Left-Wing Governmental Alliance in Portugal, 2015-2019: A Way of Renewing and Rejuvenating Social Democracy?*

The 2015-2019 left-wing government alliance in Portugal merits attention for several reasons, of which four stand out. First, because, if it worked well, it may offer a solution to the crisis affecting socialdemocratic parties by pushing them back to the left. Second, because it may offer the radical left greater influence. Third, because existing studies offering comprehensive overviews of the Portuguese case tend to be descriptive in nature. Fourth, because existing studies that are more analytical and explanatory in nature tend to be rather limited in their scope. This study offers an original contribution in that it uses empirical data and takes a comprehensive, analytical and explanatory approach. We argue that the crisis was an important factor in changing old patterns of coalition politics on the Left in Portugal, both because it brought the socialists and radical left parties together in government, and because these changes were very important in guiding the socialists to shift in their policy orientations. Broadly, we argue that the new patterns of coalition politics on the Left and an increased influence of the radical left on domestic politics offer a means of renewing and rejuvenating social democratic parties in Portugal and elsewhere.

The 2015-2019 left-wing government alliance in Portugal is worth studying for several reasons. On the one hand, because it worked well, it can offer both a solution to the crisis affecting social democratic parties (caused largely by their convergence with the neoliberal agenda) by pushing them back to the left, and furnish the radical left with an opportunity to gain further influence. On the other hand, it is worth studying because this solution is rarely adopted in contemporary Europe, where grand coalitions and/or rainbow alliances (with or without social democratic party involvement) are much more common 3 , and because the Portuguese left-wing alliance has been rather successful in both political and economic terms, producing political stability, higher GDP and lower unemployment among other achievements. Finally, and despite the reversal of austerity policies, the 2015-2019 government alliance was compliant with EU economic and financial rules. Moreover, the Portuguese solution has received growing domestic and international interest from journalists and left-wing politicians from other countries who have come to see what is happening and take home some inspiration (ESTANQUE et al., 2018, pp. 111-133;FERREIRA et al., 2017;FREIRE, 2017;SERRANO, 2018, pp. 17-47).
On the academic front, there are three main reasons why this study can add important knowledge (and data) to our understanding of the 2015-2019 Portuguese ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 3 It is true that there are some exceptions to this, such as the left-wing government alliances in Spain (January 2020-present) and Portugal (2015Portugal ( -2019. However, both currently and in the recent past, either grand coalition politics (like Germany today, with the alliance of CDU/CSU with SPD; Austria during much of the post-War era, with the alliances of ÖVP with SPÖ; in Spain for the accession of Mariano Rajoy in 2016, and when the constitution was changed to adapt to the new EU fiscal treaty -the golden clause brake; the support for the Letta government in Italy in 2013; and rainbow alliances (with or without social democratic party involvement, like the coalitions put together by parties of the Left and Right in Finland, in Greece between Syriza and the Independent Greeks, in the Netherlands, etc), have been much more common in European politics than left-wing alliances.
(2021) 15 (2) e0004 -4/34 government alliance, and its implications for the European left. First, existing studies offering more comprehensive overviews of the Portuguese case tend to be descriptive in nature (FERREIRA et al., 2017;FINN, 2017, pp. 05-32). Second, existing studies that are more analytical and explanatory in nature tend to be rather limited in their scope (DE GIORGI and SANTANA-PEREIRA, 2016, pp. 451-468;LISI, 2016, pp. 541-560). This study, by contrast, offers an original contribution in terms of data used and, particularly, in terms of its perspective, which is both comprehensive (in that it considers the roots, characteristics and results of the left-wing alliance in Portugal) and adopts an analytical and explanatory approach. Additionally, some previous studies of social democratic responses to the Great Recession did not consider the Portuguese experience (BAILEY et al., 2014a), while others were more focused on radical left parties' responses and were written before the left-wing alliance was formed (MARCH and KEITH, 2016).
Therefore, they clearly need to be updated.
We  Moreover, these elements of renewal in terms of political alliances and/or public policies can also help to bring about rejuvenation in terms of the personnel involved in the leadership of social democratic parties. Third, we expect to see significant changes in social democratic policy orientations in Portugal following the crisis and the new pattern of coalitional politics (H3), which are related to a growing influence of the radical left upon the socialists in power (H4).

