

O “Islã” como identidade nacional para a formação do Paquistão: o pensamento político de Muhammad Iqbal e Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi

“Islam” as the national identity for the formation of Pakistan: the political thought of Muhammad Iqbal and Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi

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Resumo: Em 1930, Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) concebeu pela primeira vez a criação de um estado separado para os muçulmanos indianos, para quem, na sua opinião, a força formativa mais importante ao longo da História tinha sido o Islã. Apesar de ter sido elaborado sob ideologias seculares, o movimento pela criação do Paquistão só conseguiu mobilizar as massas apelando ao Islã, pelo que o nacionalismo ficou dependente dele e, como consequência, politizou a fé. Um número de organizações religiosas e comunitárias muçulmanas assinalou a importância de promover o nacionalismo muçulmano bem como a consciência política e os interesses da comunidade. À medida que a criação do Paquistão se foi tornando cada vez mais evidente, Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) aumentou seus ataques contra a Liga Muçulmana, opondo-se à ideia de nacionalismo muçulmano, pois isto excluiria o Islã da Índia. O aumento do caráter comunitário do debate político na Índia na época, o apelo feito aos símbolos religiosos na formulação de novas alianças políticas e os programas de diferentes grupos muçulmanos, bem como dos líderes da Liga Muçulmana, criaram um clima no qual o discurso teológico de Mawdudi encontrou eco e importância. Este artigo, usando em particular o pensamento político de Muhammad Iqbal e Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi, analisa a forma como o Islã foi utilizado para justificar um estado separado para os muçulmanos indianos e os impactos e desafios sobre o processo político e a sua evolução, ao mesmo tempo que conclui que o “Islã”, como símbolo político, pode assumir diferentes formas de acordo com as ideias previamente defendidas por aqueles que o praticam.

Palavras-chave: Índia; Paquistão; Islã; Nacionalismo; Muhammad Iqbal; Mawdudi.

Abstract: In 1930, Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) devised for the first time the creation of a separate state for the Indian Muslims, for whom, according to him, the main formative force through History had been Islam. Although predicated upon secular ideologies, the Pakistan movement was able to mobilize the masses only by appealing to Islam. Nationalism became dependent on Islam and, as a result, politicized the faith. A number of Muslim religious and communal organizations pointed to the importance of promoting Muslim nationalism, political consciousness and communal interests. As the creation of Pakistan became more and more likely, Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) increased his attacks on the Muslim League, objecting to the idea of Muslim nationalism because it would exclude Islam from India. The increasingly communal character of the Indian politics of the time, and the appeal made to religious symbols in the formulation of new political alliances and programmes by various Muslim groups as well as Muslim League leaders, created a climate in which Mawdudi’s theological discourse found

understanding and relevance. This paper, using especially the political thought of Muhammad Iqbal and Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi, analyses how Islam was used to justify a separate state for the Indian Muslims, and the impacts on and challenges to the political process and its evolution, at the same time that it concludes that “Islam”, as a political symbol, can have many forms according to the ideas previously held by those who use it.

Keywords: India; Pakistan; Islam; Nationalism; Muhammad Iqbal; Mawdudi.

Introduction

On the 23rd March 1956, sixteen years after the Lahore Resolution demanding a separate state for the Indian Muslims, Pakistan became an Islamic Republic, the first of its kind in the world. The concept of “Islamic Republic” is a very problematic one, with disparities between what *ought* to be and what *actually is*.

According to Nazih N. Ayubi, Nader Hashemi and Emran Qureshi (1995, p. 318-325), to define the proper relation between Islam and the state remains a central and unresolved question. Among the chief questions are whether or not revealed sacred text, in this case the *Qur’an*, should be the exclusive or principal source of political legitimacy, and whether or not government should enforce a particular religious doctrine. Islamist movements have been strengthened globally (as recent elections in different countries of the Arab world have shown), and though their ideological positions vary greatly and are contingent upon local circumstances, they all insist on the primacy of the *Shari’a*, even though they may interpret it in vastly different ways. Support for the ideal of an Islamic state today needs to be situated against the broad failure of the secular post-colonial Muslim-majority state. At times, Muslim political identity today is formed in opposition to and rejection of “the West.” Thus Western support for secularism and liberal democracy, while it pursues foreign policies that are viewed as inimical to Muslim interests, engenders a reactive oppositional Muslim political identity. The consequences of this identity construction lend support to the abstract idea of an “Islamic state” as an alternative to Western models.¹

The modern concept of the Islamic state emerged as a reaction and response to the demise of the last caliphate in Turkey in 1924. The Syrian Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) started the move in that direction when, as a protest against the Turkish decision after World War I to turn the caliphate into a purely spiritual authority, he published, in 1923, his book *Al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-‘Uzma (The Caliphate or the Grand Imamate)*, in which he argued that the caliphate had always been, and should continue to be, a combination of spiritual and temporal authority. He called for an Arab *khilafat durura* (caliphate of necessity or urgency) and maintained that this would give both Muslim and non-Muslim Arabs a state of their own. (LEGRAIN, 2006).

The intellectual evolution of the concept of *al-Islam din wa dawla* (Islamic Religion and State) took another step forward about a decade later. The political context was marked by British colonialism and the Indian-Pakistani writer Abu'l 'Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) was its major proponent. Indian Muslims had indeed reacted most vociferously to the demise of the Ottoman caliphate by, among other things, forming the Khilafat movement. Most of Mawdudi's political ideas were developed in India in the turbulent period between 1937 and 1941. But whereas many saw the emergence of Pakistan as grounds for optimism, what Mawdudi wanted was not a Muslim state, *i.e.*, a state for the Indian Muslims, but an Islamic state, *i.e.*, an ideological state run only by true believers on the basis of the *Qur'an* and *Sunna*. Consequently, Mawdudi directed much of his writing against nationalism and against democracy, because he believed that either or both would result in a non-Muslim government.

