ABSTRACT
Anti-reductionist Theories of Action are, in general, accounts of action according to which the role the agent plays in the production of her action cannot be reduced to her mental events or states. Proponents of these theories present claims according to which Anti-reductionist Theories of Action better capture the sense of agency that agents experience when performing intentional actions than the competing Causal Theory of Action. I will investigate the arguments supporting these claims and argue that they do not survive scrutiny, especially when taking into consideration the neuro-cognitive information available about the sense of agency. Anti-reductionist Theories of Action seem incompatible with the empirical account of sense of agency, as show experiments focusing on action selection, the comparator model, and perception of the relation between action and its outcome. Alternatively, the Causal Theory of Action is more able to accommodate and explain the sense of agency.
Keywords
sense of agency; comparator model; action selection; control; reductionism