THE PUBLIC TRUST APPROACH TO POLITICAL CONSPIRACY THEORIES

A ABORDAGEM DE CONFIANÇA PÚBLICA PARA TEORIAS DE CONSPIRAÇÃO POLÍTICA

Abstract

This study argues that conspiracy theorizing essentially revolves around trust and distrust. Political conspiracy theories constitute symptoms of generalized political distrust -what I call the public trust approach to conspiracy theories. The various causes of political distrust evolve into a generalized perception of untrustworthiness. Critics of the public trust approach correctly point out that conspiracy theories have no epistemic flaws as such, dismissing narratives by imputing a conspirational logic in which public authorities can use them as stratagems to undermine valid criticisms. Although a correct objection, acknowledging it fails to obfuscate the fact that distrust configures a major political problem. Following philosophers of trust, I argue that distrust configures a practical problem and the proliferation of conspiracy theories, a symptom of political failure. The only response to conspiracy theorizing requires re-establishing the bonds of trust since an ethical and democratic political life requires a deep sense of trust.

Keywords:
trust; conspiracy theories; public trust; social epistemology

Resumo

Este artigo argumenta que o conspiracionismo é essencialmente uma questão de confiança e desconfiança. As teorias da conspiração política são sintomas de desconfiança política generalizada - isso é o que chamo de abordagem da confiança pública às teorias da conspiração (TCs). As causas da desconfiança política são várias e evoluem para uma percepção generalizada de falta de confiabilidade. Os críticos da abordagem da confiança pública estão corretos ao apontar que não há nada epistemicamente falho nas TCs como tais. A rejeição de narrativas por meio da imputação de uma lógica conspiratória pode ser usada pelas autoridades públicas como um estratagema para minar críticas válidas. Embora essa objeção esteja correta, reconhecê-la não pode ofuscar o fato de que a desconfiança é um problema político significativo. Seguindo os filósofos da confiança, argumento que a desconfiança é um problema prático e que a proliferação de TCs é um sintoma de fracasso político. A única resposta à teorização da conspiração é o restabelecimento dos laços de confiança, pois um profundo senso de confiança é um requisito para uma vida política ética e democrática.

Palavras-chaves:
confiança; teorias da conspiração; confiança pública; epistemologia social

Introduction

Conspiracy theories have lately lied at the center of political talks. The QAnon conspiracy theory, for instance, has been a significant theme in Trump’s 2020 presidential campaign and has fueled an angry mob to assault the Capitol. Everywhere, citizens have been exposed to a plethora of alternative theories and pseudoscientific explanations about the COVID-19 pandemics. Antivax protests have exploded around the globe. Although valuable works on the philosophy of conspiracy theories have emerged in the last 20 years, they remain undertheorized. Building upon this literature, this study wants to further develop our understanding of conspiracy theories by critically rehabilitating the public trust approach.

The definition of conspiracy theory has proven to be a controversial topic (Coady, 2006, p. 2). Like most social and political concepts, conspiracy theory depends on context. Understanding which kinds of narratives or explanations can be labeled as such requires understanding the broader social context in which they are inserted. In general, a conspiracy theory is an “explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons - the conspirators - acting in secret” (Keeley, 1999, p. 116). However, for the purpose of this study, I am interested in political conspiracy theories alone: politically relevant conspiracies.

For instance, I could list the various theories that emerged in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemics, the “deep state” conspiracy theory in US politics, or the various theories that anti-vaccine movements develop, excluding theories of the kind “Elvis is still alive” or “Paul is dead.” Undoubtedly, political conspiracy theories can be informed by representations of conspiracies in cultural products, as proven by Mason (2002) in a thought-provoking analysis of sci-fi literature and conspiracy theories and Boltanski’s (2012) study of conspiracy theories regarding the emergence of detective stories and spy fiction. By acknowledging this fact, I include all politically motivated theories, even if their content is not immediately political. In other words, their political character also depends on context. For instance, reptilian conspiracy theories - which, according to Barkun (2003, p. 121), are inspired by a short novel by Robert Howard - later took a political significance in variations of the Pizzagate conspiracy theory. Moreover, what constitutes an “official story” surely depends on context since it relies on what is taken to be the official authority. The same explanation can be an official story and a conspiracy theory in different contexts (e.g., in different nations).

Most controversies in the philosophy of conspiracy theories draw from Brian Keeley’s seminal article “Of Conspiracy Theories” (Keeley, 1999). There, he inaugurated what Räikkä calls the public trust approach to conspiracy theories (Räikkä, 2009, p. 191), an approach furthered by Neil Levy (Levy, 2007). According to the public trust approach, conspiracy theories are problematic or suspicious because they undermine public trust since they run against an established or official explanation of a given event. Official explanations are issued by public authorities, and these authorities are constituted by a network of trust. As knowledge is a socialized practice, only knowledge produced by a network of trust can be authoritative. By questioning official explanations, conspiracy theories challenge established authorities’ bindingness, impairing relations of trust and eroding conditions for valid knowledge.

The relation between conspiracy theorizing and public trust seems unproblematic. One would hardly deny that the contemporary spread of conspiracy theories has something to do with the lack of confidence in institutions. Nevertheless, in conspiracy theory scholarship, the “public trust approach” of Keeley and Levy has been widely criticized. Considering these criticisms, I propose two adjustments to the public trust approach. First, I argue that being expressions of political distrust does not make conspiracy theories epistemically flawed or suspicious. Second, I claim that conspiracy theories respond to an already existing crisis of trust in public authorities. In other words, conspiracy theories are, rather than the causes, enabled by political distrust. The underlying assumption of this study is that the spread of political conspiracy theories configures a phenomenon of sedimented political distrust. Hence, conspiracy theories are unable to be understood neither in narrowly epistemological nor in pathological terms. Conspiracy theories are neither an epistemic class of explanations, epistemically suspicious, nor simply express a mode of political paranoia (Basham, 2018a; Marasco 2016), although paranoia remains an important concept to capture the spread of conspiracy theories (Adorno et al., 2019; Adorno, 2019; Hofstadter, 2008). More generally, conspiracy theories express a distrustful subjective attitude in the face of a political life that is increasingly perceived as untrustworthy.

