Abstract in English:

Abstract When one speaks duplicitously one performs a (risky) speech act and at the same time intends that one have deniability regarding that speech act. What is it for a speaker who performs an illocutionary act to have deniability regarding that act? I first review an answer to this question proposed by Alexander Dinges and Julia Zakkou. According to them, deniability is “an epistemic notion. A speaker has deniability if she can make it epistemically irrational for her audience to reason in certain ways” (2023, p. 373). I argue, however, that the epistemic account is refuted by a counterexample, and informed by the counterexample, I propose an alternative. According to my alternative account, deniability concerns illocutionary norms: a speaker has deniability regarding an illocutionary action iff (i) she is permitted to deny having performed the action, and (ii) if she denies having performed the action, she thereby avoids being responsible for it. I conclude by considering the implications of illocutionary norms account of deniability for the vexed issue of the determinants of illocutionary force; I argue that the illocutionary norms account of deniability provides evidence in support of McDonald’s (2021) “collaboration” view.