Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In the literature, Weak Kleene logics are usually taken as three-valued logics. However, Suszko has challenged the main idea of many-valued logic claiming that every logic can be presented in a two-valued fashion. In this paper, we provide two-valued semantics for the Weak Kleene logics and for a number of four-valued subsystems of them. We do the same for the so-called Logics of Nonsense, which are extensions of the Weak Kleene logics with unary operators that allow looking at them as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and Logics of Formal Underterminedness (LFUs). Our aim with this work, rather than arguing for Suszko’s thesis, is to show that two-valued presentations of these peculiar logics enlighten the non-standard behavior of their logical connectives. More specifically, the two-valued presentations of paraconsistent logics illustrate and clarify the disjunctive flavor of the conjunction, and dually, the two-valued presentations of paracomplete subsystems of Weak Kleene logics reveal the conjunctive flavor of the disjunction.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In this article I offer an explicating interpretation of the procedure of content recarving as described by Frege in §64 of the Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that the procedure of content recarving may be interpreted as an operation that while restricting the subject matter of a sentence, performs a generalization on what the sentence says about its subject matter. The characterization of the recarving operation is given in the setting of Yablo’s theory of subject matter and it is based on the relation of determination between properties. The main advantage of the proposal is its generality, for it is applicable not just to the case of abstraction principles

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Causal approaches to explanation often assume that a model explains by describing features that make a difference regarding the phenomenon. Chirimuuta claims that this idea can be also used to understand non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. She argues that mathematical principles that figure in efficient coding explanations are non-causal difference-makers. Although these principles cannot be causally altered, efficient coding models can be used to show how would the phenomenon change if the principles were modified in counterpossible situations. The problem is that efficient coding models also involve difference-makers that, prima facie, cannot be characterized as non-causal in this sense. Mathematical principles always involve variables which have counterfactual (instead of counterpossible) relations between them. However, we cannot simply assume that these difference-makers are causal. They can also be found in paradigmatic non-causal explanations and therefore they must be characterized as non-causal in some sense. I argue that, despite appearances, Chirimuuta's view can be applied to these cases. The mentioned counterfactual relations presuppose the counterpossible conditionals that describe the modification of a relevant mathematical principle. If these conditionals are the hallmark of non-causal relations, then Chirimuuta’s criterion has the desired implication that variables in mathematical principles are non-causal difference-makers.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen Varios problemas en la filosofía de la física han llevado al ‘realismo estructural óntico’, esto es, la suposición de que en el nivel físico fundamental no hay ‘objetos’, sino ‘estructuras’. Hay varios requerimientos que una ‘estructura’ debe satisfacer para el ‘realismo estructural óntico’. Las estructuras deben ser entidades concretas, debe haber algo que cumpla las funciones de ‘nodo’, y las relaciones no deben depender de los objetos que están siendo relacionados. La mayoría de las ontologías tradicionales, tanto de sustratos y propiedades, como de cúmulos de propiedades, parecen ser inadecuadas para satisfacer tales requerimientos. Se argumenta aquí que hay varias formas en que tales requerimientos podrían ser solventados: por relaciones nodales, por ‘hechos nodales’ primitivos y por dependencias simétricas entre objetos y relaciones.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Several problems in philosophy of physics have led to ‘ontic structural realism’, i. e., the supposition that, at the fundamental physical level, there are no ‘objects’, but ‘structures’. There are various requirements that a ‘structure’ should satisfy for ‘ontic structural realism’. Structures must be concrete entities, there must be something that fulfills the role of ‘node’, and the relations of the structure must not be dependent on the objects that are being related. Most of the traditional ontologies, both of substrata and properties, and of bundles of properties, seem to be inadequate to satisfy those requirements. It is argued here that there are several ways in which those requirements can be met: by nodal relations, by primitive ‘nodal facts’, and by symmetric dependencies between objects and relations.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen La literatura filosófica ha ofrecido una serie de argumentos que buscan mostrar la inadecuación conceptual de la teoría de la información para capturar el modo como el concepto se usa en biología molecular. A partir de éstos, se llegó a cierto consenso de que si acaso hay alguna forma de explicar y defender el concepto de información en biología molecular, la estrategia debe ser otra, y el debate continuó principalmente persiguiendo alternativas. Sin embargo, algunos aportes recientes parecen desafiar el consenso y revigorar la discusión en torno a la relevancia de la teoría de la información en este contexto. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los argumentos que condujeron a dicho consenso y examinar en qué medida estas propuestas logran vindicar la apelación a la teoría de la información. Argumentaré que incluso la propuesta más refinada en esta línea falla en vindicar la estrategia teórico-informacional y que, como consecuencia, el consenso todavía puede ser defendido.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract The philosophy of biology literature offers several arguments aimed at showing that information theory is conceptually unsuited to capture the informational talk in molecular biology. Such arguments led to the consensus that, if the informational talk in biology can be defended and explained at all, we need a different strategy. The debate, in fact, developed mostly along this line. However, recent contributions seem to (and even claim to) challenge the consensus and thus to vindicate the role and relevance of information theory to this particular debate. In this paper, I examine the main arguments leading to such a consensus and I analyze the extent to which those recent accounts actually succeed in vindicating the invocation of information theory. I argue that these attempts fail to vindicate the information-theoretic strategy and, therefore, the consensus remains unaffected by them.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In this review, I discuss some aspects of van Inwagen’s insights with respect to the notions of free will and determinism. My main focus is on the author’s formulation of the free will problem.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In this review I briefly analyse the main elements of each chapter of the book centred in the general areas of logic, epistemology, philosophy and history of science. Most of them are developed around a fine-grained investigation on the principle of non-contradiction and the concept of consistency, inquired mainly into the broad area of paraconsistent logics. The book itself is the result of a work that was initiated on the Studia Logica conference "Trends in Logic XVI: Consistency, Contradiction, Paraconsistency and Reasoning - 40 years of CLE", held at the State University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil, between September 12-15, 2016.