Nonetheless, a solid defense of the public trust approach requires something more profound. The strong thesis of this study states that the deterioration of trust bonds trust signals a political failure. That thesis can only be sustained if trust is comprehended as a normative category and a necessary condition for a healthy democratic political life. Critiques of conspiracy theories usually assume a liberal framework that regards political distrust as a civic virtue. As an artifact of political distrust, conspiracy theories are accordingly taken to be tools of critical citizenship. To rehabilitate the public trust approach, I provide a normative account of trust that, on the one hand, overcomes the shortcomings of purely epistemological interpretations and, on the other, opposes the liberal individualistic advocacy of distrust. In essence, a defense of the public trust approach must concern itself with the intricate concepts of trust and distrust, a task that has been avoided by both defendants and critics of the approach.

Finally, addressing the challenge conspiracy theories pose requires thinking about ways of reestablishing conditions of trust. In that connection, I contend that a renovated public approach to conspiracy theories can best understand the nature, causes, and fortune of this relevant political phenomenon. To defend and rehabilitate the public trust approach, I will develop the following argument. In section one, I briefly discuss Keeley’s and Levy’s formulation of the public trust approach. In section two, I evaluate some significant criticisms raised against the public trust approach. In section three, I argue that social and political trust compound the deep structure of an ethical and democratic shared life. Correspondingly, the dissemination of political distrust signals a moral and political failure. In the final section, having in mind both Keeley’s and Levy’s contributions and the criticisms against them, I defend the public trust approach.

The public trust approach to conspiracy theories

Political conspiracy theories usually involve a contention between divergent explanations of a given event or process and that this divergence exposes the political nature of authoritative knowledge production. In all the examples listed above, conspiracy theories question the authority of established institutions, e.g., the World Health Organization, Departments of Health, political organizations, governmental agencies, and academic institutions such as “The Lancet.” In other words, conspiracy theories run counter to some “official” account of an event. This feature of political conspiracy theories is especially relevant because it raises the fundamental question of authority and trust.

Relying on the findings of social epistemology, particularly those of Goldman (1999) and Schmitt (1994), Keeley and Levy insist that knowledge is a social enterprise. Knowledge is not only socially distributed among individual minds but is fundamentally constituted as a social “cognitive fabric” (Levy, 2007, pp. 182-183). Even an individual’s knowledge is unable to be reduced to their internal representations, being allocated and distributed in a network of resources and technical devices. In his words, “our mental representations are shared” (Levy, 2007, p. 184). Furthermore, individuals rely on other individuals’ knowledge. In that sense, knowledge is fundamentally social (rather than individual), external (rather than internal), and dependent (rather than independent).

As social individuals constantly rely on the findings, testimonies, and expertise of others to carry out their lives, there must exist mechanisms and institutions to produce certified and authoritative knowledge. According to Keeley, the knowledge produced by this network is warranted since it results from “a social mechanism of warranted belief production” (Keeley, 1999, p. 122). In that connection, he refers to a series of institutions and procedures to produce warranted beliefs, such as governmental agencies, a free press, and free agents. Along the same lines, Levy refers to properly constituted epistemic authorities to which individuals should defer. Unfortunately, Levy offers little insight on what properly constitutes an epistemic authority. What features must an institution possess to be properly constituted and thus epistemically authoritative? Levy briefly suggests that the “government” is often an improperly constituted authority and continues to claim that such authority would have to be formed according to the model of “science,” namely consisting “in a distributed network of agents, trained in assessing knowledge claims, who make their evidence and processes available to scrutiny, within and beyond that network” (Levy, 2007, p. 188).

By running against official stories, conspiracy theories challenge the epistemic authorities supposed to produce warranted public knowledge. For this reason, conspiracy theories always entail the rupture of a relationship of trust in public authorities and the press. The harm caused to the public trust pressed these authors to reproach or at least be suspicious of conspiracy theories. In his seminal paper, Keeley states:

The challenge of conspiracy theory is that it forces us to choose between an almost nihilistic degree of skepticism and absurdism: the conspiracy theorist chooses to embrace the hyper-skepticism inherent in supposing dissimulation on a truly massive scale (by distrusting the claims of our institutions) over the absurdism of an irrational and essentially meaningless world (Keeley, 1999, p. 125).

Keeley’s fundamental thought is that, by questioning official accounts, conspiracy theories question the whole network of warranted belief production because they possess a reinforcing skeptical dimension. Such theories postulate the existence of mysterious forces acting against them so that any evidence raised against them can be understood as a further product of these obscure forces. It is a peculiar feature of conspiracy theories that objections raised against them are regarded as supporting evidence. For instance, if a conspiracy theory argues that a particular governmental agency manipulates information for a hidden purpose and a newspaper publishes a leading article offering evidence against this conspiracy theory, this can be interpreted as a sign that this newspaper also belongs to this conspiracy and as a reinforcing argument in favor of the theory. Put differently, every institution that objects to a conspiracy theory can be interpreted as being part of or complicit in this conspiracy. Consequently, conspiracy theorizing tends to question a large set of public institutions and to raise an overarching perception of untrustworthiness.

Similarly, Levy argues that entertaining a political conspiracy theory is sensitive because it detaches the individual from the “cognitive fabric” of society (Levy, 2007, p. 188-189). Believing that epistemic authorities are conspiring and manipulating information against public opinion implicates the collapse of public authority and the individual’s disconnection from the shared social resources that constitute knowledge.

Based on this framework, Keeley and Levy attempted to conclude that the belief in conspiracy theories is suspicious if not unwarranted. Keeley are unable to provide a solid epistemic argument as to why the belief in specific conspiracy theories is unwarranted, even though he hopes to figure out a criterion to “clearly distinguish between our ‘good’ explanations and their ‘bad’ ones” (Keeley, 1999, p. 126). Stokes (2018) defends a similar position and contends that individuals should be “reluctant” to believe in conspiracy theories. In turn, Levy explicitly argues that responsible intellectuals ought to reject conspiracy theories and simply “defer to properly constituted epistemic authority” (Levy, 2007, p. 189).

