The definition of the diagnosis of depression is analyzed based on the reflections of authors such as Canguilhem, Hacking and Pignarre. The present study does not deny the existence of concrete situations that might correspond to such diagnosis, but rather aims at carrying out a strictly epistemological analysis, however incomplete, of the way in which different aspects of this classification are validated and legitimized. First, based on Hacking's theorizations, the way in which human classifications are built is analyzed. Next, the epistemological fragility of the descriptive diagnosis of depression in the DSM-IV is pointed out, based on Canguilhem's concepts of normality and pathology. Finally, based on Pignarre's studies, some difficulties inherent in etiological explanations for this pathology are analyzed. It is possible to conclude that the alarming frequency of this diagnosis is associated with the epistemological fragility of that classificatory category.
Depression; Epistemology; Diagnostic classifications; Causality