There were two basic Muslim positions in India during the interwar period. First, there were those Muslim intellectual and political leaders who supported the All-India Congress Party, actively participated in its politics, and encouraged their fellow Muslims to do the same. They were fiercely anti-imperialist and viewed opposition to the British to be the foremost concern of their community. The most important figures were Abu al-Kalam Azad (1888-1958) and Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957).² Secondly, there were those Muslim leaders, such as Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), in the All-India Muslim League, who did not view the struggle against the British to be the paramount concern of the Muslims and who remained apprehensive about living as a minority in a predominantly Hindu India. They believed that Muslims were best advised to reassess their commitment to the Congress Party and to focus on safeguarding and furthering their communal interests before an uncertain future.

Using especially the political thought of Muhammad Iqbal and Mawdudi, this paper analyses how Islam was used to justify, before, during, and after the establishment of Pakistan, a separate state for the Indian Muslims, and the intense debate among the Muslim *intelligentsia* in India about the nature of that state.

Muhammad Iqbal and the State for Indian Muslims

Originally conceived as a State for the Indian Muslims, and supposed to be a *secular* country, the origin of the idea of Pakistan has often provided lively subjects for controversy among scholars and publicists. Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, in his interview with Beverley Nichols (1898-1983), pointed out that the idea of dividing India was not new for it had occurred to John Bright (1811-1889) in 1877. (NICHOLS, 1944, p. 192). Talking about the distant future when the British

Government might have to withdraw from India, Bright urged that the peoples of different provinces in India should be encouraged to regard themselves as citizens of different states so that at the time of transfer of power there might be five or six great successor states. (COUPLAND, 1944, p. 50-51). Similarly, Communist writers have credited Stalin with foreseeing as early as 1912 the breakup of India into diverse nationalities: “In the case of India, too, it will probably be found that innumerable nationalities, till then lying dormant, would come into life with the further course of bourgeois development”. (DUTT, 1955, p. 239).

The idea of Muslims forming a separate state in India was mooted as early as December 1883. It was Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (1840-1922) who suggested in Calcutta that in his view practically all the Provinces of Northern India should be placed under Muslim Government and those of Southern India under Hindu Government. In this scheme, the British would continue as the controlling power drawing their support from British troops stationed in each of the provinces, but “the whole civil administration, legislation, and finance should be left to native hands”. (BLUNT, 1909, p. 107-8).

After the inauguration of the Government of India Act, 1919, it became clear that the British seriously contemplated the transfer of political power by stages to Indian hands. This created a feeling of uneasiness among Muslims as regards their share of power. It was significant that even at that stage Muslims regarded themselves and their problems as somewhat separate from the rest of India. Thus, Mawlana Mohammad ‘Ali Jouhar (1878-1931),³ speaking of the resolution that reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier province of India in the annual session of the All-India Muslim League held in Bombay in December 1924, said:

If a line be drawn from Constantinople to Delhi on the map of the world it would be found that at least right up to Saharanpur, there was a corridor of purely Muslim people or Muslims were in clear majority. This gave them the clue for understanding the backward condition in which the Frontier and the Punjab were purposely kept by those in power.

The Nehru Report of 1928 recorded:

The Muslims being in a minority in India as a whole fear that the majority may harass them, and to meet this difficulty they have made a novel suggestion – that they should at least dominate in some parts of India.

A clear conception of a separate state was given by Muhammad Iqbal on the occasion of the 25th session of the All-India Muslim League, held in Allahabad and where he was elected as president.⁴ In an historical speech, on the 29th December 1930, Iqbal devised for the first time the

creation of a separate state for the Indian Muslims (IQBAL, 1930), and his conception was not only clear but comprehensive in the sense that it was based on both geographical and ideological factors.

Echoing the *Addresses to the German Nation* by Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Muhammad Iqbal talked about the question of Islam and Nationalism, saying that for the Muslims of India the main formative force through History had been Islam, which had given them the emotions and basic loyalties which gradually united scattered individuals and groups, transforming them into a well defined people. Addressing the question of the unity of the Indian nation, Iqbal raised the issues of the problem Indian Muslims would face as a minority, in their purposes of applying Islam as a moral, political and ethical ideal, if religion was to be considered a private matter, facing the risk of suffering the same fate as Christianity in Europe. For him, the unity of the Indian nation had to be searched not in the negation of some but in the reciprocal harmony and in the cooperation of many. Although the attempts to find that principle of internal harmony had failed so far, still each group had its own right to a free development according to its lines.

Following this line of thought, Iqbal considered that, contrary to European countries, India was composed of non-territorial units with human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behaviour was not determined by a common racial conscience, and even the Hindus were not a homogenous group. The principle of European democracy could not be applied to India without acknowledging the fact of the existence of communitarian groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India inside India was, for Iqbal and for that reason, totally justified. That State would include the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan, with self-government within, or without, the British Empire. The formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appeared to him to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least those of North-West India, and that state would be the best defender against a foreign invasion of India. Iqbal assured the Hindus that they did not have to be afraid of the fact that the creation of Muslim autonomous states would mean the introduction of a religious government, since he, Iqbal, had already indicated the meaning of the word “religion” as applied to Islam. The Muslims of India, who were seventy million, were far more homogeneous, in Iqbal’s opinion, than any other people in India. Indeed, they were the only Indian people who could fit the description of a nation, in the modern sense of the word.

According to Iqbal, Islam was not a church. It was a state conceived as a contractual organism “way before Rousseau” had thought of something like that, and animated by an ethical ideal that saw man not as a creature rooted in earth, defined by this or that portion of land, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of social mechanism, and having rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism: “The Hindus, though ahead of Muslims in almost all respects, had not yet

been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which was necessary for a nation, and which Islam had given to the Muslims as a free gift.” On the other hand, Iqbal was against nationalism based on territory, alerting Muslim leaders and politicians not to allow themselves to be carried away by the “subtle but fallacious argument that Turkey and Persia and other Muslim countries were progressing on national, *i.e.* territorial, lines, because the Muslims of India were differently situated”: the countries of Islam outside India were homogenous and the minorities there belonged, in the language of the *Qur’an*, to the “people of the Book”, *i.e.*, they were protected. In India, with the caste system, there were social barriers between Hindus among themselves and between Hindus and Muslims. (IQBAL, 1930).