Criticisms of the public trust approach

The attempt to draw from the public trust approach a criterion for conspiracy theories’ unwarrantedness motivated a series of criticisms to Keeley’s and Levy’s accounts. Some criticisms of the public trust approach are accurate. To rethink the potential of this approach, I must now address some of these criticisms. In conspiracy theory scholarship, generalism designates the attempt to establish standard features to conspiracy theories that would turn them into an epistemic class, that is, conspiracy theories constitute a class of explanations with general features, so that it is possible to critique them all together. In contradiction, particularism rejects the hypothesis that conspiracy theories constitute an epistemic class, that is, the fact that an explanation of an event involves an existing conspiracy as a relevant cause fails to make it part of a general class of explanations - conspiracy theories - from which general epistemic judgments can be made. In contrast, particularists claim, explanations that may happen to contemplate a conspiracy as a cause should be treated as particulars and examined on their own merits. In other words, postulating a conspiracy as a cause fails to make an account into an instance of a general epistemic class, i.e., conspiracy theories, which are as such flawed or warranted (Buenting; Taylor, 2010).

Keeley’s and Levy’s versions of the public trust approach tend to generalism since they claim that conspiracy theories as such, i.e., as an epistemic class, are unwarranted or at least problematic. To be precise, Keeley’s position regarding generalism or particularism is ambiguous. He begins his theoretical effort by construing a class of “unwarranted conspiracy theories” and concludes by arguing that “there is nothing straightforwardly analytic that allows us to distinguish between good and bad conspiracy theories” (Keeley, 1999, p. 126). This ambiguity is evidenced by Räikkä (2009, p. 192) when he claims that “both unwarranted and warranted conspiracy theories may meet the UCT” (unwarranted conspiracy theories). This ambiguity stems from Keeley’s disinterest with the factual truth of a given conspiracy theory and focus on the question of whether epistemic agents are entitled to believe in it. As he states, “the issue here is one of warranted belief. In other words, it may well be correct that ‘the truth is out there,’ but given our epistemic situation, we ought not necessarily believe everything which is, in fact, true” (Keeley 1999, p. 111). Hence, Keeley’s generalism fails to entail that conspiracy theories are in general false, rather stipulating that an epistemic agent’s belief in them is generally unwarranted. Scholars of conspiracy theories have widely criticized this conclusion. Räikkä (2009) usefully summarized the list of criticisms.

Steve Clarke (2002, pp. 141-142) claims that Keeley’s thesis that conspiracy theorizing tends to evolve into an overarching skepticism mixes up an allegedly epistemic feature of conspiracy theories with a typical argumentative strategy employed by proponents of conspiracy theories. Coady (2003) similarly argues that conspiracy theorizing fails to necessarily entail an increasing degree of skepticism since to carry out a conspiracy successfully, agents and institutions should be generally trusted. He goes as far as claiming that “the logical consequence of conspiracy theorizing may well be an increased, rather than decreased, faith in people and institutions and authority” (Coady, 2003, p. 203). His argument is compelling since a series of conspiracy theories take that institutions and practices are rational, whereas exploiters distort their expected functioning and goals.

However, the most acute criticism of the public trust approach presses on a different point. This criticism points to the simple fact that individuals have little reason to trust authorities in contemporary societies for they have gathered an “accumulated experience” of plots, deception, lies, and manipulation (Newton; Stolle; Zmerli, 2018, p. 40). Along these lines, Basham argues:

The background suspicion of most conspiracy theorists is that public institutions are and perhaps always have been largely untrustworthy where certain critical interest of the dominant powers - corporations and government - are at stake (Basham, 2001, p. 67).

Dentith (2016) formulates the same argument in epistemological terms, referring to the “prior probability” of an explanation. Prior probability reflects on how accumulated experience may inform the plausibility of a given explanation. Hence, in a context in which conspiracies abound, a conspiracy theory is more likely to be true, although an explanation is by no means better just by postulating a conspiracy. This claim would amount to an inverted version of generalism.

This objection touches on what I consider the crucial problem of Keeley’s and Levy’s otherwise insightful approach. Both Keeley and Levy invert the causal relationship between distrust and conspiracy theorizing when they claim that the practice of conspiracy theorizing foments public distrust. The spread of conspiracy theories certainly does weaken bonds of trust but conspiracy theorizing already configures a symptom of disseminated distrust. It is an individual’s response to an accumulated experience of conspiracies, deception, and plots by authorities. In a context in which institutions and epistemic authorities are unable to be trusted, conspiracy theorizing becomes an expected response. To uphold this argument, conspiracy theory scholars often refer to cases such as the Watergate scandal, the Iran-Contra case, and the false claims of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction.

Critics of Keeley’s and Levy’s approach are rightly troubled by the fact that the a priori suspicion of conspiracy theories strengthens the uncritical acceptance of established authorities. Pigden boldly claims that “the idea that conspiracy theories as such are intellectually suspect helps conspirators, quite literally, to get away with murder (of which killing people in an unjust war is an instance)” (Pigden, 2007, p. 224). Pigden is concerned with how the application of the label “conspiracy theory” has become a stratagem by politicians to dismiss criticisms and political charges. Commonly, narratives running against established accounts are deemed pathological or paranoic (Basham, 2018a; Dean, 2000; Dentith, 2016, p. 14).

Against these stratagems, particularists claim that conspiracy theorizing should be understood as a feature of citizens’ critical capacity to call governments and authorities into question. According to this account, citizens should be alert and invigilate those in a position of power. Vigilance is “the virtue of remaining alert, especially in dealing with powerful authorities, to the possibility that others may be behaving in a corrupt, sectional fashion” (Pettit, 1997, p. 263). Critical citizens should entertain alternative explanations to social phenomena, which may run counter to established stories. For that to be possible, no class of explanations should be deemed suspicious a priori. For these scholars, the defense of conspiracy theorizing is the defense of an active and engaged citizenship essential to democratic political life, a defense of “public reason” (Basham, 2018b, p. 40). In this spirit, Basham (2018b, p. 54) argues that “conspiracy theorizing is critical to social progress”.