The Great Recession and ideological change within the radical left in Portugal
The    , 1975-2015 Sources: Data elaborated by the author and taken from March and Freire (2012, p. 204 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009  were not so different from that of PCP (BLOCO DE ESQUERDA, 2015a, 2013. The party also rejected the Troika bailout and similarly called for the renegotiation of Portugal's public debt following an audit. It also believes there is a need for peripheral EU countries, especially those most affected by the debt crisis, to come together to oppose the EU's austerity-driven neoliberal approach. Like the PCP, the BE calls for greater fairness in the distribution of income between capital and labour, which is associated with calls for the state and public sector to play a powerful role in society and the economy, and for increased public investment and enhanced social rights. additional factors contributed to the PCP's inability to integrate institutionally (MARCH and FREIRE, 2012). In particular, the PCP belongs to a subgroup of more orthodox communist parties in Western Europe, meaning that, unlike the Eurocommunists, it was fairly close to the USSR and less willing to compromise with the PS. Furthermore, the electoral and organisational strength of the PCP relative to that of the PS was much greater in 1987-89 than it has been subsequently. This harmed the possibility of reaching an agreement because at that time the PS was afraid to align itself with such a powerful rival.
According to the typology of parties of the radical left (MARCH, 2011(MARCH, , 2008 -which, among other things, differentiated between the 'extreme left' sub-family (to which the PCP belongs), which is less willing to compromise for government with the social democrats, and the 'radical left' (to which belongs the BE), which is more willing to compromise for government with the social democrats -the 'radical' BE was expected to be more open to co-operating with the PS than the 'extreme' PCP. Yet, neither the PCP nor the BE had been able to establish any form of collaboration with PS or create new government solutions, either before or during the crisis period. In addition to ideological and policy differences, the legacy of democratisation, the incapacity to achieve a compromise at the elite level, and strategic considerations were also important factors accounting for the lack of agreement (LISI, 2016, pp.    Portuguese parties. For example, on European issues, the gap between the PS and the parties to its left are perhaps greater than that between the PS and PSD. Moreover, it might be asked whether the left-right divide is a relevant divide at all in Portuguese politics; we know that it is, though much more strongly for parties than for voters (BENOIT and MICHAEL, 2006;BUDGE et al., 2001;FREIRE, 2017;KLINGEMAN et al., 2006).  Third, there were strong incentives for the leader of the PS, António Costa, to take power. He knew very well that his choice was to be prime minister of a centre-left government supported by the radical left, or his party would support a right-wing PàF government, and that in the latter scenario, someone else would be better suited for the job.

The process of government formation
Portugal's 21st constitutional government was unique for four main reasons.

