Individual Conditioning Factors of Political Protest in Latin America: Effects of Values, Grievance and Resources

Theories about political protest point to three sets of variables responsible for promoting engagement in such actions: resources, grievance and values. There is consensus on the importance of resources, but the influence of grievance and values remain inconclusive. Discontent alone is not enough to motivate protest, but in societies at intermediate levels of development, grievance could be an explanatory variable. By contrast, values would have a limited effect, given that value change in developing countries could only be incipient. In view of the new cycle of protest in the region and wishing to contribute to the debate on the subject, we aim to discover what the relationship is between these three sets of variables as regards Latin Americans’ predisposition to protest. Given that these countries find themselves at an intermediate level of economic and social development, it would seem that the primary motivation for protest is discontent, as under such circumstances the relative scarcity of resources presents little obstacle to mobilization. On the other hand, as the societies in question are not advanced industrial societies, the associated low dispersion of emancipatory values would exercise limited effect. To test these hypotheses, we looked at data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey with reference to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. The results suggested that grievance was irrelevant as an explanatory factor. Participation in protests in the region is determined by the mobilization of resources and values.

that began in Brazil in 2013 and by 2019 had reached Chile, Ecuador and Bolivia. Some of these were framed by such economic issues as increases in the prices of fuel and public transportation, but they also involved pressure on governments for institutional improvements.
The literature points to three sets of variables that affect decisions to participate in protests: resources, grievances and values. Despite appearing as a key variable in classical studies on social movements (GURR, 1970;McADAM, 1999), according to Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon (2010), there is little empirical evidence to support the effect of discontent on individual engagement. In relation to values, Inglehart (1979) predicted that protests would be incorporated into citizens' daily lives. Changes in the scale of priority given to certain values underlie a reorientation of political participation. Several empirical studies have corroborated these predictions in varied contexts (DALTON, VAN SICKLE and WELDON, 2010;INGLEHART, 1990;INGLEHART and CATTERBERG, 2002), demonstrating that cultural change is related to new patterns of citizenship and engagement.
Resources constitute the third set of conditions for protest: education, free time, money and access to inter-relationship networks are described as important predictors of participation. Political action has costs that need to be borne for it to happen (RIBEIRO and BORBA, 2010), thus more resources imply more participation. Studies on political behavior have converged on a consensus in this respect (ALMOND and VERBA, 1963;VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, and BRADY, 1995).
In order to contribute to the debate on the phenomenon of political protest in Latin America, we seek to understand whether the interaction between the set of variables could explain participation in the local context. The research question that guides this study is: to what extent can protest in Latin America be explained by the interactions between resources, grievance and emancipatory values.
The study of protest in this region may offer a better understanding of this This article is organized into five sections. This introduction is followed by a review of the literature on political protest. The next section presents our methodology, and this is followed in turn by our results and discussions thereof. The article closes with a conclusion in which we summarize our findings.