Aspects of the political philosophy of trust and distrust

The polemic around the public trust approach to conspiracy theories results from an ambiguity in the very concept of trust. This ambiguity manifests in the contention between Levy and Basham: for the former, trust is constitutive of human life in society, whereas for the latter, distrust is a civic virtue. For that reason, I argue that only an analysis of the concept of trust can settle the dispute around conspiracy theories. The last decades have seen an increasing philosophical interest in that question. The problem is that, as expected, the literature has achieved little consensus. Different disciplines have radically different (even contradictory) approaches to trust, not to mention intradisciplinary dissensions. In broad strokes, sociological approaches emphasize the essential role of trust in the functioning of abstract and impersonal modern institutions, such as money (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Luhmann, 2018; Sztompka, 1999). Social epistemologists and moral philosophers tend to underscore the fact that human beings are dependent beings. In a context of vulnerability and dependence, individuals’ lives are only meaningful when they believe that others acknowledge their dignity, i.e., when they can trust others. If the socially available knowledge is undependable and they suspect that others often have ill-intentions toward them, i.e., when they distrust others, life becomes intolerable (Baier, 1986; Bernstein, 2015; Coady, 1992; Govier, 1992, 1997; Levy, 2007; Schmitt, 1994). In contrast, rational choice and game theorists have focused on interpersonal interactions following individual interests, brushing aside the social and moral concerns with trust (Hardin, 2006; Ostrom, Walker, 2003). Alternatively, the “social capital” school focuses on the vital role of trust in spontaneous sociability, cooperation, and economic productivity beyond the person-to-person relationships of rational choice models (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1994, 2001). Finally, some authors have stressed the weight of political distrust to the liberal tradition, for example, in Locke, Hume, Madison, Constant, to name a few (Bertsou, 2019; Hardin, 2002, 2006; Lenard, 2008; Suntrup, 2018).

The problem political conspiracy theories pose bears upon many of these concerns. As alternative explanations against established or official narratives, conspiracy theories stand at the crossroads of epistemology, sociology, ethics, and politics. This section aims to explain the aspects of trust and distrust that will sustain the defense of the public trust approach in the concluding section.

I begin with the claim that the question of trust is invariably tied to that of dependence. Acknowledging the centrality of trust is acknowledging the fundamental dependence of human beings. As dependent rational animals, humans are epistemically, socially, and politically dependent on others. Inhabiting a shared world implies participating in a series of practices and institutions marked by codependence and intersubjectivity. To pursue their ends, individuals must partake in these practices and rely on others’ behavior and knowledge. Trust is an essential feature of all these relationships. In that sense, rational choice or “encapsulated interest” accounts of trust are deficient because they begin with isolated individuals who decide to engage and build trust relationships, overlooking the fact that individuals are only individuals by their participation in a series of shared practices in which trust plays a fundamental role.

Secondly, any reflection on trust must come to terms with the difference between trust and mere reliance. Baier famously argues that trust is unable to be reduced to the mere reliance on another person’s regular behavior. Rather, it also involves the dependence on the goodwill of others. Unlike mere reliance, Baier claims, “trust can be betrayed” (Baier, 1986, p. 235). This conception is important because it underscores that trust involves vulnerability and requires acknowledging the dignity of the one who trusts. For example, I feel safe in walking down the street not because I rely on the regular fact that others will refrain from assaulting me but because I trust that they have good intentions toward me, recognize my worth, and, therefore, would never violate me.

However, the distinction between trust and reliance brings to the fore two further complications. On the one hand, trust (or distrust) is an assurance (or lack thereof) based on habituation and the accumulated experience of repetitive instances of interactions, e.g., a woman may feel unsafe to walk on the streets of New York because she is often harassed. On the other hand, trust appears as an ethical ideal or as a normative claim: I should be able to trust you not to harass me or, as Hardin insists, you should be trustworthy toward me. This ambivalence of trust becomes even more evident when one compares sociological and moral accounts of trust. Sociologists tend to treat trust as a way of dealing with uncertainty and risk in contexts of impersonal institutions, whereas moral philosophers insist that given our fundamental vulnerability and dependence, trustworthiness is a moral value. In that connection, I contend that trust is an immanently normative notion. To claim that trust is normative is not to claim that it is a moral imperative and individuals ought to trust. The point is that trust comes into view only when relations of trust have been broken, and the break of trust (by letdown, deception, or harassment) is a moral injury that demands redress.

The second complication of the distinction between trust and reliance concerns the dissimilarity of the meaning of trust in person-to-person or person-to-firm and person-to-abstract institution relationships. Alternatively, trust can be conceived as an “existential” state of affairs, as an almost phenomenological trust in the world. This most basal and elementary dimension of trust is undoubtedly cardinal to the philosophy of trust (Bernstein, 2011; Giddens, 1991, p. 92; Govier, 1997, p. 121). Nonetheless, I will leave them aside to focus on the political dimension of trust.

Hardin claims that trust relations only emerge in reciprocal dealings in which both parties want to preserve that relationship and, for that purpose, consider or encapsulate the interests of the partner (Hardin, 2006, p. 8). Consequently, trust relationships only emerge when one can clearly devise both parties’ motivation structures. From that point of view, the relationship between individuals and abstract institutions such as money or government is unable to be a relation of trust. Instead, individuals may confide in such institutions (Hardin, 2006, p. 68). In contrast, sociologists, economists, and political scientists often talk about trust in governments and money.

I concede to Hardin that trust among parties and trust in institutions have different logics. It is impossible to devise a motivational structure or a “good will” in governments, science, or money. In fact, it is almost impossible to single out what is being trusted when individuals, for example, go to a pharmacy and buy medication with the expectation of alleviating a disease: do they trust the seller? The quality standards of the drugstore? The technical capacity or goodwill of the scientists that developed the medication? The workers in the pharmaceutical factory? Or do they trust the national health agency and its guidelines? Or even medicine and science as such? Do they have rational grounds to justify their trust? I will refrain from attempting to solve these questions and flesh out the logic of system trust. Yet, it is important to highlight that trust in institutions is based on subjects’ series of practical and cognitive experiences within interpersonal and social institutions. Participation in these institutions involves the realization of an infinite number of scattered assessments and judgments built into an experience of the social world. Let us see below how this happens.