These issues were again focused in the Presidential Address delivered at the annual session of the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore, on the 21st March 1932 (IQBAL, 1932), and more developed in his book, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. (IQBAL, 1934). However, what was most noteworthy in Iqbal’s conception was the ideological basis of his state. His idea was not inspired by fear or hostility towards the Hindus:

A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities... Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and my behaviour; and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby re-creating its whole past, as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness. (IQBAL, 1930; SAYEED, 2004, p. 102-6).

For Muhammad Iqbal, the individual, the basic unit of Muslim society, was mandated by the *Qur’an* as God’s vicegerent with the mission of carrying out God’s will on Earth. Muslims shared in this continuous process of creation, bringing order from chaos, in an effort to produce a model-society to be emulated by others: the individual was elevated through the community and this, the community, was organized by the individual.

In the centre of Iqbal’s vision on Islam was the concept of *Tawhid* (Oneness), applied not only to God’s own nature but also in its relation with the world. Because God is an only creator, sustainer and judge of the Universe, God’s will or law also governs all aspects of its creation and should be realised in all areas of life. This belief was the base for Iqbal’s vision of the community as a religiopolitical state and for the supremacy of Islamic law in Muslim society. Basing himself on the prophetic tradition which says that the “whole of the earth is a mosque”, and in the role of Muhammad as a leader of the state in Medina, he concluded that “all which is secular is for that reason sacred in the roots of its existence”, without separation of the spiritual and the temporal.

“Church” and “State” were not the two sides of the same thing, because Islam was an unanalysable singular reality, patent in the law, being the *Shari’a*, for Iqbal, a comprehensive guide for a society.⁵

During the nineteenth century, Islamic law, with the exception of family law, had been replaced in many Muslim countries with European codes. In the Indian sub-continent the interaction between Islamic and British laws had produced the Anglo-Muhammadan law, mainly based on British Common Law. Convinced that Islam’s survival, and that the role of the Muslim community as a political and moral force, as well as its unity and life, in India, were dependent on the centrality of Islamic law, Iqbal emphasized to Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League, the future need for a state or states for the Muslims of India. However, Iqbal did not have in mind the simple restoration of law as it was framed in the doctrines of schools of law. For him, Islam’s way of life was dynamic and open to change and a differentiation was made between the eternal and immutable principles of the *Shari’a* and those which were a product of human interpretation and, for that reason, subject to change.

Iqbal faced Islam’s condition as “dogmatic slumber” which had produced five centuries of immobility due to blind obedience to tradition. Believing that the restoration of Islamic vitality required the “reconstruction” of the sources of Islamic law, he acknowledged at the same time the role of the ‘*Ulama* in the past, blaming them for the conservatism of what had characterized Islam since the fall of Baghdad in 1258. With the perpetuation of what Iqbal called the fiction of closing the doors of *Ijtihad* (independent reasoning), the ‘*Ulama* had stopped the dynamical process of reinterpretation and reapplication of Islamic principles to new situations, being satisfied with simply perpetuating established traditions.

So, Iqbal rejected the centuries’-old trend of considering Islamic law as permanent and sacred and, like others, he believed that Muslims should, once more, reaffirm their right to *Ijtihad*, *i.e.*, of reinterpreting and reapplying Islam to changing social conditions, a right which belonged to each and every Muslim who was qualified for that, and not only to the ‘*Ulama*. He also believed that the traditional criteria used to designate someone as an interpreter were both self-serving and short-sighted: the ‘*Ulama*’s incapacity in broadening their training had left them ill-prepared for resolving many new and modern questions, and, for these reasons, Iqbal expanded and redefined *Ijtihad* and *Ijma* (consensus), suggesting that the right of interpreting and applying Islam to the community should be transferred from the ‘*Ulama* to an assembly or national legislature. This collective or corporate *Ijtihad* would be the authoritative consensus of the community, and, in this way, he also transformed the meaning of community’s consensus from its traditional form, the accord of religious leaders and specialists, to a modern one, that of the modern legislative assemblies, whose majority of members would have a better knowledge of contemporary issues, for

which the legislature should seek the counsel of specialists of traditional and modern disciplines. (VOLL, 1994, p. 234-5).

For Iqbal, since equality and brotherhood of the faithful were central aspects of Islam, democracy was its more important political ideal, which had already led him to say that England embodied this “Muslim” quality: “Democracy has been the great mission of England in modern times.... It is one aspect of our own political ideal that is being worked out in it. It is... the spirit of the British Empire that makes it the greatest Muhammadan Empire in the world”. (IQBAL, 1908).

The bases for an Islamic democracy, *i.e.*, equality and brotherhood of all Muslims, were contrary to the notion of nationalism. Although an Indian nationalist when young, Iqbal dedicated himself in later times to Pan-Islamism. Besides considering territorial nationalism as antitetical to the universal brotherhood established by the Prophet Muhammad and embodied in the Caliphate, Iqbal viewed nationalism as an instrument used by colonialism to dismember the Muslim world. Islam’s political idea, according to Iqbal, was one of transnational community which transcended ethnical, racial and national bonds, based on an internal cohesion which stemmed from the community’s religious-political ideal unity. Iqbal rejected earth-rootedness, the notion of native country and place, devaluing the Arabian context of primitive Islam, and cutting the *Umma* (a concept which evokes the whole of the Muslim community in the world) from any concrete embodiment of ideal relation between *millat* (religious community) and *qawm* (nation), with the possible exception of the time of the first four Caliphs (632-661), seeing it as the expression of a spiritual vision, in the centre of which was the Prophet. The argument that Muhammad’s community was a new creation was based partially in the belief that religion, contrary to art, politics and social institutions, was foundational for the society that he developed. (WAUGH, 1983, p. 156-68). The brutality of the First World War and the aggressive nationalisms in Europe, which would lead to the Second World War and to colonial and imperial exploitation in other parts of the world, were the main reasons for Iqbal’s gradual transformation from Indian nationalist to Muslim nationalist, which can be assessed by reading some of his poems, especially the following excerpt from *Rumuz-i Bekhudi*

Our Essence is not bound to any Place;
The vigour of our wine is not contained
In any bowl, Chinese and Indian
Alike the sherd that constitutes our jar,
Turkish and Syrian alike the clay
Forming our body, neither is our heart
Of India, or Syria, or Rum,
Nor any fatherland do we profess
Except Islam
.....