Individual conditioning factors of political protest
Pioneering studies on political behavior have disregarded the role of protest and restricted the concept of participation to the interaction between citizens and the institutional sphere, mostly through elections (VERBA and NIE, 1972). The collection published by Barnes and Kaase (1979) represents a paradigm shift. Under the auspices of the protests at the end of the 1960s, protest began to be seen as a means of participation, albeit one with an exceptional character, hence 'unconventional participation'. Protest actions have recently become recurrent and have come to represent a wider range of interests and instruments of institutional policy (MEYER and TARROW, 1996), thus rendering the 'unconventional' moniker obsolete (NORRIS, 2003b). Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam (2009) define protest as a confrontation that " [...] begins when people make collective claims of others whose interests would be affected if those claims were granted" (TILLY, TARROW and McADAM, 2009, p. 11). According to this definition, protest is a distributive or redistributive confrontation involving collective actors and social interactions in which one side makes claims in relation to one or more parties -with the State being one of them. For Inglehart (1990), protests are actions that confront elites. Inglehart (1990)  protest is engaged in by more citizens. These same measures are employed in several works on protest 1 .
The literature points to three individual characteristics that can explain participation in protests: resources, grievance and values (DALTON, VAN SICKLE, and WELDON, 2010;QUARANTA, 2015). Resources means the possession of characteristics that make bearable the costs of participation. Grievance comes from the idea of relative deprivation (GURR, 1970) and is a provides a motive for protest.
Post-materialist or emancipatory values tend to encourage participation in general, but have a greater effect on protest (INGLEHART, 1979;WELZEL, 2013). Verba et al. (VERBA and NIE, 1972;KIM, 1971, 1978;VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, and BRADY, 1995) have demonstrated that there is a relationship between resource ownership and activism. Participation requires time, access to information, a network of contacts, and material conditions. Welzel (2013) divides resources into three types: cognitive, material and connective.
'Cognitive resources' may be defined as an individual's level of formal education. For each year of education, there is an increase in the capacity to search for and process political information. This expands the individual's understanding of reality and the means used to direct demands to the political system (DALTON, VAN SICKLE, and WELDON, 2010). This variable has contradictory effects on participation in protests in the countries analyzed. After analyzing participation in Argentina, Alvarez, Levin and Núñez (2017) found that high educational levels were typical of the activists and agitators most likely to lead protest movements. Ribeiro and Borba (2010) found that the same was true of Brazil, Chile and Peru. Valenzuela, Arriagada and Scherman (2012) did not find the same relationship between education and protest among young Chileans living in large urban centers.
Frassinetti (2009) expected to find higher levels of participation among Mexican university students but identified levels very close to those of the general population.
Due to the costs of participation, resources tend to enhance engagement.
Greater availability of resources is accompanied by more free time and greater ______________________________________________________________________________________________ probability of success through political action, primarily through contact with powerful people (DELLA PORTA, 2010). In unequal countries, access to education is linked to individuals' incomes. These two variables -income and educationpartially limit participation to those who have a central position in society, which calls into question the relevance of grievance.
Income and protests participation seem to contradict the centrality model (VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, and BRADY, 1995) in the cases analyzed. Alvarez, Levin and Núñez (2017), found no significant effect on protest participation in Argentina. Ribeiro and Borba (2010) found positive effects for this variable in Peru only.
However, Ortiz-Inostroza and López (2017)  workplaces or any other context, which may or may not be political, or may be somewhere in-between. Participation in them provides training in useful skills for the performance of political roles (VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, and BRADY, 1995). It also promotes cognitive shortcuts and calls on participants to take part in political actions (DELLA PORTA and DIANI, 2006;NORRIS, 2003b). The associative fabric and/or the presence of strong leaders mitigate dependence on participation in relation to other types of resources, since they enhance the engagement inhibited of people otherwise hampered by their socio-economic status (UHLANER, 2001).
As parties and unions were dissolved during dictatorships, community associations became spaces where social movements could take root (GARRETÓN, 2002;SADER, 1988). The positive correlation between civic engagement and political participation is well documented. Klesner (2007)  of scarcity or deprivation of some good or right that is owned by another group (GURR, 1970), a spur to political action. Norris, Walgrave and Aelst (2005) introduce the concept of 'radical disaffection' according to which individuals dissatisfied with the way institutions function are more likely to rise up against them and express themselves through protests, since their lack of trust leads them to seek other ways to express themselves politically. However, their empirical findings do not demonstrate the relationship between radical disaffection and greater participation.
Recent studies use the variable 'satisfaction with democracy' to measure political discontent (QUARANTA, 2015). For Quaranta (2015), the relationship between discontent and protest depicted in the literature is controversial. His study of protest in Western Europe found no evidence that this variable could explain political protest. But political dissatisfaction was significant in nine of the 19 cases analyzed. For McCarthy and Zald (1977), every society has enough dissatisfied people to trigger collective protests. Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon (2010) did not find any effect of discontent on protest but stressed that discontent in developing societies was worthy of deeper investigation.
The relationship between these variables in Latin America is also uncertain.
In Argentina, Alvarez, Levin and Núñez (2017) found a relationship between perception of national economic performance and the likelihood of political activism, but no effect for personal economic assessment. In Brazil, Mendonça and Fuks (2015) found non-linear effects between life satisfaction and protest. In the case of Chile, Ortiz-Inostroza and López (2017) found negligible effects of relative deprivation. Valenzuela, Arriagada and Scherman (2012) found a strong negative relationship between institutional trust and participation in protest among young Chileans. After analyzing the period from 1964 to 2000 in Colombia, Jaramillo (2006) identified an increase in prot ests due to deterioration on the part of the State to protect well-being.
The last group of variables found in the literature are 'values', defined as a set of beliefs internalized during the socialization process that are manifested latently throughout life (SEARS, 1975) and mediate the interactions of individuals with politics by assigning meanings through a framework of beliefs and attitudes (TESSLER, KONOLD, and REIF, 2004). Inglehart (1979)   In view of the foregoing, we have formulated two working hypotheses. The first is that the propensity for protest in Latin American countries depends on the interaction between resources and discontent. Resources are a precondition for participation; without them it is highly unlikely. However, they are dispersed throughout society and lack motivation or framing (BENFORD and SN OW, 2000) that could channel them into political action. Grievance, whether due to a subjective life situation or a negative assessment of government performance, can provide an impetus to call on the resources needed for protest to occur. H2: Value change has no effect on protests, given the low dispersion of emancipatory values in the region.