Trust can be conceived in various ways: as an affective attitude (Jones, 1996), as practical habituation (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 34), as a gamble or risk investment (Luhmann, 2018, p. 24), as a deliberate choice, or as a non-deliberative cognitive act (Hardin, 2006, p. 17). The difficulty in firmly establishing the nature of trust is that it is, as Simmel correctly puts it, a middle position of knowledge and ignorance (Simmel, 2009, p. 315). Trust is fundamentally cognitive insofar as it depends on “assessments of the trustworthiness of the potentially trusted person” (Hardin, 2006, p. 17). That is, we are unable to choose to trust someone that has gravely broken our trust. Trusting, in that case, could at best be a performative act motivated by love or by the hope of arousing trustworthiness in the (dis)trusted (McGeer; Pettit, 2017). Trust implies a double ignorance: as an expectation about another person’s future action, it is temporally uncertain because the future is unknown and it involves the incalculable and uncontrollable free will of another person. In a sense, trust is always non-cognitive insofar as it encompasses a certain lack of information. When an outcome can be exactly calculated, trust becomes useless. Moreover, in our practical dealings in the world, refining evaluations happen over a layer of groundless and non-evaluated bonds of trust. Trust is most effective when it works as the tacit and invisible cement of shared life. In that sense, Fukuyama’s practical habituation concept of trust best grasps the nature of trust as long as we understand that this habituation involves, on the one hand, risks and vulnerability and, on the other, a practical rationality.

The cognitive dimension of trust enables the leap from personal trust to trust in impersonal or abstract institutions such as government, science, and money. The encapsulated interest account of trust falls short of institutional or political trust because abstract institutions have no motivational structure or discernible interests. Nonetheless, these institutions and practices have rationality, and trust in them is based on how intelligible, fair, and meaningful they appear to the subjects that partake in them. Hence, trust in institutions depends on how these are perceived. The perception of untrustworthiness that grounds trust or distrust is unstable. Instead, it changes according to various social, political, economic, affective, psychological, and individual factors, such as income, gender, race, political changes, war, economic, or sanitary crises (Newton; Stolle; Zmerli, 2018). As long as trust is conceived as practical habituation, conditions of social and political trust are fundamentally determined by the nature of the social and political practices themselves. As a result, the perception of trustworthiness is, rather than a mere arbitrary, subjective representation, conditioned by the nature of social practices and institutions.

In sum, I conceive trust as a fundamental mode of recognition that underlies any possible meaningful relationship, including any form of social contract (Bernstein, 2015, p. 225). Ideally, trust encompasses the recognition of the dignity and worth of other human beings. Regarding this, trust is always normative, and interest structures are unable to exhaust relations of trust. In complex societies, in which we constantly interact with strangers, the sense of recognition manifests itself in a diffuse and diluted manner, namely as the belief that wrongs against me will be accounted for and set right or as the confidence that I matter. A basic sense of equality between individuals fosters an environment of trust and considerable material inequalities cause a perception of worthlessness.

Moreover, trust is unable to be reduced to singular acts of choice. Rather, it is actualized in social practices. In that sense, it is cognitive because social practices and institutions have rationality (which can be intelligible or not) and because practices imply judgments and assessments of trustworthiness. I can trust abstract institutions to the extent that I experience that my dignity matters in these shared practices or, at least, that I am not insignificant. In brief, I contend that trust is the underlying condition for the possibility of an intelligible life in a shared world. By trusting political institutions and authorities, individuals can conceive of their citizen life as meaningful. By trusting epistemic authorities, individuals can pursue their purposes and manipulate the shared knowledge and the technical means necessary to carry out these purposes. When relations of trust are broken, individuals face immense practical problems, so does society (Govier, 1992).

Let me turn now to what it means for a breach of trust to exist. It has been often argued that distrust is neither a synonym for nor symmetrical to the lack of trust - and this is important for understanding conspiracy theories (Bertsou, 2019, p. 224; Luhmann, 2018, p. 71). As argued above, trust means that I, as a dependent and vulnerable being, believe that my dignity and moral worth matter to you and the practices and institutions in which I partake. Conversely, distrust means that my dignity is irrelevant and that I find myself, as a vulnerable and dependent being, in a precarious and hazardous condition. As Lenard rightly suggests, distrust “reflects suspicion or cynicism about the actions of others” (Lenard, 2008, p. 316). In that connection, Giddens argues that the opposite of trust should not be “distrust” but rather “existential angst or dread” (Giddens, 1991, p. 100). Though lacking nuance, Giddens has understood something about the deep structure of distrust. Distrust establishes a state of fear and insecurity; it fosters a reactive attitude and requires protective measures. Individuals who perceive public institutions as untrustworthy experience a deep feeling of uncertainty either because they are unaware of these institutions’ purposes and ends or because they perceive them as harmful. Thus, distrust comprises a continuum spanning from uncertainty, unawareness, up to suspicion, the expectation of harm, and even dread. The degree in that continuum corresponds to the institutions at stake and the degree of vulnerability.

Hence the fundamental asymmetry between trust and distrust. For example, I may not trust my brother to take care of my car but I by no means distrust him. Hence, distrust is unable to be thought of merely in terms of technical incompetence or incompatibility of interests, as suggested by Bertsou (2019, p. 220). Hardin (2006, p. 172) reduces the problem of political trust to that of technical incompetence and completely misses the point of political distrust. Technical incompetence and incompatibility of interests may play an important role in particular contexts, but it is insufficient to understand the specific logic of distrust. The perception of untrustworthiness is also tied to the fact that institutions often appear so opaque and inaccessible to individuals that they feel disenfranchised and are unable to make sense of their participation in these practices.