The flagship measures of the new political alliance
The mandate of the right-wing coalition during the Troika years of 2011-15 was marked by a strong neoliberal orientation that went far beyond the requirements of the bailout MoU (FINN, 2017, pp. 05-32;FREIRE, 2016, pp. 173-193). This included wage cuts for public sector employees, cuts to pensions, public sector employment cuts and reductions in state benefits as well as extensive privatisations that went far beyond anything contained in the 2011 MoU. Many of the measures introduced were even contrary to the electoral commitments adopted by the winners of the 2011 election (FREIRE, 2016, pp. 173-193). The neoliberal policies introduced by the government during this period was one of the main reasons why the parties of the left were able to reach a compromis e -so they could reverse these decisions (CRUZ, 2015). journalists, senior EU officials and right-wing politicians, the reversal of austerity patterns has resulted in improved economic performance (with increased economic ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 10 This measure was finally passed by parliament on 2 June 2016 and shortly thereafter approved by the president and implemented on 1 July 2016. Although the measure is important in that it reestablishes the pre-Troika status quo, which was a central part of the agreements between the PS and the parties of the radical left as a means of combatting unequal austerity, the truth is that the measure is very limited in its scope and excludes public se ctor employees with individual contracts, which accounts for a large proportion of civil servants recruited since 2000 (i.e. public sector employees with individual contracts). Thus, not only does the measure not apply to private sector employees, it also excludes many in the public sector. If a more progressive approach to working hours is something that the post-election left front wants and considers feasible, then further measures will be needed. growth and lower unemployment). Of course, the relative contribution of the government's domestic policies, the reforms implemented by the previous government and the general improvement in the international economy to these positive economic outputs remain to be scrutinized.
There were also positive financial results, including reductions in the national deficit and public debt, with Portugal remaining in full compliance with EU rules (FERREIRA et al., 2017) 11 . All these positive outcomes helped ensuring that the government remained politically stable, while also raising the stakes for those who might wish to break the alliance (FERREIRA et al., 2017), and increasing popular support for the government.
Overall, this left-left alliance has pushed the PS further to the left on the leftright spectrum, thus reversing the right-wing bias in Portuguese politics (FINN, 2017;FREIRE, 2017). As such, even if the government and the parties of the radical left supporting it maintained some level of austerity and were fiscally conservative in an attempt to stay within EU rules (to a greater extent than they had intended), the truth is that the shift from an asymmetrical pattern of austerity to one that is more balanced and equitably distributed between capital and labour ('tempered austerity'), is in no way irrelevant. Indeed, it is of critical importance because this is the way to restore some of the balance between capital and labour that the rightwing parties tried to undermine during the Troika years.
Thinking about the OVERALL PERFORMANCE of the 2015-2019 Socialist government, which was supported in parliament by the BE and PCP-PEV, how would you rate this government's efforts? Would you say it has done a very good job, a good job, a bad job or a very bad job?
Unlike the stance adopted by its critics, the Portuguese electorate that voted for the parties of the Left, and those who are sympathetic to it, believe the government did a good job. According to data gathered via a panel survey  carried out between May and June 2016 12 , there was broad support for the government's actions (Table 04) and performance (Table 05).

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As with the right-wing parties in Portugal, have the left-wing parties (PS, BE and PCP/PEV) done well by reaching an agreement to govern?   Freire, Lisi and Tsatsanis (2016a). Weighted data by education.

Epilogue: the general election of 06 October 2019 and the new government in Portugal
In terms of empirical data and focus, the present article is about the leftwing alliance for government between late 2015 and late 2019. However, following the general election of 06 October 2019 we thought it appropriate to include a very general epilogue about these recent changes.
The agreements between the four parties (PS, BE and PCP-PEV) signed in November 2015 were a requirement of the then-president, and effectively underpinned the remarkable stability that characterised the 13th legislature. The agreements, which covered issues of governance (motions of censure and trust), also guaranteed political-ideological coherence by ensuring a government that was aligned to the Left. Of course, many matters were not included in the agreements (in particular those dealing with Europe and issues related to political- Left-Wing Governmental Alliance in Portugal, 2015-2019: A Way of Renewing andRejuvenating Social Democracy? (2021) 15 (2) e0004 -22/34 military alignments, as well as, for example, labour laws and support for the financial sector). On these issues the PS minority government relied mainly on support from the right (or at least their abstention) to ensure the measures passed. Overall, the 'geringonça' (contraption) government, as it was often called in Portuguese mass media, had positive outcomes in both political and socioeconomic terms, and, as already mentioned, always complied with EU financial rules.
The   European stage is yet to be seen, the example is there to be emulated. In fact, some data shows the Portuguese solution was being increasingly viewed as a source of inspiration by social democrats across Western Europe (AMES, 2017).

Revised by Fraser Robinson
Submitted on June 23, 2019 Accepted on June 01, 2020