Methodology
To test the effects of the three sets of variables discussed previously, we looked at data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) project for The choice of cases seeks to represent the diversity of the region, but no Central American country was surveyed. Table 01 depicts the characteristics of the samples. The dependent variable is a potential protest scale that measures individuals' predisposition to protest (BARNES and KAASE, 1979). It was built from five questions about whether the interviewee had participated in 01. petitions; 02.
These variables were coded as 1 = never participated, 2 = could participate and 3 = have already participated and standardized on a scale of amplitude from 0 to 10. Table 02 presents the validation of this construct through factor analysis, made from a polychoric correlation matrix. The Kaiser criterion was used to define the number of factors and, in all cases, only one factor was extracted. As can be seen, the potential protest scale is invariant between cases and measures the same phenomenon in all countries, which makes it a worthy tool for our purposes.
Education was recoded on a scale of low, medium and high. The WVS divides this variable into nine points, so we grouped values from 01 to 04 (up to complete elementary school) as low; values from 05 to 07 (complete high school) as medium; and the last two points, 08 and 09 (higher education) as high. The reference category is low education, which means that the coefficients of the other categories express differences in relation to this point.    Table 03.  MICE is a series of concatenations of univariate procedures to fill in the missing values in the variables. Through this procedure, the missing data were imputed.

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Eight linear regression models were constructed, taking the potential protest scale as a dependent variable. As independent variables, education, income, membership of associations, discontent, institutional trust and emancipatory values were included, in addition to sex and age as controls. This last variable has been identified as an important predictor of protests.
Changes in the way young people relate to politics (NORRIS, 2003b) or the dissatisfaction of more recent generations with the functioning of democracies (LIMA and ARTILES, 2013) have led this group to express themselves politically through protest. In the context of the countries analyzed, Ribeiro and Borba (2010) found no evidence that age is a factor that affects protest in Argentina, Chile or  Table 04 shows the percentages of respondents in each country who responded to having participated in some types of protests. Comparing the fifth This stability is found for participation in boycotts, with less variation than the margin of error. Again, Colombia is an exception, registering a significant increase. The number of people who reported having participated in  Uruguay also showed a reduction similar to that experienced by Peru, but to a smaller degree. Participation in petitions had a difference of -6.5% between the fifth and sixth waves, while participation in marches was -5%. But, unlike Peru, in the other two categories in which it is possible to make a comparison there was growth, not exceeding the margin of error. In the remaining countries, the variation remained stable.

Results and discussions
In Chile, there was growth in at least two categories and in Colombia in all cases.
Graph 01 shows average emancipatory values and the potential protest scale.
Scores from the assessment of the performance of the democracy 3 , produced by the Varieties of Democracy project, were also included. With only seven cases at the macro level, the derived inferences are fragile. However, we can see that Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have the highest incidence of protest but not the highest average emancipatory values. The same is true of the quality of democracy, a criterion according to which Uruguay and Chile are best evaluated but whose citizens are not the most likely to protest. Due to the small number of cases, it is not possible to question the findings of Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon (2010), who claim that democracy favors protests. In other cases, the levels of participation in this type of protest are lower.