Thou art a Muslim, do not bind thy heart
To any clime, nor lose thyself within
This world dimensionate. The Muslim true
Is not contained in any land on earth;
Syria and Rum are lost within his heart
Grasp thou the heart, and in its vast expanse
Lose this mirage of water and of clay.
Our Master, fleeing from his fatherland,
Resolved the knot of Muslim nationhood.⁶

Like al-Afghani (1838-1897) and others, Iqbal's pan-Islamic compromise was moderated by political realism. He accepted the need for Muslims to gain national independence, but believed that, as a family of nations based upon a common spiritual heritage, common ideas and law - the *Shari'a* - they should form their own League of Nations. Applying this reasoning to the situation of Indian Muslims, in 1930, he concluded that internal communitary harmony between Hindus and Muslims was impossible. Iqbal was convinced that the threat of Hindu rule in an independent India needed the establishment of a separate region for Indian Muslims, so they could preserve their distinctive identity and way of life:

The nature of the Prophet's religious experience as disclosed in the *Qur'an* is wholly different from that of Christianity. It is an individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam is organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on [Indian] national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principles of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. (quoted in DONOHUE and ESPOSITO, 1982, p. 91-93).

For Iqbal, Islam did not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter, God and the Universe, "Church" and "State", because each one of these parts was organically related with the other, and the individual was not a citizen of a temporal organization, since he was also spiritual. According to Iqbal, Prophet Muhammad's experience had created a political and social order, based on revelation and, for this reason, Islam's religious ideal was organically connected with the social order that he had created. The rejection of one would mean the rejection of the other. So, the construction of a polity based on national lines, if it meant the replacing of the Islamic principle of solidarity, was simply unthinkable for a Muslim, and Indian History had already shown that the different units of India were not inclined to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole, with each group being intensely zealous of its collective existence.

As John L. Esposito (2010) asserts, if Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) had been the traditionally educated Muslim who sought to make modern Western liberal thought acceptable to

Islam, Muhammad Iqbal was a modern Muslim, with a Western education, who reinterpreted Islam in conjunction with Western thought to show its relevancy as a viable alternative to Marxist and Christian European ideologies.

Mawdudi and the Islamic State

Although predicated upon secular ideologies, the Pakistan movement was able to mobilize the masses only by appealing to Islam. Nationalism became dependent on Islam and, as a result, politicized the faith. A number of Muslim religious and communal organizations pointed to the importance of promoting Muslim nationalism, political consciousness and communal interests.

As the creation of Pakistan became more and more likely, Mawdudi (1903-1979) increased his attacks on the Muslim League, objecting to the idea of Muslim nationalism because it would exclude Islam from India and surrender the domain of the Mughals to the Hindus. The increasingly communal character of the Indian politics of the time, and the appeal made to religious symbols in the formulation of new political alliances and programmes by various Muslim groups as well as Muslim League leaders, created a climate in which Mawdudi's theological discourse found understanding and relevance.

Born in 1903 in Aurangabad, a town in the former princely state of Hyderabad (Deccan), Abu'l 'Ala 'Mawdudi traced his lineage to an old, well-known family of Delhi that had been associated with the Mughal court and had later served the *nizams* of Hyderabad.⁷

Mawdudi had witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the failure of the Caliphate Movement to save that empire from being dismembered by Britain and France, which, added to growing Hindu assertiveness in the Indian Freedom (Independence) Movement, contributed to Mawdudi's perception of the continued deterioration of Muslim power and the threat to Islam and the Muslim community. Mawdudi blamed European colonialism and the emergence of modern nationalism, a foreign and Western ideology which divided rather than united peoples, replacing the universal or Pan-Islamic ideal of solidarity with a more tenuous and divisive identity based upon language, tribe, or ethnicity. The *Khilafat* movement, which marked the beginning of open Muslim political activism in the context of the independence movement, was the best example of this trend. From early on Mawdudi revealed a deep concern with the notion of the *Umma*, a concern which surfaces in his writings at two points: when discussing the creation of a pure Islamic order at the local level, and when envisioning a universal Islamic order. Both developments were predicated on the creation of true *Ummas*.

In 1921, Mawdudi joined the *Tahrik-i Hijrat* (Migration Movement) to protest against British rule over India. The *Tahrik* was premised on the notion that since India was no longer part of *Dar al-Islam*, all Indian Muslims should migrate to Afghanistan, where Islam continued to reign. The traditional Islamic division of the world into *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*, which undergirded the *Tahrik*'s logic, framed the problem of British imperialism not as one of foreign rule over India, but as one of non-Muslim rule over Muslims, a problem not limited to one geographical territory or nation but involving all Muslims alike. Imperialism could not, therefore, be overcome by nationalism but through the creation and preservation of an Islamic *Umma*. In this case, sustaining an Islamic normative order in India was not enough; Muslims needed to move physically beyond the purview of British authority. Traces of a vision of the world divided into an Islamic *Umma* and non-Muslim *Dar al-Harb* would periodically continue to surface in Mawdudi's works. (QURESHI, 1979, p. 41-59).

Similar considerations governed Mawdudi's understanding of the aim and political function of the *Khilafat* movement. For him the Caliphate stood not only as the symbol of Muslim unity but as a sacrosanct institution that would preserve that unity and give shape to a transnational *Umma* whose borders would encompass all Muslim territories. The *Khilafat* movement was thus simultaneously a struggle against Western imperialism (which he viewed as the principal obstacle to Muslim unity) and an affirmation of the centrality of the *Umma* as an ideal, as well as a reality for Muslim life. The abolition of the caliphate by the new Turkish Republic in 1924 ended the *Khilafat* movement in India, with major implications for Mawdudi's thinking. He was greatly disturbed by Arab hostility to Ottoman rule, and, more importantly, by the way in which Turkey had discarded the Caliphate. In both cases he believed nationalists, in collusion with Europeans, had betrayed Islam. It was then that Mawdudi developed his deep-seeded suspicion of nationalism, which he came to view as a surreptitious form of Western domination and the foremost threat to the realization of the *Umma*.

