ABSTRACT
The theory of attestation in Ricoeur points to the need of a dialectical relationship between oneself and the other in ethics. However, critics of this theory have argued that the use of the self as the starting point of this reflection hinders a genuine perception of otherness. Taking this debate into account, the present article aims to analyze the implications of this Ricoeurian dialectics for ethics, especially the understanding of compassion. The methodological steps of this analysis include a preliminary perspective of Ricoeur’s notion of the otherness of the self in La symbolique du mal and De l’interprétation, a problematization of the relationship between attestation and ethics in The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy and of the concepts of ethics and otherness in the perspective of attestation in Soimême comme un autre and Parcours de la reconnaissance. Finally, the study explores the repercussions of the articulations of oneself and the other for ethical compassion, in dialogue with Martha Nussbaum. Without denying the risks of the reduplication of the self in the alleged perception of otherness, the article concludes that the dialectics of oneself and the other is necessary for a better understanding and development of oneself and the other.
Keywords:
Ricoeur; Attestation; Ethics; Compassion; Oneself; Otherness