Furthermore, distrust has an essentially diffuse character. The perception of untrustworthiness can be directed to specific institutions, incumbents, or processes, but they can also evolve into a more general distrust of the political system as a whole. As Berstou (2019, p. 223) interestingly points out, the object of distrust is particularly unfixed and variable. The perception of distrust can slide, for instance, from an incumbent to a process, to an institution, or even to the whole political system. As indicated above, Coady objected to Keeley that the distrust in one incumbent or institution does not necessarily result in increasing distrust in institutions in general (Coady, 2003, p. 203). He further claimed that conspiracy theorizing could even increase trust in institutions. By arguing so, Coady overlooks this crucial characteristic of distrust. Distrust in an attitude that can hardly foster trust elsewhere. On the contrary, distrust is usually associated with a vicious cycle of self-reinforcement that tends to increase and become more encompassing. The perception of untrustworthiness can evolve into a diffuse state of distrust. Hence, the serious issue with distrust is that distrust in one particular incumbent or institution entails the potential distrust in all institutions and processes. Where practices and institutions appear as irrational and potentially harmful, political life becomes meaningless. Political distrust can lead to a total disidentification of the subject with the political system.

Although distrust has a diffusive character and can slide between different objects, it operates differently according to different kinds of objects, i.e., different types of institutions and processes. In that connection, Rothstein and Stolle proposed an analytic distinction between trust in “impartial” or “neutral” and trust in politically biased institutions (Rothstein, Stolle, 2008). Some institutions are expected to hold a neutral or impartial character, e.g., legal, scientific, sanitary institutions, or the police. Others are expected to be politically biased, such as the parliament, presidency, parties, etc. That difference is due to distinct sources of authority and legitimation: on the one hand, the legal or technical-scientific rationality, whereas, on the other, the source is political sovereignty. In that sense, distrust in different types of institutions is associated with undermining different kinds of authority.

Moreover, every crisis - be it political, legal, environmental, sanitary, or economic - involves a political and social trust crisis (Ellinas; Lamprianou, 2014). Moments of distress increase the sense of vulnerability and foster fear, insecurity, and anxiety, affections that can lead to an increasing perception of the untrustworthiness of authorities. Furthermore, in periods of crisis, distrust in authorities impacts not only political but also institutions that are otherwise perceived as neutral. In such contexts, individuals become aware that seemingly neutral and impartial institutions are also filled with normative, ethical, and political content. Crises commonly challenge the neutrality of legal and technical institutions. Consequently, crises can amplify and exacerbate processes of political disidentification. The degree and effects of such crises depend on the context.

Distrust is always relational, and the sense of trust or distrust is always based on “accumulated experience” (Newton; Stolle; Zmerli, 2018, p. 40). When citizens have experienced numerous conspiracies, lies, and deception from public authorities, is it legitimate or even rational to distrust such authorities? So far, I have depicted distrust as a practical problem, an impediment to cooperation, and a threat to democracy, but to a significant liberal tradition, political distrust may not be a sign of ethical or political failure but critical citizenry. Further, political distrust is necessary to the well-functioning of democracies (Hardin, 2002, 2006, p. 167; Pettit, 1997; Suntrup, 2018). As we will see below, the answer to this question is crucial for evaluating the meaning of conspiracy theories.

A defense of the public trust approach

Although disagreeing about the epistemic character and legitimacy of conspiracy theories, both Keeley and Levy and their critics, such as Basham, Pigden, and Dentith, share the underlying assumption - even if implicitly - that trust is the core issue of conspiracy theorizing. On the one hand, Keeley and Levy are concerned with how the spread of conspiracy theories may undermine public trust. In contrast, their critics believe that we often have no reasons to trust authorities, and, in such contexts, conspiracy theorizing becomes a rational practice. They have convincingly shown that conspiracy theories have nothing epistemically flawed qua conspiracy theories (Basham, 2001; Coady, 2003; Dentith, 2016). Consequently, reviewing the public approach to conspiracy theories must, to begin with, set aside the ambition of showing the epistemological flaw of conspiracy theories as an epistemic class (generalism).

Nevertheless, by rejecting the characterization of conspiracy theories as a class of explanations, particularism runs into the problem of flattening out the relevance of conspiracy theory as a particular social and political phenomenon. Pure particularism entails that the whole talk about conspiracy theories is a plain misunderstanding, for there exists no such a thing as “conspiracy theories,” only theories in general or explanations of social events instead, some of which may involve a conspiracy as a relevant cause. That may be true from a narrow epistemological point of view. Nonetheless, the fact that there is nothing epistemically false about them says very little about the meaning and significance of disseminating conspiracy theories in contemporary societies. In that direction, Stokes’ attempt to shift the concern with conspiracy theories from epistemology to practical philosophy is commendable (Stokes, 2018, p. 28).

The central assumption of this study is that conspiracy theorizing only surfaces as a relevant political phenomenon when trust bonds have already been damaged (Runciman, 2018). Thus, the rise of conspiracy theorizing in modern societies is fundamentally a symptom of broken relations of trust and sedimented political distrust. By assuming this fact, I also acknowledge that there is some rationality in political distrust. Yet, I further contend that the sedimentation of political distrust is a sign of the political failure of modern democracies. Nonetheless, the idea that endemic political distrust is a political problem is far from undisputed. In response to an increasing complaint about the rise of political distrust, several studies have recently attempted to recover the indispensable role of distrust in well-functioning democracies (Hardin, 2002, 2006; Rosanvallon, 2006; Suntrup, 2018). To conclude this defense of the public trust approach to conspiracy theories, I address the debate around political distrust to substantiate the normative account of trust underlying that approach.

We do live in an “age of distrust” (Rosanvallon, 2006). Hardin’s attempt to claim otherwise is unconvincing. In these times, the nostalgic idealization of a past society grounded on trust is useless; exhortations to blind trust are dishonest. The fact that individuals came to be suspicious regarding institutions bears a significant degree of rationality. Hence, liberal distrust holds something true. However, this recognition should avoid losing sight of the moral rationality of trust and blinding us to the perils of pervasive distrust. Exhortations to stubborn distrust are pernicious.