Despite his open hostility to nationalism, Mawdudi became cognisant of its seeming inevitability. The end of the caliphate had proved that nationalism, for better or worse, was a force whose grip on the Muslim imagination was only likely to grow. Moreover, with the caliphate out of the picture, the *Umma* was unlikely to materialize as a territorial reality. However, it was likely to shape how Muslims might imagine or idealize their relations to "others" in the international arena. From that point on, Mawdudi tacitly accepted nationalism in the framework of his idealization of the *Umma*. He would seek to address and accommodate both, sometimes conceding the reality of the nation-state system and other times asserting the inevitable ascendance of the *Umma*.

In 1926 Swami Shradhanand (1856-1926), a renowned Shuddhi activist, was assassinated, causing much anti-Muslim bitterness in the Indian press and among the Hindus, and a feeling of desperation and apologetic resignation among Muslims. (NASR, 1994, p. 3-5). After Shradhanand’s murder, Mawdudi plunged into the communalist movement, making a choice which determined the direction of his lifelong struggle to preserve the place of Islam in Muslim life. In 1929 he published his book *Al-Jihad fi’l-Islam [Jihad in Islam]*, not only as a response to Hindu challenges to Islam following Shradhanand’s death, but also as a prologue to a lifetime of religious and political effort. By 1932 the Muslim predicament had become the focus of Mawdudi’s life, and he increasingly looked to Islam for solutions and gradually adopted a revivalist approach. The result was the movement that Mawdudi’s followers regard as the heir to the tradition of Islamic *tajdid* [revival, renewal] and as its greatest manifestation in modern times.

Mawdudi articulated his views amid the lively and bitter debate between Jinnah and the Muslim supporters of the Congress Party. Some of Mawdudi’s expositions on the relation between religion, society, and politics were recorded in books on Muslim politics of the time. From 1937 to 1941, Mawdudi published in *Tarjuman al-Qur’an* a series of essays dealing with the political matters of India’s future independence and their implications for the Muslims. These essays were later printed in book form in the three volumes entitled *Musulmanon awr Mawjudah Siyasi Kashmakash [Muslims and the Current Political Crisis]*, and in the volume *Mas’alah-i qaumiyat [Question of Nationalism]*.

The particular source of Mawdudi’s apprehension was the stance of the Indian National Congress, which affirmed that all Indians constituted a single nation and that a future government in India had to be both democratic and secular. Echoing the thought of Muhammad Iqbal, Mawdudi simply did not believe that the Muslims of the subcontinent constituted one nation along with all other Indians. He insisted that the Muslims had an identity or nationality of their own which was Islam; they were bound together not by ties of race, geography, language, mutual interest, economics, or even culture, but by their commitment to follow the will of God in their lives. There were no claims which Muslims could raise against the British or anyone else on the basis of their common nationhood with other Indians; he stated quite unequivocally that Islam was the polar opposite of nationalism and all that nationalism stood for.

Within a united India, where all were Indians together, it would be construed as traitorous for Muslims to attempt to maintain their peculiar identity and sense of nationality. They would, in fact, be constrained to accept and manifest the identity of the Hindu majority. Although Mawdudi shared the desire of other Indians for freedom from British rule, independence from the British was not worthwhile in itself if the Indian Muslims were to exchange “servitude” to outsiders for

“servitude” to the majority within their own country. Hence, he urged the Muslims not to participate in the freedom struggle being led by the Indian National Congress and its nationalist Muslim supporters.

In 1937, the *Jamia’at-i ‘Ulama-i Hind*, an organization founded in 1919 and led by Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), the renowned Indian Islamic leader, also head of the *Dar ul-Ulum Deoband*, was split with a faction which was supportive of the Muslim League’s demands, originating the *Jamia’at-i ‘Ulama-i Islam*, led by Shabbir Ahmad Usmani (1886-1949). In 1938, Madani wrote *Islam awr mutahhadih qaumiyyat [Islam and Composite Nationalism]*. In this book, Madani, who had spent some time in British jails between 1914 and 1917, depicted a multicomunal Indian state that would be compatible with the teachings of Islam, and laid out in systematic form the positions that the author had taken in speeches and letters from the early 1920s on the question of nationalism as well as other related issues of national importance. Using various verses from the *Qur’an*, Madani, with his book, aimed at opposing the divisive policy of Muhammad Iqbal, Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League, dealing mainly with two aspects: the meaning of the term *Qawm* and how it was distinct from the term *millat*, and the crucial distinction between those two words and their true meanings in the *Qur’an* and the *Hadiths*. By proposing “composite nationalism”, this book strongly argued that despite cultural, linguistic and religious differences, the people of India were but one nation, and, according to the author, any effort to divide Indians on the basis of religion, caste, culture, ethnicity and language was a manoeuvre of the ruling power.

Mawdudi reacted strongly, attacking Madani in public speeches and in a number of tracts. Madani’s book, along with the Congress Party’s direct appeal to Muslims through such measures as the “mass contact movement,” which was directed at taking the Congress Party’s message to the Muslim masses and recruiting larger numbers of Muslims for the party, convinced Mawdudi that the first order of business was to close off the Muslim community to the Congress Party, articulating an Islamist ideology from that point on in order to preclude the possibility of a “composite nationalism.”

In Mawdudi’s writings the term employed to translate “secular” (*la dini*) in fact literally means “religionless”. Theoretically, in a secular system, the government would adopt a neutral attitude towards all religious groups, treating them equally. What would actually occur, according to Mawdudi, was that the government would be secularist only toward the minority religious groups, neither helping nor restraining them, but it would be necessarily partisan toward the religion of the majority. Congress secularism, believed to be based on Gandhi’s teachings about tolerance toward all other religions, was nothing but a drawing out of the implications of a specifically Hindu point

of view. Congress policy would, therefore, result in the imposition of Gandhi’s religious views on the whole of India. Mawdudi’s answer to the situation of the Muslims in India was that they should become better Muslims. As the result of that very process they would achieve organization, discipline, and social effectiveness, enabling them to transform the whole of India into *Dar al-Islam*.

