FROM PATRONAGE TO THE CENTER OF POWER: electoral reforms and centrão 2.0

The article analyzes the results of the 2017 political reform in Brazil, which aimed to penalize parties with a clientelistic behavior. The study adopts the “centrão 2.0” approach, a group united around clientelist demands, relegating the ideological agenda. Three sets of data were used: a questionnaire answered by political scientists, career data of parliamentarians, and information about the behavior of party caucuses in the Chamber. The most clientelistic parties in the legislative arena exhibit the same behavior in the electoral arena, including PSD, Pode, PP, and Republicanos (Republicanos). The reforms of 2007 and 2017 are analyzed, with emphasis on the performance clause created in 2017. Smaller parties were more negatively affected, while medium-sized parties within the centrão benefited from absorbing resources that were previously destined for the smaller parties. The conclusion suggests that the reform, by reducing the number of smaller clientelistic parties, thickened resources and power in medium-sized parties with similar behavior. This reinforces the idea that reforms in democracies tend to favor the elites.

Centrão; Electoral reform; Clientelism; Parties; Patronage