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Artículo Original • Kriterion 65 (159) • 2024 • https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-512X2024n15902 linkcopy

Open-access LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE AND ORDINARY REASONING: MORE THAN CONSIDERING, LESS THAN BELIEVING

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    ABSTRACT

    In her article “Logical knowledge and ordinary reasoning”, Besson (2012) argued that the dispositional notion of logical knowledge is doomed to failure. As a response, Steinberger and Murzi (2013) suggested a new criterion of logical knowledge, which seems to avoid Besson’s objections. In this paper, I argue that this new approach is mistaken, for the demands that it imposes over the agent are too weak. Then, I develop a modified criterion that is not affected by most of the objections.

    Keywords
    Logical knowledge; Logical consequence; Dispositionalism; Logical constants; Epistemic norms.

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