The intense degree of distrust is an index of individuals’ severe disidentification with the existing political systems. Distrust has a self-reinforcing logic: once it kicks in, it is difficult to break its self-feeding mechanism. Furthermore, a profound frustration with the promises of liberal democracy marks the contemporary political distrust. Runciman (2018, p. 61) justifiably suggested that the notion of conspiracy theory only becomes significant in formally democratic societies: in openly tyrannical societies, reality is immediately oppressive and rigged, dispensing with any idea of a true reality lurking behind visible reality. In other words, the underlying assumption of conspiracy theories is that individuals should know and determine the powers that govern their lives, and representatives should always properly inform citizens. Liberal democracies are oriented toward the normative ideals of justice, fairness, transparency, popular sovereignty, and the rule of law. Political distrust outbreaks when these norms are frustrated. In that sense, conspiracy theories constitute a byproduct and a protest against modern democracies.

Distrust offers a general framework that can map explanations to conspiracy theories. For instance, Guilhot and Moyn (2020) have recently argued that conspiracy theory configures an outcome of inequality. Their intuition is right but it should be added that inequality produces a conspirational mentality as long as it undermines conditions of trust. For instance, endemic inequality can foster the perception that individuals are worthless, that institutions are working improperly, that governments are technically incompetent to address inequality, that institutions violate the ethical principle of equality, or even that authorities use public institutions to pursue private gains at the expense of the poorer classes; in other words, that the wellbeing and dignity of a class of human beings have no value in that political context (Uslaner, 2008).

Critics of the public trust approach would probably agree with that thesis and retort that conspiracy theorizing is now legitimate precisely because trust bonds have been dissolved. This strain of criticism is based on the liberal vindication of political distrust. They could further argue that, precisely because representative democracies are unable to a priori avoid the problem of corruption by representatives, citizen’s distrust is essential to its functioning. This is precisely Hume’s view. To Hume, governments should be designed in such a way as to expect a representative to be “a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest” (Hume, 2008, p. 24). Liberal political thought begins by strictly separating individuals and government. Self-sufficient and independent individuals must always guard themselves against the tyrannical tendencies of governments. Moreover, individuals are essentially moved by private interests, and, consequently, incumbents must be permanently surveilled and inhibited to pursue their private interests while occupying public posts. Rather than trusting officeholders, distrust constitutes the “guardian of democracy” (Bertsou, 2019, p. 216). Thus, distrust is warranted, whereas naïve trust becomes complicity, a dangerous form of faith (Baier, 1986, p. 242).

According to this political conception, an ideal society would be structured as an epistemic community populated by “citizen researchers,” self-sufficient and independent individuals who are neither allowed nor requested to trust authorities and who are ultimately their own authorities (Basham, 2018b, p. 54). The demand for thinking for oneself is undoubtedly unnegotiable. Defending the importance of trust in society must avoid entailing the claim that we should blindly defer to any established authority. Nonetheless, as Runciman cleverly stated, QAnon followers also believe that they are investigating and thinking for themselves. They are “non-conformists” (Runciman, 2018, p. 98). Basham would undoubtedly object that it is irrelevant what they take themselves to be if they are unable to provide scientific support to their claims. According to his view, in a society of “citizen researchers,” scientific procedures could disarm the irrational excesses of conspiracy theories. At this point, the “liberal-scientific” defense of conspiracy theories fails to understand the political logic of distrust and the use of populism of conspiracy theories: scientific rationality alone neither does nor can remedy the political effects of distrust. By way of conclusion, I will address two fundamental problems of that view.

The fundamental question for advocates of political distrust is to precisely determine when warranted distrust turns into a destructive force of politics. Some authors have attempted to establish conceptual differences between these two moments (Lenard, 2008; Suntrup, 2018). These attempts have failed because scholar distinctions are unable to settle this dynamic immanent to distrust. As a solution, liberal political theorists suggested that the government should internalize mechanisms and instruments of distrust. The division of power, systems of check and balances, and transparency mechanisms all constitute instruments by which “distrust” is incorporated into governments. Along these lines, Benjamin Constant even claimed that the constitution itself configures an “act of distrust.” (Constant, 1800) The institutionalization of government surveillance mechanisms and transparency is certainly necessary and unavoidable but these are better understood as conditions of trust rather than mechanisms of distrust (O’Neill, 2002, p. 63). It is important to bear in mind the asymmetry between trust and distrust. In principle, these instruments should enable citizens to have confidence in government not because they trust the representatives but because they are assured that the internal mechanisms of checks and balances and oversight can amend dishonest behavior.

In contrast to classical liberalism, neoliberal doctrines have worked less to conceive new instruments for government transparency and oversight than to demonize governments as such. Neoliberal rhetoric casts the state as inefficient and essentially corrupt, reinforcing conditions of distrust (Hayek, 2013, p. 10). Further, neoliberal policies tended to undermine functions of the state toward the commonwealth and hypertrophy institutions of repression and surveillance (Gilmore, 2007, p. 87). Consequently, the political authorities increasingly become perceived as coercive forces rather than representatives of the public good. Moreover, as individuals increasingly take themselves and are taken to be “human capitals,” fellow human beings seem more and more as competitors. Competition trumps solidarity, and trust is reduced to the congruency of (commercial) interests, as theorized by game theories and rational choice models. Lastly, corporative and economic interests increasingly determine public affairs such as elections, education, and public health policies, arousing the justified perception of hidden interests behind political decisions (Brown, 2015, p. 154). Ironically, the victory of the neoliberal model and the consolidation of the human capital Fukuyama celebrated in The End of History is paid with the decrease in social capital that he attempts to salvage in his following work, Trust (Fukuyama, 1995, 2006; Putnam, 2001).