Islamism, for Mawdudi, was the assertion of the Muslim community’s prerogative to determine the limits of individual moral behaviour and define the nature of a Muslim’s relation to Islam. But more importantly, and as a result, it was the means to create impregnable walls around the Muslim community. By interpreting Islam as an ideology for a vigilant community that emphasized puritanism, the external dimensions of the faith, and strict obedience to Islamic law, and by discouraging those customs and rituals that resembled Hindu practices or could serve as a bridge to Hinduism, Mawdudi moved to change the cultural milieu of Indian Islam, as well as the context in which Muslims were encountering the political choices before them. As the balance of relations between Muslims and Hindus would change at the national level and in neighbourhoods, towns, and villages, “composite nationalism” would cease to be a viable option. In the process, the resurgence of Islamic sentiments, as interpreted by Mawdudi, would lay the foundations for organization building and political activism. His conception of the revival (*tajdid*) and reform (*islah*) of Islam, therefore, was at its inception tantamount to radical communalism. In 1938, in a lengthy article in *Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an*, Mawdudi wrote that Nehru’s promises of scientific progress and nationalist democracy would be “tantamount to the extinction of Islam, and hence Muslims.” In the same article Mawdudi systematically attacked the Congress’s position on secular nationalism and democracy as unworkable and detrimental to the interests of Indian Muslims. In its place he offered two “two-nation” schemes of his own, proposing a state within a state (*riyasat dar riyasat*) which echoed Muhammad Iqbal’s demand for a “Muslim India within India.” He then offered plans that would preserve the territorial integrity of India and still give Muslims substantial communal autonomy. The first plan favoured dividing India into two “culturally autonomous” democratic entities, which would form the “international federation” of India with a constitution similar to those of “Switzerland, Australia, or the United States”. (NASR, 1994, p. 109-10).

Mawdudi’s vision unfolded in the context of rapid polarization of the Muslim community. Following the Government of India Act of 1935 and the elections of 1937, the Congress began to make serious overtures to Muslims. Some were enticed into serving as junior partners to the Congress, thus acknowledging Hindu political ascendancy. Others in the Muslim League, under the leadership of Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, took the opposite course in the 1940s and demanded a separate state for Muslims, a demand embodied in the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Mawdudi did not

join either party, choosing instead to form his own organization, the *Jama'at-e-Islami* as the “counter-League”, headed by Mawdudi for thirty-one years, between 1941 and 1972. (ADAMS, 1983, p. 99-133; AHMAD; ANSARI, 2003, p. 360-365).⁸ He started with the premise that Muslims should return to a pure and unadulterated Islam to brace themselves for the struggle before them. They should reject Hindu ascendancy and continue to lay claim to the whole of India. He was especially disturbed by those Muslims who were willing to accommodate Hindus, and saw their support of the Congress Party as acquiescing in the inevitability of a Hindu raj (rule). His most violent rhetoric was reserved for them. As the creation of Pakistan became more and more likely, Mawdudi's polemical attacks on the Muslim League also increased, and rivalry with the Muslim League escalated with each step India took toward partition. (NASR, 1994, p. 5-7).

As India moved closer to partition, Mawdudi's political thinking became increasingly clear regarding the polity which he envisioned. He had to position himself to dominate the debate over Pakistan, and to do that he needed the Muslim League's power and prominence, for he distrusted Jinnah's intentions and even more the secularist inclinations of the League's program. For Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, people in Pakistan would be free, free to go to temples, to mosques or to any other place of worship. The State would not have anything to do with the religion or caste or creed of the citizens, who would be equals of one State:

Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. (JINNAH, 1947).

The fate of Islam in Kemalist Turkey and Pahlavi Iran had no doubt served as a warning to Mawdudi and to those other Muslims whose rationale for a separate Muslim state was the promise that it would preserve Islam in the Subcontinent. Increasingly, Mawdudi reacted directly to the Muslim League's policies, and to its conception of what Pakistan was to be; these were the subject of his strongest attacks, denouncing nationalism and berating secular politics as disbelief (*kufir*). In 1947, following partition, Mawdudi was escorted to safety after violence broke out in the Gurdaspur District of Punjab, where the *Jama'at* was based, and was taken to Lahore by units of the Pakistani army. Mawdudi now demanded an Islamic state where he had once dreamed of an Islamic empire. His programme was no longer to save Islam in India but to have it conquer Pakistan.

Ideology compelled action, which in Pakistan assumed the form of demanding an Islamic state. The *Jama'at* demanded a government inspired by and obedient to the writ of the *Shari'a* and which would promise a utopian order that gave direction to “Islamic” social action, which did not imply revolution as the term is understood in the West. Mawdudi believed in incremental change

rather than in radical ruptures. He did not subscribe to class war or disparaged violence as a political tool, and assumed that Islamic revolution would be heralded not by the masses but by the society’s leaders. Revolution, in Mawdudi’s view, did not erupt from the bottom up but flowed from the top of society down. The aim of Islamic revolution, therefore, was not to spearhead the struggle of the underclass but to convert society’s leaders. His notions of social action therefore had peculiar meanings and aims.

Like Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Mawdudi considered the Muslim societies as being dependent on the West, politically weak, and culturally adrift. Both in their early years had been anti-colonial nationalists who turned to religious revivalism to restore the Muslim community at home and universally. They drew on the example and concerns both of eighteenth-century Islamic revivalist movements like the Wahhabi and nineteenth- and twentieth-century Islamic modernist predecessors for their critique of Muslim society. They did not simply retreat to the past but instead provided Islamic responses, ideological and organizational, to modern society. They appropriated and reapplied the vision and logic of the revivalist tradition in Islam to the socio-historical conditions of twentieth-century Muslim society, reinterpreting Islamic sources and beliefs to address modern realities. Yet they distinguished their method from that of Islamic modernism, which they equated with the “Westernization of Islam”. If Islamic modernists legitimated the adoption of Western ideas and institutions by maintaining their compatibility with Islam, al-Banna and Mawdudi sought to produce a new synthesis which began with Islamic sources and found either Islamic equivalents or Islamic sources for notions of government accountability, legal change, popular participation, and educational reform. Both shared a common anti-imperialist view of the West, which they believed was not only a political and economic but also a cultural threat to Muslim societies. Westernization was a threat to the very identity, independence, and way of life of Muslims, and the religious-cultural penetration of the West (education, law, customs, values) were far more pernicious in the long run than political intervention, since it threatened the very identity and survival of the Muslim community. For them, Islam was self-sufficient, an all-encompassing way of life, an ideological alternative to Western Capitalism and Marxism, and though hostile to Westernization, they were not against modernization. Both engaged in modern organization and institution building, provided educational and social welfare services, and used modern technology and mass communications to spread their message and to mobilize popular support. Mawdudi wrote extensively and systematically, attempting to demonstrate the comprehensive relevance of Islam to all aspects of life. The range of his topics reflected his holistic vision: Islam and the state, economics, education, revolution, women. Their message, though rooted in Islamic revelation and sources, was clearly written for a

twentieth-century audience, addressing the problems of modernity, analyzing the relationship of Islam to nationalism, democracy, Capitalism, Marxism, modern banking, education, law, women and work, Zionism, and international relations. (ESPOSITO, 1999, p. 129-35).⁹

