Proper management of quality and food safety is essential for minimally processed vegetables industries in order to achieve competitive advantages. Preventive, proactive, systematic, and specific controls during the production steps of food products are needed to reach the desired quality attributes. The minimally processed vegetables (MPV) chain is composed primarily of farmers, a processing plant, final product carriers, retailers, and institutional markets. In this chain, the transactions between these agents, despite the high frequency, are characterized by large information asymmetry and differences in their asset specificity, allowing the possibility of opportunistic behavior among them, especially in the relationship between the farmers and the processing plant. This causes negative effects on the quality and safety of the final product and, consequently, it can result in adverse selection in the consumer market and lead processing plants to moral hazard. The objective of this study was to define and propose governance structures between the actors of this chain that can minimize the negative effects on the quality and safety of such products. A multiple case study comprising of 18 units and two MPV chains in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro was conducted. It was found that the processing plant leads the transactions between the agents due to the high specificity of its assets, to the detriment of other agents. Therefore, hierarchical and hybrid governance structures were proposed based on the contracting agent and type of raw material being transacted.
Food quality and safety; Minimally processed vegetables; Governance structures; Transaction costs
