and cabinet stability in 17 European parliaments, 1945–1999. In: Reform processes and policy change. Edited by KÖNIG, Thomas; DEBUS, Marc, and TSEBELIS, George. New York: Springer. pp. 125- 143.
|
INTERM |
H4: If 'relevant' midterm elections (legislative/governor) are to occur, tensions within the coalition should increase and the coalition may not survive |
1: occurrence of midterm elections during the mandate 0: no relevant midterm elections during the mandate |
Cox (1997)COX, Gary W. (1997), Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 360 pp..; Chasquetti (2008)CHASQUETTI, Daniel (2008), Democracia, presidencialismo y partidos políticos en América Latina: evaluando la "difícil combinación". Montevideo: Ediciones Cauce. 180 pp..
|
CTXT |
H5: If a critical situation has been occurring, the incentives for government defection should increase |
1: favourable or 'normal' socio-economic context 0: critical or unfavourable socio- economic context |
ECLAC |