Finally, in a state of disseminated distrust, populism tends to become the dominant mode of politics. In that connection, Runciman correctly argues, “conspiracy theory is the logic of populism” (Runciman, 2018, p. 65). Conspiracy theories are neither an invention of populism nor inevitably serve populist purposes. Nevertheless, populism requires mobilizing a conspirational logic to function. Populist rhetoric is conspirational because it feeds upon the disidentification of individuals with the political order. It requires the representation of “corrupted elites” and “deep state.” In that sense, populism instrumentalizes distrust for political purposes. Here, conspiracy theories become a fundamental tool to arouse and intensify distrust: a device that is mobilized and cast against specific targets. The “scientific” dimension of conspiracy theorizing completely disappears when it becomes an instrument of populist politics. It no longer aims at gaining insight into reality, seeking to steer hostile affections against given targets.

The second problem of the liberal scientific solution is that it equates political distrust with the skepticism of scientific rationality. Distrust is no loyal ally of science. Instead, the fury of distrust also devours science. The premise to understand conspiracy theories attack on science is that science also frustrated its normative ideals and promises. To that effect, I will briefly mention two aspects. First, science and technology are no longer seen as absolute goods. Human beings are increasingly aware of the negative side effects of science and technology, e.g., pollution, technological disasters, unhealthy effects of technological overdoses, etc. The idea that science and technology alone would emancipate humanity is now contested. Second, the axiological neutrality of science is no longer uncontested. On the one hand, people are increasingly aware of the effects of technology on their lives - the personal and social implications of technologies. On the other hand, science and technological development are perceived as permeated and influenced by social interests (corporate and particular interests). Science is more than ever conceived as mediated by ethical and political dimensions in its origins and effects. That aspect becomes most perceptible in moments of crisis, such as a global pandemic. In these periods, the political significance of scientifically grounded guidelines and instructions is immediately manifest. Additionally, controversies and disagreements within science attract the attention of public opinion. In sum, the axiological neutrality of science is no longer undisputed. This, rather than meaning that science has completely lost its authority, suggests that other criteria and principles are called upon to judge and evaluate its projects, scope, and limits. Science is no longer the absolute standpoint to arbitrate conflicting interests and ideas. This thesis lies at the core of Beck’s notion of “reflexive modernity.” Modernity becomes reflexive when it begins to take its own practices and products as problematic, i.e., as objects of critical evaluation. (Beck, 1992). Recently, such reflexivity in the face of science has evolved into a radical distrust in science and scientific rationality.

Moreover, science itself requires trust. As Levy (2007) insists, scientific practice is impossible without an environment of trust. Scientists quintessentially rely on the testimony of others (Coady, 1992). Accordingly, a community of “citizen researchers” could only exist if mechanisms of trust production were in place. Scientific practice is impossible without institutions and mechanisms for the production of trustworthy knowledge. Transposing the model of science into society to justify distrust in established authorities by no means does away with the problem of trust. Trust is cast out through the front door and comes back through the back door. Symmetrically, conspiracy theorizing is also based on trust. Believers of conspiracy theories reject the authority of established officials but elect substitute authorities. Indeed, an interesting feature of conspiracy theories is the interplay between radical skepticism and radical dogmatism, between overthrowing authorities across the board and electing new dogmas.

I hope to have shown that the liberal advocacy of distrust and conspiracy theorizing grounded on scientific rationality is unattainable. Considering these two fundamental problems, I contend that generalized political distrust must be deemed a practical problem; it signals an actual dysfunction in the political system. As Lenard puts it, “when generalized distrust characterizes a community, democracy is at risk” (Lenard, 2008, p. 316). Therefore, the question should not be - unlike what Basham (2001) suggests - how to live with conspiracy, but how to restore social and political trust. Hence, establishing conditions of political and epistemic trust is the only way to address the contemporary spread of conspiracy theories. This is no naïve endorsement to the idea that trust offers a panacea to all possible social problems, a position cleverly criticized by Suntrup (2018). As expressions of distrust, conspiracy theories contain a germ of criticism that is essential to political progress. The enlightened kern of conspiracy theories should be preserved and rechanneled.

Nonetheless, there remains something about the deep structure of a democratic and ethical life that a thick nexus of trust alone can materialize. Keeley and Levy correctly point out that human beings, as epistemic beings, fundamentally depend on others and should necessarily construe epistemic authorities to organize social and political life. Nevertheless, the relationship between individuals and authorities includes more than sheer deference. Individuals should, rather than merely relying on or deferring to experts; have reasons to trust them (Govier, 1992, p. 53). Moral imperatives are unable to impose reasons for trust. They must instead stem from an accumulated experience of trustworthy practices and institutions. For that purpose, political systems should improve their system of checks and balances and instruments of public vigilance, increase citizen participation in political processes, and fight social, economic, and racial inequality. That course of reflection constitutes the real contribution of the public approach to conspiracy theories.

Conclusion

I have argued that conspiracy theorizing is fundamentally a question of trust and authority. More precisely, political conspiracy theories presuppose a condition of generalized distrust. Political distrust has multiple causes and tends to evolve into a diffuse perception of generalized untrustworthiness. I have shown that both Keeley and Levy offer essential insights into the relationship between conspiracy theorizing and public trust. Their contribution is precisely to make explicit this connection. Critics of the public trust approach correctly point out that conspiracy theories have no epistemic flaws as such, rendering invalid a priori explanation suggesting that public theories can use conspiracy theories as stratagems to undermine valid criticisms. Further, critics of the public trust approach rightly point out that conspiracy theories fail to undermine public trust as they instead respond to disseminated and warranted distrust in public authorities. I have also conceded that conspiracy theories configure critical enterprises by questioning call governments and public authorities. Finally, I have argued that acknowledging it fails to obfuscate the fact that distrust constitutes a major political problem. Following Govier, I have argued that distrust configures a practical problem. Thus, the spread of conspiracy theories must be regarded as a symptom of a deep-rooted political problem. The only response to conspiracy theorizing refers to re-establishing the bonds of political trust. By arguing so, I neither accept the naïve idea that trust is invariably good nor aim to build the panacea to all contemporary problems. However, I maintain that an ethical and democratic political life requires a deep sense of trust.

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Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  03 Mar 2025
• Date of issue
  2024

History

• Received
  18 Oct 2023
• Accepted
  29 Oct 2024