Public attorney: does functional independence prevent institutional policy?

Marianna Sampaio About the author

Abstract

This article analyzes the General Action Plan (PGA) of the Public Attorney of the State of São Paulo (MP), an instrument that sets the priority annual performance targets for prosecutors, to examine: (i) the relationship between institutional policy and functional independence; (ii) the prosecutors view of the role of the MP and the implication of this for the judicialization of politics. It is a multiple case study with a qualitative methodology. The goals of the PGAs were classified and quantified. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with members of the MP. It is demonstrated that the PGA is conceived as an instrument to try to influence the executive branch's agenda and that the efficient establishment of an institutional policy: (i) depends on the interpretation of the concept of functional independence; (ii) could aggravate the judicialization framework of politics.

Public Attorney; functional independence; institutional policy; judicialization of politics

Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública da Universidade Estadual de Campinas Cidade Universitária 'Zeferino Vaz", CESOP, Rua Cora Coralina, 100. Prédio dos Centros e Núcleos (IFCH-Unicamp), CEP: 13083-896 Campinas - São Paulo - Brasil, Tel.: (55 19) 3521-7093 - Campinas - SP - Brazil
E-mail: rop@unicamp.br