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The exception is Colombia, where the coefficient was not significant, indicating that Colombians showed a predisposition to protest very close to that of Argentines and only inferior to Brazilians. For Rodríguez (2016), the peace processes initiated in 2012 allowed room for demands that had been systematically blocked from the public agenda by the conflict between paramilitaries, the army and guerrilla groups.
This, combined with movements' ability to expand their discourses, call on diverse ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 4 Table 05 presents the gross coefficients in the model. Standardized coefficients are described in Table S1, in the methodological appendix.   Emancipatory values are significant in all contexts analyzed. As the theory predicted, this set of beliefs represents an emancipatory impetus, serving as a necessary motivation for citizens to seek changes through protest and overcoming, in motivational terms, their feelings of discontent. Although it is not possible to postulate that the nature of political conflict has changed in Latin America, as described by Inglehart (1990) in advanced industrial societies, change is nonetheless underway, since emancipatory values are very significant in a context where objective living conditions are not as permissive as those of advanced industrial countries.
What the model presented in Table 05 indicates is that the nature of political conflict is also beginning to be guided by values not necessarily related to distribution of wealth. This is evident from the recent social movements such Analyzing the control variables, gender was significant, although with a modest effect. The gender difference is still noticeable, indicating that women are less likely to be involved in protests. The analyzed countries did not address gender differences, since they originate in the socialization process and the roles attributed to women (QUARANTA, 2015). Age was significant, indicating that younger individuals tend to protest more. Since instrumental calculations about whether to engage in protest is greater among adults, who are more integrated into society and lose more in the case of repression, effective participation is greater among younger people (OKADO and RIBEIRO, 2015).
Comparing the general model with the others, we can observe that the results are replicated in all countries. Income showed modest results only for Uruguay. An intermediate education level did not influence protest in Chile. A high education level was significant in all countries, proving that its effect on politics, described since Almond and Verba (1963) (2013) is much more robust when compared to the postmaterialism measure developed by Inglehart (1990), when applied in the Latin American context (OKADO and RIBEIRO, 2017). This would explain the differences in the works that used the Inglehart measure and those that used the index proposed by Welzel (2013).
The profile of protest-prone citizens can be sketched as follows: more educated, a member of one or some associations and a bearer of emancipatory values. Men and young people tend to be more active in this type of engagement, but the coefficients are weak. It is not necessarily dissatisfied people who have a greater propensity to protest, which indicates that the normalization of protest observed in contemporary societies (MEYER and TARROW, 1996;NORRIS, 2003b) also applies to the countries analyzed. Protests are no longer an instrument of those whose demands are barred in the formal channels of representation of the political system and are engaged in by a much more plural set of actors.
How does this profile explain the phenomenon of protest in Latin America?
Dictatorial regimes, conflicts and civil wars systematically dismantled traditional political mobilization agencies. Most unions and political parties were repressed until the political opening period began. In this context of repression, new social movements were organized on the basis of everyday sociability and identity (SADER, 1988), displacing the framework of collective action from the capital-labor relationship and inserting new demands into the public debate. Garretón (2002) points out that starting from the democratic opening period, the phenomenon of protest in the region started to reorganize itself around new axes, related to the improvement of democratic institutions, the deepening and recognition of social rights, the reconstruction of national economies and a new models of modernization, based on cultural and identity diversity.  Although each of the above cases has its own framework, the different protest cycles converge in demanding more responsiveness, integrity and a broadening of rights. These became part of the axes of collective action in Latin America described by Garretón (2002) in the period that followed the democratic transition. They also coincide with the dispersion of emancipatory values described by Welzel (2013). It is expected that, with greater or lesser intensity, political protest will increasingly be incorporated into the political repertoire of Latin American citizens.

Conclusions
Comparing the findings of this work with previous results, mainly those of Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon (2010) and Borba (2015, 2010), we can see similarities and distances. The main finding of Dalton et al. (2010) was the perception that political protests tend to happen more in more democratic societies. In the cases analyzed here, this relationship cannot be observed, since the countries that have the highest evaluations in the functioning of their democracies (Uruguay and Chile) do not have citizens with a greater propensity to protest, as shown in Graph 01. The analysis performed is descriptive and does not allow us to postulate safe inferences, but when the Latin American context is isolated, no effect of structures of opportunity is apparent. More understanding is needed on the effects of context on this measure. Borba (2015, 2010), in both of their works, conclude that the idea of centrality (VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, and BRADY, 1995) is more determinant for explaining the political protest than the evaluative dimension. They are inclined to derive such conclusions from reference to the effects of education on protest. According to their interpretation, cognitive resources are unevenly distributed in Latin American countries, meaning that only a small portion of the population is able to participate in protests.
The cognitive dimension expressed by formal education is the most important explanatory variable in our context. But we must disagree that education levels along can explain participation in protests. More educated individuals tend to participate in greater numbers, whether in conventional or unconventional actions. The evaluative dimension has a certain importance, as it redirects resources, whether material or cognitive, to make a protest happen, since resources are a condition for participation in protests. Without them, it is impossible to meet the costs of political action. However, only values can mobilize these resources and transform them into action. Individual motivations are fundamental in the process of channeling such resources towards political participation.
What our results indicate is that participation in protests in the countries analyzed derives from the interplay between resources (education), mobilization (membership of associations) and motivation (emancipatory values). Resources, expressed by education, are only more important in this relationship because they are a condition. In summary, people who participate in protests remain those who can, who are invited to protest and who believe that their participation is effective (UHLANER, 2001