When India was partitioned in 1947, the *Jama'at-e-Islami* was also divided into separate Pakistani and Indian (and Kashmiri) units, sharing Mawdudi's ideology but working through independent organizational structures defined in terms of the national polity in which they operated. Mawdudi justified this move by arguing that each organization would face different political realities under separate national circumstances and could not be caught in the middle of conflicts between Pakistan and India. By giving up his leadership of the Indian *Jama'at-e-Islami* and breaking the embryonic *Umma* along national lines, Mawdudi effectively surrendered the ideal of the *Umma* to the reality of the developing nation-state order in the region. In later years, new *Jama'at-e-Islamis* would emerge in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, again independent of one another and of the Indian and Pakistani units.

Conclusion

Using especially the political thought of Muhammad Iqbal and Mawdudi, this paper analysed how Islam was used to justify, before, during, and after the establishment of Pakistan, a separate state for the Indian Muslims, and the intense debate among the Muslim *intelligentsia* in India about the nature of that state, at the same time that it tried to explore the interaction between Muslim intellectuals and "Western" political concepts, particularly the concepts of "State" and "Nation-State".

The rich and diverse political discourses of Indian Muslim intellectuals, reflecting its variety, showed that the debate about the role of Islam in the early days of Pakistan was intense. It also sought to study how Islam was reinterpreted in the light of modern material and intellectual developments. If it is true that Mawdudi constructed Islam as an ideology and polity, Muhammad Iqbal, in an attempt to link aspects of "Islamic heritage" to "Western" institutions, considered that "Western" political concepts, such as "Democracy" and "Republicanism", as they were understood at the time, were in fact Muslim political concepts that the British, through their Empire, were spreading throughout the world. Later, Iqbal would construct Islam as an ideology and polity, without advancing in concrete terms how that polity would work. Criticising the West, especially after the First World War and its brutality, but without abandoning what he had defended earlier in his life, Iqbal's ideas would be very influential on Mawdudi, who was very critical of those attempts to equate Islam with new "Western" political ideas and practices. He felt that the writing of

apologetic pieces was the result of a defensive stance on the part of Muslim scholars, while, at the same time, he was being influenced by those same ideas, practices, discourses and language.

As Quentin Skinner (2004, p. 405-410) asserts, once the term *state* came to be accepted as the master noun of political discourse, a number of other concepts and assumptions bearing on the analysis of sovereignty had to be reorganised or in some cases given up. One concept that underwent a consequential process of redefinition was that of political allegiance. A subject or *subditus* had traditionally sworn allegiance to his sovereign as a liege lord. But with the acceptance of the idea that sovereignty was lodged not with rulers but with the state, this was replaced by the familiar view that citizens owed their loyalty to the state itself.

Political institutions and practices which had evolved in the West were considered by Western intellectuals and statesmen as the sole models of political modernity, models which had to be adopted by the rest of the world. Particularly important was the model of the modern nation-state, and the expansion in print media and education led to the rise of a new group of Muslim intellectuals who claimed authority not only to interpret Islam but also to act as spokesmen for the community, a fragmentation of religious authority which facilitated the rise of a number of intellectuals who sought to exercise *Ijtihad* in order to provide solutions to contemporary problems and who were active not only in acquiring new socio-political ideas from the West, but also in reinterpreting their own traditions in the light of these new ideas.

Islam meant, and means, different things to different intellectuals, who attribute different significance meanings to it, and drew, and draw, from varying sources within and without the “Islamic” tradition in developing their socio-political thought. The reactions of Muhammad Iqbal, Mawdudi, Madani or others, to political realities, especially the acceptance or rejection of “Western” socio-political institutions and concepts, often depended upon or reflected their interpretation of Islam, and they were intrinsically attached to Islam and looked to Muslim history, theology, sources and its symbols to help them face the challenges of modernity. However, they did attribute varying meanings to Islam, and each believed that their interpretation was a return to the true authentic Islam.

For Muhammad Iqbal and Mawdudi, Islam was not just a relationship with God, but also a comprehensive and complete system, covering all aspects of human life, with no separation of “Religion” and “Politics”, in the case of Iqbal, or with a fusion of “Religion” and “Politics” in the case of Mawdudi. These reconstructions of Islam as a system were attempts to establish an “Islamic” ideal, a vision of life set against the “West” and its ideological and political domination. As in Islam there is no such thing as a “Church”, which is, in itself, a political institution too, Iqbal considered that “Church and State were not the two sides of the same thing, because Islam was an

unanalysable singular reality, patent in the law”, something organically related, while for Mawdudi Islam had been since the time of the Prophet Muhammad “Religion” and “Politics”. Confronted by colonialism and the disempowerment of both the Muslims and the East in general, they looked to Islam to provide a solution to contemporary problems, a construction that emerged out of the interaction with colonialism and Western ideologies.

However, the question of what Islam is, as a national identity, remains. The use of Islam as a source of political and national identity for the formation of Pakistan still is an ongoing process.¹⁰ During the chaos and violence following the Partition in 1947, many Muslims, who were caught in the wrong side of the border, left their homes and went to the new country of Pakistan, which was, according to many Pakistani leaders and politicians, their new home and a safe haven. Those Muslim who were forced to leave India for Pakistan became known as the *Mohajirs*, i.e., Refugees [from the Arabic *Muhajirun*, the Migrants].

