In face of the self-sufficiency of the theoretical and practical domains of reason, which is the outcome reached by the critical philosophy at the end of the 1780s in the second Critique's argumentation, the search for a systematic function for the Critique of the Power of Judgment calls for an enterprise accomplishing the connection (Verknüpfung) or the means for combining (Verbindungsmittel) these domains. Nature and freedom are guaranteed by the first two critiques as determining legalities only within their own domains. The third Critique is therefore able to attest to a "great gulf" between the theoretical and practical domains of reason. By reconstructing the argumentation of both introductions to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the paper defends that the systemic weight given to the consideration of the problem of the possibility of a transition (Übergang) between the theoretical and the practical domains is the main reason behind the necessity of a new text for the introduction to the work.
Theoretical and Practical Domains; Nature; Freedom; Transition; Power of Judgment