Even inside the territory of Pakistan, there were factions that initially wanted no part of it, but for different reasons. Supporters of the Punjab Unionist Party placed their loyalties with the British, not with Jinnah’s Muslim League. Pakhtuns from the outset refused to accept the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as the Durand Line that marked it had been determined by the British. Some Islamist groups recoiled from the demand for Pakistan on the grounds that Islam could not be bounded by the borders of a nation state, though after Partition many of their members migrated out of necessity from India to Pakistan.

When the federal government reorganized what was then West Pakistan – in 1971, the East wing of Pakistan fought for its independence from the West wing and the new state of Bangladesh was created – into provinces in the 1960s, it decided to do so on the basis of ethnic composition of the population. Hence, Punjab was recognized as having a majority of Punjabis, Sindh with a majority of Sindhis, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) with a majority of Pakhtuns, and Baluchistan with a majority of Baluchis. Each province was given a quota, periodically reviewed based on census results, for government jobs and contracts, university admissions, revenue expenditures, such things as water and power connections, and representation in the federal government. However, since 1991, the official stance on postponing the census, a position held by different governments, had been that tensions between groups were such that holding the census would provoke violent reactions from those who might have believed themselves to have been under-counted. (WEISS, 1999). And almost seventy years after the Partition and Independence of India and Pakistan, the *Mohajirs* are considered as foreigners because they were not born in that land.

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Notes

¹ Islamic Iran is a republic with a constitution, a president, a parliament, a cabinet, bureaucracy, a court system along with regular elections (for regime loyalists). The current state owes its existence to a multi-class popular revolution within which the religious wing, led by a politicized segment of the Shi’i ‘*ulama*, was able to gain the upper hand. In Sudan the establishment of an Islamic state was attempted by a military regime, and resumed later by another. Ja’far Nimeiri’s regime (1969–1985) started with distinct socialist and Arabist leanings but was tempted, with the escalation in its economic and political problems, to adopt an increasingly Islamist orientation, in alliance with the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood led by Hassan al-Turabi. In 1983–1984 the application of *Shari’a* laws was announced, combined with sweeping powers for Nimeiri himself, stipulated in the emergency law of 1984. The escalating socioeconomic crisis and the growing resistance in the non-Muslim South, combined with Nimeiri’s arbitrariness, resulted in a popular uprising that ousted him in 1985. But the Islamic movement had used its period in government with Nimeiri to consolidate its organization and to spread its influence within the country’s institutions, including the army. This enabled the movement to win in various syndicate and political elections, and when Lieutenant-General ‘Umar al-Bashir installed another military regime, in 1989, it was markedly influenced by the National Islamic Front. A Sorbonne-educated legal scholar and founder of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Turabi was, in the early 1980s, Attorney General of the Sudan and was directly involved in the political process that sought the establishment of an Islamic state. For more details on how al-Turabi conceived an Islamic state, see AL-TURABI, 1983.

² For further details on Azad’s views on Nationalism and the role of Muslims in an independent India, please refer to KAUSAR, 2008. For Madani, please see MADANI, 2005.

³ For further details on Mawlana Mohammad ‘Ali Jouhar, please refer to HASAN, 1999.

⁴ Muhammad Iqbal was a prolific writer and his ideas were expressed through many forms, authoring many works covering various fields and genres, including Poetry, Philosophy, and Mysticism, which should be viewed as a unity. For detailed information on his work see HASSAN; TAILLIEU; LALEMAN; CALLEWAERT, 2000. For

comprehensive details on his life see MALIK, 1971; MIR, 2006. Also useful is the site <http://www.allamaiqbal.com/> established by the Iqbal Academy Pakistan with the aim of promoting and disseminating the study and understanding of the works and teachings of Muhammad Iqbal.

⁵ Normally translated as “Islamic Law”, *shari’a* means, in Arabic, “street, path, way”. In a legal context, the word *shari’a* refers to “the way or the path a Muslim would want to follow what God wants us to do.” Traditionally, Muslim scholars take primary source material - the *Qur’an* as well as accounts from the life of the Prophet Muhammad, referred to as *hadith* - and derive laws based on their interpretations of these texts. These laws pertain to two different areas of life, either religious observance (prayer, fasting, and almsgiving) or civil and criminal issues (marriage, family law, business transactions, taxation, and warfare). Of course the ways in which someone derives laws from his or her interpretations of “what God wants us to do” varies according to Time and Place. So, it is also critical to point out that translating the word *shari’a* simply as “Islamic law” is not entirely sufficient. *Shari’a* includes scores of moral and ethical principles, from honouring one’s parents to helping the poor to being good to one’s neighbour. It is incorrect to equate *shari’a* with criminal punishments. If we understand it as the idealized “path to God,” then what constitutes a moral and legal course to the divine is a subjective, and ever changing, interpretation of Islam’s sacred texts, interpretation made by human beings. For a brief introduction to this and other topics regarding *Shari’a*, please refer to KADRI, 2011; MASUD, 2001.

⁶ The full poem, from 1918, is available in its English translation, by Arthur J. Arberry. (IQBAL, 1953).

⁷ For Mawdudi’s biographical information, the following sources have been used: AHMAD, 2009, p. S145-S162; AHMAD and ANSARI (eds.), 2003, p. 360-365; NASR, 1994, p. 3-27; NASR, 2000, p. 1-22. For a bibliography by and about Mawdudi, see AHMAD and ANSARI (eds.), 2003, p. 1-14.

⁸ For more information on the *Jama’at*, especially in the period after 1947, see NASR, 1995, p. 261-285.

⁹ Much of the relevant material written by Mawdudi has been assembled in a single volume and translated into English by Khurshid Ahmad, a disciple of his and one of the leaders of the *Jama’at-e-Islami*, under the title *The Islamic Law and Constitution*. A collection of Mawdudi’s speeches with this title, the most important of which are two addresses to the Law College in Lahore in early 1948, was published originally in 1955, in Karachi, by the *Jama’at-e-Islami* Publications, with a second edition in 1960. Further details in MAUDUDI, 1960.

¹⁰ For an overview of the theoretical positions taken by various Pakistani writers on the subject, please refer to AHMED, 1987.

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